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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the New Zealand health sector reforms from 1983 to 1997 
and examines whether the reform process has been consistent with the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi. It evaluates the impact of the reforms on Maori from 
that perspective. 
The study introduces the health sector reforms generally and then their specific 
effects on Maori. It draws on two research exercises undertaken by the author, 
being research for the Wai 692 Napier Hospital and Health Services claim to the 
Waitangi Tribunal and on improving Maori Health outcomes for the National 
Health Committee. The methodologies used are those from the discipline of 
history. 
The study outlines the argument for Crown responsibilities under the Treaty and 
draws out the distinctions between Article 2 and Article 3 of the Treaty. It 
provides a historical background to the place of the Treaty in the health sector, 
and forms the basis for a Treaty based analysis of the health reforms and their 
impact. 
The New Zealand health sector has undergone massive government initiated 
structural change throughout the period under study. During this time the neo-
liberal reforms have had a key role in reshaping health service structures. The 
process of change, the international influences on the changes, and the resulting 
entities are described. An example from Tainui Iwi of the effect of structural 
health reform illustrates the changes in Maori health service provision by Maori. 
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Since 1983 successive governments have produced copious Maori health policy. 
The key policy documents, and their recommendations, are identified, as is the 
degree to which they were implemented. The cyclical nature of such policy 
making suggests that it is not always followed by policy implementation. While 
Maori are identified as a health gain priority, the evidence reviewed shows that 
the responsibility to implement and monitor the policy is diffuse and ineffective. 
The Wai 692 claim provides a detailed look at the impact of the 1990s health 
reform for Maori. The claim was precipitated by the threatened closure of Napier 
Hospital, but was broadened to include a wide-ranging look at the impact of 
health reform on Maori. As a case study it provides a specific example of one 
I wi' s experience of the reality of policy implementation at that time versus policy 
making. 
Crown evaluation of the effectiveness of its own policies, and the extent to which 
its own agencies breach those policies is explored. The lack of control and 
accountability measures, plus the inability of the Crown to monitor (let alone 
sanction) success or failure, is highlighted. A contrast is drawn between the health 
and local government sectors, using the operation of the Resource Management 
Act (1991 ). 
The latest health sector reforms consequent on the 1999 Labour/ Alliance coalition 
government are briefly considered, together with an overview of the Crown's 
effectiveness in delivering improved Maori health outcomes. The study suggests 
Page ii 
that the use of the Treaty as a cornerstone for Maori health policy formation and 
delivery may lead to more effective engagement between the Crown and Maori in 
addressing Maori health issues. The study concludes by asking the question, has 
the health sector reform process of the 1980s and 1990s itself been a Treaty 
breach? 
A brief postscript considers the further reform of the health sector beyond the 
period of study. 
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CHAPTER 1 • INTRODUCTION 
Mr Powell. Now, could I ask you to go through paragraph 4 of your 
evidence. And you note the primary objective, in the green and white 
paper (the 1991 health reform designl), the primary objective of this 
reform process must be to secure for every one access to an acceptable 
level of health care. I'm just - that's not really a new objective for the 
health services, was it? 
Mr Clarke. No, indeed. Words similar have been stated in 1948, 1956 
and 1973. 
Mr Powell. So, the primary objectives of the reforms were actually no 
different than anything that's gone on before? 
Mr Clarke. The primary objectives of any health system are to provide 
access to services that are safe, that are affordable, and are appropriate to 
the needs of individuals, within an acknowledged fixed budget. 
In that sense, no, the objectives are no different in 1999 than they were in 
the early 70s. However, the pressures in terms of technology, in terms of 
the advancement of information, have perhaps, if anything, reinforced the 
importance of those objectives (Clarke, 1999, pl 9) 
Chris Clarke, Team Leader, Targeted Assistance Group, Crown Company 
Monitoring and Advisory Unit (CCMAU, a unit of Treasury) in reply to 
cross-examination by Grant Powell, counsel for the claimants, Wai 692, 
the Napier Hospital Services Claim (the first health claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal.) 
Health Reform 
While the New Zealand health sector reforms of the 1990s were presented as 
being unique, new, and innovative, health care reform has never been out of 
fashion. The tension between "out with the old, in with the new," and "there is 
nothing new under the sun" has been almost axiomatic in these health reforms 
(Kelsey, 1990, p30). Each reform seems to be sold to the public as a revolutionary 
opportunity to finally remedy the health deficits of the existing structure. 
I Explanatory note. author· s emphasis 
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However, as the above quote shows, in fact, while the structures are new, the 
objectives are much the same as they have always been. 
Health reform in New Zealand has sat in the space between two ways of viewing 
the world. During the l 930's the first Labour government designed and built a 
welfare state based on a model of universal entitlement (Social Security Act, 
1938) (Richards, 1994 ). Throughout the period until the 1984 Labour government, 
the welfare model was the basis of a broad consensus, not only between the two 
governing political parties, but also across society as a whole. Health reform went 
on, but it was basically minor changes to the structures, with little threat to the 
underlying worldview or consensus. 
In 1983 the model started to change, with the introduction of Area Health Board 
legislation, where communities could opt for a wider health focus than the 
traditional hospital-oriented health governance and management structures 
(Beaglehole and Davis, 1992). The election of the 1984 Labour government 
accelerated the change, where the option became mandatory, and the first cracks 
in universality appeared, such as the introduction of user part charges for 
pharmaceuticals. 
The Area Health Board model was still widely accepted however, as it maintained 
most aspects of the social consensus, particularly the substantial part of 
universality. By the late 1980s Area Health Boards had been implemented 
throughout New Zealand, effectively only the second major New Zealand health 
sector reform in over 50 years. With the advent of the 1990 public sector reforms 
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however, the move to a state provided "safety net" of targeted assistance for those 
most in need, a move away from universal entitlement, became very evident in 
most aspects of the welfare state. Health was no exception, and part charges, and 
the rationing of so-called elective health care became a major feature of the health 
reforms of that time. 
The degree and frequency of recent structural change in the New Zealand health 
sector can easily lead to confusion on the part of an observer as to the various 
entities, the roles that they have played, and the chronological period in which 
they have operated. Some degree of orientation to help overcome that confusion 
will be provided in Table 7: Health Entities 1983 -1997 on page 245. 
Health as Society's Identity 
New Zealand has seen itself as an egalitarian society since the l 930's, if not 
before. Health services were a key part of the welfare provisions that grew out of 
the l 930's (Social Security Act 1938) and have thus become integrally bound with 
New Zealand's identity. This view is not a feature of New Zealand in isolation, 
but a common one in many of the western democracies, particularly Scandinavian 
and British Commonwealth countries. As Aneurin Bevan the founder of the 
National Health Service has described it: 
Society becomes more wholesome, more serene and spiritually healthier, 
if it knows that its citizens have at the back of their consciousness the 
knowledge that not only themselves, but all their fellows have access to 
the best health care that society can provide (Hall & Viney, in Bloom, 
2000,p49) 
Health and health services have become one of the key elements in how these 
kinds of societies defines themselves. When a society is going through a radical 
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redefinition of itself, it is not surprising that the health services are reformed to 
match the new identity. 
Like many aspects of New Zealand society, the health system has been involved 
in a "strife of ideologies" (Hall & Viney, in Bloom, 2000, p49). On the one hand, 
a view widely held by most New Zealanders going into the 1990s reforms under 
study, was that health is a social good, a public good. And on the other hand, a 
view of health as a commodity within the market place, a private good to be 
largely provided for at a private cost was emerging. 
New Zealand's present system of providing primary health care in 
particular, but also secondary care, is discriminatory, inconsistent, and 
heavily biased in favour of certain forms of treatment. The people who 
most need care are often those with least access to it. At present the well 
off pay little more for basic medical care than those who can least afford 
it. Because the government subsidises everyone's medical expenses those 
who really cannot afford medical care are not receiving enough help 
(Douglas, 1993, p63) 
The structure of the New Zealand health system from 1938 and its subsequent 
changes have reflected that ideological struggle. The universality of welfare, 
including health provision, established by the Social Security Act 1938 in which 
the State paid for (theoretically) all citizens to have equal access to the health care 
they needed, prevailed until the early 1980s. Since then, this view was increasingly 
replaced by a more market driven philosophy, where it is considered that the 
consumer should pay all or part of the cost of their health care, dependent on their 
ability to pay, rather than their health need. Thus, the state pays should become 
the user pays. 
Page 4 
The health sector has always been a mass of competing purposes and interests. 
Easton writes (1997, p153-155) of the state of the public health sector in 1990 as a 
'battlefield' on which the newly elected National Government launched a reform 
'blitzkrieg'. On the right of the 'battlefield, the New Zealand Medical Association 
and its allies (including the private health insurance and pharmaceutical sectors). 
On the left a mishmash of the public and smaller interest groups such as the 
Intellectually Handicapped Children's Society (IHC). And in the centre the Area 
Health Boards, all with different interests, and different patches to protect 
including tensions between maintaining medical autonomy and income, between 
cost control and prevention/promotion versus treatment, between child health and 
health of the elderly. 
Critics of health reform as a process itself have pointed to its lack of theoretical 
and philosophical underpinnings (Seedhouse 1995). That lack provides an ideal 
battleground for competing interests to play out. When this occurs within the 
context of two distinct ideological stances, the prospects for a rational reform 
process are bleak. 
Health reform turns out either to be reform dominated by the single 
purpose of reducing fiscal cost, or reform inspired only by theories of 
purpose generated by the supposedly ailing system itself (Seedhouse 1995, 
pl 1). 
When health reform has been driven by competition of many interest groups 
within and between those two ideological viewpoints, it is not surprising perhaps, 
that for Maori, who fit neatly within neither ideological framework, health reform 
has not been an unqualified success. Indeed, from the point of some Maori 
commentators, things have seldom been worse. 
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We are living in the only decade of the twentieth century in which the 
health of Maori is, by critical measures, not improving, and indeed is 
likely to be worsening. Premature death is the ultimate cost for being on 
the losing side of social change. The price to Maori of New Zealand 
citizenship has never been higher in more than a hundred years. If Maori 
health status is a proxy measure of good government as guaranteed in 
Article 1 of the Treaty of W aitangi, recent governments and their social 
and economic policies have been found lacking (Reid, 1999, p93 ). 
Research Aims and Questions 
... any consideration of the Treaty of Waitangi, which was rarely 
mentioned in discussion of health issues before 1940. Several speakers at a 
meeting of North Auckland Maori councils held at Kaikohe in 1938 
referred to the fact that the 1900 Maori Councils Act had been 
implemented at the request of Maori to carry out in some measure the 
spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi (Dow, 1999, p 14) 
The Crown may have at times forgotten to mention or discuss the role of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in health. Maori have always held the Treaty as central in their 
endeavours to have the Crown honour its undertakings made to them in 1840. 
Maori health status cannot be considered in isolation from the Treaty. 
I have chosen the period 1983 to 1997 as the period of study for several reasons; it 
marks the time of major social change in New Zealand's recent history, the 
emergence of the "New Right" as a political force and ideology and it provides a 
period in which both left and right wing governments have undertaken major 
structural changes in the health sector. Perhaps most of all, though, it 
encompasses the entire period in which the structural identity of the New Zealand 
health system was transformed, and the previous consensus was replaced by 
health becoming a defining difference in political positions. The Treaty of 
Waitangi has played a shifting role in both the political and health sector 
transformations. 
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The research is underpinned by a number of questions. If health care is a key 
element of how our society sees itself, and health sector processes breach the 
Treaty, what does that say about the delivery of health service in contemporary 
society? Has reform been an inclusive Treaty partnership experience for Maori? 
Can Maori act as full and equal partners within the health sector, as Article 3 of 
the Treaty suggests they should be able to? 
The overall question underpins the research: Is the health reform process of the 
1980s and 1990s in itself a breach of the Treaty of Waitangi obligations the 
Crown has to Maori? 
A Monocultural versus a Pluralist society 
Maori have a unique position in New Zealand, that of tangata whenua, the people 
of the land. The Treaty of Waitangi (Kawharu, 1989) recognises that pre-
eminence of Maori in New Zealand, and by doing so recognises that there are (at 
least) two distinct groups in New Zealand society, tangata whenua, those who 
were here first, and tauiwi, those who came later. 
Much of New Zealand history since the signing of the Treaty in 1840, is about the 
tension between the dominant cultural view, perhaps first expressed by William 
Hobson's statement at the signing that we are one people (Walker, 1990), and that 
of Maori, seeking to exercise their rights under the Treaty. Because of the Treaty, 
Maori view their rights as different to those of other New Zealanders. Thus arises 
the tension with the dominant view. 
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A central postulate investigated in this thesis is that both the conflicting ideologies 
driving health reform over the period of this study have served Maori health status 
poorly. The universal health system, based on the egalitarian society, can be 
described as a one size fits all approach. It has been mono-cultural, and 
advantaged the dominant culture while servicing Maori inadequately. It is further 
postulated in this thesis that this homogenising view has ignored the special needs 
and desires of Maori. 
However, that is not to say that Maori health status could simplistically be raised 
to that of other New Zealanders merely by the Crown giving due emphasis to the 
Treaty of Waitangi in establishing and carrying out health policy. Both the Crown 
and Maori agree on the need to remedy Maori health status. This research seeks to 
investigate the proposition that the Crown's attempts during the period of study to 
remedy Maori health status in a largely unilateral way, rather than using 
frameworks for partnership consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi, have neither 
solved the problem of Maori health status, nor met Maori aspirations in respect of 
participation in health sector decision making. 
The research examines the degree to which Maori health interests have been 
caught between the two most recent competing ideologies, and the impact the 
reform process of the 1980s and 1990s has had on Maori health aspirations and 
status. It investigates how successfully an ideologically driven state health policy, 
irrespective of the basis of the ideology, engaged Maori as partners in the health 
sector, or as determinants of their own health status. 
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It will be argued that the health market ideology infused into the system since the 
early 1990s has not fared much better and that targeted assistance has tended to 
break down the social compact identified in the Bevan quote on page 3. 
Maori have been treated as a competing interest in the health market and Maori 
have treated health as another lwi development vehicle. Maori themselves have 
contributed to this effect. Health has replaced land as a lead vehicle in Iwi 
development in many lwi (Durie, 1994). 
MR POWELL (Counsel for the Claimants, Wai 692): Now, if new 
needs come up for those - those particular three providers encounter that 
they want to expand their services, because they see a need to do so, they 
have to go back and renegotiate their contract with the Health Funding 
Authority, don't they, otherwise they'll get into trouble? 
MS EARP (Deputy Director General, Maori Health, MOH): That's -
part of the process at the moment is that, yes, they would renegotiate with 
the HFA. 
MR POWELL: And at that point, when they go back, they really - they 
could well find themselves in competition with the HHS, with Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay, which has set itself up to be the greatest provider of Maori 
Health Services? 
MS EARP: Or other independent primary care providers as well. I mean, 
part of the primary care is - includes GP services, so GP's are a very 
significant component, or a significant part of primary care providers. 
MR POWELL: But, in terms of the HHS, it's got an advantage over 
Maori providers in the sense that, the HF A has to look at the additional 
cost, fiscal risk or fiscal cost, of contracting services to somebody other 
than an HHS, doesn't it? (Earp, 1999, pl55, 156) 
The State and the Other 
As a disillusioned psychiatric nurse tired of ethical dilemmas it was never my 
intention to retrain and work within another sphere of health and medicine. My 
interest in the social history of health and medicine in New Zealand was not 
inspired by the good deeds of doctors and nurses in the pioneering history of New 
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Zealand. It was the realisation that the politics of health in the contemporary 
context was part of a much more complex and historic dynamic. 
Working in psychiatry for 17 years my working life was dominated by defining 
deviance and judging behaviour by the definition of society's norms. These norms 
were validated and legitimised by the medical profession. It was in the discipline 
of history that it became evident to me that "science" and the application of it was 
critical to the State to fulfil any chosen agenda. While health and medicine have 
generally been perceived as neutral or objective this is not the experience of 
colonised or oppressed peoples. Medicine has been active in establishing and 
maintaining a relationship of power and authority between rulers and ruled 
(Nicolson, 1988). My interest in the role of health professionals (including 
myself) as agents of the state developed further. 
University study in the early 1990s led me to focus my interest on history, 
particularly New Zealand social history. During the course of my M.A. study, I 
found myself once again coming back to an interest in health and medicine, but 
now from an historical perspective. My M.A. research began to formalise my 
interest in the health sectoral experience of indigenous people, particularly Maori. 
My M.A. thesis used oral history to help tell the story of the establishment and 
development of health initiatives in the Tainui Iwi. 
The book that expanded the range of views I had on science and its supposed 
objectivity was Said' s 'Orientalism' (1978). It has been one of the most influential 
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in presenting a framework that enabled me to tell the story of the other from the 
perspective of the other. This thesis is part of that story telling process. 
Said challenges the Western intellectual tradition and worldview. He 
demonstrates that there could be more than one world view and validates the 
views of the defined "other". For indigenous, colonised and dispossessed peoples 
the reality of the colonised experience is that the only perspective or worldview of 
any validity is that of the western intellectual tradition. Indigenous people value 
the opportunity to tell their own stories, rather than be objects of study. 
Earlier historical accounts of 18th and 19th century European explorers made 
reference to the number of scientists and medical practitioners who accompanied 
them on their expeditions. Said describes the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 
1798 as not driven entirely by conquest and acquisition, but a fascination with a 
previously inaccessible society. Napoleon had a desire to have that society 
completely open and available to European scrutiny. 
From being a land of obscurity and a part of the Orient hitherto known at 
second hand through the exploits of earlier travellers, scholars, and 
conquerors, Egypt was to become a department of French learning (Said, 
1978,p83) 
In 1798 the Institut d'Egypte was founded with the intention that it would build a 
living archive for the expedition and conquest of Egypt. The Institut comprised of 
teams of chemists, historians, biologists, archaeologists, surgeons, and 
antiquarians and described by Said as the learned division of the army. 
Its job was no less aggressive: to put Egypt into modern French ... 
Almost from the first moments of occupation Napoleon saw to it that the 
Institut began its meetings, its experiments - its fact-finding mission, as 
we would call it. Most important, everything said, seen, and studied was to 
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be recorded, and indeed was recorded in that great collective appropriation 
of one country by another, the Description de /'Egypte, published in 
twenty-three enormous volumes between 1809 and 1828 (Said, 1978, 
p.84) 
The secretary of the Institut Jean-Baptiste-Joseph Fourier described in the preface 
of volume one of Description de L 'Egypte, the benefits of colonisation and 
exposure to a more civilised society and the means of achieving that. Fourier 
gives credit to the contribution of science and the arts to achieving the original 
vision. 
Napoleon appreciated the influence that this event would have on the 
relations between Europe, the Orient, and Africa, on Mediterranean 
shipping, and on Asia's destiny ... Napoleon wanted to offer a useful 
example to the Orient, and finally also to make the inhabitants' lives more 
pleasant, as well as to procure for them all the advantages of a perfected 
civilisation. 
None of this would be possible without a continuous application to the 
project of the arts and sciences (Said, 1978, p. 83) 
Said' s writing struck a chord with me. I could see parallels to the exploration and 
colonisation of the Pacific. There was a sense of connectedness and common 
experience with other colonised indigenous peoples framed within an academic 
debate that redefined the West as the 'other'. Orientalism described the 
application of the western tradition to the Near East and the defining of those 
societies was replicated in New Zealand. On Cook's voyage of rediscovery in the 
18th century he travelled with four medically qualified men, a botanist, an artist, a 
natural historian and an astronomer. Gluckman states in 'Medical History of New 
Zealand Prior to 1860' ( 1976) that "this company, together with Cook and his 
officers obviously embodied the great potential for great observations and 
conclusions. Endeavour on this three year voyage can be looked upon as a 
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floating laboratory with high intellectual climate". Observations of Maori were 
documented and judgements passed. 
During one of Cook's visits it was noted that ' every house, or every little 
cluster of three or four houses, was furnished with a privy, so that the 
ground was everywhere clean. The offals of their foods, and other litter, 
were also piled up in regular dunghills'. Like other observers, Banks 
thought the Maori were not very 'cleanly in their persons' (Lange, 1972). 
The observations and judgements of Maori were filtered and shaped by the 
prevailing ideology of imperialism which maintained the strong belief of the 
biological and cultural inferiority of non-European peoples. This belief was 
reinforced by the medical and religious beliefs of the time . 
.... Cook concluded that Maori in 1769 were a healthy race: 'a further 
proof that human nature is here untainted by disease is the great number of 
old men that we saw, many of whom by the loss of their hair and teeth 
appeared to be very ancient, yet none of them were decrepit, and though 
not equal to the young in muscular strength were not a bit behind them in 
cheerfulness and vivacity ... .' ' .... In all our visits to their towns where 
young and old, men and women, crowded about us, we never saw a single 
person who appeared to have any bodily complaint, nor did we perceive 
the slightest eruption upon the skin or any marks that any eruption had left 
behind' (Durie, 1994, p24-25) 
In the reading of those accounts it becomes evident that the role of scientists and 
doctors was to define the "other" and make sense of the alien world. The voyages 
of exploration and discovery treated the contact with new societies as scientific 
projects. Scientists defined, reified, explained and rationalised the behaviours, 
practices and structures of these new societies. 
Medical opinion at the time used 'objective' science and their legitimate close 
contact with the indigenous population to give authority to their opinion. The 
scientific opinions on Maori health status were not static and shifted depending on 
how Maori were viewed by the colonisers at the time. At the time of first contact 
Page 13 
between Maori and Pakeha Maori health status was observed by Cook to be 
impressive. When the relationship between Maori and Pakeha deteriorates in the 
second half of the nineteenth century the scientific opinion on Maori reflects it. 
Dr Alfred Newman' an English trained doctor who returned to New Zealand in 
1875 to practise medicine briefly' provides an example of this. Newman is 
described as having played a significant role in colonial science due partly to his 
becoming president of the Wellington Philosophical Society in 1879 and 1885 and 
publishing numerous papers in the Institute'sjoumal between 1876 and 1909. 
Early papers utilised his medical training to analyse Maori and Pakeha 
demography. In 1882 he published 'A study of the causes leading to the extinction 
of the Maori', in which he depicted the race as diseased, depraved and brutal, 
dying out before the arrival of the Europeans' (J. Stenhouse, in 'The Dictionary of 
New Zealand Biography', Volume 3, 1996, p 358-359) 
Dr Newman presented his study to the Wellington Philosophical Society in 1882 
and argued that Maori were congenitally incapable of the forms of behaviour 
required to maintain health. 
The whole evidence of modern medicine shows, beyond a shadow of a 
doubt, that the two chief causes of phthisis amongst all nations is the 
intermarriage of phthisical people and dwelling on low, damp, ill-drained 
soils: yet these as the very things which the Maori seem to prefer doing. 
Amongst ourselves the awful ravages of phthisis may be either entirely 
checked or greatly abated, by care, by medicine, by nursing, and by 
change of climate, of all of these the Maori knows nothing ... he never 
takes care of himself (Nicolson, 1988, p89) 
In the examples provided I have attempted to demonstrate the power of health and 
medicine to shape, influence and ultimately determine how the colonised will be 
understood. In both the Said and New Zealand examples doctors and scientists 
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have played an important role in the documenting of their observations and 
opinions, or passing judgement, which are then committed to the academic 
archives for succeeding generations. Due to how their professions are perceived, 
their observations shaped by their own personal views and cultural beliefs are 
treated as the definitive word on the societies that they pass judgement on. 
Given the credibility given to the so-called objectivity of science then it is not 
such a huge leap that it must influence how governments have developed and 
implemented health policy in the last two centuries. Health policy could be 
viewed as an indicator of prevailing attitudes as it indicates how a society treats 
its members and the value placed on them. 
So what is the relevance of all this to developing a doctoral research topic? 
Having worked in the New Zealand health sector since 1979 I have lived through 
the major changes of the 1980s and 1990s and the shift in ideology. I have 
observed the realities as an employee buffeted in the succeeding, repetitive and 
cyclical changes. It is a case of having lived the history of some of the most 
significant changes to and within New Zealand society. 
The timing of these major changes in the 1980s and 1990s coincides with the 
growing awareness within Maori communities of the significance of health and 
healthcare provision, and the realities of the monocultural system. From the early 
1980s health became highly politicised and rivalled land as the issue that became 
the focus for Maori hopes and aspirations. 
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In 1984 the Hui Whakaoranga, the Maori Health Planning Workshop, at the 
Hoani Waititi Marae was a major national hui for Maori health and provided a 
focus for a collective direction (Durie, 1994, p53, p2 l 1) It was at this hui that an 
important link was made between health and political advancement, that health 
was constituted as an integral component of Maori development. Maori were 
intent on defining health for themselves, and linking advances in health with 
advances in other areas such as Maori language development, marae 
development, tribal development and Maori political aspirations for greater 
autonomy. 
Political developments of the 1980s and 1990s indicate that the issues raised at 
Hui Whakaoranga were significant for Maori and health provided the political 
vehicle. Tainui led the country in the development of health initiatives that 
challenged the way in which the State had traditionally provided health services 
and information to Maori. My MA thesis Marae based health initiatives within 
the Tainui lwi 1983 to 1995 examined the basis for the Tainui model and where 
they had taken community development. The health reforms or'the early 1990s 
provided opportunities for Tainui to develop a wider range of health services and 
increase the number of initiatives. The changes in government policy allowed 
Maori into the health sector market as players and access to the health dollar 
which had previously been denied. This was a major contributing factor to the 
escalating number of Maori health initiatives of that time. 
This development raised questions as to whether this was what would be in the 
interests of Maori, to address the appalling health status issues or suited an agenda 
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of the governments. The reforms led to development opportunities for Maori in 
the health arena. It is, however, arguable that the development and shape of the 
initiatives which have resulted is at least as much a matter of the economic 
ideologies driving the health reforms as it is an example of tino rangatiratanga, or 
Maori control of Maori health services. Durie argues that the reforms created a 
dilemma for Maori. 
'Privatisation masqueraded as tino rangatiratanga (tribal authority and self 
determination); biculturalism was confused with partnership; and 
devolution merely created the illusion of self-determination' (Durie, 1994, 
pl51). 
In, my view the reform process and consequences for Maori required further 
scrutiny and thus led to my Ph.D. research interest. The lack of examination or 
analysis on the impact of government policy on Maori health provision or the 
social impact of such policy raised several questions: What were the models that 
influenced government policy since 1983? What was the ideology behind the 
reforms of 1991 and 1993? Were Maori influencing mainstream health policy? 
Was the tremendous growth in Maori health initiatives an example of Maori 
development or their establishment as de facto Crown agents? 
From the outset the overall aim of the thesis was to examine government policy, 
reform of the health sector and the relationship between health services and Maori 
from 1983 to 1997. Critical to this is the Treaty of Waitangi, identifying the 
Treaty partners and the relationship and understanding the relevance of the Treaty 
of Waitangi to the contemporary health sector. 
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The intention of the thesis research was not to examine health status or argue that 
if the Treaty of Waitangi was honoured everything would be fixed and Maori 
would no longer experience health disparities. The focus is Crown health policy. 
Does the Crown comply with its own policies or has it been in breach itself over 
the period of health reform 1983-1997. 
Fundamentally, I have examined the State and its relationship to one group of its 
citizens, Maori, as the "other". The New Zealand experience of colonisation is in 
part different from other British colonies because of the Treaty of Waitangi. The 
Treaty has been a chance for New Zealand to forge a blueprint for a new society. I 
personally have experienced the role of an agent of the state as a nurse within the 
health sector. As part of that role, I began trying to understand the realities of an 
oppressed and despairing community. Where does the difference in their situation 
get made? It was not at the individual level. At the state level then, what has been 
the relationship of the state with the other? This thesis therefore examines the 
New Zealand health sector, and particularly the recent reforms of it, as one of the 
fields in which the relationship of the state with the other has been defined and 
played out. 
Case Studies 
Two significant opportunities have contributed to the research documented herein. 
The first has been the opportunity of the researcher to participate in the 1998 Wai 
692 claim to the Waitangi tribunal, first through the preparation of a scoping 
report, and secondly through commissioned research on behalf of the Tribunal. 
The second was research into improving Maori health outcomes commissioned by 
the National Health Committee in 2000. 
Page 18 
The Wai 692 claim is the first health claim to be heard by the Waitangi Tribunal. 
It expanded and replaced an earlier claim (Wai 473) to the tribunal lodged by one 
of the claimants in 1994. As such it has provided a unique opportunity, because at 
the time of the fieldwork for the research (mid 1998 to mid 1999), the key health 
reform decision-makers were still in Cabinet. The decisions, which the claim 
challenged, were decisions made by contemporary politicians on both sides of the 
house, being tested within the Tribunal process. 
Contemporary Crown officials were available for oral cross-examination, rather 
than their predecessors' views needing to be disinterred from a 100-year old tomb. 
The claim and the accompanying research embodied an unprecedented level of 
accountability, together with, in the view of some Tribunal officials, 
unprecedented levels of resistance. 
The Wai 692 claim has given the opportunity to look at one community as a case 
study - from health consumer to Cabinet Minister. 
It has involved one Hawke's Bay Iwi, which has made the researcher's job a much 
simpler one. Ngati Kahungunu have been involved in the issues highlighted by the 
claim from its inception, so have a lengthy institutional memory in respect of the 
claim and all issues associated with it. Their enormous cooperation and support, 
and the link with their regional claim, facilitated the research and claim process 
enormously. 
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While the Wai 692 process produced a great deal of primary source material, a 
further opportunity arose in respect of research for the National Health Committee 
(NHC), chaired by Professor Mason Durie. The NHC commissioned research into 
the policy process and its effectiveness in respect of Maori health. Conducting 
research with Crown agencies on behalf of a Crown agency opens doors for a 
researcher that otherwise may be somewhat less penetrable. The opportunity to 
gather primary source material through the NHC contract was exceptional. 
Field research for this thesis took many months. The Wai 692 process involved 
field research, in both Hawke's Bay and Wellington for about 9 months during the 
period 1998/99. NHC research took up from February to June of 2000, and 
involved Crown and other agencies throughout the country. 
Methodology 
The research process underlying this dissertation has been the standard approach 
used by historians. That is, the initial focus has been on primary source material, 
followed by a widening of the line of enquiry from there to the secondary sources. 
The primary source material for the research would be predominantly oral history 
interviews including those key personnel in government involved in the 
development and implementation of health policy, Maori health providers and 
Maori health professionals working in mainstream health services implementing 
government policy. 
Oral history has been described as giving a voice to the voiceless (Lummis, 1987, 
p 17). In this context the value and purpose of this methodology overcomes lack of 
formal documentation. The era of recent health reform was dominated by the use 
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of consultants and public relations companies. The documentation generated by 
them was not necessarily for public use and consequently not always retained 
within government and other agencies concerned. With the high turnover of key 
staff in the health sector, numerous reconfigurations and structural changes the 
lack of institutional memory in the sector adds to the difficulty in establishing a 
historical record. Thus oral history interviews with some of the key players and 
personnel provide in some instances the only information as to how or why a 
decision was made. 
Oral history in its present form permits the purposeful intervention of 
historians in collecting the data needed to illuminate particular areas about 
which too little information has survived from other sources. It is an ideal 
method for studying the recent past of unorganised workers, domestic life, 
attitudes and ideology at the grass roots, the experience of childhood or 
indeed any historical dimension which can be explored through lived 
experience. In Europe, for example, it is now virtually the only method of 
fully exploring the many underground struggles against fascism because 
these were by definition clandestine and often undocumented by those 
involved (Lummis, 1987, p. 17). 
Selection of interviewees for both Wai 692 and National Health research projects 
occurred in a variety of ways; recommended by key personnel as appropriate to 
speak to, name came up in archival information or interviews already conducted, 
current employees or officials of Crown agencies and represented their 
organisation, representatives of NGO's, individuals identified by comments made 
in the media and Waitangi Tribunal claimants and individuals identified by 
claimants. Waikato University Ethics Committee approval was granted December 
1999 (see Appendix 4). 
There were no standard interview questions for every participant. Some 
interviewees requested a range of questions or areas of interest from the 
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researcher prior to giving consent to being interviewed. This was complied with. 
In other instances the actual interview did not take place until the third or fourth 
meeting when the interviewee was comfortable with the process. 
The oral history interviews have been conducted with: 
• a large cross section and range of key Crown officials, 
• health care consumers 
• officials of a large range of health care entities including NGOs and private 
providers 
• Maori leadership 
• Whanau and hapu of Ngati Kahungunu 
A table setting out the interviews follows: 
Table 1: Oral History Interviews 
Entity Branch 
Raukura Hauora 0 
Tainui 
Raukura Hauora 0 
Tainui 
Ministry of Health 
New Zealand Hawke's Bay 
Medical Association Branch 
Healthcare Hawke's 
Bay 
Maori Women's Napier 
Resource Centre 





Hawke's Bay Health 
Council ( since 
disbanded) 
Official & Role 
Ramiri Te Hemara-
Maipi, Primary 
Health Care Worker 
Tutata Matatahi, 










Bevan Taylor, Chair 









25 June 1996* 
11 July 1996* 
June 1997 
13 January 1999 
14 January 1999 
19 January 1999 
19 January 1999 
19 January 1999 
20 January 1999 
25 January 1999 
25 January 1999 
Te Kupenga Hauora Te Maari Joe, 26 August 1998 & 
Business Director 26 January 1999 
Hawke's Bay Napier John Osborne, 29 January 1999 
Ambulance Service CieneralManager 
Hawke's Bay Napier Barry Howell, 29 January 1999 
Ambulance Service Operations Manager 
Napier City Council Neil Taylor, Chief 5 February 1999 
Executive Officer 
Healthcare Hawke's Mark Flowers, 5 February 1999 
Bay Chief Executive 
Officer 
Labour Party Napier Michael Cullen, 16 February 1999 
Deputy Leader & 
List MP 
Independent MP Neil Kirton, MP, ex 20 January 1999 & 
Associate Minister 17 February 1999 
of Health 
Alliance Phillida Bunkie, List 16 and 19 February 
MP, Alliance 1999 
Spokesperson on 
Health 
Napier City Council Alan Dick, Mayor 19 February 1999 
Ministry of Health Te Kete Hauora Hera Douglass, 19 February 1999 
Policy Analyst 
Maori Health Wayne McLean, Telephone 
Commission Maori Health interview, 9 March 
Commissioner 1999 & 10 March 
2000 
Treasury CCMAU Steve Anderson, 12 March 1999 
Principal Adviser, 
Health 
Treasury CCMAU James Hay, Legal 12 March 1999 
Adviser 
Te Puni Kokiri Monitoring and Lisa Davies, Branch 12 March 1999 
Evaluation Manager 
Accident Ciarry Wilson, CEO 2 March 2000 
Compensation Verna Ohia-Ciates 
Corporation 
Platform Barbara Anderson, 6 March 2000 
Chairperson 
Commissioner for Roger Mclay 15 March 2000 
Children 
Capital Coast Margot Mains, CEO 15 March 2000 
Health 
Auckland Nigel Chee & 16 March 2000 
Healthcare Simon Royal, Maori 
Health Unit 
Pacific Health Ron Dunham, CEO 17 March 2000 
Te Puni Kokiri Policy Dame Cirant 20 March 2000 
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Health Funding Clinical Training Michael Moore, 22 March 2000 
Authority Agency Manager 
Pegasus IPA MikeT 23 March 2000 
Mental Health Barbara Disley, Bob 27 March 2000 
Commission Henare, 
Commissioners 
Eru Pomare Paparangi Reid, 28 March 2000 
Research Institute Director, Vera 
Keefe-Ormsby, 
Bridget Robson 
Treasury Health Directorate Nicholas Mays, 30 March 2000 
Dominic Walton 
Treasury CCMAU Steve Anderson 30 March 2000 
Healthcare Aotearoa Peter Glensor 30 March 2000 
HCA 
The Royal New Becky Fox and 30 March 2000 
Zealand Plunket Angela Baldwin 
Society 
Ministry of Health Performance Joan Mirkin 31 March 2000 
Monitoring Branch 
Health Funding Maori Health Group Rob Cooper, 31 March 2000 
Authority General Manager 
Ministry of Youth Mereana Ruri, 31 March 2000 
Affairs Policy Analyst 
Canterbury Health Richard Webb, CEO 4 April 2000 
Ngai Tahu Fiona Pym 4 April 2000 
Development 
Corporation 
Te Runanga O Nga Norm Dewes, CEO 4 April 2000 
Mata Waka & Linda Ngata 
Crown Health Combined meeting 
Association of CEOs and Chairs 
Ministry of Health Te Kete Hauora Ria Earp & Rachel 5 April 2000 
Robson 
Health Funding Te Tai Tokerau Louise Davis 6 April 2000 
Authority MAPO 
Northland Health Ken Whelan, CEO 6 April 2000 
Te Hauora O Te Tai Edith McNeil 6 April 2000 
Tokerau 
Ministry of Health Safety and David Press 12 April 2000 
Regulation Branch 
Work and Income Angela Wallace 13 April 2000 
New Zealand 
Health Funding Public Health Group Don Matheson, 28 April 2000 
Authority DDG 
Health Funding Personal Health Win Bennett, Mara 11 May 2000 
Authority Group Andrews 
Ministry of Lesley Kelly, Policy 12 May 2000 
Women's Affairs Analyst 
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* Oral history interviews, author's MA Thesis 
Additional primary source material has included: 
• Transcripts of evidence and cross examination at the Crown hearing of Wai 
692 
• Media, newspaper cuttings, press releases and media interviews, Crown and 
Crown agency commissioned reports 
• Crown reports 
• Crown policy statements 
• Departmental reviews 
• Crown research 
• Submissions to Government Commissions 
Methodology used in the research has included a wide ranging survey of the 
documentary sources, with some restrictions due to access limitations imposed by 
some of the Crown agencies involved in health service delivery. 
Chapter Outlines 
The first chapter introduces the health sector and its reforms, identifies the basis 
for the author's interest in the research, and the theoretical stance being adopted .. 
It includes some introductory comments on the Treaty of Waitangi and health. It 
provides details of the research methods used, including a summary of primary 
and other source material, and identifies the two major research opportunities that 
have supported the development of the thesis 
The second chapter (Chapter 2 - The Treaty of Waitangi & its role in the Health 
Sector) provides a background to the Treaty of W aitangi, together with a brief 
overview of how it is seen in the contemporary context. It puts the argument for 
Crown responsibilities under the Treaty and draws out the distinctions between 
Article 2 and Article 3. It provides a historical background to the place of the 
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Treaty in the health sector, and forms the basis for the Treaty based analysis of the 
reforms and their impact. 
Chapter three provides an historical overview of the New Zealand health sector 
during the period of reform under review. The chapter starts with the development 
of the New Zealand Welfare State. The welfare state under pressure leads to a 
broad overview of the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s as they impacted on New 
Zealand society. 
Chapter four considers two strong international influences on the last decade of 
New Zealand reforms, being the changes in the United Kingdom, and the so-
called "Oregon experiment." The chapter then focuses on Crown entities, their 
development and reform, and the broad changes in the mainstream side of New 
Zealand's health care delivery system. The structural changes that mark much of 
mainstream health reform are outlined and the resulting entities described. 
Chapter five highlights the effect of health reform on the growth in Maori health 
service funding and provision. It uses the development of Maori health providers 
in the Tainui lwi as an exemplar for that development elsewhere, much as those 
providers served as a development model for other Iwi. 
Chapter six provides a detailed look at the impact of the 1990s health reform for 
Maori, using the specific example of health services to the Ngati Kahungunu lwi. 
The chapter is based on work carried out in respect of the Wai 692 claim to the 
Waitangi Tribunal. The claim was precipitated by the threatened loss of health 
services associated with the closure of Napier Hospital, but became broadened to 
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include a wide ranging look at the impact of health reform on Maori. The chapter 
provides detailed consideration of the reforms in respect of the Treaty of Waitangi 
principles as promulgated by the Royal Commission on Social Policy. 
The chapter which follows (Chapter 7 - Crown Accountability to Maori -
Monitoring of the Health Sector and its Impact on ) contrasts the Crown's stated 
intent in health service delivery to Maori with both its ability to influence 
outcomes, and with the outcomes themselves. The health policy-making context is 
reviewed in some detail. The emphasis on Maori health policy is set within the 
context of health reform and the fragmentation that it causes. The Crown's 
attempts (through its agencies) to effectively lead in improving Maori health 
status, its stated goal, are examined at many levels. Extracts from transcripts of 
evidence given by Crown officials to the Wai 692 hearings are used to illustrate 
the Crown· s own evaluation of its success, and to assess the efficacy of the 
Crown's efforts. 
The lack of control and accountability measures, plus the inability of the Crown to 
monitor (let alone sanction) success or failure, is highlighted. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by contrasting the health system with the operation of the Resource 
Management Act ( 1991) within the territorial local authority sector, a contrast 
which is heightened by the fact that hospital governance once sat squarely in the 
local authority sector too. 
Chapter eight provides concluding argument for the research, and has some 
suggestions for improving Maori health outcomes. The central role of the Treaty 
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in such improvement is restated. Finally the prospects for improvement are 
considered. If the ideological conflict between Labour and National viewpoints on 
health is maintained, the voice and perspective of Maori is unlikely to get the 
attention it deserves. 
A short postscript brings the impact of the specific reforms up to the present day. 
It looks at the health service reforms since the period of study, particularly the 
1999 Labour-Alliance coalition government reforms that are creating the current 
health structure. It reviews some of the criticism and debate surrounding those 
reforms. The inclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi in this legislation, while at first 
appearing as a step forward, is shown to have been subject to the same ideological 
conflicts as those noted earlier. Those ideological conflicts are seen to be part of 
the entire welfare sector, and the fit with the retreat on the government "Closing 
the Gaps" policy is made explicit. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE TREATY OF WAITANGI & ITS ROLE IN 
THE HEALTH SECTOR 
Who are the Parties to the Treaty of Waitangi? 
The Treaty of Waitangi is a treaty between two parties, the Crown and Maori. It is 
a not an uncommon view held by Pakeha that all Maori should act together, by 
way of some pan-tribal approach, in order to simplify relationships between the 
parties, and the resolution of grievances (Alves, 1999). Maori have a somewhat 
similar perspective of the Crown. It is important from the outset to clarify what is 
'the Crown· and how it is defined for the purpose of this research. The Treaty 
texts identify the two parties involved in it to be Queen Victoria and Maori hapu. 
Maori understood that ultimate authority was vested personally in the 
Queen. Indeed, the Treaty encouraged them to believe this, regardless of 
the reality of the constitutional relationship between monarch and 
government in Britain at the time (Dawson, 2001, p 194 ). 
Despite how Maori perceived the relationship the dynamics shifted in the second 
half of the 19th century with the responsibilities devolved to the settler government 
fundamentally altering the status of one of the Treaty partners. 
By 1863, authority on all New Zealand matters, including Maori affairs, 
had been transferred to responsible settler government. Maori resisted this 
development and attempted to retain a partnership with the Queen. 
Increasingly, Maori sought the Queen· s protection against the action and 
inaction of 'the Queen's government' in New Zealand ... Despite appeals 
to the Queen (the Crown), the government in New Zealand was now 'the 
Crown' (Dawson, 200 I, p 194 ). 
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There is much confusion in the Treaty discourse of what is and who is the Crown. 
The Crown represents the legal entity of the state. Confusion emerges in the 
debate when the Crown also includes Maori in some contexts and not others. 
The fact that the Crown has come to be synonymous with government is a 
reflection of the fact that New Zealanders in general (and Maori in 
particular) do not have that layer of authority which can provide protection 
from government actions and authority in New Zealand. However, perhaps 
the most significant injustice is that the government, in assuming the 
position of the Crown, is playing two roles at once as both protector and 
accused subjugator of Maori rights under the Treaty. 
The key concern is that governments use the Crown at the expense of the 
public's understanding of the detail of treaty negotiations and that the 
symbol protects the present power structure while also determining future 
possibilities. These implications are particularly serious for Maori, many 
of whom ... have an alternative conception of the Crown whose progress 
in treaty negotiations may be inhibited by the prevailing interpretations of 
the Crown and the obstacles to future development which these 
interpretations create. In using 'the Crown· symbol, Ministers were not 
only sending a message to Maori that the Treaty was acknowledged, but at 
the same time were sending a message to others seeking reassurance that 
... Sovereignty in New Zealand would continue to reside in the Pakeha 
system of government (Dawson, 2001, pp 194-195 ). 
The term 'the Crown· is open to manipulation dependent on who the parties are. 
In some instances fragmentation of different Crown agencies roles and 
responsibilities is used to distance 'the Crown' from its own Treaty 
responsibilities. In the Wai 692 hearings crown entities themselves denied they 
were Crown agencies and tried to use statute to distance themselves from 'the 
Crown'. 
PROF SORRENSON (Member of the Waitangi Tribunal Hearing 
Wai 692): Mr Wilson, just some fairly general questions. First of all, is 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay an agency of the Crown? 
MR WILSON (Chairman, Healthcare Hawke's Bay): No, it is a 
separate registered company in which the Crown are the shareholders. So, 
I don't know whether that is strictly within the definition of an agency. 
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PROF SORRENSON: Yes, you referred at times to a shareholding 
Minister. So. One of the Ministers holds a shareholding, or the Crown's 
shareholding in the company, does it? 
MR WILSON: Yes. The shares are held by the - equally by the Minister 
of Finance, and the Minister of Health. So, they are Crown holders. 
PROF SORRENSON: They are Crown? 
MR WILSON: They are Crown holders in effect. 
PROF SORRENSON: Holders. It's a Crown enterprise, isn't it? 
MR WILSON: Yes. 
PROF SORRENSON: Who owns the land that the hospitals are sitting 
on? Is that Crown land? 
MR WILSON: Yes. It is owned by Healthcare Hawke's Bay. The 
Company actually owns the land, but if you track through the 
shareholders, you could say that there is a Crown interest in the land. 
PROF SORRENSON: Yes; and you've, in a sense, inherited it from the 
Hospital Board? 
MR WILSON: Indeed. 
PROF SORRENSON: Yes. And I think you said that the current 
members of the board are appointed by the Minister? Is that right? 
MR WILSON: They are appointed by the Cabinet Appointments and -
well, the Appointment Committee, and it seems to be a complicated 
process, but it's --
PROF SORRENSON: Is that a committee of Cabinet? 
MR WILSON: It is a committee of Cabinet, yes, who makes decisions 
based on recommendations provided by the Appointments Officer at 
CCMAU. 
PROF SORRENSON: So, you can be hired and fired by that committee? 
Is that right? 
MR WILSON: Absolutely. 
PROF SORRENSON: Yes. So, in many ways, you appear to be a Crown 
- an agency of the Crown. Well, assuming that you are, do you consider it 
your responsibility to be familiar with the obligations of the Crown, the 
Treaty obligations of the Crown, under the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the 
1975 Act and the 1985 amendment? 
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MR WILSON: Yes, I think it is an obligation to be aware of the 
principles. 
PROF SORRENSON: Are you familiar with the jurisprudence of the 
Treaty principles, and particularly the findings of various Waitangi 
Tribunal reports on Treaty principles, and the principal judgments of the 
courts, like the Court of Appeal in the Lands case? Are you personally 
familiar with them? 
MR WILSON: No, I am not personally familiar with them. I would rely 
on advice on those matters. 
PROF SORRENSON: You would rely on advice? 
MR WILSON: I would rely on advice. 
PROF SORRENSON: From what? From your lawyers? 
MR WILSON: Well, if they were matters, and they principally relate to 
the ownership of land, and principally relate to matters concerning the use 
of the land, and on those matters there are agencies of the Crown who 
provide specific advice. 
PROF SORRENSON: I see. But, in your operations, you don't appear to 
be familiar with some of the leading principles of the Treaty? 
MR WILSON: We actually provide the services according to a contracted 
arrangement, which includes the references to the Treaty obligations, and 
that's the level of my understanding (Wilson, 1999, pp309, 310) 
The concept of 'the Crown· has been used by successive governments to portray 
that they are not responsible as the government and that they do not exert the 
determining influence. The reality is 'the Crown' is an instrument of politics 
regardless of what political party is in power. The Crown is the Crown is the 
Crown no matter what it may want to call itself and how it may want to reinvent 
itself. My position on 'the Crown· is consistent with that adopted by the Waitangi 
Tribunal. The Crown's many bits and fragments cannot escape the fundamental 
relationship of Crown with Maori as determined by the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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: Why $houfd the State Factor in Maori Interests? 
Non-Maori New Zealanders have asked the question 'Why should Maori be 
treated any differently to Pakeha? (Scott, 1995, p7) In the context of the health 
sector and health service delivery to Maori the question could be asked slightly 
differently with similar purpose. Why should the State promote and support Maori 
interests in the health sector? 
The Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840 between Maori and the British Crown is at 
the heart of the reason why. The Treaty signalled a commitment between the two 
parties to a partnership. It provided Maori with certain rights, privileges and 
guarantees that they legitimately continue to expect to be upheld and honoured. 
This ensures Maori have a unique place in New Zealand society with the rightful 
expectation that their interests will not only be factored in by the State but also 
actively protected. 
The founding document of New Zealand is the Treaty of Waitangi and was 
between two defined parties, the British Crown and Maori as tangata whenua. The 
Treaty partnership is between the Crown and Iwi and Hapu (Orange, 1987). This 
is the primary relationship. It was these parties who entered the agreement that is 
the Treaty of Waitangi. They engaged with each other as sovereign entities and 
they both sought to satisfy interests in common while protecting separate 
interests. 
The Treaty of Waitangi has two texts, one Maori and one in English. The English 
text is not an exact translation of the Maori text. 
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'The Treaty of Waitangi may be unique in internat\O~l~~~rit=~ce in that 
it is comprised of two texts, one not a precise translation of the other and 
each carrying its own cultural expectations, history and tradition' 
(Kawharu, 1989, pl 31 ). 
Despite the conflict and debate caused by the different translations, both texts 
represent an agreement in which Maori gave the Crown rights to govern and to 
develop a British settlement, while the Crown guaranteed Maori full protection of 
their interests, their status and full citizenship rights. 
Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu has translated the Maori text of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. His translation of the First Article is 
The Chiefs of a Confederation and the chiefs all also [who] have not 
entered that Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England 
forever the Government of their land. 
He translates the Second Article 
The Queen of England arranges [and] agrees to the Chiefs, to the sub-
tribes to people all of New Zealand the unqualified exercise of their 
Chieftainship over their villages and over their treasures all their treasures. 
But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs 
will sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and 
by the person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as her 
purchase agent. 
The third 
For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the 
Queen, the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New 
Zealand and will give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the 
people of England (Kawharu, 1989, p3 l 9). 
The significance of the Treaty to Maori is huge. It goes beyond the defined 
relationship between Maori and the Crown. It is in the very recognition of Maori 
as a collective whole as the Treaty partner that is unique. The citizenship rights 
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and duties contained in Article Three effectively created Maori. Up until the 
signing of the Treaty Maori were not a political entity perceived as a collective 
· whole, but consisted of hapu and lwi groupings that had separate and distinct 
identities. 
The flip side of that is the Treaty also gave the Crown legitimacy. In New Zealand 
Maori Council vs Attorney General, Richardson J expressed the view that the 
Treaty of Waitangi was a solemn compact in which for its part 'the Crown sought 
legitimacy from the indigenous people for its acquisition of sovereignty and in 
return it gave certain guarantees. That basis of compact requires each party to act 
reasonably and in good faith towards the other.· In the context of Government 
action under the Treaty, he found that 'The concept of the honour of the Crown 
also has continuing expression ... in the international law doctrine of good faith' 
(Kawharu, 1989, pl28). 
With the agreement to Article Three, tangata whenua also gained citizenship 
rights as Maori. It did not replace the individual rights and obligations that tangata 
whenua had to their Hapu and Iwi. As tangata whenua their identity relied upon 
whom they belonged to and the rights and obligations that flowed from this. The 
language of the culture reflected this in that individuals identified and were 
identified on the basis of whakapapa, and the whenua from which they came, with 
all its symbols of identification (maunga [mountains], moana [lakes and oceans], 
awa [rivers])" (NZLS, 1999, pl8). 
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The guardians of the Treaty have been Maori who have retained the original 
vision of the undertakings made in the Treaty of Waitangi. What has sustained the 
vision is the belief of their individual and collective sovereignty that derives from 
their status as tangata whenua. It is the mana of tangata whenua status as 
identified and confirmed in the 1835 Declaration of Independence (Kelsey, 1990) 
and again in the Treaty of Waitangi that creates a different expectation for Maori 
in contrast to that of non-Maori New Zealanders. It is te tino rangatiratanga o te 
iwi Maori, the absolute authority of the Maori people collectively over their lives 
and resources that is the defining difference. 
Maori have consistently upheld their right to assert tino rangatiratanga. 
The Treaty of Waitangi ... guaranteed that the rangatiratanga of Maori 
would be maintained and that the ritenga or basic threads of Maori society 
would be promoted. These concepts, crucial to the mana or sovereign 
prestige of Maori, are the tahuhu or ridge-pole of Maori self-
determination. They are the 'singular context' which define the authority of 
Maori to determine the destiny of Maori. They arise not from a recent 
minority place in New Zealand, but from time immemorial as tangata 
whenua. They are not dependent upon definition and recognition by the 
Crown or Pakeha international law, but are rights shaped by the place of 
our tipuna, our ancestors, in this land ... 'The source of our rights is that, 
like the kauri, we are grounded here, we were nurtured here, we are the 
people of this land .... and we know that the Treaty protected our place, 
covenanted our rights' (Te Ataria, in Kelsey, 1990, p6). 
The Declaration of Independence predates the Treaty by five years. It focused 
strongly on the rights of tangata whenua to exercise tino rangatiratanga and have 
autonomy over their own affairs. It clearly stated a position of how Maori viewed 
their independence and that sovereign power would remain with them. 
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In 1835 thirty-four northern chiefs and the British Crown, represented by Resident 
Busby executed the Declaration of Independence of New Zealand. The English 
text of the declaration reads: 
We the hereditary chiefs and heads of the tribes (tino rangatira) of the 
Northern parts of New Zealand ... declare the Independence 
(rangatiratanga) of our country, which is hereby constituted and declared 
to be an Independent State (wenua rangatira), under the designation of the 
United Tribes of New Zealand. All sovereign power (kingitanga) and 
authority (mana) within the territories of the United Tribes of New 
Zealand is hereby declared to reside entirely and exclusively in the 
hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes (tino rangatira) in their collective 
capacity, who also declare that they will not permit any legislative 
authority separate from themselves in their collective capacity to exist, nor 
any function of government (kawanatanga) to be exercised within the said 
territories, unless by persons appointed by them, and acting under the 
authority of laws regularly enacted by them in Congress assembled 
(Kelsey, 1990, p7). 
An invitation was extended to the southern tribes to join the confederation and the 
last signature added to the Declaration of Independence occurred in July 1839 
making a total of fifty-two chiefs. 
Less than one year later the Treaty of Waitangi was signed and affirmed Maori 
tino rangatiratanga, over their whenua, kainga and taonga. In the Treaty 
'independence' was translated in the English text as 'full, exclusive and 
undisturbed possession' of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other 
properties which they wished to retain in their possession. 
Sir James Henare, kaitiaki of the Treaty ofWaitangi and member of the Council 
of Chiefs of Ngapuhi, defined the meaning of taonga as basically the Maori way 
of life, in contrast to the concept of Maoritanga. 
'Te tino rangatiratanga' as used in the Treaty means the Chieftainship over 
all their taonga, tangible or intangible. Things animate or otherwise. 
Page 37 
'Taonga' are tangible and intangible culture, language, art, craft, lands. 
That is the Maori way of life, 'Maoritanga' being expressed by way of their 
art, their craft, their language, their customs, their traditions. When their 
'taonga' were to be protected by the Treaty the people trusted that the 
Maori way of life would also continue and be guaranteed (Henare in 
Kelsey, 1990, plO). 
As Sir James described it the Treaty was a guarantee of the Maori way of life with 
the added benefits which Pakeha presence could bring. Sir James stated that: 
Because of the Treaty the Maori believe, right to this day, that they are 
equal partners and they know from experience that it's not so. But right to 
this day, and those Chiefs that I had the great privilege of being associated 
with, Runanga o te Tiriti o Waitangi, and they always said that, that they 
had equal rights. That is why they signed the Treaty. And lots of people 
and including some historians, Lindsay Buchanan and these people, seem 
to infer that those Chiefs didn't know what they were signing. They knew 
what they were signing, reading the Maori version. But, when it came to 
sovereignty in the English version what in fact they did sign was giving 
away all their mana and everything else to the Queen of England. Which 
they never believed and never intended to do so. And that's quite plain 
from signing the Maori version. That it was the Government and the 
governments of their land. Not sovereignty (Henare in Kelsey, 1990, p 11 ). 
The Maori perspective is at odds with the prevailing ideology of mainstream New 
Zealand who advocate the one New Zealand argument. The general ignorance of 
most Pakeha concerning the continuing history of the Treaty within Maoridom 
has been commented on in several Waitangi Tribunal reports: 
The Treaty of Waitangi has always assumed great importance in the eyes 
of the Maori. He [sic] believes that by the solemn agreement made with 
the Queen of England the peaceful colonisation of New Zealand became 
possible ... The European on the other hand generally regarded the Treaty 
as an historical event which does not have much impact on modem New 
Zealand. This view springs largely from the judicial decisions in cases 
when the legal consequences of the Treaty have been in question and 
which have led to the conclusion that it has no place in New Zealand law 
(Waitangi Tribunal, Wai-4, 1984, para 5.1&5.2). 
Maori have consistently honoured their commitment to the Treaty by not 
repudiating the legitimacy of the Crown. Maori have not entered into acts of 
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rebellion. Their armed struggle has been limited to self-defence when the Crown 
has acted to threaten their rangatiratanga. Maori have consistently worked within 
the political and legal system to seek redress from the Crown for breaches of the 
Treaty. They have approached the Queen, used the Court processes, established 
Maori political parties, and most recently used both the Waitangi Tribunal and 
direct negotiation with the government of the day to secure redress (Walker, 1990, 
pl60-185, Kelsey, 1990, p2I0-237, Ward, 1999, p172). 
Pakeha perceptions of the Treaty have generally focused on the historical events 
of 1840 and the great benefits colonisation has brought to Maori. There is no 
recognition by non-Maori that the Crown's commitment to the Treaty has shifted 
since 1840. Contemporary comments and documents in the three decades after 
signing suggest that the treaty was influential on some decisions and legislation. 
Governor Fitzroy commented in 1844 on the significance of the Treaty and some 
of the perceptions at the time of signing: 
That the natives did not view all its provisions in exactly the same light as 
our authorities is undoubted: but whatever minor objections may be raised, 
the fact is now unquestionable that the loyalty, the fidelity and cooperation 
of any natives in New Zealand, has hitherto depended mainly on their 
reliance on the honour of Great Britain in adhering scrupulously to the 
Treaty of Waitangi - the Magna Carta of New Zealand (cited in Kawharu 
1989, p73). 
Representatives of the Crown were expected to uphold and comply with the 
Treaty obligations. Governor Fitzroy instructed his successor George Grey: 
'You will honourably and scrupulously fulfil the conditions of the Treaty 
ofWaitangi' (cited in Kawharu 1989, p73). 
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A private letter written in 1848 by the then British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel 
suggests pragmatic reasons, such as the size and vulnerability of the settler colony 
in contrast to the Maori population, encouraged Treaty recognition at the time: 
If the obligations of good faith vary with the military skill and prowess of 
the parties to a Treaty, the New Zealanders [that is, the Maori] have put in 
a claim to be respected which it has become prudent on our part to 
recognize (cited in Kawharu 1989, p75). 
The English texts of the Treaty have been taken into account in the drafting of 
legislation in the 19th and 20th century. The English wording on Crown pre-
emption in Article 2, and the understanding that this entailed a Crown monopoly 
to purchase Maori land, was incorporated in the Land Claims Ordinance 1841 and 
the Native Land Purchase Ordinance 1846. The English wording of Article 3 was 
relied upon to justify the Native Rights Act 1865. The reference to fisheries in 
Article 2 was explicitly mentioned in the Fish Protection Act 1877. The Waitangi 
Day Act 1960 provided that 6 February is 'a national day of thanksgiving in 
commemoration of the signing' and that it might be a substitute for a provincial 
anniversary statutory holiday. It later became a national holiday (Kawharu 1989, 
p77). 
The Treaty's lack of legal status and recognition has been a great source of 
frustration to Maori. The Waitangi Tribunal in its 1983 Te Atiawa (Motunui) 
Report commented that 'Maori people have persistently pleaded the Treaty in the 
Courts but without success' (Waitangi Tribunal, Wai-6, 1983) and they provided 
fourteen examples of superior court decisions from 1847 to 1977. 
Yet in an opinion given on the Treaty of Waitangi in 1848, the noted jurist Joseph 
Phillimore commented: 
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Of the validity of this Treaty no one at all versed in the science of public 
law can entertain a doubt. It possesses all the ingredients which Writers on 
the Law of Nations deem essential to establish the validity of such a 
compact. .. (Kawharu, 1989, p 126 ). 
Phillimore' s comment endorsed the legal validity of the Treaty in international 
law at the time of signing. Despite such views and opinions the Crown has 
resisted and refused from the second half of the 19th century to give the Treaty 
status domestically. A long line of judicial decisions has reinforced the opinion 
that the Treaty is not part of New Zealand law. The infamous example is that of 
Chief Justice Prendergast, in an 1877 case brought by a Maori tribe to void a 
Crown grant of land, declared the Treaty to be, 'A simple nullity. No body politic 
existed capable of making cession of sovereignty, nor could the thing itself exist' 
(Palmer, 1992, p72). This view is now recognized as having been based on a 
wrong approach to international law that persisted for a long time (Williamson J 
in Dawson, 2001 ). 
For Maori the very lack of legal status is a breach of the undertakings made and 
entered into between the two Treaty partners in 1840. As Chief Judge Durie has 
stated when commenting on the Treaty's lack of legal status 'Of course no one 
told the Maoris that would be so when the Treaty was signed, or that partnership 
would be conditional on the affirmation of a democratically elected parliament' 
(Durie in Kelsey, 1990, p220). 
Between the lack of legal status and the inconsistency of the Crown's position it is 
not surprising that there has been a widening gap between Maori and Pakeha 
expectations of the Treaty. Richardson J, sitting in the Court of Appeal (cited in 
Kawharu, 1989), has commented: 
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... the Treaty has never been legislatively adopted as domestic law in New 
Zealand. And any readings of our history brings home how different the 
attitudes of the Treaty partners to the Treaty have been for much of our 
post 1840 history: on the one hand, relative neglect and ignoring of the 
Treaty because it was not viewed as of any constitutional significance or 
political or social relevance; and on the other, continuing reliance on 
Treaty promises and continuing expressions of great loyalty to and trust in 
the Crown. It is only in relatively recent years and as reflected in the 
Treaty of Waitangi legislation itself that the lagging partner has started 
seriously addressing these questions (Kawharu, 1989, p76). 
So if the argument that the Treaty is the reason why Maori interests should be 
factored in by the Crown was rejected that in itself is not sufficient to ignore the 
State's obligation to Maori. There are ample precedents within many Western 
jurisdictions that acknowledge that a colonising State has obligations to remedy 
the negative effects it has had on an indigenous people. The United States alone 
makes special provision for indigenous health services, indigenous gambling 
rights, land, and other natural resources (Prucha, 1990). 
The Crown has a responsibility to Maori due to the Treaty commitments entered 
into and as the coloniser of the indigenous people. International law has 
recognized the Treaty as legally valid and an international Treaty of cession. 
International arbitral tribunals have twice indicated that the Treaty of Waitangi 
was a valid and effectual international treaty of cession. 
In Rogers & Co, an arbitral decision under the Convention between Great Britain 
and the United States of 8 February 1853, the British Commissioner, Homby, 
held: 
On the 6th of February 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was concluded, by 
which the Islands of New Zealand were ceded to Great Britain ... 
(Kawharu, 1989, pl25) 
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He added that 'the cession was accepted by Governor Hobson and Sir G.Gipps'. 
The Anglo-American arbitral tribunal in the William Webster case reached the 
same conclusion in 1925. The terms of the Treaty established the expected 
relationship between the indigenous people and the Government. Failure by the 
Government to honour the terms of the treaty may be seen as a denial of the 
intemati~nal law obligation to ensure treatment which is equal in fact as well in 
law. 
The Treaty of Waitangi and the modem understanding of its principles represent 
part of the 'public law· by which the relationship between Maori and the Crown is 
legally expressed. International law, including norms relating to indigenous 
peoples and to human rights, is imported into this public law to a limited but 
significant extent (Kawharu, 1989). 
The rights of indigenous people as determined by the United Nations, who have 
historically advocated to protect human rights, would place an obligation on the 
Crown to recognise the unique rights of Maori as tangata whenua. Internationally 
the rights of indigenous people have been recognized by organizations such as the 
United Nations and affiliated working parties, International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and UNESCO. 
Critical to the debate on the rights and recognition of indigenous peoples is the 
very definition of what or who are indigenous people. In 1989 the International 
Labour Organisation adopted a treaty dealing with indigenous rights; the 
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Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations in Independent 
Countries: Convention 169. The Convention defined indigenous peoples as: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and 
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national 
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own 
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, 
or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of 
conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries 
and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
The ILO Convention also notes that "self-identification as indigenous or tribal 
shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which 
the provisions of this Convention shall apply" (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994, pl 0). 
The Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the United Nations 
Assembly December 1986 and supported by New Zealand took a position that 
upheld the aspirations of indigenous and colonised peoples. It encompassed the 
contemporary view of tino rangatiratanga. Relevant provisions of the Declaration 
included: 
Article I (I) 'the right to development is an inalienable human right by 
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realised .... 
Article 3( I) 'States have the primary responsibility for the creation of 
national and international conditions favourable to the realisation of the 
right to development. .. 
Article 10 'Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and 
progressive enhancement of the right to development, including the 
formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other 
measures at the national and international levels' (UN, 1986). 
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The Waitangi Tribunal in its 1988 report on the Muriwhenua Fisheries claim 
noted 'That all peoples have a right to development is an emerging concept in 
international law following the Declaration on the Right to Development' and 
referred to its possible application to indigenous peoples (Kawharu, I.989, p139). 
In its 1987 report on Indigenous Peoples, the Independent Commission on 
International Humanitarian Issues said: 
At the conceptual level, the Working Group [ on Indigenous Populations] 
should help clarify specific details relevant to the indigenous in the 
application of the 'right to development' as elaborated in the specific 
General Assembly resolution. We believe that, in the case of the 
indigenous, the 'right to development' has a special historical and 
substantive significance (Kawharu, 1989, pl41). 
The ILO convened a meeting of experts in 1986 to begin the revision of the ILO 
Convention 107 on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, which concluded: 
2. Indigenous and tribal peoples should enjoy as much control as possible 
over their own economic, social and cultural development. 
A provision of these terms was included in the revised Convention and added that, 
'The indigenous and tribal peoples concerned should have the right to decide their 
own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, 
territories, institutions and spiritual well being .. .' (Kawharu, 1989, pl42). 
The United Nations World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination urged States to recognize the rights of indigenous people. 'To 
carry on within their areas of settlement their traditional structure of economy and 
way of life; this should no way affect their right to participate freely on an equal 
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basis in the economic, social, and political development of the country ... ' 
(Kawharu, 1989, pl47). 
In 1990 the United Nations circulated a draft of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples to the international community for comment. The Declaration 
is a comprehensive document consisting of nine parts and forty-five Articles. Part 
One outlines the international provisions to protect and uphold the rights of the 
indigenous. 
Article 1 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full and effective enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized in the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
international human rights law. 
Article 2 
Indigenous individuals and peoples are free and equal to all other 
individuals and peoples in dignity and rights, and have the right to be free 
from any kind of adverse discrimination, in particular that based on their 
indigenous origin or identity. 
Article 3 
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their 
legal systems, while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so 
choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. 
Other relevant Articles 
Article 7 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be 
subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide, including prevention of and 
redress for: 
Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity 
as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; 
Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their 
lands, territories or resources; 
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Any form of population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or 
undermining any of their rights; 
Any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life 
imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other measures; 
Any form of propaganda directed against them. 
Article 8 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain 
and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right 
to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such. 
Article 19 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, at 
all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives 
and destinies through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance 
with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own 
indigenous decision-making institutions. 
Article 20 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, 
through procedures determined by them, in devising legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them. 
States shall obtain the free and informed consent of the peoples concerned 
before adopting and implementing such measures. 
Article 22 
Indigenous peoples have the right to special measures for the immediate, 
effective and continuing improvement of their economic and social 
conditions, including in the areas of employment, vocational training and 
retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. 
Article 23 
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and 
strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, 
indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop all health, 
housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as 
far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own 
institutions (UN, 1990). 
In 1993 the New Zealand government sought the opinion of tangata whenua on 
the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through consultative hui 
and submissions. The Draft Declaration intentions support Maori aspirations to 
assert tino rangatiratanga. In the international context it is perceived as a 
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legitimate right. In the context of the United Nations those are rights that Maori as 
indigenous peoples have an entitlement to assert and have recognized. The New 
Zealand government has yet to sign the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. 
While the aspirations of Maori as indigenous people with rights is upheld by 
Human Rights groups there is no obligation on the State to recognize such rights. 
There is a range of responses to Maori requests to have the Treaty honoured and 
their Treaty rights recognized. The relationship Pakeha have had with the Treaty 
could be described as conflicted, inconsistent and dishonest. Crown leadership has 
appeared at times to do little to encourage it to be otherwise (Kelsey, 1990, 
Dawson 2001). 
What recognition there has been could be described as backhanded. Historically, 
Treaty recognition has focused predominantly on the actual day of signing and the 
events that took place in 1840. It has been more comfortable to look to the past 
and focus on the actual event than get to grips with the contemporary reality of the 
Treaty. 
Events of the last three decades in New Zealand's social history have contributed 
to a shift in public opinion surrounding the Treaty. The 1970s saw the rise of 
Maori protest action that focused on the Treaty and challenged the Crown's lack 
of recognition. Significant events included the march on Parliament of the Maori 
Lands Right movement with 30,000 supporters that demanded a moratorium on 
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the alienation of the remaining Maori land, and land occupations of disputed land 
such as Bastion Point, Raglan and Awhitu. 
Other contributors have been the Waitangi Tribunal and its role in the 
examination of New Zealand's colonial history. Initially the Tribunal was to only 
hear claims of Treaty breaches after 1975 when the Act came into force. The 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 also required the Tribunal to take into account the 
principles of the Treaty and gave it statutory authority to decide what those 
principles were. In 1985 the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act was passed to 
give the Waitangi Tribunal retrospective power to 1840. 
As a result Maori claims on the property rights of physical resources such as land 
and fisheries began to receive long overdue attention. Furthermore, a key 
challenge to the corporatisation process under the State Owned Enterprises Act 
1986 (NZMC v AG, 1987 I NZLR 641) had set some small limits (Kelsey, 1990) 
on the Labour government's ability to ignore the Treaty of W aitangi in its public 
service restructuring and reform. However health, education, welfare, and housing 
had received virtually no consideration at all, and their relevance to the Treaty of 
Waitangi remained largely unexplored (Durie, 1998). 
A combination of these factors led to increased pressure for the Government to 
examine social policy from a Treaty perspective. In 1985 the Standing Committee 
on Maori Health recommended that the Treaty of Waitangi be regarded as a 
foundation for good health. 'The parent body, the New Zealand Board of Health, 
immediately responded in a positive way and itself recommended that 'All 
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legislation relating to health should include recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi' 
(Durie, 1998, p8 l ). 
Despite the above recommendation legislation specific to the health sector 8 years 
later had minimal reference to Maori. The 1993 Health and Disability Services 
Act provided the direction for how the health sector would be reformed. Section 8 
of the Act refers to the ability of the Minister of Health to give to a purchaser 
written notice of the Crown's social and other objectives. These objectives 
include 'the special needs of Maori and other particular communities or people for 
those services· (Health and Disability Services Act, 1993, Section 8 ). The Act 
does not contain either a Treaty reference or specific Maori health objectives. 
Another forum at the time that explored the Treaty and its relevance to New 
Zealand society was the Royal Commission on Social Policy. The Royal 
Commission reported back to the Government its findings in 1988 on its 
examination of the standards of fairness and the foundations of New Zealand's 
society and economy. The terms of reference stated: 
The Royal Commission will inquire into the extent to which existing 
instruments of policy meet the needs of New Zealanders, and report on 
what fundamental or significant reformation or changes are necessary or 
desirable in existing policies, administration, institutions or systems to 
secure a more fair, humanitarian, consistent, efficient and economical 
social policy which will meet the changed and changing needs of this 
country and achieve a more just society (Royal Commission on Social 
Policy, 1987, pl). 
They also included the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 'The Treaty of 
Waitangi is an established foundation of New Zealand's society and economy and 
the application of its principles is one of the major tasks facing the Royal 
Commission on Social Policy' ( 1987). The conclusion that the Royal Commission 
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on Social Policy reached on the Treaty of Waitangi and its role in New Zealand 
society was: 
The Commission believes that the Treaty is always speaking and that it 
has relevance to all economic and social policies. Not only must the past 
be reviewed in light of its principles, but the Treaty's promise must also be 
seen as fundamental to those principles which will underline social 
wellbeing in years to come (Durie, 1994, p84 ). 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy recommended ( 1987) three principles 
relevant both to social policy and the Treaty of Waitangi: partnership, 
participation, and protection. 
The Royal Commission also referred to the Appeal Court litigation between the 
NZ Maori Council and the Crown (NZMC v AG, 1987 1 NZLR 641) over the 
State Owned Enterprises Act and the comments made about Treaty partnership. 
The Appeal Court Judges who heard the case placed emphasis on the 
Treaty as a partnership requiring "the utmost good faith" and a need for 
the partners to act reasonably towards each other. The partnership was 
seen to create responsibilities, including the active protection of Maori 
lands and waters by the Crown and, in tum, loyalty to the Queen and her 
Government by Maori people (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1987, 
pl5). 
The Royal Commission took the view and reinforced that the Treaty's relevance 
could not be excluded from the range of Government policies. This was at odds 
with the Treasury conclusion that the Treaty was 'silent, as in respect of 
employment, incomes, and economic development' (Durie, 1998, p85). The 
Commission rejected the Treasury position. Precedents had been set by the 
Government and Crown agencies that indicated that Treasury was out of step with 
some of the Crown's own initiatives and attempts to address the contemporary 
Treaty issues. 
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The State Owned Enterprises Act l 986 has an explicit Treaty of Waitangi 
reference that provided the sole constitutional impediment to privatisation and 
radical government reform of State assets that occurred in the ensuing period. 
Section 9 of the Act states 'Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a 
manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi'. 
The Labour Government Cabinet in 1986 agreed that "all future legislation 
referred to Cabinet at the policy approval stage should draw attention to any 
implications for recognition of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" (Royal 
Commission on Social Policy, 1987, p 15 ). It also recommended that government 
departments should consult with Maori on significant matters as well as assessing 
financial and resource implications arising from Treaty considerations. 
The Department of Health was one of the first responsive government 
departments to the Government suggestion. In 1986 in a circular memorandum 
from the Director-General of Health, Dr George Salmond, to the Hospital Boards 
and Area Health Boards, he noted that the Treaty had special significance and 
recommended that its principles be integrated into the health services. He stated 
the Department's views as: 
For the Department of Health, the Treaty has special significance. 
Concepts of health are firmly based in Maori culture (which according to 
the Treaty has a right to official recognition and protection) and Maori 
people have a right to appropriate services - funded through our health 
system. The Department accepts this view which is in accord with the 
WHO principles set out in the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 on Primary 
Health Care (Durie, 1998, p85). 
The Ministerial Advisory Committee on A Maori Perspective published a report, 
Puao-te-ata-tu, in 1986 which examined the structures, practices and processes of 
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the Department of Social Welfare as they related to Maori. The Department later 
made a submission to the Royal Commission, which stated that 'all State agencies 
will have to come to terms with their responsibilities under the Treaty of 
Waitangi' (Durie, 1998, p85). 
While some Crown agencies recognized their Treaty partnership responsibilities 
and obligations there was no uniform or standard approach throughout Crown 
entities or within the Crown itself. One attempt to address this was the Labour 
Cabinet's 1989 "Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi". This 
• 
initiative was to get some consistency on how the Crown proposed to act on 
Treaty issues. The intent was to state both the Crown· s rights and obligations in a 
balanced way. 
Geoffrey Palmer, former Prime Minister, Attorney General and Minister of 
Justice has described the purpose of the Principles as: 
There was no intention on my part or the Government's to rewrite the 
Treaty. And the document did not do this. There did need to be some 
specificity about what we were doing and what we were not doing. Where 
did the Crown stand? The Treaty is not a self-executing document. It does 
not render up plain meaning to current issues in the way that statutes 
sometimes do. It is vague and uncertain. When you are running a 
Government it is not enough to tell the officials to follow the Treaty. They 
need more clarity than that, especially where valuable economic assets are 
being negotiated. I wanted a clear set of principles which would be applied 
by the whole government system. I also wanted a statement that could be 
given to the public which set out in plain terms the principles on which the 
government was acting. I wanted the principles on which we were acting 
rigorously thought through and stated. That was achieved and the 
statement was used later as the base for the decisions we took (Palmer, 
1992, p85). 
The principles were: 
The Kawanatanga Principle - The Principle of Government 
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The first Article of the Treaty gives expression to the right of the Crown to 
make laws and its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional 
process. This sovereignty is qualified by the promise to accord the Maori 
interest specified in the second Article an appropriate priority. 
The Rangatiratanga Principle - The Principle of Self Management 
The second Article of the Treaty guarantees to lwi Maori the control and 
enjoyment of those resources and taonga which it is their wish to retain. 
The preservation of a resource base, restoration of iwi self-management, 
and the active protection of taonga, both material and cultural, are 
necessary elements of the Crown· s policy of recognising rangatiratanga. 
The Principle of Equality 
The third Article of the Treaty constitutes a guarantee of legal equality 
between Maori and other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all 
New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. Furthermore, the common 
law system is selected by the Treaty as the basis for that equality, although 
human rights accepted under international law are incorporated also. 
The third Article also has an important social significance in the implicit 
assurance that social rights would be enjoyed equally by Maori with all 
New Zealand citizens of whatever origin. Special measures to attain that 
equal enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international law. 
The Principle of Co-operation 
The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two 
peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality 
implies distinctive cultural development and unity implies common 
purpose and community. The relationship between community and 
distinctive development is governed by the requirement of cooperation 
which is an obligation placed on both parties to the Treaty. 
Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there is consultation on 
major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and 
commonsense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable 
cooperation will be partnership. 
The Principle of Redress 
The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution 
of grievance arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, the 
Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation. The provision of redress, where 
entitlement is established, must take account of its practical impact and of 
the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown demonstrates 
commitment to this process of redress then it will expect reconciliation to 
result (Palmer, 1992, p85, 86). 
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Palmer believed that the principles were an effective guide for the Crown as 
Treaty partner in its dealings with the Maori Treaty Partner. 
Effectively, every new government has been able to reinterpret the Treaty in line 
with its own ideological and political imperatives, a 'Crown monologue' 
(Dawson, 2001, p193). The "Crown" as a consistent Treaty partner with whom 
Maori can hold dialogue, has degenerated into a seesawing process between 
parties competing for government, rather than that consistent partner. Maori have 
been obliged to react to unilateral change imposed by governments who believe a 
democratic mandate is the only legitimacy that they need (Dawson, 2001). 
The disparity between Maori, collectively and individually, and other New 
Zealanders highlights the degree to which Maori have been disadvantaged by this 
process. The health reforms in the period covered by this study provide an 
illustration of its impact. 
The Treaty of Waitangi, The Crown and Maori Health 
The role of the Treaty of Waitangi in respect of public provision of health services 
is not a new issue. As noted the Department of Health was addressing the issue 
over 15 years ago. There have been policy guidelines for Boards and health 
management on their Treaty responsibilities and the implications in the delivery 
of health care for over a decade. 
In 1995 the Public Health Commission stated its understanding of the Treaty and 
its applicability to health service delivery as follows: 
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The clear direction of Te Ara Ahu Whakamua Hui (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994) 
was that the fundamental base of any relationship between Maori and a 
Crown agent should be the Treaty of Waitangi. It is a living document 
which recognises the tangata whenua (indigenous people) status of Maori 
and establishes an ongoing relationship between Maori and the Crown 
(Public Health Commission, 1995, p 13 ). 
The Ministry of Health, in its 1994 publication Kia Whai te Maramatanga, 






Partnership and equality 
Article One sets out the constitutional basis for the system of government in New 
Zealand. It is on the basis of the relationship with Iwi Maori as tangata whenua 
that the Crown must consult with Maori. Thus, in the health context Maori have a 
legitimate expectation to be both consulted with and involved in the significant 
decisions which effect the planning, funding, and delivery of health services to 
them. 
The Treaty contains within it specific obligations which require the 
Government, as Treaty partner, to address the inequitable position of 
Maori .... This carries with it specific duties to consult with Maori in the 
development of government policies and programmes (Public Health 
Commission, 1995, p13). 
Article Two confirms the right of Maori to control their own property, resources 
and destiny, within those rules necessary for the operation of the state. Non-
material assets including health and well being are included in those ownership 
rights. 
There were reminders from kuia and koroua that Maori wellbeing was the 
result of a complex set of relationships which included social, economic, 
political, cultural and spiritual factors (Pomare et al, 1995, p26). 
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The government, in its explicit funding of Maori kaupapa, or (provided) by Maori 
for Maori services, recognises the principle of tino rangatiratanga over matters of 
health. 
Dr Paparangi Read also insists on the significance of Article Two in respect of 
intangible resources: 
Article 2 of the Treaty is important in terms of resources. It guarantees 
protection of resources, people resources, natural resources, intangible 
resources - head space which is Maori. Unless we take care to actively 
protect the survival of that head space, the natural resources, the human 
resources, we are not honouring the Treaty (Reid, 1989, p26). 
According to Mason Durie, 
Health professionals could have unwittingly contributed to an 
undermining of these values [integrative Maori conception of health] 
(referred to in Article 2) by assuming leadership roles that diminished the 
authority of tribal leaders and chiefs. The treaty guaranteed to tribes the 
right to determine and control their own villages and treasures: it did not 
expect that doctors or social workers would have higher order claims on 
child care or the care of the elderly (Durie, 1989, 283-5). 
Article Three says that Maori have the same rights as other New Zealand citizens, 
in addition to their rights under Articles One and Two of the Treaty. In the health 
service context, this article guarantees Maori both an equitable use of health 
services, and equity of health outcomes. The fact that Maori are higher than 
average users of health services does not release the Crown from the obligation to 
ensure their health status is as good as that of other citizens. In fact, their poorer 
than average health status is the contributor to their higher than average 
utilisation. Mason Durie argues in respect of mental health that: 
Good (mental) health is not compatible with unemployment, demeaning 
and unrewarding work, negative experiences at school and powerlessness. 
Neither is it consistent with article three of the Treaty of Waitangi with its 
guarantee of equality between Maori people and other New 
Zealanders ... By almost any indicator, Maori participation in society and 
the economy is low and disparities between Maori and non-Maori remain 
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at unacceptably high levels. Poor (mental) health is a not unexpected 
consequence (Durie, 1999, p5-12). 
Pomare et al. ( 1995, p27) argue that health and the Treaty have been linked from 
the moment of its signing: 
The Treaty has special relevance to health. Firstly, the wellbeing of 
residents, and some would argue particularly Maori, was an intention of 
the Treaty noted both in Normanby's instructions to Hobson and in the 
preamble to the Treaty. This is reinforced by the health implications of the 
various articles including processes of good government, self-
determination and development of iwi resources, as well as participation 
and equity. 
Recent Government Response to the Treaty and Health 
From 1986, the Department of Health began informing Hospital Boards and the 
then developing Area Health Boards of their Treaty of Waitangi responsibilities 
and the implications for Maori health. The Department's memorandum in 1987 
specifically stated that it had "notified districts and board offices that workshops 
would be held to assist them to understand the Treaty and its implications for the 
health services" (Dept. of Health, 1987). 
The Department of Health ( 1987) defined two aspects of the Treaty as having 
implications for the provision of health services and Maori health. These were the 
concept of partnership and the protection of taonga. Partnership was described in 
the following terms: 
• partnership can occur at all levels of policy making by the 
sharing of power and decision making, satisfactory consultation 
and the inclusion of a cultural perspective in policies. 
• partnership can refer to the process of drafting, implementing 
and monitoring of legislation. 
• partnership is about the manner in which representation is 
ensured at all levels of administration. 





partnership extends to the provision of social services and the 
types of services available. 
partnership challenges the diverse, ethnic and cultural groups in 
New Zealand to consider their relationships with the tangata 
whenua. 
partnership requires opportunity for partners to regularly 
review their relationship and to plan jointly for the well-being 
of all New Zealanders (Dept. of Health, 1987). 
The Department of Health described the concept of partnership as the core issue 
in honouring the Treaty. The first principle of the kaupapa of the Department 
stated that it intended "to recognise the Treaty of Waitangi in all activities 
undertaken" (Dept. of Health, 1987). 
The memorandum from the Department on Treaty responsibilities for Area Health 
Boards was clear on why Boards needed to be more proactive in honouring their 
Treaty obligations and how this would be demonstrated: 
To fulfil the requirement to honour the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori people, 
particularly the tangata whenua in board areas, need to be an integral part 
of the consultation and planning processes. Boards will need therefore to 
identify and liaise with local Maori authorities. 
Proposals to become Area Health Boards should clearly document how 
Maori people have participated in the process of consultation and 
planning. The arrangements proposed to ensure that they will continue to 
be involved in the subsequent development and administration of the area 
health board should also be specified (Dept. of Health, 1987). 
The National Interim Provider Board (NIPB) managed the structural changes of 
the 1991 health reforms. They were charged with overseeing the radical shift from 
a consultative to a competitive health model, and were mindful of the 
government's Treaty policies and obligations and reported as follows: 
The NIPB expects that the Crown's general Treaty of Waitangi policies 
will continue to apply to health sector assets and activities after the 
reforms. 
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Although Area Health Boards are not part of the "legal" Crown, the 
Waitangi Tribunal can consider claims relating to acts or omissions by the 
Crown in respect of area health board assets or activities, and has done so. 
The process of transferring those assets to Crown Health Enterprises and 
Regional Health Authorities does not change any Treaty of Waitangi 
obligations the Crown may have and does not weaken the position of 
Maori claimants as the assets remain in Crown-owned entities (NIPB, 
1992, p58). 
This recent momentum to incorporate the Treaty in all aspects of the health 
delivery and health management system dissipated in the 1990s. Several factors 
may account for this, including the ongoing fragmentation of the health system, 
engendered in the reforms of the 1990s and dominance of the commercial model 
in the health sector, and consequent lack of clarity over whose role it was to 
monitor Treaty compliance in health. 
From the above it is clear here is a marked contrast between the specific Treaty 
policies of thel 980s, with directions on how they can be implemented at the 
regional level, and the statements in the 1990s about the Treaty at the national 
level. The generalised position the government took at the national level in the 
1990s appears to have placed no expectation that regional health services would 
comply with the Treaty and there has not been active monitoring to ensure that 
they did so. For example, the Green and White Paper "Your Health and the Public 
Health" (Upton, 1991), contained no reference to the Treaty whatsoever. The 
monitoring issue is discussed in some detail in a later chapter. The degree to 
which this was government naivety (perhaps in part due to the National Party's 
more distant links to traditional Maori power structures) or oversight is difficult to 
determine. Certainly, the 1990 health sector reforms included a wish to lessen the 
effectiveness of, or capture by, interest groups in the health sector, and Maori may 
have been perceived as one, if not one of major importance. 
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Treaty compliance and implementation at the regional level was left to the 
individual CHE to interpret. The proactive stance the Department took in the late 
1980s dissipated with the drive to meet the commercial expectations of the new 
Government initiatives in the 1990s. 
Many of the senior health service managers in Area Health Boards of the late 
1980s were replaced in the 1991 reforms. In particular, the newly created 
commercially focused Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) often employed a CEO 
with a commercial background, such as Auckland Healthcare, whose first CEO 
was Denis Pickup, an ex Brewery General Manager. The loss of institutional 
memory in the transition, plus the change in organisational culture and leadership, 
may also partially account for the reduced emphasis on the Treaty. 
However, it is evident in much of the documentation reviewed for this study that 
the Treaty and interpretation and application of its articles in the health context 
was no longer driving government policy in the mid 1990s. For example the 
Minister of Health's Policy Guidelines for Maori Health 1995/96 make the 
following references to the Treaty of Waitangi: 
Securing the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in the health and disability 
sector will be fundamental to the improvement of Maori health in the 
medium term. 
The government has affirmed that the Treaty of Waitangi is New 
Zealand's founding document (Shipley, 1995, pl0,19). 
Aside from this affirmatory rhetoric, little is provided by way of explanation as to 
the nature of that place, or the means of operationalising the Treaty in the 
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planning and delivery of health services, in contrast to the detailed Department of 
Health advice to Area Health Boards (Dept of Health, 1987 ). 
Maori Health as a Health Gain Priority 
Concurrent with the restructuring of the health sector in the 1990s the 
Government identified Maori health as one of its four health gain priority areas. 
This influenced government policy and objectives. The most comprehensive 
description of the Government's objectives for Maori health at the start of the 
1990s round of health sector reform is found in "Whaia te ora mo te iwi", a 
statement of response to Maori issues in the health sector, published in 1992. The 
Minister of Health stated in the foreword that the Government " regards the 
Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of New Zealand, and acknowledges 
that government must meet the health needs of Maori and help address the 
improvements of their health status" (Dept. of Health, 1992). 
In a separate document also titled Whaia te ora mote Iwi(1993), a statement of 
Maori health policy objectives for the Regional Health Authorities and the Public 
Health Commission, the government indicated how it would implement policy to 
achieve the Crown objective. In the attempt to meet Maori needs, Regional Health 
Authorities were obliged to encourage providers to: 
• be aware of and responsive to the aspirations and interests of 
Maori; 
• be aware of and responsive to the diversity of Maori needs and 
expectations; 
• encourage greater participation of Maori in service provision 
and the delivery of culturally appropriate services; 
• work sensitively with Maori and Iwi through high quality 
consultation; 
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• recognise the tikanga and mana of each Iwi group in their 
region; 
• consider how the health needs of Maori who are outside their 
own rohe were to be met; 
• be aware that lwi and Maori groups have their own vision of 
health, often linked to their history (Dept. of Health, Te Puni 
Kokiri, 1993 ). 
The overall Government objective for Maori health was to "seek to improve the 
health status of Maori, so that in future Maori will have the opportunity to enjoy 
the same level of health as non-Maori" (Ferguson, 1998). The notion of 
partnership with Maori, particularly at the level of Maori political institutions is 
lacking. The Crown set out to remedy Maori health status its way. 
Maori health has remained a high priority for government in its funding and 
delivery of health services. Policy advice to the incoming National/New Zealand 
First coalition government following the 1996 election stressed that the three key 
issues in Maori health were: 
• Maori health remaining a health sector priority for 
improvement 
• The need to consolidate gains in Maori health development 
• The need to continue to acknowledge the special relationship 
between Maori and the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi 
because Maori continue to lag behind non-Maori in almost every indicator 
of health status ( Steering Group, Ministers of Health, 1997). 
Monitoring the Treaty and Health 
It has been difficult to establish who held the responsibility during the period 
1990-2000 for monitoring of Crown Companies to ensure they met the 
government's objectives and did not breach the Treaty and honoured its 
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principles. The fragmentation of the public health services over that time is one 
factor that has led to this confusion. Earlier comments about accountability and 
the commercial interests of providers and funders apply in equal measure to the 
issue of monitoring. 
It might be, as some of the interviewees in this research thought, that the 
monitoring of Hospital and Health Services (HHS) and their Treaty compliance 
was the responsibility of Te Puni Kokiri. This was not so. Te Puni Kokiri did not 
have a monitoring role at the local or regional level. Their focus was at the central 
decision-making level. The agency review process did not look at performance 
but was process focused. They were not involved in the monitoring of Hospital 
and Health Services. 
In the Ministry of Maori Development Act 1991, Te Puni Kokiri is 
required to "monitor, and liaise with, each department and agency that 
provides or has a responsibility to provide services to, or for, Maori for the 
purpose of ensuring the adequacy of those services". This has led the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Branch to focus on reviewing the policy 
advice, purchasing processes and decision-making processes in the public 
sector. 
CCMAU is responsible for monitoring HHS on behalf of the Crown, as 
owner of those companies (Davies, 1999). 
Te Puni Kokiri was not the only Crown entity to believe that CCMAU held the 
monitoring role. The Maori Health Commission also supported this definition of 
their role. The former Commissioner Wayne McLean stated that the opinion of 
the Commission was that the role of oversight and monitoring of the HHSs was 
the responsibility of CCMAU (Linkhom, telephone interview, 1999). 
However, it is not evident from the publications of the Crown Company 
Monitoring Advisory Unit that the monitoring of HHSs for Treaty compliance 
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came within their monitoring role. CCMAU published a booklet ( 1999) to clarify 
its roles and responsibilities. It contains no reference to the Treaty of Waitangi. 
When the question was put to Crown Law to raise with CCMAU on the 
researcher's behalf, the Assistant Crown Counsel wrote: 
I am advised that no information is held by the Crown Company 
Monitoring Advisory Unit that specifically addresses your request for 
information on "how Crown companies are monitored to ensure the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi are upheld and the interests of the 
Maori Treaty partner are protected" (Linkhorn, Letter, 1999). 
What is more, it was the opinion of the Maori Health Commissioner that as the 
Treaty was excluded from the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 there was 
no obligation on Crown agencies to comply with or adhere to Treaty principles 
(McLean, telephone interview, 1999). The Health and Disability Services Act was 
the legislation that created the new health entities and established the new 
structural framework for health service delivery in the 1990 reforms. 
This of course sits very strangely with the previously referenced statement of 
Jenny Shipley when Minister of Health, who, in the foreword to "Whaia te ora mo 
te iwi - Strive for the good health of the people" (Dept. of Health, 1992), stated 
that the Government: 
regards the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of New Zealand, 
and acknowledges that government must meet the health needs of Maori 
and help address the improvements of their health status. 
The Crown as Owner of Hospital and Health Services 
The ownership relationship between the Crown and CHEs/HHSs sat with two 
Ministers, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of CHEs ( until 1996) or 
Health (post 1996 National/New Zealand First coalition Government), and was 
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exercised through CCMAU. The Crown established its expectations of its 
commercial entities through annual statements of owner's expectations. These 
formed the matching half to the CHE/HHS annual statement of intent. 
CCMAU described itself (Clarke, 1999, p 11) as an independent unit 
administratively attached to the Treasury. The publications from CCMAU and 
Treasury indicate that their internal culture does not appear to take into account 
the people-based principles that underpin the Treaty. The focus is economic and 
financial analysis driven. Interviews with CCMAU personnel did not clarify the 
exact legal and organisational status of CCMAU. 
Statements of owner's expectations of Crown Health Enterprises contain few 
references to Maori, and Maori health, all of a relatively marginal nature. For 
example, the March 1998 Statement requires Boards of CHEs: 
In disposing of surplus facilities, ... ensure that you comply with the 
surplus asset disposal requirements, including; 
the relevant protection mechanism which addresses the Crown's 
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi, and good governance over 
Maori sites of significance 
This same document further notes that CHEs are also required by the Health and 
Disability Services Act ( 1993) to: 
assist in meeting the Crown's objectives under the Act, which include the 
special needs of Maori for health and disability services. 
The Maori Health Commission developed policy with CCMAU ( 1999) to include 
Treaty-based obligations in the annual set of expectations. The 1999 Statement of 
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Expectations from the Shareholding Ministers refers for the first time to principal 
objectives and performance expectations of HHSs for Maori health: 
Maori Health 
Principal objective 
The Crown's overall objective for Maori health is to improve Maori health 
status so that Maori have the opportunity to enjoy the same level of health 
as non-Maori (CCMAU, 1999- see Appendix 1). 
This change appears to reflect the government policy changes bought about as a 
result of the 1996 National/ New Zealand First Government Coalition agreement, 
and specifically the advice to the government on implementing that policy, as 
referred to in previous chapters (Steering Group, Ministers of Health, 1997). 
Interdepartmental work in 1997 and 1998 by Te Puni Kokiri in partnership with 
the Ministry of Health, Health Funding Authority, Mental Health Commission 
and Maori Health Commission produced a matrix of critical success factors which 
"should be used as the basis for evaluation of funder and provider performance" 
(MHC, HFA, MOH, 1998). While the partners focused on the funding and 
delivery of mental health services, the document's principles are in many cases 
more generally applicable to Maori health service delivery. For example, when 
evaluating a mainstream service provider such as Healthcare Hawke's Bay on the 
issue of Maori access, the critical success factors are listed as: 
Can the provider demonstrate strategies are in place to ensure that access 
to the service is as easy and effective for Maori as it is for non-Maori? 
Does the provider check that Maori know when and how to access 
services? 
Can the provider show that there are strategies in place to encourage 
Maori to access services at early stages of their illness? (Mental Health 
Commission, 1998). 
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While the Crown has been much less explicit in the 1990s in respect of its Treaty 
obligations and health, it is clear throughout the health sector that Maori health 
and Maori health disparity remains a major Crown concern. Numerous reports by 
Te Puni Kokiri, the Ministry of Health, the Health Funding Authority and 
independent health researchers confirm that fact (TPK, 1994, MOH, 1998, HF A, 
1998, Pomare et al, 1995 ). If health and wellbeing are taonga, treasures protected 
by Article 2 of the Treaty, as both Professor Mason Durie and the Department of 
Health have held, (Durie, 1989) then clearly the Crown has failed to protect and 
enhance Maori health to the same degree as that of other citizens. 
The reduced focus on the centrality of the Treaty to health in policy, contract and 
law during and following the 1993 health sector reforms suggests a loss of focus 
on the Crown's responsibility for Maori health in the specific light of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, during that period. Furthermore, it suggests a lack of commitment on 
the part of the Crown, to involve Maori adequately in solution seeking. The 
Minister of Health, as quoted earlier stated that the Government" acknowledges 
that government must meet the health needs of Maori and help address the 
improvements of their health status" (Dept. of Health, 1992). The Crown appears 
to act as if the problem of Maori health status, and the solutions thereto, are its 
own singular concern, at the policy formation and funding allocation level. Maori 
may participate as providers of solutions, but may not help determine what 
suitable solutions are to be. 
The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that the Crown during the 1990s 
has clearly failed to set objectives and standards in respect of Crown agency 
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response to the Treaty of Waitangi, let alone monitor the performance of its CHEs 
in respect of Crown obligations under the Treaty. While the CHEs were 
commercial enterprises, the ownership interest in them was entirely the Crown's. 
If the National Interim Provider Board's view was correct, the Crown cannot 
release itself from its obligations to protect and promote the rights of Maori by 
commercial constructions (see earlier discussion regarding the unitary Crown). 
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CHAPTER 3 - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NEW 
ZEALAND'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORMS: 1938 - 1997 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist -
John Maynard Keynes (Easton, 1997, p245-6 ). 
The New Zealand health sector as it is today grew out of the establishment of the 
Welfare State in the 1930s. The post-1984 reforms to the Welfare State, based on 
burgeoning costs, a decline in the New Zealand economic performance in 
comparison with similar nations, and the introduction of "New Right" economic 
ideologies eventually, also came to dramatically change the face of the New 
Zealand health system. 
This chapter provides some historic background to the New Zealand Welfare 
State, and its development. It then examines the radical transition in New Zealand 
society begun in 1984 as a result of the factors outlined above. The roles of 
ideology, the place of public versus private provision, are considered, along with 
the internationalisation of the New Zealand economy. This provides the necessary 
context to an understanding of the most recent changes within the New Zealand 
health sector. The following chapter commences with the impact of international 
influences on the New Zealand health sector, followed by a review of mainstream 
health sector changes in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The Establishment of the New Zealand Welfare State 
The structural reforms of the 1980s were not the first example of New Zealand 
government ideology influencing, driving and shaping health policy. Walter 
Nash's 1936 Budget was a declaration on the nature of the social democratic state 
in New Zealand society and provided a blueprint for how that society would exist. 
According to Nash, the aim of the state was to: 
... organise an internal economy that will distribute the production and 
services of the Dominion in a way that will guarantee to every person able 
and willing to work an income sufficient to provide him and his 
dependents with everything necessary to make a 'home' and 'home life' in 
the best sense of the meaning of those terms (McKinlay, 1987, p 15). 
In 1938 the first Labour government funded and directed the activities of what 
was intentionally a 'welfare state', in which the government took responsibility for 
the welfare of New Zealanders from the cradle to the grave. It established "a 
single scheme covering everyone for every need" (Mendlesohn, 1954, pl84). 
The legislation that imposed change on the health sector was the Social Security 
Act 1938. It is an example of revolutionary change in the health sector driven by 
the ideology of the prevailing government. The Act mandated an open-ended 
commitment to universal access to health care for all citizens and has been 
described as the world's first national health service (Cheyne, O'Brien & 
Belgrave, 1997; Rudd, 1997). The ideology promoted that access to health care 
was a social right and should be based on need not ability to pay. The extensive 
coverage in welfare benefits heralded what has been described as the 'golden age 
of the welfare state· (Rudd, 1997, p256). 
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The Act included provision for medical, hospital and other health related benefits, 
placed under the responsibility of the Minister of Health. Its intent was to legislate 
for universal access to a comprehensive health care system. Before 1938 and 
particularly before 1900, there was no single or coherent policy driver directing 
the funding or financing of health care in New Zealand, and many different 
arrangements could be found. Individuals paid for primary medical care on a fee-
for-service basis, to the best of their ability, including a rudimentary medical 
insurance structure based on benevolent societies, unions, and the like, whereas 
local and central governments jointly financed hospital and related care. Public 
health responsibilities gradually evolved and centralised after the 1918 influenza 
epidemic (Bloom, 2000; Cheyne, O'Brien & Belgrave, 1997). 
The Social Security Act (1938) provided public hospitals with a daily payment 
initially set at six shillings per bed-day. Although the sum was increased from 
time to time by government, it did not keep pace with the rising costs of hospital 
care. This resulted eventually in an unmanageable burden on local government 
and charitable organisations. It was evident by the 1950s that there was no option 
but to change the basis of hospital funding. The responsibility for all hospital 
funding was transferred to central government by 1957. 
By the mid-1960s the NZ government was having difficulty financing the 
comprehensive provisions of the welfare state (Richards, 1994 ). Due to the public 
hospitals being entirely funded by central government at this time, the financial 
status of the patient and their ability to pay was immaterial. Admission was 
determined strictly by clinical need. There was a consequence for patients who 
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found it increasingly difficult to gain admission to a public hospital for elective 
surgery, and were denied admission altogether if the hospital determined that the 
need for surgery was not sufficiently urgent. This ad-hoc form of rationing 
predated the deliberate and transparent attempts via the 1990s health reforms to 
formalise rationing through core services and guidelines (Core Services 
Committee, 1994 ). 
Expenditure on health services in New Zealand in the 1960s was high by 
international standards. In 1961/62 New Zealand's expenditure on health services 
as a percentage of national income was 6.5 per cent, only 0.3 per cent behind the 
USA in the same year and 0.5 per cent greater than Australia's expenditure in 
1960/61 (Bloom, 2000). In the 1967 Budget the National Government introduced 
unique restraints on grants to hospital boards. They no longer were permitted to 
determine their own financial requirements and control was shifted to the Health 
Department (Bloom, 2000). Change was looming in the coming decade. 
1970s -The Welfare State Under Pressure 
The 1970s were marked by a number of crises that buffeted the New Zealand 
economy, such as the oil crisis, and Britain joining the EEC triggered New 
Zealand industry reviews and assessments. Identified problems were concerns 
about poor industry productivity, export market performance and input costs. The 
New Zealand economy was viewed as insulated, dependent and required 
'fixing' (Britton, 1992; Easton, 1997; Jesson, 1999). 
In this decade there were three particular innovative social welfare initiatives 
implemented that were reminiscent of the first Labour government's welfare 
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policies. In 1972 the Accident Compensation Act was enacted which introduced a 
no-fault, comprehensive system of compensation for all personal injury and death. 
Accident Compensation used creative means to fund the programme in 
comparison to existing social benefits. Compensation was to be earnings-related 
as opposed to a flat rate and financed largely by levies on motor vehicles and 
employers as opposed to general taxation. 
The second significant development arose out of the recommendations of the 
Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security 1972. The 
Commission recommended the introduction of a statutory domestic purposes 
benefit, commonly known as the DPB, for sole parents, women caring for infirm 
and sick persons, and women alone. This welfare provision was innovative in that 
it recognised the statutory right of sole parents to income support, irrespective of 
fault. Previously a discretionary benefit had been available for sole mothers, 
provided they met the criteria which was that the 'male breadwinner' was absent 
through no fault of the intended beneficiary. The Domestic Purposes Benefit did 
not discriminate against unmarried women or women who left their husbands and 
sole fathers were also eligible. 
The final major welfare reform of the 1970s addressed the provisions of pensions 
for the elderly. The complex dual system, Age Benefit and Universal 
Superannuation that did exist required examination, particularly after rapid 
inflation after 1970 reduced the real value of pensions. The Labour Government 
of 1972-1975 proposed an earnings-related scheme, financed by levies on 
earnings and by employers' contributions. 
Page 74 
In 1975 the National opposition responded with a proposal for National 
Superannuation. Brian Easton ( 1997) has described this scheme as the 'most 
expensive' election bribe in the history of New Zealand. National Superannuation 
was to provide that all persons aged sixty or over would receive a flat rate benefit 
equal to 70 per cent of the average weekly wage; the benefit was inflation 
adjusted, and financed wholly by taxation. Additionally, National Superannuation 
was not subject to any income test. After the change from the Labour to National 
Government in 1975 and the introduction of the Scheme in 1977, government 
expenditure on pensions virtually doubled (Rudd, 1997). 
These policy initiatives of the 1970s increased welfare coverage and gender 
equity. The irony was while the innovative developments in welfare provision 
were taking place New Zealand was entering a prolonged economic recession, 
with low economic growth, high inflation, increasing unemployment, and 
resulting in a growing public indebtedness (Easton, 1997; Rudd, 1997). While the 
post-war decades had seen stability in welfare policy coverage and expenditure 
the 1970s saw a dramatic rise in social welfare expenditure. The costs increased 
from 5 .69 per cent of GDP in 1971 /72 to over 11 per cent in 1980/81 (Rudd, 
1997). 
By the late 1970s, the momentum for change had started to gather. New Zealand, 
once near the top of the OECD tables for economic performance and social 
welfare, had fallen well down the list. At the close of the decade the pressures 
were mounting to review and evaluate the welfare state. Some of the arguments of 
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the time suggested that the welfare state was considered to be undermining 
competitiveness on two counts. Firstly the level of taxation required to sustain the 
welfare state reduces commercial profitability, which increases the cost to the 
market and makes it uncompetitive. The second thrust of the argument was more 
overtly anti-welfare when it was argued that the safety net of welfare benefits 
caused workers to lose the incentive to work (Douglas, 1993; Pierson, 1991 ). 
Health service provision, too, would begin to change. 
1980s - A Society in Transition 
A New Ideology 
In the 1980s a new jargon swept New Zealand, the language of neo-liberal reform. 
Key phrases such as market economy, restructuring, competition, stakeholders, 
New Right, Business Roundtable, efficiency and rationality became common to 
explain the revolutionary change New Zealand society experienced. 
'Neo-liberalism' describes a critique of political action based on a 
combination of classical liberal philosophy and present-day, market-
oriented economic theory. From classical liberal philosophy and 
contemporary economic theory, neo-liberalism draws an emphasis on 
individual liberty, as both morally desirable and conducive to the well-
being of society. From economic theory, it draws a scepticism about the 
capacity of activist government to improve upon the outcomes of 
voluntary exchanges. Neo-liberalism is, in essence, individualistic, pro-
market, and anti-utopian in its vision of the state (Miller, 1997, p34 l ). 
Ironically it was the fourth Labour Government after its election in 1984 that 
initiated and implemented this major programme of neo-liberal economic and 
social reform. In the early 1980s the state was viewed critically by many New 
Zealanders. New Zealand was a highly regulated society and the state's role was 
that of regulator of economic and social processes. 
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In the broadest terms Labour's agenda (post 1984) and that of its advisers 
from overseas and within New Zealand, opened the way for the 
elaboration of 'market forces', or more correctly, the regeneration of 
capitalism. Seen in its historical context, this 'development' strategy 
meant the institutional structures which had aided post-World War Two 
growth had to be dismantled. Labour's agenda involved several 
components: changes in macro economic management (a floating 
exchange rate, lower tariff barriers, less control of currency flows and 
interest rates, taxation reform), an overhaul of the social welfare system 
(health, education) and a changed management philosophy in the public 
service (Britton, 1992, p 11 ). 
Underpinning the ideology of the Labour government led New Right reform was 
the commitment to the market in preference to the state as the means of allocating 
resources, and an emphasis on greater individual and corporate freedom as the key 
to economic and social progress. In the casting about for solutions the decline in 
economic growth was blamed on the size of the public sector. 
The 1984 Treasury briefing paper Economic Management presented to the 
incoming Labour government recommended three ways of assessing the future of 
state sector activities. 
Where the benefits of these were primarily individual and separately 
identifiable, they should be sold (privatised); where the benefits were both 
societal and individual, state owned enterprises should be established and 
expected to operate commercially (corporatised); and where the benefits 
were more societal than individual, government departments should 
remain, (departmentalised). Treasury argued that the departmental form of 
organisation was not conducive to the efficient production of goods and 
services for the market (Britton, 1992, p165). 
The prescription that was proposed by the fourth Labour Government was of a 
reduced role of the state in the economy and a dramatic restructuring of the public 
sector. Underpinning the change was the strong belief that the government needed 
to separate its core functions from those public sector businesses that primarily 
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provided marketable goods and services. That prescription had been influenced by 
private sector interests in a way that was quite new. 
Private Sector Influences on the Government of 1984 and beyond 
Reserve Bank Governor Don Brash stated in a 1996 Hayek Memorial Lecture in 
London: 
'The economic debate brought together a small but strategically 
influential team of civil servants, think tankers, policy makers and 
politicians around Roger Douglas. This group of quite remarkable people 
understood clearly what needed to be done and was committed to seeing it 
through' (Jesson, 1999, p13). 
The 'small but strategically influential team' clearly included Treasury and 
Reserve Bank officials advising Douglas, and a group of businessmen who 
became increasingly influential and constituted the inner circle of the Business 
Roundtable (BRT) from 1986: Alan Gibbs, Doug Myers, David Richwhite and 
Ron Trotter. 
There was an informal link with Treasury and BRT and at times the advice or 
position of the two matched. The Chief Executive of the Business Roundtable 
from 1986 was Roger Kerr who was recruited from the Treasury think tank. After 
Kerr's appointment Easton describes the BRT as the most prominent private 
sector advocate of the commercialist approach (Easton, 1997). 
The Business Roundtable was instituted in 1980 and took its name from the 
Business Roundtable in the United States. It had met informally from the mid-
l 970s. Its early industrial membership had been expanded to include chief 
executives from major investment and financial organisations. The Business 
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Roundtable has progressively taken public stands and challenged the government 
of the day on policy issues, including fiscal strategy, electricity pricing, Accident 
Compensation Corporation, tertiary education, public spending efficiency, labour 
market reform, replacement of export incentives and unemployed income support 
(Britton, 1992). The BRT supported privatisation and changes in arrangements for 
the delivery of health care and education, and industrial relations in a direction 
that could be readily described as favouring private enterprise. 
The level of influence of the BRT extended beyond the private sector and a 
number of BRT company directors were advisers to government during state 
sector reform and later held directorships in SOEs, as Table 2 below illustrates. 
Table 2: Business Roundtable Company Director Links to State 
Owned Enterprises, 1989 
Business Roundtable Companies State Owned Enterprises 
FletcherChallenge ------- Telecom (privatised 1990) 
Brierly Investments 
Carter Holt Harvey 
BN2 ------- Government Life 
Lion Nathan ------- Electricorp 
ANZ 
Magnum 
QualityBakers(GFW) ------- Coalcorp 
National Bank 
AMPSociety ------- Electricorp 
Shell NZ Holding 
Comalco 
Newmans Group (Corporate Investments) ------- Airways 
Wilson Neill ------- Government Property Services 
Mainzeal 
Steel and Tube 
Union Shipping 
Ceramco ------- Telecom (privatised 1990) 
United Banking 
Mconnell Dowell 
(Britton, 1992, p 52) 
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One of the most explicit examples of the pervasive influence of the BRT was that 
of Ron Trotter (knighted by Labour). He was chairman of the BRT, which was 
publicly advocating privatisation, and chairman of Fletcher Challenge, which at 
the same time was involved in buying a number of state assets (Easton, 1997). He 
also chaired the board of Telecom and the State Owned Enterprise Monitoring 
Group. Sir Ron Trotter was also a director of the Reserve Bank during the mid-
l 980s and later a chairman of the National Interim Provider Board which steered 
the 1990s National government initiated health reforms. This one example 
demonstrates the network of the BRT and ability it had to influence the Labour 
Government of the mid-late 1980s. 
The Fourth Labour Government 1984 - 1990 
The most recent round of socio-economic reform in the 1990s, although initiated 
by National governments, has its origins in the Labour government initiatives of 
the 1980s when radical measures were introduced to reform the public sector. The 
Labour government based its rationale for public sector reform on it being 
essential to get a better return from state owned assets if the government was 
expected to meet the demands for lower deficits and taxes but provide increased 
support for those least able to help themselves. On 12 December 1985, Roger 
Douglas, the Minister of Finance, in an Economic Statement to the House of 
Representatives said: 
There is scope for improving efficiency within the public sector. This will 
increase our ability to reduce the Government deficit, lower taxes, and 
provide income support and social services for those least able to help 
themselves. In the case of trading operations inefficiency can represent a 
tax on their customers. The essence of the problem is that the public sector 
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needs to be adapted to meet the management needs of the modem 
economy (Chew, 1989, p2). 
Poor performance was attributed to the institutional framework in which public 
sector organisations operated. The flaws were identified as their lacking in clear 
objectives, competition, and performance incentives. The development of state 
owned enterprises (SOE) policy focused on these areas. 
Targeted activities were reviewed to separate out commercial and non-
commercial objectives and functions. New structures were sought to give 
managers clearer objectives and incentives to increase returns, with 
commercial criteria being the basis of performance assessment (SSC, 
1987). Barriers to competition were removed, for example, in the 
deregulation of posts and telecommunications. The State Owned 
Enterprises Act became law in 1986, authorising the formation of nine 
new SOEs. A number of others were subsequently established ... The Act 
set out the principles under which the SOEs are to operate and established 
a regime for accountability (Britton, 1992, p166). 
This theme was not unique to New Zealand. It was echoed internationally after 
the lead of the Thatcher government in Britain that had embarked on programmes 
of privatisation. World Bank and IMF influence coupled with changes in 
democratic systems or governments, had also led to the implementation of similar 
structural adjustment policies in countries such as Chile, Argentina, Peru, Turkey, 
and several of the transition economies of Central Europe (Brook Cowen, 1997, 
p346) 
Initially the Labour government did not tum to privatisation; instead it chose 
corporatisation. This has been defined as a process of "restructuring of 
government owned trading enterprises from departmental form into a limited 
liability company with balance structures and performance criteria similar to 
private companies" (Chew, 1989, p2). The Labour government regarded 
corporatisation as a politically pragmatic strategy that would be more palatable to 
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the public in that it would not have the same negative connotations of 
privatisation. 
One of the key architects of the reformed public sector, Roger Douglas, Minister 
of Finance in the 1984 fourth Labour Government, initially denied the structure 
was directed towards eventual privatisation and described the changes in terms of 
public expenditure control. Simulation of private sector ownership may not have 
been seen as necessarily a step on the path to such ownership. While the architects 
may have been unaware of the possibilities and implications Treasury was well 
aware of the step from corporatisation to privatisation. In their 1984 post-election 
briefing Treasury indicated they supported privatisation. Officials explained to 
sympathetic private sector audiences that corporatisation was a step to eventual 
privatisation. The international trends indicated that if this government did not 
complete the transition from corporatisation to privatisation then a subsequent 
government would. 
The State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 came into effect April 1987 and created 
nine SOEs (seeTable3) and provided the basic legal framework for their rights, 
obligations and functions. The SOE structure allowed the government to retain 
ownership of the trading enterprises and introduce the benefits of monitoring by 
financial markets to these organisations. 
The SOE Act specified the objective of SOEs was 'to operate as a successful 
business'. The SOE programme affected over 60,000 employees. The 
corporatisation of the public sector was implemented with rapid speed and was 
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deliberately undertaken much more rapidly than in either the UK or Australia 
(Douglas, 1993 ). 
The Economic Statement announced a set of principles for State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) that produced goods on a commercial basis. These principles 
were added to by the statement of Principles Guiding the 1986 Expenditure 
Review, which also put the trading activities of departments which were not SOEs 
on a more commercial basis, and the Statement on Government Expenditure 
Reform. None of the three statements is explicit about the form of ownership. The 
objective, corporatisation, was to mimic as closely as possible private sector 
ownership, with the shareholding being held by two ministers of the Crown. This 
created a structure that was ideal for privatisation. 
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Table 3: Development of State Owned Enterprises (Britton, 1992, 
p166) 
Government Department Resulting Entities 
Land Corporation (SOE) 
~::::...---__,,.. Department of Survey and Land 
Department of Lands and Information 
Survey 
Department of Lands ( dissolved 
1990) 
Department of Conservation 
NZ Forest Service 9'1111!!~----•Forestry Corporation (SOE)* 
Commission for the 
Environment 
Ministry of Transport 
Ministry of Forestry 
Ministry for the Environment 
Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment 
Electricity Corporation (SOE) * 
Ministry of Energy ( absorbed by 
Ministry of Commerce 1989) 
Airways Corporation 
Ministry of Transport 
"" Telecom Corporation (SOE) * 
Post Office ...e:.::::::----r Postbank (SOE) * 
NZ Post (SOE) 
-----=----=-: Government Property Services 
SSC (SOE) 
SSC 
* assets subsequently privatised 
Although he had initially denied reform led to privatisation Roger Douglas later 
described the process of corporatisation of the public sector as 'polishing the 
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family silver' in preparation for sale (Douglas & Callen, 1987). The declared 
intention was the need to reduce public debt. The 1988 Budget statement spelt out 
the criteria for the sale of state assets. Douglas stated that 'the best approach to 
ridding the economy of deficits and debt is a combined programme of asset sales 
and a reduction in government expenditure' (Douglas, 1993, p33 ). 
The December 1987 Economic Statement committed the government to a much 
more extensive form of privatisation, fully selling the state-owned enterprises that 
had been corporatised. Roger Douglas later argued that privatisation was the only 
answer due to cost savings and ultimately debt reduction (1993). Douglas 
believed that the market forces would improve the profitability of the newly 
privatised SOEs which they previously would not have achieved. The Douglas 
position was supported in the international forum by the World Bank who 
supported privatisation and in a 1992 study concluded: 
Private ownership makes a difference. Some state-owned enterprises have 
been efficient and well managed for some periods, but government 
ownership seldom permits sustained good performance for more than a 
few years. There is higher probability of efficient performance in private 
enterprise (Douglas, 1993, p35 ). 
So corporatisation and privatisation proceeded, much as Treasury had envisaged, 
under Labour and under the following National government through the1990s. 
The official reason presented was that they were a means of getting down 
government debt, but in reality they were a part of the commercialisation strategy 
(Easton, 1997). 
After Labour's re-election in 1987, the next wave of reform was driven by the 
desire for immediate fiscal savings. Treasury's briefing paper to the incoming 
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government in 1987 argued for implementation of greater clarity of objectives in 
management and the separation of operational activities from provision of policy 
advice, regulatory and funding activities. The first was the goal of the State Sector 
Act, 1988, which introduced private sector styles of management to the public 
service, with chief executives of departments being employed on five-year 
performance related contracts. The purpose was to improve the accountability, 
responsiveness and efficiency of the public service (Britton, 1992). 
The second aspect of the Treasury paper was implemented by separating policy 
and service provision functions within departments. The consequence of this was 
a radically redefined public service. The rationale for the reform was to reduce the 
potential for policy advisers to be 'captured' by those delivering services, and to 
improve responsiveness to clients. 
By 1990, the 'new order' of the machinery of government could be 
summarised as consisting essentially of three central agencies (Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the SSC and Treasury), ten mainly 
policy advisory agencies (usually called ministries, such as Defence, 
Education, Environment), 19 mainly delivery and transfer agencies 
(usually called departments, such as Conservation, Labour and Social 
Welfare) and two with taxing functions (Boston cited in Britton, 1992, 
pl 72). 
The Reform Process 
Critical to how reform was achieved was the process. Fundamental to the success 
of implementing the reforms was the speed with which they were introduced. A 
rhetoric of crisis or doom regarding the sector was introduced, positioning the 
need for change. A policy goal would be announced which was radically different 
to the existing order, to be attained in a short period, following a surprise 
announcement and a very rapid implementation. Change was imposed rapidly 
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with the intention of preventing a concerted resistance from interest groups. The 
public· s wishes could be discounted, for fear they could be manipulated by the 
pressure groups (Easton, 1997 ). 
Roger Douglas has described his strategy in the following terms: 
If a solution makes sense in the medium term, go for it without 
qualification or hesitation. Nothing else delivers a result which will truly 
satisfy the public. 
Consensus among interest groups on quality decisions rarely, if ever, 
arises before they are made and implemented. It develops, after they are 
taken, as the decisions deliver satisfactory results to the public. 
Do not try to advance a step at a time. Define your objectives clearly and 
move towards them in quantum leaps. 
Vested interests continuously underestimate their own ability to adjust 
successfully in an environment where the government is rapidly removing 
privilege across a wide front. 
It is uncertainty, not speed, that endangers the success of structural reform 
programmes. Speed is an essential ingredient in keeping uncertainty down 
to the lowest possible level. 
Once the programme begins to be implemented, don't stop until you have 
completed it. The fire of opponents is much less accurate if they have to 
shoot at a rapidly moving target. 
The abolition of privilege is the essence of structural reform (Douglas, 
1993, 215-238, in Easton, 1997, p80-8I). 
This type of approach does not allow the opportunity for reflection or alternative 
analysis. It also minimises the opportunity for public consultation if not prevents 
it completely. The Douglas approach generates a state of affairs that has been 
called 're-disorganisation' or a state of crisis that merits the need to restructure 
(Easton, 1997, p 164 ). 
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Another key aspect to the strategy that Roger Douglas promoted was 'Replacing 
people who cannot or will not adapt to the new environment is pivotal' (Douglas, 
1993 ). Effectively all critics or those that expressed a dissenting view would be 
removed. It raises the question of who protected the public interest when the 
reform process did not allow the opportunity to question whether the proposed 
policy solution was right. 
At the heart of the strategy was a fundamental change to the nature of the 
democratic process and its operation (Easton, in Miller, 1997). Under the previous 
National Government ( 1975-84) the role of interest groups was recognised, and 
they were consulted and involved in government policy setting. The Labour 
government ( 1984-90) distrusted special interest groups and used a process of 
public consensus building to limit their influence (Kelsey, 1990). However, the 
vacuum in public input into government policy setting was not offset by other 
public participation processes, but by rapidly driven reforms, and hand-picked 
participants in public exercises such as the 1984 Economic Summit Conference. 
The influence of the party in power became paramount, at least between elections. 
While the government pursued a policy of welfare benefit reduction the policies 
they chose to pursue (as in Great Britain during the Thatcher government) also 
increased the number of welfare recipients. For the period 1984/85 to 1990/91: 
the demand for social benefits increased considerably during this period, 
with the total number of people receiving benefits of some kind rising 
from 1,058,747 to 1,252,030. In particular, there was an almost threefold 
rise in the numbers of unemployment beneficiaries - clearly an 'overspill' 
from the fourth Labour government's economic policies. As a result, real 
expenditure per benefit recipient actually fell for a number of welfare 
benefits during the term of the fourth Labour government (Rudd, 1997, 
p261 ). 
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The Labour government 1987-1990 also cut some of the benefit rates and in some 
cases abolished them entirely, as in unemployment benefits for those aged under 
eighteen. Eligibility rules were changed with the intention of saving money. The 
age of entitlement to a state pension was to be gradually increased from sixty to 
sixty-five years. In March 1990 the Minister of Social Welfare was to claim that 
the fourth Labour government had cut benefits by at least $800 million a year, 
disingenuously, given the rise in the number of beneficiaries; 
... with $150 million from changes to indexation, $300 million from the 
superannuation surcharge, $58 million from accommodation benefit 
changes, $25 million from benefit control units, $57 million from 
superannuation changes for those whose spouses did not qualify, $23 
million from changes to youth unemployment, $7 million from school-
leavers stand-down and $200 million from other measures. 
While the pursuit of reduction of welfare expenditure was used to justify a 
sweeping range of changes it reflected a short-term view of the effects of 
government policy. Changes in eligibility criteria may have a significant 
long-term accumulative impact, which would not be evident during the life 
span of a single term government. In changing the 'rules of the game' it 
can set the agenda for future governments, 'who inherit from their 
predecessors not just the policies themselves, but also the institutional 
structures and organisational procedures which shape the very policy-
making process· (Rudd, 1997, p261 ). 
The Treasury post-election briefing paper, Government Management (1987), 
explicitly laid down control of inflation as the overriding objective of government 
policy, and stated that any adverse effects on employment which resulted were 
unfortunate, but unavoidable. According to Treasury thinking, sound monetary 
policy would, in the long term, have no detrimental effect on employment. 
. . . In its briefing, Treasury recognised the interconnectedness of monetary 
policy and the welfare state. The formal abandonment by the fourth 
Labour government, in 1987, of full employment as a primary government 
objective removed what had been, until then, the central feature of the 
New Zealand welfare state (Rudd, 1997, p261-262) 
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It is evident that major changes in economic policy have a relationship and 
influence on social policy (see Table 4 ). Changes in economic policy do not occur 
in a vacuum or isolation. The fourth Labour government 1984-1990 affected the 
development of the welfare state in two ways. Firstly, it refused to expand welfare 
provision in line with the increase in demand which arose from demographic 
changes and the consequences of its own policy. Secondly, it altered the 'rules of 
the game', or the political environment, in such a way that a long-term 
retrenchment of the welfare state was facilitated. The belief of the majority of 
New Zealanders of the right to access the safety net of the welfare system was 
profoundly shaken. Exposure to the new ideology had profoundly changed the 
shape of New Zealand society. 
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Table 4: Main Policy Changes Since 1984 
Economy State 
Tariff reductions Separation of policy formulation and service delivery 
Floating exchange rate New models of management and accountability in the public 
service 
Removal of producer Commercialisation of functions within government 
subsidies departments 
Delicensing of industries Corporatisation of state tradin_g functions 
Deregulation of Privatisation of selected corporatised activities 
monopoly/ protected 
activities 
Financial deregulation Reform of local _government and re2ional policy 
Taxation reform Targeting of social welfare payments 
Labour market reform Reform of environment administration and resource 
mana_gement law 
Strengthened role of Treaty of Waitangi and incorporation of 
Treaty of Waitangi in legislation 
(Britton, 1992, pl2) 
Internationalisation of the economy 
The changes experienced during the 1980s in the New Zealand economy did not 
occur in isolation as there were important ties between New Zealand restructuring 
and the global economy. Internationalisation, the deepening and changing links to 
the global economy describes several processes: the move to off-shore investment 
and production; the serving of local markets by production units owned or 
controlled by overseas based producers; the degree to which local economic 
activity is affected by global capital flows and production systems; and the extent 
to which domestic macro and micro-economic policy is shaped by external 
conditions (Britton, 1992). 
The government's policy of deregulating the financial markets enabled money to 
circulate freely into and out of the nation. The effect of this placed the New 
Zealand business environment and its players into the orbit of the global 
Page 91 
economy. The deregulated economy was attractive to foreign investors and from 
1984 there was a dramatic rise in the level of foreign investment in New Zealand, 
as demonstrated in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Trends in Foreign Investment in New Zealand 
March Years Foreign Direct Investment NZ Direct Investment Non-resident Ownership of 
$m in New Zealand Overseas Public Debt 
1980 343 73 
1981 204 118 
1982 366 1115 
1983 364 604 
1984 205 54 
1985 456 349 
1986 745 166 
1987 402 949 
1988 238 938 40.8 
1989 725 226 163.4 
1990 1543 1477 400.0 
(Britton, 1992, p28) 
International influences were not limited to the economic marketplace. They also 
impacted on the broad market of ideas and nature and structure of the public 
sector in general. The next chapter ( 4) considers the influence of specific neo-
liberal reform ideas in both Great Britain and the United States. Those influences 
also helped shape the scope and nature of the New Zealand public health sector 
reforms of both the late 1980s and 90s. The remainder of chapter four provides an 
historical overview of the New Zealand health sector reforms and focuses largely 
on the mainstream health sector structural reforms. The specific reform effects on 
Maori will be outlined in chapter five which follows. 
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CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES AND AN 
OVERVIEW OF NEW ZEALAND HEALTH REFORM: 1984-98 
International Influences 
Health Care Reform in the United Kingdom 
We have to sweep away myths, dispense with several sacred cows and 
conduct our discussions rationally ... outdated ideology must not be 
allowed to stand in the way. John Moore ( 1987) 
The radical 1980s and 1990s reforms experienced in the New Zealand public 
sector in general and the health sector in particular were not confined to New 
Zealand. The same time period saw the United Kingdom experience similar 
restructuring of the welfare state with significant consequences for the health 
sector. 
The United Kingdom National Health Service had experienced repeated attempts 
at its reform since the early 1960s. Successive governments had introduced 
changes aimed at making the service more efficient, or realistically cost effective. 
The Conservative government heralded changes in the health sector as part of 
their value-for-money policy in the early 1980s with the introduction of income 
generation schemes for the National Health Service' though these never produced 
the types of revenue return that advocates had predicted (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 
1995). 
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At the same time, a policy of contracting out services became increasingly 
attractive to the government. By 1985 health authorities were required to put out 
their laundry, cleaning and catering services to competitive tender. These were the 
preliminary steps to the review of the NHS in 1988 by a confidential review team 
chaired by the Prime Minister that focused on the internal market model. The 
necessity for the funder/provider split was described as 'health authorities did not 
have an inalienable requirement to deliver services themselves but they were 
principally in existence to finance and manage the provision of services ... • 
(Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, p73 ). In the autumn of 1988 the government 
decided that the ideas of self-governing hospitals and GP fund-holders as a route 
for the internal market would be the most successful basis for the reforms. These 
were striking similarities to the model being simultaneously proposed by findings 
of the 1988 Gibbs Report in New Zealand. 
In January 1989 the British government White Paper, 'Working for Patients' was 
published accompanied by television campaigns and user friendly brochures. 
Central to the model proposed by the Conservative government was the internal 
market concept to separate the providers from the purchasers. The intention was 
to replace the centralised control system with a planned market model designed 
'to expose providers to competitive tests of cost-effectiveness and quality while 
retaining safeguards for the consumer' (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, p7 l ). 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described the proposed reforms in her 
foreword to the government's White Paper 'Working for Patients' as 
Page 94 
'represent(ing) the most far-reaching reform of the National Health Service in its 
40-year history' (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, p72). 
The main proposals as stated in the White Paper were to secure two objectives. 
1. To give patients, wherever they live, better health care and greater choice of 
services available. 
2. To produce greater satisfaction and rewards for NHS staff who successfully 
respond to local needs and preferences (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, p75). 
The White Paper contained several key measures. 
1. More delegation of responsibility to local level: responsibilities were 
delegated from region to district and from district to hospital. 
2. Self-governing hospitals were formed. NHS hospital trusts were created by 
transferring hospital management and ownership to a trust with centrally and 
locally appointed directors. 
3. New funding arrangements were created by making money follow the patients 
across administrative boundaries. 
4. Additional consultant posts were created. Stricter control of consultant 
contracts was proposed. 
5. GP practice budgets, later termed fund-holding practices, were introduced. 
GPs were able to use their fund to buy care from NHS providers or private 
practices on a cost-effective basis. 
6. Management bodies were reformed by reducing regional, district and FPC size 
and by putting executive and non-executive directors on the authorities. An 
NHS management executive was set up. 
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7. Better audit arrangements were instituted. Medical (peer review) audit was 
made compulsory throughout the NHS; and the Audit Commission was asked 
to audit the financial accounts of the health authorities including the Family 
Health Service Authority and the NHS bodies. 
The aim of the health sector reforms was to improve the efficiency in the 
production of services through the creation of a competitive market in the NHS in 
which the successful providers would expand and flourish. Consequently the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors of health care would blur. The 
next step was the belief that the health authorities would be free to measure and 
plan for the needs of their resident populations unhampered by the domination of 
self-interested providers. This underestimates the politics of health. 
The UK reforms were greeted with a similar outcry to that in New Zealand. The 
common element in the opposition against the reforms was the feared outcome of 
introducing market principles into the health sector and the creeping privatisation. 
Similar to New Zealand, despite the opposition to the proposals, the Conservative 
government maintained its strong commitment to reform and adhered to a strict 
timetable for the introduction of change. With the general election that could be 
held at the latest in 1992 the political considerations meant that the reforms 
needed to indicate that they were successful before that time. There was 
considerable pressure on ministers to activate and implement the reforms 
expediently. The UK Conservative government was subsequently elected for a 
fourth consecutive term in the 1992 general election. 
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What Have the UK Outcomes Been? 
As in New Zealand there was no independent, non-governmental system 
established to monitor or evaluate the changes and outcomes of the reforms. Other 
factors complicate objective evaluation. After the 1992 election significant levels 
of additional funding were provided for the NHS. If there are recorded 
improvements in service provision and delivery it is difficult to ascertain whether 
they are attributable to extra resources or the introduction of the market model 
(Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995 ). 
In the post-reform NHS the district health authorities have the responsibility for 
assessing the health care needs of their population and commissioning the 
appropriate services for that population. The new responsibilities that the district 
health authorities are charged with are compromised by the budget restraints. 
There is a shortfall between matching the total needs of a population and 
resources 'a series of choices has to be made about which services are 
commissioned, in what quantities and for whom' (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, 
p81). 
Determining the priorities, a problem for the NHS prior to reform has been made 
more explicit post reform. It raises questions of, who should be involved in the 
determining of priorities on behalf of the population? How are priorities decided 
on and assessed? 
The criticisms voiced in New Zealand over recent health reform were echoed in 
the United Kingdom. The over bureaucratisation of the reforms was symbolised 
by the growth in the numbers of NHS managers and the lack of public 
Page 97 
consultation and consumer choice. Despite the rhetoric in the original proposal 
'Working for Patients' that 'all the proposals ... put the needs of patients first' 
(HMSO, 1989 in Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, p82) consumers were not more 
empowered by the NHS reforms. Consumer involvement in critical decisions did 
not occur (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995 ). 
The internal market model suggests that consumers can exercise influence in the 
health sector by their selection and utilisation of providers that deliver the services 
they want. 'Consumer choice would be based, not on government promise, but on 
that personal power to inflict economic pain on unsatisfactory producers which 
consumer payment alone can bring' (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 1995, p82). This is 
an unrealistic and confused argument given that the health services are 
nationalised and fully funded by taxes therefore consumers have already paid the 
full cost of the services they receive. As consumers have already surrendered their 
potential buying power to the government via taxation they have also surrendered 
their ability and freedom to choose. If supply of primary health services exceeded 
demand, the situation might well be different. 
The reforms in the United Kingdom illustrate that as in New Zealand 'decisions 
about health care continue to be value-laden and to be inescapably set within an 
ideological and political context. In that and many other respects the post-1991 
NHS has remarkable similarities to what preceded it' (Gladstone & Goldsmith, 
1995, p82-83). The revolutionary reforms promised to deliver increased efficiency 
and more health care for the dollar. For consumers discernible benefits that 
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justified the upheaval are not easily evident or identifiable (Gladstone & 
Goldsmith, 1995). 
The Oregon Experiment 
In the early 1990s the reforms proposed in the US State of Oregon attracted the 
interest of the New Zealand National government. Oregon was grappling with the 
issues of access, funding and prioritisation of the health sector. The State had 
recognised that sizeable numbers of its citizens did not have or qualify for medical 
insurance. The experience of Oregon was a microcosm of the dilemma facing the 
United States with over 37 million Americans uninsured (Brannigan, 1995). 
In 1989, an estimated 400,000 Oregonians were uninsured, of these 120,000 were 
unemployed, while the other 280,000 although in working households, did not 
qualify for Medicaid, the public assistance programme for the poor. Eligibility for 
Medicaid is determined by each state, and Oregon had set its requirement at 58 
per cent below the federal poverty level. The federal poverty level for a single 
adult is an annual income of US$6620; for a family of four, it is US$ l 2 000. In 
Oregon, if a family made over US$6960 per year, it became ineligible for public 
funding (Brannigan, 1995 ). 
There were other issues that complicated the Medicaid dilemma. The imbalance 
of funding within the programme particularly impacted on children. In 1988, 
although 70 per cent of the nation· s Medicaid population were children, they 
acquired only 12 per cent of its funds. Eligibility of some of the specific 
programmes within Medicaid for impoverished families continued to decrease 
Page 99 
which adversely affected many children and single parents. Oregon took steps to 
tackle the looming crisis in the health sector directly. 
Issues of allocation were a major concern at the 1982 conference held by the 
Governor on Health Care for the Medically Poor, and the Oregon Health Council 
established Oregon Health Decisions Inc (OHD). The objective of OHD was to 
stimulate public awareness of issues in bioethics, particularly in health care 
apportionment. 
OHD volunteers worked proactively during 1983 and 1984 holding 300 meetings 
throughout the state, involving over 500 Oregon citizens. In October 1984 the 
Citizens' Health Care Parliament concluded with a report, Society Must Decide, 
which reported the consensus was that 'Health care rationing, cost containment, 
and health resource allocation were seen, first and foremost, as community 
matters' (Brannigan, 1995, p29). This view presented health care as owned and 
defined by the community. 
Two further health care parliaments stimulated further public discussions and 
recommendations for a more just health care system. A former physician, later 
politician, Senator John Kitzhaber, advocated universal access and fair 
distribution of health services in the state. Kitzhaber, OHD and others established 
the 'Oregon Medicaid Priority-Setting Project' (MPP). This endeavour 
concentrated on the principal groups of Medicaid beneficiaries, obstetrics and 
gynaecology, paediatrics, adult and geriatric and ranked a variety of health care 
benefits from some general health service areas. 
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The legislature also established an 11-member Health Services Commission 
(HSC), who had two goals: expand Medicaid coverage and establish a list of 
prioritised health care services, to be periodically reviewed. The process was to be 
that prioritisation recommendations would be made by the HSC to the legislature. 
If accepted, the state legislature which meets for six months every two years 
would then determine the level of funding and range of services for the next two 
year session. 
This was a unique way to prioritise services. Historically shrinking health care 
budgets were reconciled by either lowering Medicaid eligibility, reducing access 
to health services, or by discounting reimbursements to providers. The approach 
of Oregon was to address its reducing health care budget by cutting those services 
that are lowest in priority. The cut-off line defining the range of services would 
shift according to legislative determination of the state's financial health. 
The Oregon Basic Health Services Act of 1989 
The Oregon Basic Health Services Act (OBHSA) was passed in the Oregon 
Senate in 1989 with support in both houses. The fundamental principle of the 
OBHSA was that all citizens have a right to basic health care, that 'floor beneath 
which no person should fall' (Brannigan, 1995, p3 l ). 
The Act comprised three separate bills that were interrelated. Senate Bill (SB) 27, 
the Basic Health Benefits Act, sought to extend Medicaid coverage to all 
uninsured Oregonians below the federal poverty level. 
While extending coverage, a prioritised list of services is determined by 
the Health Services Commission. This list ranks condition/treatment pairs 
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according to the net benefit of each, incorporating medical effectiveness 
and community values. This ranking assists the legislature's designation of 
the funding level, which will in tum demarcate a basic health care package 
for all citizens of Oregon (Brannigan, 1995, p30). 
SB 534, the State Health Risk Pool, intended to provide health care to those who 
were classified as uninsurable due to 'pre-existing medical conditions'. The state 
and private insurers were to contribute to this 'risk pool', calculated to affect 
around 20, 000 people (Brannigan, 1995). 
SB 935, the Health Insurance Partnership Act, required employers to offer the 
basic health benefit package from Senate Bill 27 to all full-time workers and their 
families. Employers and employees shared in the costs, employers contributing 75 
per cent and employees 25 per cent, with increased employee contributions for 
optional dependant coverage. Incentives to employers by way of tax credits were 
offered if the scheme was implemented before 1994. This proposal was estimated 
to affect around two-thirds of the uninsured in Oregon (Brannigan, 1995). Casual 
and part time workers were still at some risk of being unable to access health 
services. 
The Health Services Commission's model for the prioritisation of health services 
combined empirical data of medical effectiveness with community values. There 
was no comparable model with what Oregon was attempting to achieve. The HSC 
resourced an extensive campaign to evaluate responses and concerns about health 
care values from the community. This consisted of public hearings, community 
meetings and random telephone surveys. 
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The Clinton Administration on March 1993 finally approved the Oregon plan. 
Oregon· s strategy tackles a monumental challenge: how is it possible to expand 
access to quality health care and still manage to control health care spending? 
A consequence of a market-driven health care system is that it turns out to be 
ultimately profit-conscious, with services evaluated primarily in terms of their 
investment return, rather than on health care needs. And problems spiral since we 
tend to confuse 'health care needs' with 'health related desires'. 
Oregon· s experiment forces us to face squarely inequities within the current 
system. Its unique response to its finite budget is not to cut eligibility, or to 
diminish reimbursements, but to reduce spending for treatments which are 
considered to be of lowest priority, while access is guaranteed for all. 
New Zealand's Health System before Reform - local control 
of service provision 
The health system as developed by the Labour government in the 1930s was 
accepted by New Zealand society. This was evident in the minimal difference in 
the health policies and funding among the major political parties for several 
decades. Evolving from the 1938 Social Security Act, the funding of health 
services, and particularly of New Zealand's major hospital infrastructure, was 
based on spending by 28 regional Hospital Boards supported by Government 
allocation from general taxation. Hospital Boards consisted of locally elected 
Page 103 
representatives, who administered a structure usually managed by a Medical 
Superintendent, Chief Nurse, and possibly a Chief Executive or Administrator. 
Hospital Boards were responsible for the delivery of three types of health 
services, general, obstetric, and mental services. Their funding was based on the 
comparative utilisation of inpatient services in each of the categories, though they 
were also responsible for the delivery of outpatient services. Service delivery and 
funding was largely weighted towards hospitals, and treatment services. 
Hospital Boards were highly locally accountable, with a three-year Board election 
cycle on the same timeframe as other local body elections. However, funding 
accountability was diffuse, with central government footing the bill, but the local 
need and local interest groups driving the demand. 
The first attempt at reform after 1938 occurred in 1974, when the second Labour 
government developed a policy that would have provided a system similar to that 
of the United Kingdom's National Health Service. The proposed change was 
driven by a desire for integrated service delivery across primary, secondary, and 
public health sectors, a precursor of the 1980s Area Health Board model. In 
addition the changes challenged GPs uncapped fee for service income and the 
particular interests of other health sector groups out of a need to contain costs, 
despite the attempt for financial control a decade earlier by the National 
government (Davis & Ashton, 2000; Davis & Dew, 1999). 
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The Third Labour Government's White Paper "A Health Service for New 
Zealand" ( McGuigan, 197 5) proposed a design for health administration aimed at 
improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of care. The model 
proposed is described as the early forerunner of the Area Health Board model 
(AHB ). Policy would be set at the central agency level and implemented in a way 
that would be reflected at the regional level, in hospitals and in general practice. 
The medical profession and local politicians opposed the proposed changes and 
before they could be introduced the Labour Government was defeated at the 1975 
General Election. The AHB model was to take another decade before it was 
formally introduced and even then it was done cautiously with the stipulation that 
local communities must support it. 
By the end of the first Muldoon National administration (1978 ), a number 
of government reviews had questioned the sustainability of universal 
health provision, and ways to reduce the welfare burden on the state 
(Davis & Dew 1999). To solve its growing fiscal crisis, the state had to 
curtail government expenditure, over 50 per cent of which was in welfare, 
health and education (Rudd, 1997). 
Between 1970 and 1980 health spending had increased from 5 .1 per cent to 7 .2 
per cent of GDP, and was now falling behind the rapidly increasing spending in 
the United States, Canada, and Australia. In spite of the escalating cost, access to 
primary care was becoming restricted as a result of a decrease in the real value of 
the General Medical Services benefit from around 75 per cent of the total fee to 
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less than 20 per cent (Ashton, 1994 ). As a result fully funded hospital services 
were used increasingly by some members of the public as their only accessible 
primary health care. Consequently, issues of equity and cost containment 
dominated the health policy agenda in the early 1980s. This resulted in the 
introduction of a population-based funding formula for hospital boards, which 
will be discussed more fully below. 
Cost Containment 
Population based funding for hospital boards was formally introduced under the 
National Government on I April 1983. The formula was developed by the 
Advisory Committee on Hospital Board Funding (Dept. of Health, 1984) after the 
then Minister of Health, George Gair, in 1979 requested the committee carry out 
an extensive and thorough review of the methods of allocating of funds to boards. 
The committee recommended a population based funding system after reviewing 
the funding arrangements of other countries. 
The population based funding system the Committee recommended for New 
Zealand was similar in principle to those that had been adopted in Scotland and 
England. Some of the unique and unwieldy differences for New Zealand were the 
size of the hospital boards ranging in population from approximately 2,500 to 
over 800,000 at the time. Essentially the size of the board populations determined 
the size of equitable allocations. 
The actual formula for funding calculated the boards' entitlements to funds using 
an assessment of their relative needs (see Formula pl 12). The resulting 'equitable 
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allocations· had two components, a population grant and a set of supplements. 
The population grant was designed to meet needs that were related to the 
populations served by boards. Although the allocation of the grant was based on 
population numbers, other factors such as the movement of patients between 
board districts was taken into account. The supplements were based on funds 
required for purposes not related to populations such as training of staff, or the 
transfer of patients to neighbouring boards who had higher level specialist 
services. The training of medical students was concentrated in a few boards, not 
spread across boards according to the numbers of trainees in boards. 
How The Distribution Of The Population Grant was to be Determined 
Stage 1 . Determine the total 
funds available for 
distribution. 
Stage 2. Calculate each 
board's supplements. 
Stage 3. Calculate the 
population grant by 
subtracting all the 
supplements from the total 
funds available. 
Stage 4. Calculate each 
board's share of the 
population grant. 
Stage 5. Calculate each 
board's equitable allocation 
by adding its share of the 
population grant to its 
supplements. 
BDE's. 
(Dept. of Health, 1984 ). 
Outline of the Formula 
Step 1. Determine board populations by age and 
sex. 
Step 2. Calculate expected bed-days for each 
board and each age and sex for three types of 
service: general, obstetric, and mental. 
Step 3. Apply cost weights to get bed-day-
equivalents (BDE's). 
Step 4. Adjust for differential mortality and 
fertility. 
Step 5. Adjust for inter-board flows. 
Step 6. Adjust for flows to the private sector. 
Step 7. Divide grant in proportion to each board's 
The calculation of each board's share of the population grant, Stage 4, is the main 
part of the formula in the sense that it deals with the distribution of most of the 
funds. 
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Calculating Each Board's Share of the Population Grant 
The simplest way to allocate this grant would be in proportion to the crude 
population of each board's district. The Advisory Committee viewed this as 
unsatisfactory because of a number of factors: 
• the need for health care varies greatly between age and sex 
groups, and board populations have differing age and sex 
structures 
• environmental, ethnic and social factors may lead to differing 
levels of morbidity between board populations 
• certain specialised care cannot be economically provided by 
every board - not only would this be costly but in some 
instances it would result in specialist units with low patient 
throughputs and poor quality care; it is therefore reasonable for 
patients to travel to boards offering specialist services and this 
needs to be taken account of in the funding 
• in some board districts the private sector treats a higher 
proportion of patients; this relieves these boards of some 
responsibility for health care and to maintain equity their needs 
for public funding should be assessed lower. 
The Advisory Committee acknowledged that the funding formula would involve 
value judgements about what is equitable. 
It is perhaps helpful to make it clear that the Committee· s judgements on 
equity were tempered by considerations of efficiency. It would have been 
more equitable for all boards, irrespective of size, to mount a full range of 
services rather than to have had some specialised services provided only 
within the larger boards. However, for all boards to mount all services 
would have been inefficient (Dept. of Health, 1984 ). 
The introduction of the population-based funding formula for the allocation of 
resources to hospital boards was significant in New Zealand health policy as it 
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signalled an end to the open-ended policy that had existed since 1938. The 
implementation of the formula highlighted the tension between containing costs 
and continuing to provide the delivery of services that the New Zealand public 
had come to expect. The pragmatic rationing by health professionals at the 
individual level that had already been part of services now was to become both 
more overt and transparent. 
Considerations of equity in the report clearly did not extend to Maori. There is not 
one reference to Maori in the Department of Health publication The Hospital 
Board Funding Formula 1984. The distinctive health needs of Maori and 
associated cost for health provision to high-density Maori populations was not 
factored in the formula. Maori were accorded status neither on the basis of Treaty 
of Waitangi requirements nor on that of their poor comparative health status. The 
obligation of the Crown to ensure Maori citizens received consideration no less 
than that of their fellows appears to have been completely overlooked. 
New Zealand Health Sector Restructuring 
In New Zealand too, just as in Oregon, solutions had to be explored to grapple 
with the issue of cost containment in the health sector and prevent inequitable 
funding. Pilot studies aimed at rationalising the delivery of publicly funded health 
care were undertaken in Northland and Wellington in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. In 1983 the Area Health Board Act was enacted. A major provision of the 
Act was the decentralisation of public health activities away from the Department 
of Health to regional agencies. Due to the National government's policy that Area 
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Health Boards (AHBs) would only be established on local initiative, progress on 
implementation was negligible during their time ( 1981-1984) in office. 
Following the election of the 1984 Labour Government, health reform became but 
one strand of the sweeping economic and social reforms introduced at this time. 
The irony should be noted here that it was government workers being made 
redundant that primarily drove the dramatic increase in unemployment over the 
late 1980s. While promoting an ideology that loss of incentive to work was a 
consequence of the welfare state, the same state was withdrawing the opportunity 
to work from large numbers of workers. The growing popularity of these types of 
market ideology argument set the scene for the radical health reforms of the fourth 
Labour government in the l 980s(Ashton, l 995;Tenbensel & Gauld, 2001 ). 
The continuing health sector problems in the 1980s, lengthening waiting lists, the 
inequitable distribution of health care services and perceptions of inefficient 
management, led to two major reviews of health services, both commissioned by 
the 1984 - 1990 Labour Governments. The first was the Health Benefits Review 
commissioned by the Labour Government in 1986 to 'report upon the underlying 
rationale for state involvement in health and to recommend broad principles and 
directions for reform' (Scott et al, 1986, p 124 ). Five options were presented, the 
preferred option of the Review was a system that boards would 'establish rational 
priorities and plans by researching needs, discussions at the local community level 
and negotiations with a range of private, voluntary and public providers' (Scott et 
al, 1986, pl25). The process was to determine the range of services required: 
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boards could put them out for tender and award contracts for services on the basis 
of quality and price. 
The second review was conducted by the Hospital and Related Services Taskforce 
in 1988 and its report was commonly referred to as the Gibbs Report. Although 
commissioned and rejected by the Labour Government, the Gibbs Report, along 
with the Business Roundtable commissioned report from CS First Boston by 
Professor Patricia Danzon (Danzon & Begg, 1991) 'Options for Health Care in 
New Zealand,· provided the basis on which the 1990 National Government 
reformed the health sector in 1991. It is considered in detail later in this chapter. 
Despite the rejection of the Gibbs Report recommendations by the Labour 
Government there were other major changes in health policy in the late 1980s. 
Hospital board management shifted from the old triumvirate system of nurse, 
doctor and administrator to the model of general management. To improve access 
to primary care the General Medical Services benefits were increased and general 
practitioners were given the option of joining a contract scheme which gave them 
an inflation-adjusted subsidy for all consultations in return for limits on user 
charges. 
There were two phases of hospital sector restructuring that span both Labour and 
National governments of the 1980s and 1990s. These were successive attempts to 
deal with health sector structural weaknesses perceived by both political parties. 
The strategies were different. While Labour had introduced AHBs with increased 
managerial accountability, it had rejected the Gibbs "more market" approach. 
Pagel!! 
The core of the health sector reforms of the 1984/ 1990 Labour government was 
the New Zealand Health Charter ( Clark, 1989) that defined a set of goals for the 
public health system until the year 2000. This was instigated by the New Zealand 
commitment to the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 (WHO, 1978). The goals of the 
Health Charter were to provide priority guidelines for the first time in New 
Zealand for the equitable allocation of health resources, and establish as a national 
goal the achievement of a substantial improvement in health outcomes. New 
contract requirements for Area Health Boards emphasising the performance and 
accountability of each Board to the Minister were released at the same time. The 
New Zealand Health Goals were identified as: 
• To reduce the onset of smoking in non-smokers, especially 
adolescents, and to reduce the number of smokers and the 
consumption of tobacco. 
• To reduce the incidence of dietary related health disorders by 
improving nutrition. 
• To reduce alcohol-related health problems by reducing alcohol 
consumption. 
• To reduce the prevalence of high blood pressure. 
• To reduce preventable death and disability from motor vehicle 
crashes. 
• To reduce hearing loss in children in the under five year age 
group. 
• To reduce disability and death from asthma. 
• To reduce avoidable illness and death from coronary heart 
disease and stroke. 
• To reduce the incidence of invasive cervical cancer and the 
cervical cancer death rate. 
• To reduce skin cancer (melanoma) incidence and death rates 
(Clark, 1989, p6). 
These priority health goals addressed significant causes of death, disease or 
chronic disability. If attained it was believed they would reduce social and ethnic 
Page 112 
inequalities in health status. To achieve the specific improvements of each goal 
measurable targets were set that were identified as medically attainable, required 
equitable resources, and were measurable as desired health outcomes. The Health 
Charter recognised the connection between health status and cost of provision of 
health care. 
The stated objective of the Health Charter was to maintain a nationwide publicly 
funded health system with the overall goal of protecting and improving the health 
of all New Zealanders. Health care described as essential was to be universally 
accessible, 'in a manner that is acceptable to both individuals and the community, 
taking into account the cost that the community and the country can afford' 
(Clark, 1989, p 1 ). 
The development and operation of the public health sector was to be based on the 
New Zealand Health Charter principles with the stated expectation that health care 
managers and providers were expected to observe and follow the principles 
including; 
• Respect for Individual Dignity 
• Equity of Access 
• Community Involvement 
• Disease Prevention and Health Promotion 
• Effective Resource Use 
To achieve the desired outcomes of the New Zealand Health Goals the 
Government had to restructure the health sector to enable it to operate and 
implement the health care principles, in particular, the aligning of hospital and 
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public health services (Ashton, 1995 ). The previous split between hospital board 
and central agency (Department of Health) responsibility had to be corrected. 
The new structure allocated specific responsibilities at three levels, Minister of 
Health, Department of Health and Area Health Boards. At the Ministerial level 
the Government accepted responsibility for setting national health policy and for 
funding public health. It was to be ultimately accountable for the quality and 
appropriateness of healthcare provided, and for the health status outcomes 
achieved. The Minister of Health was in turn accountable to Parliament that health 
services were provided and delivered in the most efficient and effective way. 
Accountability also extended to the effective implementation of the overall health 
policy. 
The Department of Health had a direct reporting relationship to the Minister of 
Health and was to provide the Minister with strategic advice and analysis on 
health issues. It had a key role in overseeing the implementation of the Health 
Charter and reporting to the Minister of Health on that. The Department of Health 
was responsible for administering health legislation, regulations and the funding 
of health programmes and ensure the provision of health services. The Area 
Health Boards were to be the implementation arm of the governments' Health 
strategy, understanding local health needs, and developing and delivering services 
to meet those. 
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Area Health Boards 
After 1984, it was the Labour government that escalated the development of area 
health boards as it fitted with their model of accountability and fiscal control, and 
the government's need to have greater fiscal certainty in the provision of health 
services. While the rationing of health services has always been present in part, 
asset run-downs and the increasing cost of new technology in health (health 
inflation) led to a desire for more central control of funding risks inherent in the 
AHB structure (Bloom, 2000). 
Area Health Boards had a statutory obligation to establish and maintain an 
appropriate balance in the provision and use of resources for health protection, 
promotion, education and treatment services. This represented a broadened 
construction of health and health services to include population health alongside 
personal health care. New contract requirements for Area Health Boards 
emphasising the performance and accountability of each Board to the Minister 
were released at the same time. 
The Area Health Boards Act ( 1983) stated that the main objectives of an Area 
Health Board were: 
• to promote, protect and conserve the public health and to 
provide health services within their region; 
• to provide for the effective coordination of the planning, 
provision and evaluation of health services between the public, 
private and voluntary sectors within their area; 
• to establish and maintain an appropriate balance in the 
provision and use of resources between health protection, 
health promotion, health education and treatment services 
(Nelson Health Services Advisory Committee, 1985, pl5). 
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Area Health Boards were to ensure that public health expectations within their 
regions were assessed and met. This included providing and funding health care 
services from both the public and private sector. 
A critical difference between Area Health Boards and their predecessor the 
Hospital Boards was the multiple accountabilities Area Health Boards were 
charged with. The Boards were accountable to the Minister of Health for 
implementing the New Zealand Health Charter and the effective and efficient use 
of public health resources. 
They were also accountable to their communities through Community Health 
Committees and other consultative bodies. The communities that the Area Health 
Boards represented were able to exercise the option of democratically electing 
Board members at the local body elections. This provided an important 
opportunity for the community to participate at the regional level in the 
governance, management and provision of local health services. 
The transition to Area Health Boards was not a sudden one however. Two 
geographical locations, Northland and Nelson, were selected as trial Area Health 
Boards in 1984. Following the apparent success of the model, other groupings of 
Hospital Boards moved slowly to Area Health Board status. Requirements for 
change included community support, and the process involved a considerable 
degree of consultation, as local communities came together to join their health 
services. 
Page 116 
In 1989 the last of the Hospital Boards were disestablished and the elected Area 
Health Boards replaced them. Government appointments were added to Area 
Health Boards to supplement the locally elected representatives. With the passage 
of the Public Finance Act in 1989, Area Health Boards entered a contractual 
relationship with the Minister of Health, and the desired financial accountability 
regime was established. 
The intention was that the Minister and each Board would conclude a contract 
before Government funding would be made available. Appended to the contract 
and forming part of it would be a five-year strategic plan and an operating plan. 
Each Board and the way they managed their funding would be subjected to 
unprecedented scrutiny. Future funding could potentially be at risk. It was a level 
of accountability to the Minister that had not previously existed. 
However, before this system had a chance to demonstrate its effectiveness, Crown 
Health Enterprises were to take the place of Area Health Boards, operating under 
a different philosophy and model. They were part of the second and more radical 
wave of health reforms of the early 1990s initiated by the incoming National 1990 
government. 
1990s - Health in the Marketplace 
November 1990 brought a change of Government. The new National Government 
quickly made it evident that the ideology of market principles (introduced for 
trading arms of the Crown such as Forestry by the previous government) would 
dominate all government agencies and further reform of the services the 
government traditionally provided would take place. 
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The Budget message of the new National Government 1990 made it clear that 
moves towards a competitive, market-oriented system would be paramount for the 
future development of New Zealand society. This fourth National government 
introduced a piece of legislation that effectively 'locked in' a policy framework 
designed to restrict future government flexibility with regard to welfare and 
government expenditure. The 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act lays down various 
principles for a fiscally responsible government to observe. Included in the 
principles are the reduction of public debt to a 'prudent' level and the 
maintenance of a 'prudent' level of public debt, by achieving budget surpluses. 
Governments should also pursue policies which 'provide a reasonable 
predictability about the level and stability of tax rates' (Rudd, 1997, p265). 
The implications were crucially significant. A government wishing to increase 
expenditure on any item that could include health, education or welfare by using 
previous budget surpluses, increasing the public debt, or raising taxes, would now 
have to repeal the Fiscal Responsibility Act or justify the departure from the 
principles of fiscal responsibility and state when and how a return to those 
principles would take place. 
National Government: 1990-93 1993-96 
In 1991 the new National Government announced that the health sector was to be 
reformed again. There was to be no opportunity for analysis or review of the 
effects of the Labour Government's recently fully established AHB initiatives. 
The Green and White Paper "Your Health and the Public Health" (Upton, 1991) 
introduced a restructuring of the public health system that mirrored the 
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recommendations of the 1988 Hospital and Related Services Task.force Report 
(the "Gibbs Report") rejected by the then Labour Government. It provided the 
blueprint for the radical reform the incoming National Government wished to 
implement. Central to the reforms was a shift from universal access on the basis 
of need to a targeting of health services to specific users, part charges for hospital 
inpatient and out patient care, and creation of a category of core health services 
that the government would continue to fund. 
The Gibbs report was in two parts. The American accounting firm Arthur 
Andersen had purported to find potential efficiency improvements of around 30 
per cent in the New Zealand health sector. However, it was later argued that 
'much of its claimed potential 'productivity' amounted to cost shifting; that is, 
switching costs from the public sector to the individual patient, family, and 
community' (Easton, 1997, p 152). Nevertheless the commissioning committee 
used the Arthur Andersen findings to support a management model that would 
achieve the presumed efficiency outcomes. 
The 1988 Gibbs Taskforce Report entitled "Unshackling the Hospitals" had 
recommended that six Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) be responsible for 
determining and funding regional health needs. In tum those needs should be met 
by public, private, or voluntary agencies whose services would be contracted by 
each RHA on the basis of quality and value for money. 
Under our proposal area health boards would become more like the boards 
of public companies. They would be able to concentrate on running 
efficient services, helped greatly by the payment system which would give 
them an objective value of the services they provide. These prices would 
drive signals through the system, causing rapid improvements in resource 
use and clinical practice (Gibbs et al, 1988, p28). 
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A significant feature of the Gibbs Report was the recommendation that there be a 
separation of the funder and provider roles, as the RHAs would purchase health 
services from providers on behalf of the people in their regions. 'They would not 
manage or own any services but would contract with public, private and voluntary 
providers on a competitively neutral basis' (Gibbs et al, 1988, p27). Effectively 
providers were to be paid only for services provided and outputs met rather than 
for reimbursement of costs. This model was to be incorporated as the core of the 
1991 Regional Health Authority reform programme. 
The separation of these funder/provider roles was rationalised by the belief that 
hospital boards were biased toward their own institutions and services over 
private providers and community based care. Thus, it was argued that there was 
no control over inefficiencies or incentives when the same agency controlled 
services and their funding. However, the separation of roles appears ideological, 
as essentially the actual separation had previously existed with the Department of 
Health funding and allocating resources and the hospital boards providing 
services. 
Diagnosis-related groups (DR Gs) were considered to be the appropriate device for 
determining payment levels. DRGs would be paid prospective fees based on 
average rates for treatment of a disease or illness and would replace retrospective 
reimbursement of costs. The strong competitive element in the Taskforce 
recommendations fitted with the market ideology of the National Government of 
1991 and it was that government that implemented the general model 
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recommended by the Gibbs Report. The key features of the Taskforce 
recommendations were: 
• the separation of funder (RHA) and provider (CHE, voluntary 
sector, private) 
• integration of funding of primary (GP) and secondary (hospital) 
care 
• public hospitals becoming crown companies (CHEs) with 
commercial objectives 
• a regime of user part charges (Scott, 1996, p99). 
At the next phase of health sector restructuring there was a more direct influence 
of the business sector on policy development. Critics such as Blank (2000) state 
that there is evidence of the significant influence of the Business Roundtable, of 
which Gibbs was a member, and CS First Boston NZ Ltd. The recommendations 
of the Roundtable · s commissioned report by CS First Boston· s visiting Professor 
Patricia Danzon (Danzon & Begg, 1991) 'Options for Health Care in New 
Zealand' were in tum key provisions of the health reforms initiated by Simon 
Upton as Minister of Health. 
The Danzon report as it became known concluded that 'a private insurance 
option ... could be viewed as a final stage towards which a mixed public/private 
system could evolve .... '. The report also makes reference to 'corporatisation ... 
would also be a sensible transition path if more far-reaching reform is 
contemplated' (Easton, 1997, p157-158). This is a repeat of the similar path that 
Labour had trod in the belief that the public would oppose outright privatisation 
thus the objective could be more easily achieved through corporatisation. 
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CS First Boston were then commissioned to advise and provide guidance to the 
National Interim Provider Board on options for implementing the new health care 
provision structures. The National Interim Provider Board (NIPB) was a key 
agent in the transition to the next major phase for the reforms. It was located in 
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) which was to 
supervise the establishment of the CHEs. 
The chairman appointed to the board was Sir Ronald Trotter, chairman of 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd, which had been an active purchaser of public 
assets. Trotter, a well-known spokesperson for privatisation, was also 
chairman of the Business Roundtable at the time of the Danzon report. He 
had no background in health administration .... 
Its primary consultants were CS First Boston, the sponsors of the Danzon 
report, again without specialist experience in the health sector. The NIPB 
hired overseas consultants of a privatisation persuasion, including Danzon. 
Later it hired Peter Troughton, an ex-Roundtable member who as CEO 
had been involved in the privatisation of Telecom, again with no 
background in health administration (Easton, 1997, pl58). 
The 1990 National Government placed an emphasis on individual responsibility 
for health, access to core services was guaranteed to be affordable but not free. 
The state role was increasingly seen to be one of subsidising costs for those 
persons who were either unable to afford or who were high users of health care. 
Although the Government considered moves toward a social insurance system, it 
decided to retain the existing tax-based funding system, instead of a shift to a 
more radical private health system. 
The Funder Provider Split - CHEs and RHAs 
The structure of the new health system emphasised the separation of purchaser 
and provider roles via the establishment of four Regional Health Authorities 
(RHA) to purchase services and 22 Crown Health Enterprises (CHE) to provide 
Page 122 
services. The prevailing system of 14 Area Health Boards, which both purchased 
and provided services, was perceived as not producing the best value for the 
health dollar even though it was only fully implemented in 1989. It was believed 
that resources were locked into the maintenance of buildings and consequently 
boards were reluctant to look beyond their own facilities for better provision of 
service. Having funding and provision of services in the same body provided little 
incentive to develop efficiencies and cost savings. The new National Government 
considered that service providers who performed well were unable to be 
rewarded. "The emphasis was still on providing bricks and mortar, rather than 
providing best value health services" (CCMAU, 1996, p7). 
A transitional process occurred throughout the period 1 July 1991 to 30 June 
1993. Separation of the purchaser and provider functions required management, 
and the National Interim Provider Board was established to oversee the process. 
As an interim measure until the four RHAs went into effect on 1 July 1993, 
elected AHBs were abolished and commissioners were appointed to effect the 
transition. Crown Health Enterprises (CHE), while not yet established, were 
constituted as CHE Boards Designate. 
The reform separated the purchaser and provider roles of the AHBs and 
established a competitive market approach to the provision of health services. 
Four Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) in 1993, instead of the six 
recommended in the Gibbs Report, were established to manage the purchasing of 
and contracting for health services in their geographically defined populations. 
Although initial plans called for the creation of alternative Healthcare Plans to 
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compete eventually with the RHAs for clientele, under considerable pressure this 
approach was dropped. 
Four Regional Health Authorities were responsible for the purchasing of health 
services that best met the needs of their respective communities. There were three 
Regional Health Authorities in the North Island and one in the South Island. 
RHAs were to be funded by the Ministry of Health according to a population-
based formula with weighting for certain geographical and demographic factors 
such as population dispersion and age of population. Regional Health Authorities 
were able to contract for health services with a wide range of providers, including 
the public, private and voluntary sectors. The competitive contracting mechanism 
was intended to produce efficiencies through the operation of a market, where the 
competing bids would provide the most efficient and cost effective price for 
services. 
The four Regional Health Authorities were bodies corporate established by Order-
in-Council and run by a board established by the Minister of Health. The 
objectives of Regional Health Authorities were defined in the Health and 
Disability Services Act ( 1993) as: 
• promoting the personal health of people; and 
• promoting the care and support for those in need of personal 
health services or disability services; and 
• promoting the independence of people of disabilities; and 
• meeting the Crown's objectives notified to it under section 8 of 
the Act- in accordance with, and to the extent enabled by, its 
funding agreement (Ellis J, 1994 ). 
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The RHAs were also given responsibility for purchasing primary care, thus 
devolving this function from the Department of Health and integrating it with 
secondary care. 
Another key to the reforms was the reconstitution of the provider function of 
public hospitals into Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) which were to be run on a 
business basis under the direction of appointed boards. These entities (CHEs) 
were incorporated as limited liability companies. Elected Area Health Boards 
were abolished and replaced by an appointed Board of Directors. The owners and 
shareholders of the CHEs were the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Crown 
Health Enterprises. A Board appointed by the shareholders ran each of the CHEs. 
A government organisation, the Appointments and Governance Board appointed 
directors. The appointment criteria were based on skills and relevant experience in 
business, public or private sector and community management skills. 
The principal objectives of a Crown Health Enterprise were stated in the Health 
and Disability Services Act (1993) as: 
• Providing health services or disability services, or both; and 
• Assisting in meeting the Crown's objectives under section 8 of 
the Act by providing such services in accordance with the 
CHE' s statement of intent and any purchase agreement entered 
into by it, while operating as a successful and efficient 
business. 
Subject to economic feasibility and government approval, smaller communities 
could opt to take over control and management of their local hospitals as 
Community Trusts (CTs). The funding of both CHEs and CTs was dependent 
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upon the winning of contracts for particular services. These bodies were 
potentially in competition with private hospitals and private and voluntary 
providers in a bidding process. 
Traditional public health functions such as education, prevention, and public 
health research were to be carried out by the newly established Public Health 
Commission (PHC). The role of the PHC was to monitor and analyse the state of 
public health, advise the Minister of Health on health goals and objectives, and 
purchase public health services on a contestable contract basis. Traditional public 
health functions were separated from the general health system and given a direct 
support role in relation to the Minister of Health. 
For the consumers of health services the most obvious example that the health 
system had been radically changed was the introduction of part charges for 
secondary care. Until the RHAs were in place (1993) and operating and able to 
set user charges, a national interim system of part charges for hospital and 
outpatient care was established, with subsidies for low-income families and high 
users (Blank, 1998). The introduction of part user charges provoked more 
hostility, non-compliance and confusion than any other change. This was the most 
obvious symbol that the National Government had broken the long tradition of 
free hospital care (Davis & Ashton, 2001; Easton, 1997). 
Forms of Health Service Rationing 
Definition of what the government could be expected to fund was critical to the 
success of the reforms finally fully implemented in 1993. While the list of core 
services could not be defined other forms of financial and administrative rationing 
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were introduced. The reforms of the 1990s departed from the previously accepted 
universal access philosophy and focused on targeted assistance to specific groups. 
In 1992 the government created a Community Services Card (CSC) scheme, 
which gave people on low incomes access to health services at reduced prices. 
The cards were available to members of families with an annual income of less 
than NZ$35,000 (Bloom, 2000). 
Cardholders included a high proportion of students and older people. The 
actual level of co-payment for each type of service varied around the 
country, in line with variations in doctors' fees for identical services. For 
those eligible under the CSC scheme, co-payments were generally set at 
approximately 50 per cent of the service provider's fee (Bloom, 2000, 
p94). 
Other forms of targeting involved part charges for public hospital services. For 
subsidised hospital costs to be available for low-income families, charges were 
introduced for many hospital services for the wider population. In 1991, the 
government introduced a $31 charge for each hospital outpatient visit. 
The objectives of the new fee were mainly to reduce utilisation and to 
reduce the barrier to greater and fairer competition among service 
providers and service settings. The government argued that there was little 
sense in maintaining co-payments for general practice and medical 
specialist services in other settings while hospital outpatient services were 
free of charge (Bloom, 2000, p94-95). 
The irony was that hospital management reported that the cost of collecting the 
new co-payments was approximately the same as the revenue they generated. The 
co-payment scheme was unpopular amongst the public and generated a lot of 
negative publicity and became a political liability. Unsurprisingly the co-
payments were dropped shortly after they were adopted. As a strategy the co-
payment scheme appeared to be ill considered without the implications thought 
through let alone the actual cost to administer (Bloom, 2000). 
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Elements of the Oregon rationing model were replicated to some extent by the 
National government. With the separation of the funder, purchaser and provider 
the government also attempted to define 'core services', those essential, central, 
or fundamental services that form part of what the government would provide for 
all citizens. 'Governments seek to define 'core services' in the course of health 
reform as a means of delimiting what government can reasonably be expected to 
finance' (Bloom, 2000, p95). 
'According to the Minister it was a 'crucial' part of the health reforms 'probably 
the most important concept in the new health system' (Upton, in Davis & Ashton, 
2000, pl64). For the Minister of Health, Simon Upton, to have a defined list of 
services the government would fund was an important component of the reform 
programme. It would provide clarity for the public of the Government's 
commitment to what services would be publicly funded, individual entitlement to 
publicly subsidised health services and the overall intention to limit the growth of 
health expenditure. 
Similar to Oregon the list of core health services was to 'reflect the communities 
priorities' and a government appointed committee, a National Advisory 
Committee on Core Health Services, was to be selected to engage in a process of 
public consultation about what should be included in the core list (Upton, 1991 ). 
The Committee was to then advise the Minister of Health on the range of services 
to be included in the core. The list of core services 'would be specified in general 
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legislation ... and would be enforced either through the general courts system or a 
specialist tribunal established by legislation' (Upton, 1991, p86). 
The Minister of Health appointed the CSC in March 1992, to assist the 
Government in defining a core of services. The Committee consulted widely on 
the effectiveness and access of existing services. Despite the best intentions 
within seven months of its appointment the committee abandoned the notion of an 
explicit core. The members decided it would be 'impossible to implement' (Core 
Services Committee, 1994, p 1 ). They claimed 'it would either have to be so broad 
as to be meaningless, or so rigid as to be inflexible and unfair' (Finlayson, 2000, 
pl65). 
The complexity and the political contentiousness of the task in the hostile reform 
environment of the time did not make the outcome surprising. The Committee 
shifted its focus from advising Government on which services should be provided, 
to assessing the terms of access to existing services. 
Rather than defining general entitlements, the committee became 
concerned with setting the terms for access to services at the individual 
level, claiming that the social and clinical circumstances of individuals 
needed to be taken into account when considering access to services. A list 
approach - that is, defining general entitlements in an explicit core of 
services - would have disregarded these factors (Finlayson, 2000, p165). 
As a result of the decision to not define a core, the Ministry of Health set out in its 
annual Policy Guidelines for Regional Health Authorities the services RHAs were 
obliged to purchase on behalf of their clients. These were known as service 
obligations and lacked any specificity and detail of what services that members of 
the public might be entitled to from publicly-funded health services in New 
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Zealand. The outcome for the public was that ad-hoc covert rationing continued as 
before. 
Health as Business 
The new structure and emphasis on commercial viability introduced in 1993 under 
the RHA system brought new lines of accountability to entities that hospitals and 
related services had not previously had a direct relationship with. The Crown 
Company Monitoring and Advisory Unit (CCMAU), a government agency 
affiliated with the Treasury, monitored Crown Health Enterprises (now known as 
Hospital and Health Services). CCMAU reported directly to the Ministers of 
CHEs and Finance, who owned the CHEs as shareholders on behalf of the 
government. Historically, hospitals had not had such a direct reporting 
relationship with Treasury. The accountabilities and reporting relationships have 
been and remain highly complex. 
CCMAU described their role as being "to advise shareholding Ministers on the 
balance between public policy objectives and efficiency objectives, and identify 
trade-offs between them" ( CCMA U, 1999, p8). Their core objective as stated was 
"to provide advice that protects and enhances the value of Crown companies" 
(CCMAU, 1999, p3). 
CCMAU thus advised the Ministers of Health and Finance. Treasury also had a 
role in advising the Minister of Finance in respect of Health. CCMAU was 
significantly funded through the appropriations of its client agencies, in this case 
Vote: Health. Treasury had ultimate authority in preparing the government 
Budget, including Vote: Health (Steering Group, Ministers of Health, 1997). 
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The discernible disapproval and resistance of the public to many of these health 
sector changes led to proposed changes in the health sector becoming a key point 
of the election campaign for National in the 1996 election. Bill English, the new 
National Minister of Crown Health Enterprises indicated that if his government 
were returned it would ensure: 
• The reduction of the four RHAs to one; 
• The reduction of the number of CHEs to about half (the 
reforms had split 14 AHBs into 23 CHEs); 
• The combining of the portfolios of the Minister of Health and 
Minister of CHEs (Easton, 1997, p 163 ). 
Effectively the National government was proposing a strategic retreat on some 
issues that appeared to return the health sector to centralised control. 
Despite the initial 1990 intention to revolutionise the health sector the National 
government by 1996 had had to retreat on key goals. The government had 
already: 
• abandoned health care plans (the public stated firmly it wanted no change in 
public funding); 
• abandoned the Public Health Commission (PHC) as a stand alone entity 
charged with advising and monitoring public health; 
• abandoned the core health services definition programme; 
• withdrawn the hospital overnight charges and withdrawn or reduced some 
other user part-charges; 
• failed to gain significant productivity gains; 
• substantially increased public funding (rather than hold it, as hoped), yet 
various indicators (such as the length of waiting lists) had not improved or had 
deteriorated; 
• increased the exposure of ministers to minor failures in the system (because 
previously the area health boards had taken responsibility); while 
• despite their business goals the CHEs continued to make losses. 
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The 1996 OECD report on the New Zealand economy was reticent about the 
health reforms and what the gains may have been. Their report did not sound 
totally convinced of the projected gains and outcomes . 
. . . . even though the system is in its third year of operation, it is not yet 
clear how the reforms will ultimately affect health care in New Zealand. It 
is too early to observe their effects on health outcomes and to discern what 
impact they will have on output of the health sector as well as the 
organisation of output provision (Easton, 1997, p162). 
After 1996, with the introduction of Mixed Member Proportional representation 
(MMP), no one party would hold an absolute majority in Parliament. Legislation 
would require the support of at least two or three parties particularly if major 
policy changes were involved. Effectively any succeeding government was locked 
into the 1994 legislation of the Fiscal Responsibility Act unless significant 
support could be harnessed from other parties to support any initiative that 
deviated from the principles. 
The 1996 National/New Zealand First Coalition Government 
With the formation of the National/ New Zealand First Coalition government of 
1996, the ownership relationship changed from the Minister of CHEs to the 
Minister of Health, who subsumed the Minister of CHEs • responsibilities. 
Ownership on the Finance side remained with the Minister of Finance, and was 
not passed to the new position of Treasurer. 
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Hospital and Health Services and the Health Funding Authority 
The change in name from Crown Health Enterprises to Hospital and Health 
Services (HHS) in 1998 was due to a further restructuring as a result of the 
governing coalition agreement entered into between the National and New 
Zealand First parties in 1996. The politicians argued that it was more than a name 
change as there was a shift from the requirement of CHEs to make a profit to 
Hospital & Health Services being required to act in a business-like manner. Other 
changes included the return of a level of direct community representation, with 
local Councils being invited to nominate two candidates for inclusion on CHE 
Boards, with the condition that they not be sitting Councillors. Health funding, 
which had been regionalised under the RHA model, began the process of 
transition to a single national health funder, the Health Funding Authority. That 
change was completed by October 1998. 
Evaluating Changes in New Zealand Health Service Delivery 
New Zealand has experienced two sweeping health system reforms in the past 
twenty years: a reformed public health model under Area Health Boards 
introduced gradually through the 1980s and a more explicitly market driven and 
rapidly implemented model under Regional Health Authorities instituted in 1993. 
The reforms of the New Zealand health sector in the 1980s and 1990s have been 
driven by the prevailing ideology of the government of the day. The changes in 
the health sector were an integral both Labour and National governments model 
for the economy and consequently the public sector. Rationalisation for change 
has frequently been argued on the basis of cost and the need to contain cost. 
While the public expectation and government policy had been since the late 1930s 
that the demand for services should be based on need and be met and funded by 
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the State, the State in the 1980s and 1990s has explored models that have 
attempted to set finite limits on cost and types of health services that would be 
funded. Potential need can always outstrip funding potential in any health system. 
However, the changes in New Zealand, as elsewhere, included as maxims the shift 
from the government to the private sector and the development of a competitive 
model. 
There will always be tension in funding (and rationing in some form is inevitable 
in any system). The shift was not totally about cost containment, but also -a 
political shift to a new ideology, the free market, without the accompanying 
acknowledgment that the free market health system (the United States is the major 
and most developed example) also includes rationing to contain costs. That is, the 
large number of US citizens who are either uninsured or under-insured, the "gap" 
group and thereby receive inadequate or minimal health care access. 
Over the last decade in New Zealand there has been an attempt to shift the burden 
of health care provision from the State to the individual. This has been 
ideologically driven not because the public has endorsed and accepted a new style 
of health care delivery. Since the 1930s there has been a strong belief within New 
Zealand society that free health care was a right that every citizen was entitled to. 
The exploration of other models that challenged the prevailing egalitarian 
philosophy has been influenced by international trends and solutions adopted by 
other governments, though in many respect can be seen to have gone further and 
faster than others (Boston et al, 1996). World Bank and International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF) influence has helped shape New Zealand economic and social policy 
in much the same way it has in large parts of the developed and developing world. 
Examination of the recent market-driven New Zealand health sector reforms of 
the 1990s would initially suggest a radical departure from past policies. When 
examined within the trends in New Zealand health policy since the early 1980s 
these should more accurately be seen as further steps towards a major 
transformation of a national health care system, already under way by the end of 
the 1980s. This transformation has been driven by a number of factors, including: 
• Technological advances 
• Population changes 
• Expanded public expectations for health care 
• Realisation that NZ cannot afford to maintain a system formed at a time when 
the country had the third highest per capita income in the world. 
After decades of living beyond its means and the accumulation of $50 billion 
worth of debt, the international pressures to reduce fiscal risk required a 
considerable scaling back of government spending (Blank, 1994, p129). 
Clearly, the ideological shift of governments internationally away from the ideal 
of the welfare state has also been common to both main New Zealand parties 
since 1984. Whether health care is one of those services that ought to be 
transferred to consumers or whether it should be targeted to certain parts of the 
population is an ideological question concerning the type of society of which we 
wish to be a part. While the governments may have seen the abandonment of a 
universal state funded health system as necessary and desirable, "the public" was 
arguably not convinced, let alone consulted (Blank, 1998). For example, despite 
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the growth of the private sector the actual proportion of health funding from 
private insurance remained low. In 1992, while over a third of New Zealanders 
had some insurance coverage, and there were over one million members of 
Southern Cross alone, private insurance represented only about 3.5 per cent of 
total health expenditures (Blank, 1998, p273 ). 
The successive Labour and National governments of the 1980s and 1990s had 
demonstrated that they were able to restructure the health system at will. This was 
achieved in several ways: the speed in which change was imposed, successive 
changes of Ministers, introduction of external advisers and consultants from the 
private sector. While Labour initially took a more incremental approach to the 
development of Area Health Boards, by the end of the 1980s they were mandating 
them through legislation, and replacing one by a commissioner. National then 
built on this precedent, mandating wholesale change through legislation and 
replacing all the Area Health Boards with commissioners. The impact of these 
approaches has been instability in the health sector for health professionals and 
confusion for consumers as they struggled to understand the implications for the 
sector and the shape of the new structure. 
A major contributor to the instability has been the succession of health ministers, 
particularly since 1986. Each had differences in style and their personal vision for 
the role. With each new minister came new preferences and a new agenda for 
health reform. Within a three-year period ( 1987-90), Labour had Michael Basset, 
David Caygill, and Helen Clark. In 1991 National appointed Simon Upton who 
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was replaced in less than two years by Bill Birch, then followed by Jenny Shipley, 
Bill English and in 1999 by Wyatt Creech. 
While it is not unrealistic to expect policy change when governments change, 
health policy is also subject to the personal agendas of changing ministers even 
within the same government. Blank has described the 4th Labour Government as 
particularly characterised by the dominance of individual ministers and the 
apparent inability or unwillingness of the government as a whole to offer a 
coherent and comprehensive health policy (Blank, 1994). 'At times this resulted 
in reversals in the implementation of major internal restructuring efforts, caused 
directly by fundamental changes in direction reflecting the different priorities of 
the individual ministers' (Blank, 1994, p133). 
The New Zealand public health sector is one of the most complex of all sections 
of government, with accountability and role definition at times overlapping 
between agencies, and at other times seeming to leave a vacuum. The frequent 
recent reform processes have increased that structural complexity, and heighten 
the observer's difficulty in following the changes in influence and decision 
making. Those processes can highlight the apparent failings of government 
agencies in respect of the Treaty of Waitangi and health. Such failings may have 
as much to do with omissions occasioned through structural change and loss of 
institutional memory as with any intent on the part of the Crown. 
Public Accountability 
Accountability in the reformed health sector is not a simple issue, even to the 
point of determining accountability at the local level for decisions. 
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The organisational changes in the health care system and the public sector 
generally over the last twenty years, and particularly since 1984, are as 
cataclysmic as the post provincial revolution in government administration 
[1876]. Indeed, last years structural changes [1993] may become so 
epochal that previous healthcare history could eventually be referred to as 
BC (before the changes) and subsequent events as AD (after the 
Department.) These changes were achieved with significant staff losses, 
significant haemorrhaging of institutional memory, and management and 
organisational disruption, (Brunton, 1994, p 136 ). 
The changes to the core public sector led to a reduction in policy provision by the 
downsized public service, and the increased contracting of external private sector 
consultants in the development of health policy and refining the government's 
position (Boston, Martin, Pallot & Walsh, 1999). The public perceived these 
consultants as extremely influential and contributing to the marginalisation of the 
public and health professionals in the development of health policy (Blank, 1998; 
Blank, 2001 ). Public resistance to the health reforms also provided a pressure and 
influence on government policy (Easton, 1997). 
The motivation for the use of external consultants was driven in part to avoid 
capture by the traditional interest groups and the desire of successive health 
ministers to achieve their own particular agendas with minimal opposition (Blank, 
1994; Easton, 1997). These objectives have been met at a cost. Over the last two 
decades the result has been the replacement of health sector interests with 
business sector interests. This has created alienation of health professionals 
because of their exclusion, loss of good faith and sector reform fatigue due to 
repeated restructuring (Blank, 1994; Easton, 1997). 
Generic Management 
Easton ( 1997) has argued that the reform model was wrong as it was based on the 
assumption that health was a generic product that could be administered by 
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generic managers. Within six months of their inception in 1993 the CHE boards 
which were made up of predominantly private sector business people recognised 
that the health sector was different. The Chairman of the Crown Health Enterprise 
Chairs' Consultative Committee wrote 'the CHE group are of the view that the 
business of providing is not a genuine commercial mode· (Easton, 1997, p 164 ). 
Central to the justification of the economic reforms (including specifically the 
health reforms) of the 1980s and 1990s was the theory that any able manager was 
capable of managing any agency in the private or public sector (Easton, 1997). 
The implications for the health sector were the replacement of specialist managers 
with institutional experience, with generalists with no institutional memory and 
little institutional experience. The most well known example of this was the 
appointment of the first chief executive officer of the largest Crown Health 
Enterprise who was previously involved in brewery management (Easton, 1997). 
The theory translates with this example that the same skills are needed to run a 
hospital as to manage a brewery and that the production of health services is not 
essentially different from the production of beer. 
Such a theory inevitably led to serious tensions between clinicians and generic 
managers. Easton ( 1997) describes it as a clash of culture between generic 
managers focused on profit and clinicians focused on patients, with those that 
advocated for the reforms claiming the two objectives are much the same thing. 
The clash of culture had some dramatic results. Within three years ( 1993-96) over 
half of the chief executives of Crown Health Enterprises had left and were having 
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to be replaced. Ian Frame, when CEO of Canterbury Health, wrote 'the 
professional and commercial cultures have come face to face in a way that has not 
happened before . . . At present there are serious tensions ... · (Easton, 1997, 
p 170 ). Within six months of this statement Mr. Frame's CHE had a major 
industrial dispute with clinicians over work practices and remuneration and Mr. 
Frame had resigned. 
Public "consultation" 
The sweeping policy changes of the 1980s and 1990s were deliberately conducted 
with few opportunities for public input by so-called vested interests (Douglas, 
1993 ). The sense of alienation possibly contributed to the dramatic drop in the 
real participation rate of voters in the 1990 general election that fell to a fifty-year 
low with 24 per cent of eligible New Zealanders failing to either register or to 
vote. 
In 1989, the percentage of New Zealanders reporting 'full trust and 
confidence' in politicians had fallen to 4 per cent, compared with 33 per 
cent in 1975. But perhaps most disturbing are the results of a 1991 survey, 
which revealed widespread feelings of cynicism and powerlessness in the 
electorate (Hayward, 1997, p409). 
In the 10 years 1987-97 there were over 373 instances of the use of the word 
'consultation' in new legislation (Hayward, 1997). The term 'public consultation' 
referred to lay community involvement in the policy process, where the 
responsibility for decision-making ultimately remained with elected 
representatives or their officials. In a landmark ruling in the High Court (Air New 
Zealand Ltd vs Wellington International Airport Ltd, 1992) Chief Justice Mr 
McGechan defined public consultation as: 'The statement of a proposal not yet 
finally decided upon, listening to what others have to say, considering their 
responses, and then deciding what will be done.· He went on to state that 
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consultation was not 'merely telling or presenting information·; nor, he argued, 
did it necessarily involve ' ... the negotiation toward an agreement, although the 
latter not uncommonly can follow .... Consultation is an intermediate situation 
involving meaningful discussion· (Hayward, 1997, p411 ). His ruling defined the 
essential elements of public consultation. They included: providing sufficient 
information to consulted parties; ensuring sufficient time for public consultation 
and subsequent deliberation on advice; genuine consideration of the advice given; 
and an open mind and willingness to change. 
Consultation with the public in the 1980s and 1990s became a parody of 
how to consult without really consulting. It became a one-way process of 
convincing the public and health community that the policy selected was 
the best for society (Douglas, 1993). Labour and National governments 
had, once in power, the political capacity to initiate policy change without 
effective opposition. Consultation on social policy moved from being a 
pre-policy-making activity to being a post-policy-making activity. Instead 
of explicitly initiating public debate before the policy was made, public 
relations efforts were used to post-hoc educate the public or to sell the 
policy at the implementation stage (Blank, 1994, p135). 
Public consultation has had important symbolic significance in that the policies 
ultimately made were viewed as the result of democracy, despite the fact that 
most of the public did not actively participate. In their desire to escape capture by 
special interests, recent governments even jettisoned the symbolically important 
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perception of having sought public input at the initiation and estimation stages 
(Blank, 1994, pl35). 
In 1993 the National Government launched an advertising campaign to convince 
and educate the public of the benefits of the health sector reform and the new 
system. The $2.5 million dollar campaign did not have the desired outcome that 
the government may have wanted. The advertising campaign was seen as overt 
political advertising that increased public resistance to the new reforms not 
acceptance. Resistance from the Coalition for Public Health, which included a 
number of retired and active sector participants, gave a public face and voice to 
the general public's disquiet (Easton, 1997, pl59). Easton suggests that the 
campaign was a failure as the Prime Minister transferred the health portfolio held 
by Simon Upton to Bill Birch, 'Any campaign whose commander is replaced 
must be judged a failure· (Easton, 1997, p 161 ). Birch drove through the reforms 
to the establishment of the CHEs and RHAs on time in July 1993. However, while 
the structural changes succeeded, many of the policy changes did not (Easton, 
1997). 
Public representation 
The National government's (1990-1993) own actions reinforced the sense of 
alienation for sectors of the community. They ignored established public 
consultation procedures and practices, with the market-oriented policy reform 
process that started in 1984, as evident in the government's decision to dismantle 
the elected hospital boards. Local communities first elected hospital boards in 
1909. This had been a tier of local government in which women were active 
participants with reasonable representation. 
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... In 1989, 53 per cent of all elected candidates and one-third of board 
chairpersons were women. In 1993, these elected boards were dismantled. 
They were replaced by government-appointed boards charged with the 
task of running the newly created Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) and 
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). In an ironic twist, this reform took 
place in the centennial year of women's suffrage; yet fewer than one third 
of the new government appointments were women, and only one of the 
twenty-three new CHEs was chaired by a woman (Hayward, 1997, p410). 
For the public of New Zealand the claims before the health sector reforms of 
substantial and rapid improvements that justified the costs of the upheaval were 
not substantiated. Jim Bolger who led the National government through the 
duration of the reform process acknowledged there had been a high political cost 
to the health reforms (Easton, 1997). The government's health policies were 
identified as a major reason for the substantial loss of support for National in 
1993, in which it lost a quarter of its 1990 vote, though still maintained power. 
While the public in general may have reacted negatively to the health reform 
process, the issue of its success or failure for Maori is separate. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the impact of reform changes on Maori. 
In particular, it highlights the development of Maori health initiatives outside of 
the mainstream health sector during this period, and considers the extent to which 
that development may be said to address the Crown's responsibility for Maori 
health under the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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CHAPTER 5 KAUPAPA MAORI HEALTH INITIATIVES: 1983 -
1997 
Kaupapa Maori (By Maori for Maori) Health services and 
their development 
In 1984, at the beginning of the structural reform period under study, a crucial hui 
addressing the question of Maori health was held at Hoani Waititi Marae in West 
Auckland (Dept of Health, Hui Whakaoranga: Maori Health Planning Workshop, 
1984 ). The participants were a range of Department of Health, Maori Affairs, and 
Hospital Board representatives, as well as representatives of Iwi. The then 
Minister of Maori Affairs in the National Government, the Hon. Ben Couch 
stated, ' .... there is no such thing as Maori health or Pakeha health; there is only 
people health'. In his view, the individual was to blame for the state of their health 
' .... most people who enjoy good health have earned it. The rules are the same for 
people of all races; good eating, plenty of sleep and exercise, and moderation in 
all things' (Durie, 1994, p67). 
While that may have been Mr Couch's view, Hui Whakaoranga rejected that 
position. The hui recommendations advocated that 'health and educational 
institutions recognise culture as a positive resource' and that 'the feasibility of 
including Maori spirituality in health education programmes in schools and in 
tertiary educational institutions be investigated' (Durie, 1994, p67). 
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Hui Whakaoranga is significant in the development of Maori health initiatives, as 
it was the first national health hui held. The participants, a wide range of Maori 
health professionals, academics and health care providers, supported Maori health 
initiatives and advocated the provision of health care programmes by Maori. Over 
the next six years considerable progress would be made in the development of 
Kaupapa Maori health programmes. 
1980s - Maori Public Health 
Debate within Maoridom regarding the comparative health status of Maori had 
been occurring for a long time. Tainui had had a particular interest dating back to 
the public health programmes of Te Puea in the early 1900s. 
It was during the chickenpox outbreak that I first commenced my work. 
That was in the year after King Mahuta died. I was living on my farm at 
Mercer at the time. I found that Maori people were dying by the riverside. 
We could get no nurses for them. I had very little money so all my sister 
and I could do was to make a camp from Nikau palms at the river and 
there we nursed as many as possible back to health (Ramsden, 1927). 
As I have noted elsewhere (Ferguson, 1997), Tainui lwi were among the first 
developers of indigenous health initiatives within New Zealand. The Waahi health 
model was developed in the early 1980s (Ferguson, 1997). The model grew out of 
a desire by local people to have greater control over their own health status. It was 
catalysed in part by the visit of Dr Corinne Shear-Wood, a visiting American 
medical anthropologist, who was sponsored to work with the Waahi community 
by the Centre for Maori Studies and Research at Waikato University. 
Dr Shear-Wood had extensively researched cultural factors influencing the health 
of indigenous people. Two key findings emerged from her several months of 
residence at Waahi Marae, that 'the marae is an invaluable adjunct to maintenance 
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of Maori health', and 'the Pakeha medical profession continued to ignore the 
marae as a potential resource for the delivery of health services' (Shear-Wood, 
1982). She concluded her study with the view: 
that considerable improvement for the Maori people in Huntly - in health 
conditions in general and blood pressure levels in particular - could be 
attained in direct ratio to the extent that the strengths and acceptability of 
the Maoritanga are utilised. Specifically, the establishment within the 
Marae setting of a minimal health facility, would benefit from the trust and 
confidence the Maori people experience in such an atmosphere. For the 
Maori people involved in this study, it is apparent that the Waahi Marae 
offers an ideal location for such an innovative Maori Health Centre within 
the Huntly community (Shear-Wood, 1982, p37). 
She anticipated the centre providing a focus for a mix of health education and 
primary prevention work, work that fitted neatly within the role of the Department 
of Health of the day. 
The proposed facility could be used for examination, treatment, health 
education, and for the training of primary health care workers who would 
constitute the essential out-reach liaison component. The services of a 
general practitioner on a one day weekly basis, a dentist on a one day 
monthly schedule, and a nurse/health educator in attendance on a half-time 
arrangement would constitute a low cost, skeletal, but adequate, work 
force (Shear-Wood, 1982, p37, 38). 
Primary health care workers were an innovation at the time and had been 
advocated by the World Health Organisation (1978). Three or four workers would 
be recruited from within the Waahi community. The control of the project, its 
direction and guidance were to rest with the community, making it a true kaupapa 
Maori health initiative. 
This concept of marae based health care was not what the Waahi community had 
been used to. Primary health workers had an interesting time working with the 
community to redefine their views of health. 'At that time health was sickness. 
Right away you thought of doctors ... ' (Matatahi, 1996). The Waahi community 
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supported the proposed initiative, and in September 1981 the Centre for Maori 
Studies and Research, submitted a pilot proposal on their behalf to the Minister of 
Health, to test the feasibility of a marae based health project. The then Minister of 
Health George Gair viewed the proposal favourably: 
the proposal was in line with an approach formulated at a conference for 
Maori doctors which was held in Wellington in September 1981...the 
philosophy of self-help in the preventative and clinical aspects of health 
had much to commend it and Waahi Marae could be seen as a pilot 
scheme (Van Meijl, 1987, p 11 ). 
A formal proposal was prepared and submitted in November 1982. 
The proposed centre was to be a community based, community staffed and 
community controlled health facility. Its focus was to be on the 
maintenance of health in its physical, mental, emotional and spiritual 
aspects. Just as the meetinghouse represented Maoritanga, and the whare 
kai represented hospitality, so the health centre would represent health. It 
was emphasised that the project should never become a sickness or clinical 
service, as health is more concerned with habits and beliefs than with 
disorders and disease (Van Meijl, 1987, p 11 ). 
The governance of the centre was planned to remain largely with the Waahi marae 
community. The kaupapa of the training programme was the integration of Maori 
cultural values and beliefs, traditional Maori healing practices and modern 
preventative health knowledge. 
The proposal was supported by organisations such as the New Zealand Cancer 
Society and the New Zealand Diabetes Society, who saw it as improving the 
access of Maori clients to their services and increasing the availability of 
community health information. General practitioners did not have such a 
favourable view, believing the new role encroached on the preventative work they 
were already undertaking . 
... At that time only one per cent of health funding was going towards 
prevention and doctors they say they were doing prevention but we were 
saying they weren't because people had to be sick to go and see them to 
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prevent it but whereas we wanted to stop them from being sick ... The 
opposition was strong [from doctors] Who were these two Maori women 
with no qualifications .... Who were those two to come and speak to the 
diabetes conference at Waikato? (Matatahi, interview, 1996). 
They thought Tutata and I were going to go out and tell all these Maoris 
they shouldn't smoke and the dangers and so on. We didn't really have a 
relationship with them at all because we weren't qualified we were just in 
the community ... There really wasn't much support from our local doctors 
(Te Hemara-Maipi, interview, 1996). 
The community health workers believed that the improved access to information 
would impact positively on the health of the individual and consequently reduce 
the cost of health care on the tertiary level. 
If they could get clientele that became informed and they were able to 
come off their medication or if they avoided going into hospital we were 
actually going to save thousands and thousands of dollars for the taxpayer 
(Te Hemara-Maipi, interview, 1996). 
The Waahi Health Centre always had a strong community and individual 
empowerment focus. A fundamental aim of the Health Centre was to raise the 
awareness of the people of the community so they were able to take increased 
responsibility for maintaining their own health. 
We were trying to deliver a health message but the impression was, or the 
interpretation used to always be, that we would pick up on all these 
delinquent people who weren't doing the right thing. Even today I 
absolutely refuse to be part of that environment...We were challenged time 
and time in the institutions to go and talk to groups of kids that were 
naughty and I'd think hey hey this is not about kids being naughty we were 
in there to give a buzz about being Maori, a buzz about what we were 
wanting to share ... No way would we pick up on groups of our rangatahi 
that they were identified as being troublesome .... We said no that we there 
to give a positive message (Te Hemara-Maipi, interview, 1996). 
The Waahi model was firmly based in principles of community empowerment. It 
argued that health did not belong to doctors and institutions. Health equalled 
wellness and the model believed the key to this was self-responsibility. With 
Page 148 
health education and promotion people could make choices that would promote a 
healthy lifestyle. 
The philosophy of the early health initiative was based on the recognition that 
'The state of Maori health is serious and is a concern for all Maori people working 
in health and related areas' (Ave & Maclean, 1991, p24 ). As a result of this: 
Programmes that have a preventative bias, educative approach, offer social 
support by Maori people for Maori people, and others who feel they would 
like to avail themselves of this type of service, should be encouraged and 
supported by the present health system (Ave & Maclean, 1991, p25). 
There was great national interest in what was being done at Waahi. The tribal 
development aspirations occurred at a time when the Department of Health was 
seeking to develop improved means of accessing Maori (Ferguson, 1997). Waahi 
developments coincided with the development of strong public health 
philosophies within the health sector, prompted in part by the Alma Ata 
declaration ( 1978). Area Health Boards were being promulgated to achieve 
similar public health ends, however there was no specific overlap in the Waikato 
between these two developments (Ferguson, 1997). 
The Waahi model was hailed as innovative and at the cutting edge of changes 
within health care delivery. It incorporated the development concepts - autonomy, 
control and working for the collective good which were guiding Tainui. It 
provided an example for other marae within the Iwi that was soon to be picked up 
by others throughout the land. The aims of the Waahi initiative and those which 
were later modelled on it were primarily: 
To reinforce that the Waahi Health Centre is a preventative centre that will 
be a resource pool for all marae, where health is taught rather than where 
sickness is cured (Ave & Maclean, 1991). 
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The focus was on health, development, and empowerment under a local kaupapa. 
As the decade of the 1990s health reforms arrived that focus was to change 
considerably. 
1990s - Maori Medical Entrepreneurs 
Primary Maori Health 
The market-driven health reforms introduced by the National Government from 
1991 led to two new developments within Maori health initiatives. These were the 
introduction of primary medical (GP) services at marae based health centres (Te 
Puni Kokiri, 1993) and the development of urban authority health centres not 
affiliated to a traditional Iwi based marae providing standard general practitioner 
service (Cunningham & Kiro, 2001, p75). Maori recognised the reforms offered 
an opportunity to access funds through the delivery of primary health care 
services within a competitive market (Te Puni Kokiri, 1993). 
Maori health status was recognised as significantly worse than that of non-Maori. 
Risks for Maori were especially high for respiratory disease 
(hospitalisation rate of 2.2 times as great), diabetes (2.1 times), cataracts 
( 1. 9 times), kidney disease ( 1.5 times), circulatory disease ( 1.5 times), 
female reproductive system disorders ( 1.4 times), and complications of 
pregnancy and childbirth ( 1.3 times as high as non-Maori) (Durie, 1994, 
p131). 
There were two related responses from Maori to the abysmal picture of Maori 
health. Firstly, it was argued that the Maori view of health needed to be 
recognised, and to influence how health care was delivered in main stream health 
services (Durie, 1994 ). As noted earlier the late 1980s included an emphasis by 
the Ministry of Health on biculturalism and the implications for health of the 
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Treaty (Dept. of Health, 1987 ,88). Commitment to the Treaty was demonstrated 
by partnership arrangements that some lwi entered into with Area Health Boards, 
an approach endorsed by the report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on 
Maori Health ( 1990). The employment of community health workers nationally to 
promote health and provide programmes recognised that the needs of Maori 
communities were different and required different solutions (Cunningham & 
Durie, 1999). 
Article Two of the Treaty was fundamental to the second response. The increased 
emphasis on a Maori perspective in health care services coincided with the 
"mainstreaming" of Maori services into the wider state sector agencies and the 
devolution of Department of Maori Affairs functions to Iwi. The demand for main 
stream health services to recognise and allow for Maori involvement was mirrored 
by the strengthening of Maori aspirations for autonomy and independence from 
the State (Durie, 1994 ). The development of kaupapa Maori or "by Maori for 
Maori" services began to accelerate (Ministry of Health, Coordinated Care For 
Maori, 1995 ). 
In 1994 Maori health was identified as one of the Government's four health gain 
priority areas (Policy Guidelines for Regional Health Authorities, 1994/1995). 
The Core Health Services Committee had made recommendations in October 
1992 that during 1993/1994 more emphasis should be placed on 'ensuring that 
primary care for Maori is effective, available, and provided in forms that 
encourage use by Maori for health maintenance, health promotion' (MOH, 1993) 
After the RHA model health reforms of the early 1990s: 
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Primary health care services were recognised as singularly important and 
an obvious focus for positive health development. Health promotion, 
disease prevention, and early intervention were to be part of an accepted 
lwi package of services and were increasingly viewed by Maori as 
services which they themselves could provide in a more effective manner 
(Durie, 1994, p 161 ). 
With the de-regulation of health services ( 1991) it was now possible for lwi to be 
providers of health care. lwi such as Tainui had already gained expertise in the 
establishment and management of health programmes during the 1980s. The 
contracting opportunities that were now possible under the Regional Health 
Authority model for defined services offered lwi the chance to compete with other 
providers for service delivery. As Mason Durie argues: 
.. .lwi participation in the reformed health sector did not represent a new or 
even renewed interest. Instead, the reforms simply allowed plans and 
programmes already in place to find new expression. While there was an 
initial disquiet as Area Health Boards disappeared to make way for Crown 
Health Enterprises, in the long run Iwi were interested in the health of 
their people within a context of Maori development. Of secondary 
importance was the shape of the health sector; it was, after all, only one 
aspect of the Maori development mosaic and certainly not the entire focus 
(Durie, 1994, p164). 
After 1992 there was a shift in the style of health care being delivered on marae 
and the numbers of Maori involved in health care delivery. The emphasis swung 
from a focus on health to an agenda of lwi development (Te Puni Kokiri, E Mua 
Kai Kai, 1993). 
Tainui had been among the first Iwi to enter the health reforms as primary health 
care providers. Up until 1993 health development within the lwi had been under 
the auspices of the Tainui Maori Trust Board. The Waahi Health Centre arising 
from the report of Shear-Wood had provided the example and health development 
had been further built on with the Tainui Health Plan (Tainui Maori Trust Board, 
1990). 
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After 1993 there was a shift away from the Health Plan by the Waahi Health 
Centre management committee and the previous style of development. The new 
focus became providing medical services and a medical practitioner was 
employed. This appears to have been significantly due to recognition from the 
management committee of the control and gate-keeping role played by doctors in 
primary health funding. All of the primary health funding sources identified by 
Tainui (Te Puni Kokiri, 1993) required the presence of medical staff. Indeed, they 
identified the prospect of capitation funding as attractive, both because of its 
reliability, and the ability to broaden the funding to a range of non-medical 
services (Te Puni Ko kiri, 1993 ). Clearly, medical staff availability became a key 
factor in achieving Tainui health service delivery ambitions, ironically at the cost 
of the broader preventive health development model that had initially inspired the 
service. 
In the period 1992 and 1993 additional primary health services were implemented 
in the Tainui health initiatives. These included the establishment of medical 
practices and the employment of doctors and practice nurses. Doctors were 
employed on salary at the lwi health centres as it was alleged that the difficulty in 
accessing medical care was primarily because of cost to the patient. This created a 
barrier to health care. A report states that: 
The presence of Tainui in the primary health sector is intended to address 
these barriers, thereby putting medical help and medication within the 
reach of Maori. 
Many communities are disadvantaged through poor transport, and limited 
services. Some services can be made more accessible; and in the case of 
Tainui, by providing marae-based clinics and delivering basic health 
services to the 'front door'. Location is therefore paramount in the delivery 
of health services for Tainui (Te Puni Kokiri, 1993, p9). 
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Waahi Health Centre continued to provide an example for the next phase of 
development with the establishment of the RHA model in 1993. The medical 
practice at Waahi was established utilising the new RHA contractual 
arrangements the 1993 health reforms allowed. The Waahi Health Centre owned 
the medical practice and the doctor was contracted by the Centre to provide a 
general practice service for an identified patient group. Capitation as it was called 
enabled initiatives to have improved access to funding as the patients were 
registered with the practice not with the doctor. 
Capitation is an alternative arrangement with the RHA to provide general 
medical services on a contractual basis. It replaces the normal process for 
claiming General Medical Subsidies, which is fee-for-service based. 
Normally a general practitioner would claim GMS each time a patient 
eligible for a subsidy visits. In comparison, the capitation scheme uses a 
funding formula to work out an annual fixed amount to be paid for each 
patient eligible for a subsidy irrespective of the number of visits. 
Capitation funding, unlike GMS, is not demand driven and provides a 
more predictable and stable form of funding (Te Puni Kokiri, 1993, p17). 
The Health Centre carried all risk and owned all profit. This provided Maori 
health initiatives increased access to the health dollar. Patients benefited 
financially by having to pay no fees in the case of beneficiaries or a contractually 
limited low fee for others. 
Once this new arrangement was refined there was a tremendous growth in the 
number and styles of Maori health centres and not all of them were marae-based. 
After 1991 health and the delivery of health care was seen more as a business 
opportunity by entrepreneurs in contrast to the original kaupapa of the marae-
based initiatives (Ferguson, 1997). With the establishment of Raukura Hauora (a 
corporate body distinct from Tainui governance) in 1992, Tainui entered the 
business of primary health care with a vengeance. 
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Within the Tainui leadership and other lwi health initiatives concern has been 
expressed at the expansion of Raukura Hauora and the growth of health centres 
that are not marae-based (Ferguson, 1997). The majority of Tainui health 
initiatives from 1993 did not evolve out of a similar process to that of Waahi 
Health Centre. The introduction of doctors created debate within the Tainui Iwi as 
to whether the prevention and promotion message is being undermined. The new 
model, health service as a business (Maipi, in Te Puni Kokiri, 1993), changed the 
paradigm from one of employment of Maori health workers to contracts with 
doctors to provide services that met capitation requirements from the RHA, i.e. 
personal health care and clinical treatment services. 
There was concern that the Iwi has lost control of health development and an 
independent group within the Iwi has captured health (Ferguson, 1997). 
Comments have been made by other Iwi and marae based health care providers 
that Raukura Hauora viewed marae as business opportunities or competition 
(Ferguson, 1997). It is clear that Raukura Hauora grasped the contracting 
opportunities that the 1991 reforms provided. However the opinion within Tainui 
is split as to whether those opportunities have been at the expense of the 
development emphasis and the early promise of health status improvement to be 
delivered under this model. 
Maori Secondary Providers 
By the end of 1997 several Maori health organisations in various parts of the 
country were looking to establishing secondary (hospital based) Maori health 
services. These were generally brought about by shifts in the requirements for 
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hospital stock, as services became more specialised, and tended to concentrate on 
larger urban centres. 
Two examples are immediately evident. The first is that of Ngati Porou Hauora, 
which took over the running of Te Puia Hospital north of Gisbome, when it was 
no longer an asset to the Tairawhiti Crown Health Enterprise (Durie, 1994 ). The 
second is Hauora Waikato, which grew out of the Maori health service established 
in Tokanui psychiatric hospital in the early 1980s (Durie, 1994 ). 
Both examples have the same thing in common with Maori primary health care 
initiatives, the shifting of cost or risk from the Crown to Maori organisations. 
Taking on the risk has brought organisational benefits, with the independence of 
running small and not so small businesses, and consequent employment benefits. 
However, any positive impact on Maori health status as a result of that risk-taking 
has yet to be comprehensively quantified. 
Maori Purchasers and Funders 
A further development as a result of the 1990 health reforms was the development 
of purchasing and funding relationships between Maori and the Crown. Several 
Regional Health Authorities entered into different types of arrangements with Iwi 
or Maori health providers, in order to ensure their engagement and participation in 
the reforms. The most persistent model has been that of MAPO, or Maori 
Purchasing Organisations, established by way of Treaty partnerships between 
North Health (the Northern Regional Health Authority) and various Maori 
organisations purporting to represent Iwi in that region. 
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Maori Health Provision - a success story? 
To answer the question, has Maori health provision been a success story, we have 
to ask first, by what criteria, by whose point of view. There is no doubt the 
Ministry of Health views it as a success story, and furthermore one for which it 
takes a great deal of credit. Ria Earp, Deputy Director General of Maori Health 
rates the significant growth of Maori health provider numbers as an achievement 
the Ministry can lay claim to. And certainly on the face of it, the numbers are 
impressive: 20 providers to 240 in the last decade, and a budget increase from 
$300,000 to $110 million (Earp, 2001 ). 
However, that latter figure needs to be put in context. The national budget for 
publicly funded health services in 200 I is on the order of $7 billion. Spending on 
kaupapa Maori health services amounts to 1.6% of that figure, or about a tenth 
proportionally of the Maori population. 
One must look further into what constitutes a kaupapa Maori service. As the 
previous section indicated, what was initially framed at Waahi as a strongly 
community based preventative and health development service has shifted over 
the past ten years to a model of medical entrepreneurship which is driven by 
financial development as much as any other kaupapa. 
Even where the kaupapa has remained Maori, in many instances the service 
provider, and particularly the medical service provider, is not Maori. The service 
itself is provided within a mainstream medical model in many instances. 
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Clearly, however, from the view of the health reformers themselves, the risk 
shifting of unlimited primary health care demand from the Crown to Maori 
primary providers has been a success. So much so that the same strategy has been 
adopted with some success in the mainstream primary healthcare environment, 
with non-Maori providers grouped together as Independent Practice Associations 
(IPAs) (Midland RHA, 1995). 
The current Labour-Alliance government's Primary Health Strategy reiterates the 
view that Maori health care provision has been a success. 
It is essential that these (recent gains in Maori health care provision) are 
not lost. District Health Boards will continue to contract with Maori 
providers, and support their further development, so that Maori 
communities have control over their health and wellbeing (King, 2001, 
pl I). 
Arguably, while the strategy met government goals in the 1990s of addressing 
Treaty issues in respect of Maori health care provisioning, it could equally be seen 
as having suited their market ideology to create a competitor to the State. Thus, 
meeting Treaty of Waitangi obligations may have been coincidental with other 
motivations, whose longer term implications may be counter to the State's 
partnership obligations to Maori, such as the development and failure of Maori 
provider organisations in a competitive environment. 
Before leaving the issue, it is important to reiterate that, even with the massive 
growth in Maori health service provision under Article II of the Treaty, it amounts 
to only 1.6% of the Crown's health budget. Furthermore, Maori utilisation of 
kaupapa Maori health services is comparatively small, with the Ministry of Health 
estimating it at about 20% of all primary health utilisation by Maori (Manaia, 
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interview, 1997). For this reason, the research in this study concentrates primarily 
on the Crown's responsibility under article ID of the Treaty ofWaitangi, and the 
provision of mainstream health services to Maori. 
The next chapter provides a detailed case study of the impact of a particular 
reform initiative on the delivery of Public Health services to Maori in the 
Hawke's Bay. Maori in the Hawke's Bay took a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal 
concerning the delivery of health services. The chapter sets out the basis and 
scope of the claim, and provides a detailed history of the decisions by the Crown 
agencies that led to a change in health service delivery. It concludes with an 
examination of those decision-making processes in light of the Treaty of Waitangi 
and its principles. 
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CHAPTER 6 - WAI 692: A CASE STUDY OF A MAINSTREAM 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE REFORM IN LIGHT OF THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
Wai 692 - Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi 
Tribunal 1999.2 
The New Zealand health sector reform process of both the 1980s and 1990s has 
been portrayed as the seeking of improvements to the current services and the 
subsequent benefits to the consumer (Upton, 1990). The advocates of reform have 
assumed that their changes would bring automatic improvements and be better 
than what had previously existed (Upton, 1990). 
It will be argued here that the reform process across the whole of the state sector, 
particularly in health, has not recognised the rights of the other Treaty partner 
adequately. For some Maori communities the health reforms have left them with 
increased barriers to accessing health care, a less responsive service and what they 
would describe as a diminished service (Ferguson, 1998). As a Treaty partner the 
Crown has embarked on several radical restructurings of the health sector with at 
times little if any acknowledgment of their obligation to the other Treaty partner 
(Upton, 1991, Dept of Health, 1993) 
2 The author was conunissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal as the principal researcher for the Wai 692 claim. However. this 
did not provide unfettered access to infomration regarding the decisions to close Napier Hospital. as several Crown 
agencies refused to allow her to interview staff or Board members. or restricted the range of material that could be 
covered by interview. 
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Post-recent-health-reform Maori have, by default, a health system that has 
significant regional variation in the development of Treaty relationships between 
the Crown and Maori, varying degrees of access to services, regional 
inconsistencies in the development of by Maori for Maori services, and minimal 
Treaty partner recognition of the right to participation, representation and 
consultation in the key decisions of the health sector. 
"While the significance of the Treaty is acknowledged by many, the 
principles are not protected by statute. Experience has shown that 
implementation of the principles of the Treaty has been subject to repeated 
negotiation with ever-changing health bureaucracies. Historical 
contractual relationships, such as the gifting of land for hospitals in return 
for free health services, may be subsumed when resources, previously 
under the guardianship of the Crown Treaty partner, are being transferred 
to Crown Health Enterprises." (Pomare et al, 1995, p27) 
For some Maori communities these health sector reforms changed the structure of 
health service delivery in a way that they perceived as detrimental to their 
collective health and well being (Ferguson, 1998). The exclusion of Maori from 
the process and a refusal to recognise their Treaty partner status led to Waitangi 
Tribunal claimants from Ngati Kahungunu challenging the Crown's 
accountability for the health reform implications specific to their region of 
Hawke's Bay. This was the first health claim to be heard by the Waitangi Tribunal 
and will be used here as an illustrative case study to further the argument of this 
dissertation. 
The chapter consists of a short introductory section setting out the basis and 
changing scope of the claim. A detailed review of the decision-making process, 
begun in 1980 and leading to the eventual closure of Napier Hospital follows. The 
process involved many Crown agencies, and the Crown acting at many different 
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levels, and illustrates the degree to which fragmented and changing entities, 
subject to both external and internal reform processes have led to the Crown 
overlooking its obligations to Maori health in the reforms. The principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (discussed fully in Chapter 2) provide a useful evaluative 
framework to judge the extent to which the Crown may have overlooked Maori 
health interests. Each of the three principles, consultation, participation, and 
representation, are applied in tum to the decision making process. The Crown is 
shown, through intent or neglect, to have acted in a unilateral fashion in respect of 
the Napier Hospital closure, and to Ngati Kahungunu in respect of the reform 
process in general. 
Wai 692 Claim Basis and Changing Scope 
In 1997 a claim was made to the Waitangi Tribunal followed by a request in 
January 1998 for an urgent hearing to prevent the reduction of services provided 
at Napier Hospital. At the time of the request for an urgent hearing the concern of 
the three claimants who lived in the local community of Napier was the possible 
social impact closure of Napier Hospital would have on the Maori community. 
That the Crown is in the process of altering the provision of health 
services in this area (Napier). The degree of alteration is substantial in that 
a hospital and community based services which were, until very recently, 
providing services of a significant level are being rapidly depleted to a 
point where all that will remain are very basic services. 
The information supplied by the CHE suggests that the services in Napier 
will be little more than a pit stop for minor medical matters. Earlier 
assurances from the Crown that Napier Hospital would continue to be the 
site for provision of those services have now been recanted upon. 
In addition to on site services there also appears to have been a proposal to 
reduce the availability of various community-based services such as home 
help and District Nurses. 
The claimants fear for the health of their people. They honestly believe 
that the degree of medical services which are now and will be available to 
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the people of the Ahuriri region are nowhere near sufficient to meet the 
reasonable health needs of those people (Counsel for Urgent Hearing, Wai 
692, 1998) 
Urgency was not granted and the Waitangi Tribunal heard the claim in June and 
July of 1999. 
The focus of claim Wai 692 or the Napier Hospital Services claim as it was 
known was originally on the reduction of services at Napier Hospital located in 
Napier city. Napier Hospital provided a comprehensive acute surgical, accident, 
medical and maternity service with related services such as x-ray, laboratory and 
physiotherapy. The Board of Healthcare Hawke's Bay, that administered Napier 
Hospital, decided originally in 1994 and reconfirmed in 1995 to stop the 
duplication of services by two hospitals in the region, Napier and Hastings, and 
resource a regional service on the Hastings Hospital site. This provoked wide 
spread debate within the Napier community. "No issue has ever created such 
polarisation and divergence of views across Hawke's Bay" (Napier City Council, 
Residual Health and Hospital Services for Napier City, October 1996, pl). 
Several attempts were made to stop the development of a regional service at the 
expense of the Napier Hospital. This included court action taken by the Napier 
City Council against Healthcare Hawke's Bay (HCHB) in 1994, public rallies up 
until early 1998 to publicise the community's opposition and an attempt to 
introduce a private Member's Bill to Parliament to provide for the continuance of 
Napier Hospital in 1994. None of these actions dissuaded HCHB from proceeding 
with the closure of Napier Hospital, which they achieved in October 1998. 
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The Third Amended Statement of Claim (Waitangi Tribunal, 200 I, p40 I ) that the 
claimants filed in 1999 widened the scope of the claim. They cited two Causes of 
Action, firstly breaches of historical undertakings between the Crown and tangata 
whenua, and secondly contemporary Treaty breaches arising from the health 
reform process, as outlined below; 
4. Pursuant to the terms and principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, from 
1840 the Crown was and remains under an obligation to provide for the 
health and well-being of Maori including: 
4.1 Consulting with Maori on substantive matters affecting Maori 
health (Article 1 ). 
4.2 Ensuring that Maori are given control of adequate and 
appropriate resources within their communities (Article 2). 
4.3 Ensuring that Maori are in receipt of the same standards of 
health care and health outcomes as other citizens of New Zealand 
(Article 3). 
6 .... The Crown retained the land subject to the 1851 Ahuriri transaction 
and: 
6.1 Failed to consult with or otherwise adequately ascertain Maori 
health needs at Ahuriri including failing to provide for adequate 
Maori representation and participation in health agencies in Ahuriri 
including the Hawke· s Bay Hospital Board, and 
6.2 Failed to give any control over the delivery and administration 
of health services and resources to Maori, and 
6.3 Failed to fulfil its promise to establish appropriate health 
services, including hospitals and resources so as to ensure Ahuriri 
Maori enjoy the same standards of health care as non-Maori. 
8. Since 1988 the Crown has reorganised the provision of public 
health and hospital services through the creation of a number of 
entities variously described as Area Health boards, Ministry of 
Health, Regional Health Authorities, Health Funding Authority, 
Crown Health Enterprises, Health and Hospital Services, and (to 
the extent that it is involved in the provision of or monitoring of 
health services) the Crown Company Monitory Advisory Unit 
("Crown Health Entities"). 
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12. In breach of the obligations under the Treaty and the Maori Health 
Policies, the Crown and Crown Health Entities (including individual 
entities) have failed to give effect to the principles of the Treaty and Maori 
Health Policies. (The Third Amended Statement of Claim (by the Wai 692 
claimants,) Waitangi Tribunal, 2001, p401) 
Critics, such as Bill English the Minister of Health at the time, described the 
claimants and others challenging the closure of the Napier Hospital as voicing a 
parochial response of resistance to change (House of Representatives, 1997). The 
response of Bill English to the Bill to prevent hospital closure was dismissive of 
any need to refer the Bill to select committee. He believed the people of Napier 
had had plenty of opportunities to have their views heard. 
However, select committees have never been banned from using their 
common sense when it comes to parliamentary procedures. The behaviour 
of the member for Napier over this issue for the last 3 or 4 years has 
pushed to the limit the patience and tolerance of anyone associated with 
the issue, including the select committee. There is no doubt about that. 
There can be no question whatsoever that the views of the people of 
Napier and those who represent them have been heard. They have been 
heard ad nauseam, month after month, year after year, and press release 
after press release - negative and short sighted, parochial, and political 
views ... 
Just because they did not like the result does not mean the process was 
wrong ... Parliament can be reassured that the argument that the people of 
Napier have not been heard is totally spurious. At the cost of millions of 
dollars to the New Zealand taxpayer, the view has been heard. 
I might finish off by paying tribute, since I have the opportunity, to the 
Chairman of Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Mr. Peter Wilson, and those who 
have worked with him over the years. That member and his local mayor 
have through their dogged, myopic political view made the job of getting a 
better public health service for the people of Hawke's Bay as difficult as it 
could possibly be (House of Representatives, 1997) 
Initially the Wai 692 claim had focused on prevention of closure. In broadening it 
through the third amended statement of claim to an examination of the health 
reforms of the 1990s ( clause 12, page 165) it provided a unique case study of the 
subsequent impact of those reforms on a provincial community. 
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Closing Napier Hospital - a Seventeen Year Crown 
Decision-Making Process 
The decision to close Napier Hospital, which sparked the Wai 692 claim, was not 
a sudden or unexpected one. The Crown and its various health entities spent a 
considerable period of time arriving at that decision, and involved the public of 
the Hawke's Bay in the decision on several occasions. There were many 
opportunities to involve Maori in that process, as will be evident from the history 
that follows. 
The Hawke's Bay Hospital Board: A New Hospital on A New Site? 
In 1980, the Hawke's Bay Hospital Board maintained three hospitals: general 
hospitals at Napier and Hastings, cities 18 kilometres apart, each with a range of 
medical specialist services and community outreach services, and a smaller 
hospital at Wairoa, one hour's travel time north of Napier, staffed by general 
practitioners. 
Historically, the two acute hospitals functioned largely independently. The 
pressures to avoid the duplication of expensive equipment led to partial 
integration. The trend towards integration was assisted by the appointment of 
specialist staff to the Board rather than to a specific hospital, by the training 
programmes provided by the hospitals and by the proximity between Napier and 
Hastings Hospitals, a distance of only 18 kilometres. 
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Hawke's Bay Hospital Board undertook a major review of the future direction of 
hospital services in Hawke's Bay in 1980. Three main options were considered for 
future planning: 
• further rationalisation (i.e.: reduction of duplication, services 
available on one site or the other) of hospital based services 
between Napier Hospital and Hastings Memorial Hospital. 
• the transformation of either Napier or Hastings Hospital into 
the sole acute hospital, the other becoming a long-stay hospital. 
• the establishment of an acute hospital at a new site (Shaikh, 
1992, p7) 
Initially, members of the Hawke's Bay Hospital Board favoured building a new 
hospital at a neutral location between the two cities. A site between the two cities 
at Clive was proposed and the cost of a new facility was estimated at fifty million 
dollars. 
While this may have appeared sensible and appropriate, the Board members did 
not expect the level of criticism this proposal was to receive. The Hastings 
District Council was particularly strident. The Mayor stated that if a single acute 
hospital had to be built it must be exactly midway between the two cities. He 
suggested as an alternative the establishment of a separate Board to administer 
Hastings Hospital. 
This was the start of overt action taken by both local and national politicians to 
protect what they believed their local communities were entitled to in the 
provision of health services. The Hastings Member of Parliament David Butcher, 
fearing that Hastings Hospital would be downgraded in favour of Napier, asked 
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questions in the House of the then Minister of Health George Gair about the 
provision of surgical services at Hastings (Shaikh, 1992). 
Gradually, Hastings City Councillors and others withdrew support from the Clive 
proposal. The decision was then made for the Board when the Minister of Health 
declared that a new hospital was neither a practical nor a financially feasible plan. 
Instead, both hospitals received an upgrade of some facilities. 
The Hospital Board resolved at its meeting in November 1980 that it would 
continue to maintain general acute hospitals at both Napier and Hastings, to 
rationalise clinical services between them, and to maintain a community hospital 
at Wairoa. The Board explained its reasoning for rejecting a single hospital: "Due 
to logistical, financial and other local factors this alternative was clearly ruled out, 
as an option." (Hawke's Bay Hospital Board, 1986, p232). The decision did not 
remove the onus on the Board to use government funding as efficiently and 
effectively as possible. Despite not pursuing the single acute hospital option at 
that time, the Board continued to consider the idea out of the public eye. 
In early 1981, the Board's executive officers established the parameters for a 
review of the future provision of hospital-based services for the Hawke's Bay 
region. The Board was concerned that unnecessary duplication might further 
reduce their access to financial resources. The options it considered were: 
• to consider the basic range of services that need to be provided 
in a general acute hospital at Napier and Hastings (ie services 
required on both sites). 





to review the possibility of locating advanced services at a 
single institution. 
to review what clinical services might naturally be grouped 
together at one site (Hawke· s Bay Hospital Board, 1986, p233) 
The review was adopted with certain provisos at the Board meeting in May 1982. 
They specified both common and non-duplicated services at the Napier and 
Hastings Hospital sites. The review also stated what services would be provided at 
Wairoa Hospital. 
The Board saw it as a distinct future advantage to pursue the single hospital 
option. "The inability to deliver health services from a single institution to a high 
density area has denied the Board the opportunity of 'economies of scale"' 
(Hawke· s Bay Hospital Board, 1986, p235). The review recommended that the 
Board in future planning should consider rationalising its land and property 
holding: 
• the Board hold no more ( or fewer) buildings than needed for 
providing health care 
• the building stock be located in situations best suited for 
populations to be served. 
• the estate be used in an effective and economic manner 
(Hawke' s Bay Hospital Board, 1986, p236) 
The Board, when considering future planning issues, explored a range of 
scenarios. It considered the pros and cons of either Napier or Hastings as the 
single acute hospital site. The restricted site for future building development went 
against a single facility located at Napier Hospital. 
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The Board recognised that at some point someone would have to revisit the issues 
they had raised as to what was required in future health care provision for 
Hawke's Bay. They chose at that point not to pursue the option of a single acute 
hospital and defer the decision to the next group of decision-makers. 
Hawke's Bay Area Health Board - The Booz Allen Report 
The new Hawke's Bay Area Health Board assumed responsibility in June 1989 for 
816 hospital beds located in five different hospitals covering a geographical area 
of 200 kilometres. In addition to the Napier and Hastings city-based hospitals, two 
rural town hospitals, Wairoa and Waipukurau provided general practitioner care. 
Hospital services on the Chatham Islands also fell within the new Board's ambit. 
By March 1990 the new Board was having to consider the single acute hospital 
option again. The Public Finance Act 1991 had heightened accountability, as 
previously noted in the section on the establishment of Area Health Boards. The 
issues of the level of government funding and future resource allocation meant 
that a single facility had to be reconsidered. At the Board meeting of 26 March 
1990 the General Manager Mr. Clark, presented a report for the Board members 
to consider. Points he raised in his report included: 
• Work needed to start quickly on the major strategic issues facing the Hawke's 
Bay Area Health Board, because of the impact of the New Zealand Health 
Charter issued by the Minister of Health and the requirement that Boards enter 
contracts in the form of performance-orientated accountability agreements. 
• Without such work, Government funding would be constrained. 
• The development of new initiatives and their application would make 
demands on Board finances. The Board needed to recognise that over the next 
five years it would face major problems of resource allocation. 
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Mr Clark informed Board Members that they were facing their third consecutive 
year of funding restraint, at a time when the public and the Government had 
expectations of increased activity in health promotion (Hawke's Bay Area Health 
Board, 26 March 1990). 
He submitted that the Hawke's Bay Area Health Board was receiving sufficient 
funds to provide a first class acute hospital service for its communities. However, 
the acute service could only be afforded at one location, it could not be 
contemplated at two or four hospital locations. 
Unless acute hospital services were concentrated at one location, all the hospitals 
in Hawke's Bay would provide a steadily deteriorating service. Modern acute 
services could be provided from one hospital, either at Hastings or Napier. The 
hospital not selected for long term development could undertake a reduced role in 
the provision of non-acute care. 
Mr. Clark emphasised in his report "Acute hospital medicine requires specialist 
team work in a situation where all the expensive facilities of a modern hospital 
can be deployed to meet patient need. Acute services are inter-dependent and have 
to be provided on one campus" (Hawke's Bay Area Health Board, 26 March 
1990, p9). 
He summed up the dilemma the new Board was facing: 
It was arguable that as long as the Government was prepared to fund two 
acute hospitals twenty kilometres apart, nothing needs to be done. There 
are two major objections to this laissez-faire approach: neither hospital at 
present provides a comprehensive service and care for some, on occasions, 
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is sub-optimal; secondly the increasing costs of health care and its new 
developments preclude the adoption of a static strategy (Hawke's Bay 
Area Health Board, 26 March I 990, p9) 
The recommendations of his report were focused on pursuing the single acute 
service option. Mr. Clark suggested that management consultants be appointed to 
consider and recommend to the Board the feasibility of a single acute unit and a 
preferable site. The terms of reference for the study included the population 
projections for Hawke· s Bay and appropriate services to meet the demand, 
determining which was the most advantageous site, either Napier or Hastings, for 
building development, and the cost of building development. The Board then 
recommended that a sub-committee be appointed to define the issues that would 
need to be considered by management consultants. The sub-committee would also 
recommend to the Board the management consultants that should be appointed to 
undertake the study. 
In May 1990 the sub-committee informed the Board that seven proposals had 
been received from management consultants. The sub-committee advised they 
were inviting four of the consultants to make a presentation to them the following 
month. 
In June 1990 the sub-committee advised the Board that they recommended the 
consultants Booz-Allen and Hamilton/Lend Lease to undertake the study of 
feasibility and cost of locating all acute hospital services for Hawke' s Bay on one 
site. Objectivity and independence was what the sub-committee believed this 
consultancy offered. 
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At the Board meeting of 26 November 1990 Board members were advised by the 
Chairman that the public were to be excluded during the discussion of the 'Single 
Acute Hospital Study - Public Relations.' The grounds for the exclusion were in 
order to "enable the organisation to carry on negotiation (including commercial 
and industrial negotiation) and without prejudice or disadvantage to its 
commercial activities." 
At the same meeting Mr. Clark advised Board members: 
that consideration had been given to the handling of the public release of 
the Consultants' report on the single acute hospital study. A proposed 
programme had been submitted by Phoenix Public Relations Ltd. of 
Auckland, and was presented for Members' consideration (Hawke's Bay 
Area Health Board, 26 November 1990, p71) 
Mr. Clark outlined the advantages in engaging this organisation as the Director 
was an ex-Hawke's Bay person who knew the area well and was experienced in 
the management of public communication. The importance of this was stressed, as 
the public release of the Consultants' report would need to be handled correctly. 
Members were informed that the Consultants' report would be received 11 
December 1990 and made public the following day. The meeting concluded with 
the Board endorsing the public relations programme provided by Phoenix Public 
Relations Ltd.3 
The Public Relations Programme prepared for the Hawke's Bay Area Health 
Board stated its objectives as being: 
3 There is no record in the minutes that the Board formally adopted or agreed the public relations programme. At the 
26/11/90 meeting the Board resolved that the Public Relations programme submitted by Phoenix Public Relations Ltd be 
received. The Board appears to have been endorsing a PR strategy selling the single site without a formal decision in 
principle to pursue a single site hospital. 
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• To inform the public in the Hawke's Bay Area Health Board 
region of the need and value of having one single acute hospital 
and increase their understanding and appreciation of the way in 
which it would operate. 
• To communicate as effectively as possible to ensure staff were 
kept fully informed of developments, their rights to contribute 
submissions to the Board and the rationale behind the final 
decision. 
• To ensure that the Minister together with the region's Members 
of Parliament and local authorities understood the reasons 
behind the decision and accepted that it was in the best long-
term interests for the Hawke's Bay district as a whole. 
• To ensure the Hawke's Bay Area Health Board was seen as 
having handled the investigation and subsequent decision in an 
open and professional manner. 
• To signal to individuals and groups, both inside and outside the 
Hawke's Bay Area Health Board region, that the establishment 
of a single acute hospital ( or whatever decision was taken) 
marked a new era in the quality of health care for the public, 
offered advanced prospects for staff, and provided 
opportunities for improved efficiency and support for 
community groups involved in the provision of related services 
(Phoenix Public Relations, 1990, p3-4) 
The Public Relations Programme identified the 'target audience' and believed this 
was an important part of the process so that communication in selling the concept 
could be effectively managed. The key individuals and groups they identified 
were: 
• staff at both hospitals at all levels in the structure, 
• Board members, 
• union officials, 
• District Health Committees, 
• Minister of Health Simon Upton and Associate Ministers, 
• Director General of Health and staff, 
• local Members of Parliament, 
• local authorities and business groups, 
• community groups, 
• patients, 
• and the media. 
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Phoenix Consultants clearly had a professional awareness of who in the 
community it was necessary to "manage" and bring on board. In spite of this, the 
Public Relations Programme presented by them had only one reference to Maori. 
This is in the identified target audience collective category of District Health 
Committees. Iwi were not recognised or acknowledged as entitled to be informed 
and included in the consultation process. However, the draft timetable only 
considers the likelihood of presenting speeches to groups "as requested," and 
makes no further mention of District Health Committees or of Maori (Phoenix 
Public Relations, 1990, p 14-16) 
Recommendations made to the Board in the Public Relations Programme were 
that: 
It is imperative that the Board assumes responsibility for managing all 
communications leading up to the release to the public of the consultants' 
report and the processes whereby the public can present submissions 
before Board members make their final submissions. 
All methods of communication must be carefully coordinated to ensure 
consistency of message and be designed to generate maximum support 
throughout the community - including the media (Phoenix Public 
Relations, 1990, p7) 
The strategy in selling the message to the defined target audience groupings 
varied considerably depending on how significant they were perceived to be by 
the public relations consultants. There were contrasts in how the different groups 
would be managed. Union officials would receive all written information 
provided to staff and a personal briefing. In comparison, specialist staff would 
receive all staff communications, a special group briefing, a copy of the executive 
summary, and the full report. Members of Parliament were invited to a special 
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briefing by the consultants, and given a copy of the report and executive summary 
and a letter from the Chairman of the Board detailing action over the decision 
process. 
Local groups and community activists were to receive a letter from the Chairman 
explaining the process for submissions, a pamphlet would be enclosed and an 
offer made to speak to the group to explain the decision. For the public the 
primary means of communication was to be paid advertising in the local paper, 
supplemented with editorial publicity and columns and letters to the editor.4 A 
brochure was to be sent out to households. 
The release of information to the public was to be managed so that key issues 
could be developed. The consultants recommended that certain points be 
emphasised to enhance public support. These points included the provision of 
healthcare services to the Hawke's Bay, how these would be improved and a 
suggested follow-up to the programme one year on to demonstrate the benefit of 
the decision. The management of the public release of information extended to the 
media: "Phoenix will liaise with the key media to arrange/interest in editorial 
coverage" (Phoenix Public Relations, 1990, p9). 
The report was timetabled for release to the public at a press conference 12 
December 1990. There was to be local media coverage, presentations, letters and 
brochures to identified key groups. Ten weeks had been allocated for consultation. 
4 While it is clear that Phoenix Public Relations intended to mount a letter-writing campaign. it is unclear from their 
proposal whether they would prepare the letters for such a campaign or encourage members of the public to do so. 
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The Board invited the public to express their opinion either in written or verbal 
submissions before the Board made a final decision. The public submission days 
were advertised as 20 and 21 February 1991. It was anticipated that the Board 
would make a final decision by the first week of March. 
The Booz-Allen Hamilton Lendlease Corporation Report was released to the 
public on 12 December 1990. The study had taken 23 weeks and followed 
extensive consultation with staff, councils, unions and the media. The consultant's 
recommendations were: 
• That a single acute hospital facility is developed on the site of 
the present Hastings Hospital over the next four years. 
• That all low risk obstetric services should be located at the 
Hastings Hospital site. 
• That all children should be located together in a children's unit 
at Hastings. 
• That Napier should retain clinics and long stay geriatric 
facilities, probably located in town, closer to the community. 
• That policies on personnel matters should be developed by the 
Area Health Board whilst planning proceeds (Booz Allen and 
Hamilton, 1990, Summary) 
The last two recommendations clearly imply the closure of Napier Hospital as a 
consideration. Without the ability to interview relevant executive staff, it has not 
proved possible to determine to what extent that implication was a factor in the 
Board support of the recommendations. 
The consultants provided supporting information detailing how they reached their 
recommendations. They had considered demographic trends and projected growth 
for Hawke's Bay, transportation and accessibility, socio-economic factors, capital 
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costs, land and building value and most desirable planning solution. Hastings was 
preferred as: 
[the] site is flat and would allow greater flexibility to position the 
recommended low-rise buildings efficiently. This means that specialist 
wards could be located close to clinical support services. Access and 
parking for each sector of the hospital could be provided as necessary and 
clearly identified. The design and layout would allow efficient movement 
of staff and patients, and the site would be able to accommodate future 
change (Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board, 1990, p4) 
The study concluded that the Hastings site would be less costly to develop than 
Napier; it would take less development time, ongoing maintenance costs would be 
reduced and all specialist services could be located on the one site saving a 
suggested one million dollars a year. 
Also in Hastings' favour were the population projections to 2006. While the 
population was split evenly in 1990, it was projected that Hastings would grow 
faster and Napier would age faster. Hastings, it was felt, had better road access 
and public transport with a better chance of obtaining a helicopter licence. 
Hastings provided more flexibility for future changes and overall was a better 
planning option. The suggested cost for the single acute hospital development at 
Hastings ranged between sixty-six and seventy million dollars. In the information 
to the public the initial cost was to be balanced against the proposed savings, an 
estimate of between $7.4 and $8.6 million with the consolidation of all acute 
services onto one site. 
The Napier City Council described the report and its associated marketing in the 
following terms: 
This recommendation, its associated sales promotion and consultation, 
started the controversy, conflict and anxiety which has continued since 
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unabated. No issue has ever created such polarisation and divergence of 
views across Hawke's Bay (Napier City Council, 1996, pl) 
Opinion varied as to whether the proposal had merit or not. Difference of opinion 
was not limited to the local critics. There were mixed points of view from 
Parliament. The change of government in 1990 meant a new Minister of Health. 
The commissioning of the Booz-Allen Report was to some extent in response to 
the previous Minister of Health Helen Clark's stated expectations. Now there was 
uncertainty as to what the new Minister, Simon Upton, would expect and support. 
The Area Health Board minutes indicate that at their meeting of 28 January 1991 
the Board had received correspondence from the new Minister dated 13 December 
1990 indicating that he was not offering unreserved support for the Booz-Allen 
Report. The Minister stated: 
Thank you for your offer to discuss this with me but at this stage my 
preference would be to await a further report, via the Department, on the 
progress of Board/Community consultation and the likely outcome which 
would result. This, together with particular operational or financial 
information will enable me to convey to the Board, before it makes any 
decision, any matters I might consider relevant. Hawke's Bay Area Health 
Board, 13 December 1990, E) 
Some members of the Board felt it was necessary to "seek an assurance from the 
Minister that the Board's long-term plans, once developed, would not be frustrated 
by any change in Government policy."5 (Hawke's Bay Area Health Board, 28 
January 1991,p 231 ). The minutes do not indicate whether this was pursued. The 
new tone must have created a dilemma for the Board. They were now embarked 
upon a process that they could not easily disengage from. They not only had a 
5 Board Members or executive staff might have been able to throw some light on whether this a~surance was pursued. 
either formally or informally. Unfortunately. Healthcare Hawke's Bay declined to allow interviews of either Board 
members or staff. 
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community consultation process under way; they had also invested $600,000 in 
the report. 
At the same meeting the Phoenix Consultancy were invited to inform the Board of 
their recommendations for the next phase of the public relations exercise. The 
feedback was described as generally being in favour of the Board but more 
education and information on the issues was required. 
It was suggested that the Board consider a shop front display in Napier City as 
this would provide improved access to the information for a wider range of 
people. Written information and models would be displayed to try and provide a 
visual example of the proposed concept. The Board supported this. The shop front 
display was open in Napier for three weeks and then moved to a similar venue in 
Hastings. 
Phoenix made further suggestions on the management of the information and how 
it would be received by the public and relevant decision-makers. At the Board 
meeting on 28 January 1991, their Director gave the following advice: 
Mrs. Langley pointed out that it was likely the Board would receive a 
higher proportion of submissions against the recommendations than in 
support of the proposal, and she suggested it could be useful for the Board 
to undertake some research with a view to obtaining a regional perspective 
on which to base its decision. She also suggested that tours of the two 
hospitals could be organised for the local MPs, Mayors, Council Officials, 
and news media editors, to enable them to obtain a geographical insight 
into the recommendations (Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board Minutes, 28 
January 1991, p 232). 
It had also become clear that the proposed schedule for submissions, feedback and 
management of the information process would have to be extended. A motion was 
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passed extending the period for submissions by one month. A special Board 
meeting was set for 11 April 1991 to consider the recommendations in the Booz-
Allen Hamilton Report and make a decision. 
The Board minutes of 25 March 1991 comment on the high quality of the 
submissions, both written and verbal, on the single acute hospital proposal. It was 
also timely that the Minister of Health was to meet with the Board Chairman and 
General Manager in Wellington one week before the special meeting of 11 April. 
Minutes for the meetings held on 11 April (the special meeting) and 29 April 
1991, where it is likely that any formal decision concerning the Booz Allen report 
was made, have not been supplied to the commissioned researcher.6 All 
indications, such as the confirming of minutes at the May 1991 meeting, are that 
one or both such meetings were held. 
The Board had been alerted to the Minister's concerns about the Booz-Allen 
proposal in December 1990. By 12 April 1991 his criticisms were more explicit 
and focused on the increased debt loading for the Board if they took on the 
additional costs that regionalisation would incur. The Minister of Health 
expressed his concerns: 
The level of additional debt envisaged is much higher than originally 
anticipated. Although it may be possible for the board to sustain this level 
of debt any significant changes in terms of interest rates, cost increases or 
projected savings to be achieved would make this difficult. As well, 
placing the board in a high debt situation reduces the flexibility it will 
need over the short to medium term. 
6The author requested all of the Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board minutes from 26 March 1990 to mid I 999. a period that 
would include Area Health Board minutes.-Most AHB minutes have been supplied but it would appear not all. 
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Given the high level of debt required to finance the recommendations I 
wonder whether sufficient benefits are being obtained. Although the ideal 
situation recommended by the consultants would meet quality concerns 
regarding acute services the cost as it stands is probably too high 
(Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board Minutes, 227 May 1991, Ml) 
The Minister suggested that the Board undertake further work investigating 
options that could accommodate the concerns he raised. One of the suggestions he 
made for further exploration was to: 
assess whether an "intermediate" option is available which would require 
significantly less debt raising but would enable critical service quality 
gains to be made. Such an option might, for example, place acute surgical 
services on one site with non-acute services such as long stay and some 
convalescence being located at the other site. 
One member of the Board expressed concern that if the Minister's letter was 
publicly released "it would identify to the community that their concerns were not 
parochial issues but were concerns shared by Government" (Hawke' s Bay Area 
Health Board Minutes, 27 May 1991, p 273 ). Another felt that it was better that 
the letter went on the record, as it was better to inform the public of these matters. 
It is unclear whether the Minister's suggestions were pursued at this time as the 
Board was disbanded on 30 July. Given the lack of relevant minutes for April 
1991, it is impossible to conclude whether the Board formally adopted the Booz-
Allen report and recommendations, or, given the Minister of Health's interest as 
evidenced in his letter of 12 April 1991, deferred a decision until they were 
disbanded. Interviews with staff or Board members could have quickly clarified 
this point, had they been allowed. 
As an interim arrangement, in the transition to a funder/provider (RHNCHE) 
split, the government replaced Area Health Boards, including the Hawke's Bay 
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Area Health Board, with Commissioners. Little can be reported about decisions 
made during the tenure of the Commissioner, Andy Train, the previous Chairman 
of the Area Health Board.7 Community disquiet is evidenced by letters from 
Michael Laws MP to Simon Upton, the Minister of Health and Paul East, Minister 
of Crown Health Enterprises, stating that the Napier community would not be 
happy if Andy Train was appointed to chair the new Crown Health Enterprise, 
when it was formed: 
Mr. Andy Train was then appointed by you as the new Health 
Commissioner for Hawke's Bay- a man who championed the Booz-Allen 
report when he was the chair of the Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board. 
The controversy was further stirred when Sir Ron Trotter and Mr. Harold 
Titter made a flying visit to Hawke's Bay - in their capacity as your 
appointees, and made the precipitate remarks that Hastings was the logical 
site for a single acute hospital (Laws, 1992) 
Harold Titter was Andy Train's equivalent, as Commissioner for the Auckland 
Area Health Board. Sir Ron Trotter was the Chair of the National Interim 
Provider Board, the body overseeing the transition from Area Health Boards to 
Crown Health Enterprises. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay- Layers of Accountability 
Two key questions related to the Crown responsibility under the Treaty of 
Waitangi arise in considering the Healthcare Hawke's Bay decision early in the 
1990s to site a single regional acute hospital at Hastings. The two questions are: 
• When was the decision made to have a single regional acute hospital? 
• When was the decision made to site the single acute hospital in Hastings? 
7 Because the researcher had been refused access to interview staff in respect of the intervening period by Healthcare 
Hawke· s Bay. Crown Law letter to Lisa Ferguson. 18 February 1999 
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These decisions and the manner of their making are critical in determining 
whether the Crown breached its duty under the Treaty of Waitangi. The decisions 
are considered in each of the next two sections, entitled Regionalisation and the 
Hastings site. The implementation of the decisions is considered in the following 
section. 
Regionalisation 
The Board of Healthcare Hawke's Bay (or Crown Health Hawke's Bay Limited 
as it was called when first created) has always made the commercial or business 
decisions. The Board is accountable to the Shareholding Ministers. The Board's 
performance is monitored by the Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit to 
ensure that fiscal risk is minimised and that sound commercial decisions are 
made. The senior executive team is responsible for the operational day to day 
running of the hospital and reports to the Board through the Chief Executive 
Officer. 
To the public it may appear that there is a reasonable distance between politicians 
and the management decisions taken by the senior executive staff in running a 
hospital. Yet Simon Upton the Minister of Health (1991) took an active interest in 
the planning of health services in Hawke' s Bay during Area Health Board tenure. 
This intimate involvement by Ministers in decisions at the local level did not end 
with the change to CHEs(l993). The Minister had already expressed concern at 
debt levels likely to be incurred by a single acute hospital plan. 
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Writing to a Napier citizen on 28 June 1994, Paul East, Minister for Crown Health 
Enterprises, explained what had become of the Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board 
$16 million reserve fund. 
In recognising the reserve shareholding Ministers were mindful that the 
Hawke's Bay Area Health Board had established the reserve to assist in 
funding the consolidation of the existing services onto one site. The 
reserve was agreed to on the basis that the Board of Healthcare Hawke' s 
Bay undertake a full business appraisal of the issues surrounding the 
initiatives advanced by their predecessor organisation. Having completed 
the appraisal and obtained support and commitment from the purchaser of 
health services, Shareholding Ministers undertook to make funding 
available, with the exact detail of the funding being determined at that 
time. 
In recognising the reserve and in keeping with the approach taken with 
other Area Health Boards, it was the intention of the shareholder to relate 
the reserve to a particular event. That is, if the proposal for the review of 
health services in Hawke's Bay had not been active at the time, the reserve 
would not have been established. By implication therefore, had there been 
a continuation of the status quo, the reserve would not have been created 
at the time Healthcare Hawke's Bay was established (Gwynn, 6 April 
1999). 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay needed to review health services again if they wished to 
receive the $16 million held by their predecessor organisation. This was a 
substantial amount of money hanging in the balance. Regionalisation was on the 
agenda again in part because of a desire on the part of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay to 
retain the reserve fund. 
The Funding Agreement 1 July 1993 between Healthcare Hawke' s Bay and the 
Ministers of Finance and Crown Health Enterprises established that the $16 
million was to be paid to Healthcare Hawke' s Bay on 31 December 1994 or 
earlier if Healthcare Hawke' s Bay was commercially at risk. Clearly, as the 
Minister indicated, the government had been satisfied that Healthcare Hawke's 
Bay had met its preconditions for release of the reserve fund at July 1993. 
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The Board minutes from June 1993 comment on the discussions with the Crown 
Health Enterprise Management Unit, the predecessor of CCMAU, on the business 
plan. The minutes indicate that the pressure to act on regionalisation at times was 
driven by Treasury officials. "Management of the $16 million reserve fund was 
resolved and it was recognised that consolidation of the acute hospital issue had to 
be addressed quickly" (Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board Minutes, 29 June 1993 ). 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay has been defensive in the past when critics 
within the Napier community have raised the issue of predetermination. 
The critics have argued that the decision to regionalise the health services 
in Hawke's Bay was made well before public consultation took place 
(Hawke's Bay Area Health Board Minutes, 29 June 1993). 
It is evident that the decision to regionalise the services was made before or 
during the first half of 1993. This was well before public consultation, which did 
not commence until 1994. The 1993 Statement of Intent from Healthcare Hawke· s 
Bay, presented to Parliament in August 1993, states: 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay is to conduct a review of the provision of hospital 
services in Napier and Hastings. It is intended to develop a regional acute 
facility on one of the current hospital sites. A decision as to the site will be 
made by February 1994, and rationalisation of services will then proceed. 
This issue is a pivotal one. It is impossible to say with any certainty what the 
exact timing of the decision was. The Commissioner, Andy Train, could have 
made it without reference to any committee. The CHE Board designate could 
have made it before taking up office. The author of the Statement of Intent could 
have made it in isolation. The decision by Healthcare Hawke's Bay to refuse 
interviews of its staff and Board members has meant that the transition period 
between the Area Health Board and the CHE is largely devoid of information. 
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It is apparent that the status quo was never in contention. The title of the 
consultation project following the Taskforce report, "Public Consultation on A 
Regional Hospital for Hawke's Bay" makes this quite clear. The report was 
clearly designed to set public expectations for a change. 
The Hastings Site 
At the first meeting of the CHE Board proper (as opposed to the CHE Board 
designate) on 19 July 1993, members were advised during an address by the Chair 
that a single acute taskforce had been established. The members consisted of 
Mark Flowers, Surgical Services Manager (Chair), the Chief Executive Officer 
Alistair Bowes and the Finance Manager Paul Drury. 
The first key issue to be examined by the Taskforce was stated as: 
The establishment of a vision ... The vision should be established to the 
exclusion of the various interest groups, to provide the Board with an 
ultimate long-term goal8 (Hawke's Bay Area Health Board Minutes, 19 
July 1993). 
At the Board meeting of 23 August 1993, a proposed methodology for the 
planning of the regional hospital was considered. A design model based on 
identified parameters would be developed, against which to test the Napier and 
Hastings sites. Mr. Wilson, Board Member9, made the following statement about 
the decision making process: 
He believed the Board should first reach its decision and that once a 
decision has been made, it would then need to market the idea very 
carefully. He considered it was important that no public debate should be 
8 On the face of it. this issue suggests that the Board were adopting an approach of intentionally limiting public debate. 
While this may not have been their intent. without the ability to interview staff or Board members. the researcher is 
unable to clarify this point. 
9 There were two Board members named Wilson. the Chair. Peter Wilson. and Walter Wilson. the Maori Board member 
from Wairoa. At times in the minutes it is difficult to detemline with cenainty which Board member is being referred to. 
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entered into on this decision until the Board had made its decision 
(Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board Minutes, 23 August, 1993, item 16) 
The Model Regional Hospital paper of November 1993 provided a working 
example of the model regional hospital that it described as a facility designed 
from the ground up. 
For over three months the task force and staff have worked on an ideal 
hospital design. This was an essential requirement before we examined the 
Napier and Hastings sites and then quantify the costs of getting them as 
close as possible to this ideal. 
The team planned to evaluate how Napier and Hastings Hospitals could be 
adapted to get as close as possible to the model hospital design. It is unclear in the 
paper how close the "model hospital proposal" was to the Booz-Allen 
recommendations or whether this was a reworking of the Minister's suggestion 
for an intermediate option. 
There were similarities to the Booz-Allen report terms of reference. One wonders 
why a new set of consultants ( Octa Associates, Project Managers) was brought in 
to rework the original recommendation that had cost $600,000. It is unclear why 
they were reconsidering both sites again when they had been provided with an 
expert opinion as to the most cost-effective option in 1990. 
The Healthcare Hawke· s Bay document entitled 'Analysis of Potential 
Efficiencies' indicates that in November 1993 Service Managers for Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay were asked to explore the possibilities for saving 4.5% per annum 
from operating budgets without significantly reducing outputs. The suggestions 
included the frequently raised option of a regionalised hospital service. It was 
believed that efficiencies could be gained in the following areas: Immediate 
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Efficiencies (Service and Staffing), Regional Hospital Development and 
Information Systems Development. 
In a 23 December 1993 memorandum to senior staff from Mark Flowers, Surgical 
Services Manager (and Taskforce member), it was evident that the regional 
hospital proposal had progressed to discussing bed requirements and working 
within a specific time frame. Consultants were identified to work with 
management on the proposal. 
Also attached is a chart of bed requirements for the proposed regional 
hospital. The aim is to "sign off' with you and clinical staff on the bed and 
staff requirements by the end of January. We will also want to confirm 
staff savings by that time. 
We are also working on space requirements for departments and the like. 
These will be discussed with you during January, and will involve Colin 
Clayton from OCT A Associates who are assisting with the design of the 
hospital (Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Model Regional Hospital paper, 1993). 
In the detailed analysis of the Regional Hospital Development there was an 
emphasis on projected savings that were assumed to be available in 1995/96. The 
benefits were summarised as quality, medical/legal, financial and certainty. Issues 
around patient care were raised in support of regionalisation. It was believed that 
the centralisation of services would enhance patient care. 
The Taskforce continued working on the proposal and presented a report to the 
Board of Healthcare Hawke's Bay March 1994. The Task Force had considered 
three scenarios: to locate all acute services at either Napier or Hastings, or to 
maintain the status quo. Included in the terms of reference was "minimising 
damage and loss to the site not chosen" (Regional Hospital Taskforce, 1994, p23). 
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The Taskforce report's options were similar to those studied by consultants in 
1990. The recommendations and conclusions of both groups were also similar. 
The Taskforce · s recommendation was that a regional hospital be developed on the 
site of the Hastings Memorial Hospital. 
The Taskforce recommended Hastings as the preferable site, giving four main 
reasons: 
• the site is central to the region. 
• the site has easy access, is well laid out and provides the 
greatest flexibility for future developments. 
• the site is safe from flood and all buildings can be constructed 
or upgraded to withstand a major earthquake. 
• development costs are lowest and provide the best rate of return 
(Regional Hospital Taskforce, 1994 ). 
It also recommended that a substantial part of Napier Hospital be retained for 
certain categories of patient care including a range of day and outpatient services 
and community health and disability services. 
The Board at their meeting of 29 March 1994 received the report in draft. 
The Healthcare Hawke' s Bay Board made their final decision at their meeting of 
21 July 1994. The Hastings site, as recommended by the Taskforce, was adopted 
as the site of the Regional Acute Hospital. In arriving at its decision, the Board 
considered the Taskforce report in the light of twelve different questions. These 
included issues of scale in servicing a total population of 140,000, purchaser's 
requirements for access, and employees· points of view. No reference was made 
in the Board's decision-making criteria to the needs or wants of any particular 
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community segment, including Maori. The impact, if any, of the one Maori Board 
member on the decision is covered in the section on representation later in this 
chapter. 
The Napier City Council challenged the consultation process and pursued a case 
in the High Court in November 1994. The City felt that the limited amount of 
time for consultation prevented them from making a considered submission. They 
also alleged non-disclosure of information and asserted that the Board was biased 
and that the decision was predetermined. 
In his judgement, delivered on 15 December 1994, Judge Ellis directed that the 
City enter into further consultation with Healthcare Hawke' s Bay and that they 
receive further submissions from the City. The City was allowed further time to 
prepare and make those submissions. Napier City Council presented a fresh 
submission in February 1995. Despite the efforts and cost to the City, they were 
unable to alter the outcome. 
On 28 March 1995 the Board of Directors of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay confirmed 
their decision that: 
Hastings Memorial Hospital is reconfigured to become the Hawke's Bay 
Regional Hospital, providing the current range of services available across 
the two sites in Hastings and Napier, and 
Napier Hospital is reconfigured to provide a comprehensive range of 
outpatient, accident and medical services, continuing and day care for the 
elderly, Maori health facilities, maternity care, day surgery, and as a base 
for community care services for the Napier area (Healthcare Hawke's Bay, 
Collection of Information, 1995) 
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The last question raised at the beginning of this section, that of Maori 
participation in the decision-making process, is covered in detail in the section of 
this chapter entitled "Crown Compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi: the core of 
Wai 692" on page 202. 
Implementing the decision 
At the conclusion of the above Board decision, the Board advised that it would be 
developing an implementation framework for the Regional Hospital project. They 
stated that their intention was that the implementation programme would involve 
members of staff, the Hawke· s Bay Health Council, who would represent the 
Local Authorities, GPs, and other unidentified health stakeholders. 
The Board reminded the community that the Central Regional Health Authority, 
rather than the Board, was responsible for consultation with the community. In 
doing so, they relied on the Health and Disability Act 1993, which requires 
funding bodies to consult, but does not specify the same requirement on 
providers. However, the decision of Judge Ellis, in the Napier City Council 
challenge to the Healthcare Hawke's Bay decision, made it plain that the CHE 
also had a requirement to consult, as a State Owned Enterprise. Central RHA had 
to incorporate community opinions in their purchasing decisions for the health 
care for the people of Hawke's Bay. Healthcare Hawke's Bay was subsequently 
contracted to provide the services stipulated. Healthcare Hawke's Bay stated they 
would endeavour to work with the community "to ensure that the services that we 
are contracted to provide are delivered in the most favourable way for the region" 
(Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Decision of the Board, 1995). 
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This attempt at clarification does sound a little like Healthcare Hawke's Bay 
placing the responsibility for the change at the door of the Central Regional 
Health Authority. It also avoids the fact that regionalisation had been repeatedly 
explored by the successive Boards of the region, Hospital, Area Health Board, 
Commissioner, and Crown Health Enterprise. Furthermore, the advice the Board 
had received from their consultants when considering the public relations 
programme was: 
That for the Company to be a successful commercial organisation it was 
necessary to have the co-operation of its stakeholders, the public. The 
process he was proposing was in effect a stakeholder consultation process 
(He) suggested it would be appropriate to approach the RHA and seek 
their support and involvement in a joint venture approach (Healthcare 
Hawke· s Bay Board, 29 March 1994 ). 
This is not to say that a close relationship did not already exist between the two 
entities. The discussion document released by Central Regional Health Authority 
in August 1994 outlined their purchasing expectations for Hawke· s Bay. It fitted 
neatly with the Taskforce recommendations and the Board's just approved 
reconfiguration of services. 
The Board of Directors of Healthcare Hawke's Bay has recommended a 
regional hospital at Hastings and a range of services to be provided from 
Napier Hospital as a complementary site. The Central RHA has assessed 
the Board of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay's recommendations against the 
criteria of quality, access and value and has accepted that a regional 
hospital at Hastings, with complementary services being provided at 
Napier Hospital, fits with its purchasing expectations (CRHA, 1994 ). 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay had been at some pains to ensure that the Central RHA 
was well briefed on their plans, releasing a draft copy of the Taskforce report to 
them at the same time the Board received it. Board discussion made plain that 
they regarded purchaser approval of their proposal as critical, even if there was no 
formal requirement to obtain such approval (Healthcare Hawke' s Bay Board 
Minutes, 29 March 1994) 
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The services that the Central Regional Health Authority expected to purchase 
from the Napier Hospital site were: 
• Accident and Medical Services (within business hours 9am- 5pm) 
• Maternity Services 
• Outpatient Services 
• Day Surgery 
• Dental Services 
• Care of the Elderly Services 
• Continuingff erminal Care Services 
• Community Health Services 
• Mental Health Services 
• Services for people with disabilities 
• Alcohol and Drug Services 
• Sexual Health Services 
• Public Health Services 
• Child Health Services 
• Maori Health Services 
The Central RHA expected that those services would require the provision of at 
least the following support services: 
• Pharmacy Services 
• Pathology Services 
• Radiological Services 
Acute services, including acute surgical, medical, and 24 hour accident and 
emergency services were no longer to be purchased and provided from the Napier 
site (CRHA, 1994). 
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The part the Central Regional Health Authority had played in the decision to 
regionalise has not been highlighted to any great extent in this research. This 
reflects a combination of factors impacting on the research. The difficulty 
accessing many of the Healthcare Hawke' s Bay documents, together with the 
refusal on the part of the Health Funding Authority (which assumed the role of the 
Central RHA in the 1996 reform) to allow interviews of their staff, has meant that 
the relevant documents to support or record the Central RHA decision-making 
have not been able to be identified. 
The purchasing expectations of the Central Regional Health Authority reassured 
the community that they would not lose the hospital (CRHA, 1994). While not 
overjoyed that they would not retain 100% of the services that the hospital had 
provided, public opinion in Napier was somewhat appeased that something would 
be retained. As a result of this, there was a slight lull in community action to resist 
the changes they believed were attributable to health reform. While not 
completely satisfied with what was proposed, they had some reason to believe that 
the remaining services delivered from the Napier Hospital site were safe 
(Waitangi Tribunal, 2001). 
The next phase in the regionalisation proposal was the implementation 
framework, which was going to make the proposal a reality. A steering committee 
was established and Mark Flowers, now Development and Planning Manager, 
was appointed to oversee the project. The steering committee consisted of 
executive and clinical staff. Octa Associates were appointed by the Board to carry 
out the project management of the construction of the Regional Hospital and 
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associated works. The date for the presentation of the final plan of the Regional 
Hospital was December 1995. The projected date for the completion of the 
Regional Hospital was May 1998. 
The regional community was subjected to another round of consultation and 
public relations. Those in the community with an interest in health care were to be 
known as "stakeholders" following the advice of Network Communications to 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay (Henley, 1994). They were targeted in the project goals 
of the implementation plan so as to "implement the appropriate involvement of 
the broader community and health interest groups to achieve a sense of 
community ownership" (Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Implementation Framework, 
1995, p 2.) 
The community may have been reassured by the purchasing commitment from the 
Central Regional Health Authority. However, the business plan of Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay approved by the Government by June 1995 indicated how 
additional savings could be made " from the decision to move to a single regional 
hospital, instead of maintaining two hospitals in Napier and Hastings" (Gwynn, 
1995, p2). While assurances may have been given publicly Healthcare Hawke's 
Bay was informing the government of the cost effectiveness of what they intended 
to pursue. 
The publication in 1996 of the Central Regional Health Authority's purchasing 
expectations 'Health Care in Napier' alerted the public that changes were 
occurring that contradicted what they had committed themselves to in 1994: 
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Central RHA has decided not to specify where services should be 
delivered from in Napier. We are aware of the strength of public 
commitment to the Napier hospital site, and appreciate that leaving the 
location of services undetermined is a significant change from what was in 
the 1994 document. 
It is not the Central Regional Health Authority's role to specify the site 
from which providers will operate. Central RHA is responsible for a range 
of functions, including monitoring health, assessing the need for health 
services, and purchasing those services. As such, we can only specify the 
levels of services that will be purchased, quality standards that providers 
must meet, and criteria that determine who needs to have easy access. 
Central RHA cannot specify the site services should be provided from, as 
this would mean limiting who could provide the service. Specifying the 
site would also significantly limit a provider's ability to be innovative and 
improve services. It could also be seen as anti-competitive and in breach 
of the Commerce Act (Central RHA, 1996, p 5) 
It has not been possible for the researcher to establish what influenced the CRHA 
to shift its position, for lack of access to official information. However, this 
change, the dropping of a commitment to the location of hospital-based services 
for Napier, was a critical step towards the eventual fate of Napier Hospital. The 
Central Regional Health Authority proceeded to acknowledge that Healthcare 
Hawke' s Bay would need to take into consideration public opinion regarding the 
Napier hospital site. The Central Regional Health Authority wanted to reassure 
the people of Napier they would not lose services, even though the site for those 
services would not be specified: 
The purchasing expectations state that while the Central Regional Health 
Authority cannot be site specific for clinical safety certain services need to 
be located within close proximity of each other. These were identified as 
accident and medical, day surgery, and medical and surgical outpatient 
(Central RHA, 1996, p 5). 
This now provided the opportunity for Healthcare Hawke' s Bay to contain all 
services on one site. Whenever the various Boards had considered the single 
facility option, their ideal from the early 1980s had been to contain all hospital 
services on one site. 
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The further loss of services from Napier Hospital was not well received by the 
people of Napier. For some in the community it felt like a betrayal of what they 
had been promised. They believed that the intention of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay 
had always been the closure of Napier Hospital and that this had been assisted by 
the position Central Regional Health Authority had taken in their 1996 paper 
Health Care in Napier. The Board Minutes of meetings following the final 
decision on the regional hospital in March 1995 provide some indication of the 
parties influencing the decision to exit the Napier Hospital site. 
Working towards closure 
Following the CRHA declaring its position on the Napier site, in March 1997 a 
working party comprising Healthcare Hawke's Bay staff and representatives from 
the community selected by Healthcare Hawke's Bay was brought together. There 
was no specific representation of Maori interests on the working party. The 
working party examined and recommended to Healthcare Hawke's Bay the scope 
and volume of services that it considered appropriate for the Napier community. 
The Central RHA document was to be the basis for the initial discussions. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay consistently dialogued with Central RHA to ensure that 
any developments they initiated matched the purchasing intentions of CRHA. 
Two key issues were to be addressed by the Napier Services working party: 
building site configuration, and volume of service. The terms of reference for the 
working party suggest that future services for Napier were to be delivered from a 
new site and not the Napier Hospital site: 
• To determine service and building configuration options for delivery of those 
services. 
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• To consider site options for delivery of those services within the city and 
ensure the recommended site(s) meet configuration, access and cost 
requirements. 
• To make recommendations to the Executive of Healthcare Hawke's Bay on 
the preferred option(s). 
The working party spent four months investigating various options for the 
location of Napier's future health services. The report they produced in November 
1997 made three main recommendations: 
• That a new purpose-built health centre be located in the central 
city. 
• That certain services are co-located [within close proximity of 
support services, suggesting on the one site]. These services 
include outpatients, an accident and medical centre, therapy 
services, support services including x-ray and diagnostic 
services, dental services and day surgery performed under local 
anaesthetic. 
• That other services are provided from one or more separate 
downtown sites. Many of these services are already established 
downtown (Healthcare Hawke' s Bay Media Release , 3 
November 1997). 
The recommendations also included in the report to the Executive of Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay were quite explicit about the siting of services for Napier: "Clinical 
services for Napier should be provided from a new built facility in a City centre 
location, not on the hill." 
A pamphlet was distributed in November 1997 to all households in Napier and 
Taradale outlining what the working party had recommended. Public meetings 
were to be held and were advertised widely. The public had five weeks until 5 
December 1997 to make written submissions. 
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For the people of Napier there was a familiar tone to the way the information was 
being presented for the public. The recommendations were of little surprise and 
there was a sense of inevitability in the outcome. Effectively the Napier Hospital 
site was to be exited by Healthcare Hawke's Bay. 
Like previous information management exercises , the public were to be consulted 
with the decision already made, and were informed they would have little 
influence on the outcome. The process was a public relations and marketing 
exercise, rather than anything approaching the consultation and partnership in 
decision-making implied in the Treaty of Waitangi. As with the previous public 
consultations of 1994 the status quo was not up for consideration, despite it being 
called consultation. A participant has described it as "telling us what was going to 
happen" (Joe, lnterview,1998). The 28 October 1997 Board minutes indicate that 
consultation was to proceed on the understanding that it was focused on a new site 
for Napier services: "The Minister of Health's office had agreed that the 
Company could proceed with consultation on the Napier site issue, on the basis of 
a downtown site." 10 (Healthcare Hawke's Bay Ltd. Board, 28 October 1997, p17) 
The Chairman of the Healthcare Hawke' s Bay Board commented in a press 
statement on 3 November 1997: 
The Board is charged with making the final decision on the location of 
health services in Napier, but before we make that important decision, we 
10 Note that the reading of the Board"s minutes is subject to .interpretation. as there is an ambiguity over whether the 
Minister assented to the downtown site, or required the downtown site. This key difference of perspecti\'e could not be 
resolved from the minutes alone. An interview with relevant Board members may have helped to resolve the ambiguity. 
Such interviews were denied. An interview with CCMAU that allowed discussion on the Napier Hospital claim may 
also have resolved this issue. Once again. an interview on that basis was not allowed. 
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want to know what Napier people think about the working party 
recommendations. 
The primary purpose of this consultation is to gain feedback from the 
community on the principle of a new purpose-built health centre located in 
downtown Napier (Healthcare Hawke's Bay Media Release, 3 November 
1997). 
The working party report included a timetable for the new Napier site 
development in the central city. The new facility was expected to be completed at 
the end of 1998. 
However, the Board minutes of 28 October 1997 indicate that the Board was 
investigating options and creating a community expectation when funding issues 
had not been resolved: 
The Chairman stated Treasury now required a business case to be prepared 
specifically for Napier before they would make any recommendations to 
the Shareholders. He also pointed out that Central Health were not 
prepared to pay a service delivery premium in recognition of increased 
costs as a result of duplicating facilities in Napier. This would impact on 
the Company's financial position to the extent of $0.95 million. 
The Chairman advised that some funding options had been presented to 
the Shareholders to ascertain their preference for funding this project. 
Treasury and Central Health had since indicated that the Company's 
business plan assumptions in terms of efficient prices, compensation for 
inflation of supplies and increased wage costs would not be renumerated. 
In other words, there would be no increased revenue flows (Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay Board, 28 October 1997, p 17) 
The Board minutes of 25 November 1997 indicate that the funding issue was 
resolved. 
The Chief Executive Officer stated that advice had just been received from 
Andrew Weekes of CCMAU, that the Minister of Health had agreed to 
sign their letter and would be releasing a press statement later that day 
advising of Government's additional equity investment in Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay ( Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board, 25 November 1997, p 5) 
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At the 16 December 1997 Board meeting the Board unanimously agreed that the 
Napier Hospital site should be vacated in favour of a new health centre to be 
located on a site in Napier which meets certain specific requirements. It resolved: 
That the specific requirements are that the services to be provided in 
Napier by Healthcare Hawke's Bay are provided from a downtown site 
and that the site be of sufficient size to allow the potential for the transfer 
of Community and Public Health services on the site, and be of sufficient 
area, both in terms of building development and parking, to allow for co-
location with other providers on the site. 
That this is a decision in principle and that its implementation will be 
dependant on a suitable site being located, and on terms and conditions for 
the development of the site and its lease by Healthcare Hawke's Bay 
meeting the Company's requirements (Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board, 16 
December 1997, p20) 
A timetable for the relocation of those services based at the Napier Hospital site 
to Hastings was to be implemented from December 1997. The complete exit from 
the Napier Hospital site, except for the Company office, was scheduled to be 
completed by July 1998. This was later postponed until October 1998. 
The new regional Hawke's Bay Hospital was formally opened in April 1999. The 
Napier Health Centre was completed by December 1999. 
Crown Compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi: the core of 
Wai 692 
Clarity on the timing and implementation of the decisions to regionalise and site 
services at Hastings hospital is an important precursor to determining the answer 
to the key question: 
• What opportunity was afforded to lwi Maori to participate in and inform 
either of these decisions? 
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The when and how of the decisions considered above provides an opportunity to 
evaluate the impact of Maori on that decision-making. Healthcare Hawke' s Bay 
was but one part of the Crown involved in those decisions. This section considers 
the extent to which Healthcare Hawke· s Bay is accountable for those decisions. 
Each of the Treaty principles, consultation, participation, and representation, are 
then used in turn to determine Healthcare Hawke's Bay's compliance with the 
Treaty of Waitangi in the way it reached its decision to site a regional hospital at 
Hastings, and thereby downgrade and ultimately close Napier Hospital. 
Accountability 
While it may at first sight appear that the health reform process has hindered the 
process of regionalisation of the Hawke' s Bay hospitals, such an interpretation is 
not, in my view sustainable. The health service framework existing in 1991, with 
democratically elected Area Health Boards, meant a 3 year election cycle, plus 
representatives who were highly sensitive to local considerations. As has been 
shown, the Hawke's Bay Area Health Board had great difficulty making a 
decision on the Booz-Allen report, and received direct ministerial input on at least 
two occasions into that decision. It is unlikely, in my view, that a continuation of 
that framework would have led to a decision on the regional hospital option at a 
much greater speed than the Crown Health Enterprise model achieved. 
It is noteworthy that throughout the CHE deliberations on the regional acute 
hospital service and the future of Napier Hospital, many bodies have influence, 
and the pattern of decision-making is quite complex and unclear. The latter may 
partially reflect the limited access to documents and staff that have constrained 
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the author in her researching. However, it may equally well reflect an 
environment where public accountability through democratic representation in the 
governance of district health agencies had been removed, and the bodies making 
decisions did so in an executive, rather than a committee style. 
A purchaser wishing to pay the most economic price for a service, together with a 
provider trying to minimise their debt loading, may easily lead to a situation 
where selling an asset that is not wanted (Napier Hospital) and replacing it with 
new leased premises, is seen as commercially beneficial on all sides (Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay Board, 28 October 1997). The clinical justification on quality 
grounds is not hard to arrive at either. 
The question remains, however, whether the new service was what the people 
wanted, and in particular reference to Maori as Treaty partners, whether they had 
any meaningful say in the decision; that is, whether the Crown's responsibility to 
consult (see Chapter 2) was discharged or not. On the face of it, this is not a 
question that Healthcare Hawke· s Bay, its predecessors, or its advisers, appear to 
have ever asked themselves. The actions of the sole Maori Board member as 
recorded in the minutes do not indicate a particular concern on his part. Certainly, 
without the benefit of interviews, there is nothing in the documentary record to 
indicate it was a concern for Healthcare Hawke's Bay as a whole. 
A review of the processes used by Healthcare Hawke's Bay against the three 
Treaty principles of consultation, participation and representation throws some 
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light on the extent to which that lack of concern disadvantaged Maori in Ahuriri. 
Discussion follows under each principle separately. 
Principle 1: Consultation 
Tangata whenua of Napier believe that consultation between Treaty Partners did 
not occur in the decision to regionalise and relocate their health services to the 
Hastings Hospital site. The Maori Treaty Partner perceived consultation to mean 
that their opinion would be sought, considered, taken into account and be able to 
influence the outcome (Tom Hemopo, Submission to Healthcare Hawke's Bay, 1 
June 1994 ). This is quite consistent with the then Crown view of consultation. For 
example, the then Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, speaking to a radio audience in 
1994 stated: 
I think the most important thing there Paul, is that the obligation to consult 
by the Crown Health Enterprises and the Regional Health Authorities, 
whether it's in Canterbury or Auckland or wherever, that they actually do 
genuinely consult. And are prepared to alter their original proposals once 
they have talked to the community. That's what it's all about (Bolger, 
Newztel Log lZB, 15 August 1994) 
Given this, there appears to have been a lack of understanding by Healthcare 
Hawke· s Bay of the Treaty obligations on them and the appropriate expectation 
that the Ahuriri community had that these be honoured. 
The CHE did respond to criticisms from claimants over the issue of consultation 
(Heaney, 1998 ). When defending their consultation process Healthcare Hawke· s 
Bay challenged the criticisms of lack of consultation with Maori by suggesting 
that Maori could have attended any of the public meetings. The suggestion 
appears to be that the CHE was not obliged to consult separately and specifically 
with Maori. Healthcare Hawke's Bay did not see that they had a Treaty 
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responsibility to the Tangata Whenua separate and distinct to their public 
consultation obligations. The Chairman of Healthcare Hawke· s Bay Board 
defined who, in his view, the responsibility of consultation lay with in the Napier 
City Council litigation. 
Mr. Wilson deposed that the Board did not regard its decision making 
process as subject to any duty of consultation, and drew attention to the 
absence of any statutory provision to that effect, contrasting it with the 
express obligations of an RHA (Ellis J, 1994) 
However, this appears to overlook the responsibility of the CHE to comply with 
the State-Owned Enterprises Act: 
Section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986 states that "Nothing in 
this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." 
The principles referred to are generally agreed to be those defined by the 
Court of Appeal and include the requirement that the Crown act in good 
faith and make informed decisions. From this requirement the duty to 
consult has developed. So far the Court of Appeal has recognised a Treaty 
duty to consult Maori "on truly major issues" (Te Puni Kokiri, 1993) 
It does appear inconsistent that the Minister of Health had power to direct the 
RHA to consult but no such power of direction existed in the case of a CHE. In 
the context of the Wai 692 claim the initiative to regionalise appears to have been 
driven by the CHE. If so, there should have been equal accountability for the 
decision. The legislation stated that Regional Health Authorities were required by 
s34 to consult in the following terms: 
34. Regional health authorities to consult - Every regional health authority 
shall, in accordance with its statement of intent, on a regular basis consult 
in regard to its intentions relating to the purchase of services with such of 
the following as the authority considers appropriate: 
Individuals and organisations from the communities served by it who 
receive or provide health services or disability services: 
Other persons including voluntary agencies, private agencies, departments 
of State, and territorial authorities (Health and Disability Services Act 
1993) 
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Healthcare Hawke' s Bay saw consultation as part of a public relations exercise to 
sell the regionalisation proposal. After the decision was made they saw that 
opposition could be minimised with "consultation". Healthcare Hawke's Bay and 
Central Regional Health Authority jointly shared the consultation. 
There is no documentation that indicates that Tangata Whenua were ever 
consulted in 1993 when the decision to regionalise all services to Hastings was 
committed to. This should have occurred prior to discussions with Ministers and 
Treasury and as a Treaty responsibility is separate from the issue of public 
consultation. 
The Consultation Process 
The Model Regional Hospital paper contained a category titled 'cultural issues' 
listed between the categories flexibility and staff facilities. The paper states 
cultural issues had been addressed in the model hospital as the design has allowed 
for a "Whare Whanau or rentable accommodation for those requiring private 
accommodation". This category also included a statement that mothers must be 
given choice on how they deliver their baby. It concludes with "We must respect 
patients right of choice" (Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Model Regional Hospital 
paper, 1993). It would appear that there was not comprehensive Iwi consultation 
in the consideration of a model hospital. 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay had a very carefully planned and controlled public 
information and consultation programme. As indicated earlier, this was managed 
by Network Communications and was developed in consultation with the 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay Board. It was initially proposed that the process would 
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be described as a validation process with several phases. Critical to the process 
was the selection of stakeholders, representatives of interest groups, who would 
attend carefully controlled meetings. The stakeholders represented staff, union 
groups, patient groups, civic leaders, community health groups and the only 
reference to Maori was a group described as Maori groups. If the public wanted to 
actually meet with the decision-makers, they were expected to apply for an 
invitation by calling an 0800 number after April 13 1994. 
Two public meetings were held on 6 May 1994 where nominations were called 
for stakeholders who would then attend further meetings. At the selected 
stakeholder meetings the case for and against a regional hospital would be 
presented by speakers identified as validators. This process was described by the 
Chairman as " an extensive process of public information to ensure that the people 
of Hawke's Bay with an interest in hospital services are fully informed" (Peter 
Wilson, Letter to Michael Laws, MP, 14 April 1994). The process was also to 
include the opportunity for written public submissions, and where appropriate, the 
hearing of oral submissions. 
Further public meetings were held in the suburbs of Napier and Hastings during 
May 1994. It was estimated that approximately 800 people attended the public 
meetings throughout the process. 
In a memorandum to Board members and other relevant parties, Mr. Kevin Moore 
a Board director stated; 
The stakeholder nominees are a critical issue. Currently our thinking is: 
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• It must be clearly stated what their role is. They have no power and 
can make no recommendations. The sole aim is to allow a group to get 
really close and to question the Task Force/Board/RHA/Consultants and 
report to their groups (Healthcare Hawke's Bay Memo from K. Moore 3 
May 1994) 
The participation of the validators was also carefully controlled. Network 
Communications suggested to the Chief Executive Officer that; 
It occurs to me that the validators need to be teed up for the second 
meeting of the consultation process and on stand-by for a third meeting. 
Talking with Derek North his major concern was not wanting to speak to a 
rabble-like public meeting. These stakeholder meetings will be carefully 
controlled and there will be adequate protection for the validators 
(Network Communications Memo, 14 April 1994) 
This stage managed process was described in a press release by the Chairman of 
the Central Regional Health Authority, Hutton Peacock as, "We are satisfied that 
the programme is fair, transparent and well thought through and are confident that 
the final decision, whatever it is, will be in the best interests of the health of the 
people of Hawke's Bay" (Healthcare Hawke's Bay Media Release, April 1994). 
For Maori that attended the stakeholders meetings the presentations were not 
always easy to follow and they did not think the structure worked for Maori. 
Quite often the speakers would talk about very technical things that were 
difficult for lay people to grasp what was going on. Some of the questions 
related to, will there be a bus for transport; will there be eye clinics. As I 
have experience in such things there was no discussion and people did not 
understand things like primary care as compared to secondary care so 
consultation by way of a stakeholders meeting was not appropriate. It 
would have been more appropriate to have consulted the formal structures 
that existed like the Taiwhenua Boards and the Taiwhenua itself to have a 
considered response to the CHE (Joe, Interview, 1994). 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay consulted specifically with I wi once, 18 May 1994 at 
Omahu Marae Hastings, according to their documentation. It appears that 
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consultation to discuss the regionalisation proposal was initiated by the CHE to 
inform lwi of the decision. It is unclear what degree of control Iwi had over 
choice of venue and the way in which consultation would be conducted. The 
minutes of the hui indicate that the purpose was to inform and impart information. 
This was consultation after the decision was made and not a dialogue that could 
possibly influence outcome. 
Presentations were given by Healthcare Hawke's Bay and Central Regional 
Health Authority on issues pertaining to a regional hospital for Hawke's Bay. The 
summary of the joint presentation was; 
• importance of spending tax dollar wisely for the community 
• more dollars being spent in hospital services rather than 
community health projects 
• need to free up dollars from hospitals for more community 
initiatives 
• job is to ensure quality health services for the people in the 
community- must get this through efficiencies (Minutes of the 
Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994) 
The irony seems to have escaped the Crown agencies; they were supposedly there 
to discuss a regional hospital yet their presentation comments on the need for 
more funds to go into primary health in the community. This appears a 
contradiction to the concept that they were there to sell and the statements they 
were making about spending less on hospitals and more on community initiatives. 
Comments in the minutes of the hui indicate a poor understanding of consultation 
on behalf of Healthcare Hawke's Bay and the Chief Executive Officer. They 
denote a particular mindset. The comments from Maori focused on lack of 
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consultation from the CHE, decisions being imposed and a lack of inclusion about 
the future development of health services in Hawke's Bay. 
Maori were critical of the assumptions inherent in the presentation. Comments 
from the floor challenged the language used and clarified what services would be 
retained and where they would be located. 
Issue has been publicised and stated by the team making the presentation 
that there is "one hospital". This implies the other one (Napier) is closed. 
Yet hearing today that in fact some specialist services are being centralised 
to Hastings, and Napier will continue to provide much of what it does 
today. CHE should get story right and present the facts- don't confuse us 
by talking about ONE hospital. It is one Regional hospital and three 
satellites - Napier, Wairoa and Waipukurau.[Agreed] (Minutes of the 
Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994) 
At the one consultative hui (Minutes of the Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu 
Marae, Napier, 1994) with Maori, Healthcare Hawke's Bay confirmed that the 
Napier site would be retained. 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay attempted to sell the advantages of the regional hospital 
to Maori suggesting subject to funding they intended to include a Maori Health 
Centre in the plans to offer a range of services for Maori. Maori responded with, 
who had asked what Maori wanted? It was the consistent complaint of lack of 
consultation and inclusion in decision making. 
• Have Maori people agreed they want to go to a Maori Health 
Unit in Hastings? Have you asked us what we want? 
• Have Maori had a say in the job of Maori Health Manager? 
Have you (Alistair-Chief Executive Officer) and Pare [Niania] 
already decided? 
• Believe we should have the same access for resources as the 
CHE. Maybe services need to be revamped so we can play a 
part. Needs to be far more consultation with us. 
• Maori have not been consulted about the Maori Health Centre. 
MWWL make a submission that we want two hospitals. 
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Problems with transport. Napier could have a helipad for 
instance, if there were less carparks for staff (Minutes of the 
Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994). 
The response of the CHE demonstrated their difficulty with the concept of 
partnership. The Chief Executive Officer is documented as replying; 
• the job of Maori Health Manager will be advertised. Not sure 
what input you want in the process. Person works for me. 
Cannot work for two bosses- accountability issues. However 
can see you want a say in it- will have to find a way to achieve 
that. 
• Establishment of the centre will depend on Central Regional 
Health Authority funding-have not put proposal in yet (Minutes 
of the Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994). 
An unidentified speaker from the floor challenged the CHE on its proposal to 
establish a Maori health facility and whether it was the most appropriate provider, 
"CHE has stolen a march on Maoridom. You are another service provider like 
many Maori groups. You are a competitor. If you have a Maori Health Centre you 
have beaten us to the mark" (Minutes of the Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu 
Marae, Napier, 1994). 
There was criticism from the hui of the Maori policy for the CHE. The comments 
reinforce the lack of involvement of lwi in all aspects of decision making from the 
regional proposal, resource allocation, staffing, and policy development. "Saw a 
version of your Maori policy for the CHE. Looked like a Government proposal 
with Maori people in it. Needs a sixth unit- Rongoa. Kaupapa needs to be Maori-
at present your kaupapa is Government. We can determine our own structures" 
(Minutes of the Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994). 
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The response from Healthcare Hawke· s Bay to such comments does not indicate 
an understanding of their Treaty obligations and the implications for health. The 
Chief Executive Officer gave an opinion on the place of rongoa, " As far as 
traditional medicine concerned, think it is difficult to have two styles of health at 
the same hospital. Think it is wrong to have western medicine in a hospital 
environment mixed with traditional Maori medicine in a hospital environment" 
(Minutes of the Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994). 
A speaker from the floor identified the source of conflict with the CHE, " Believe 
communications from CHE could be a lot better. We as Maori hear very little 
indeed. Needs to be updated and brought back to the people. The Advisory group 
needs to be chosen by the people. We need to be consulted" (Minutes of the Maori 
Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994). 
The Maori community viewed the consultation process as less than adequate. Te 
Maari Joe attended a stakeholder meeting and the Omahu Marae consultation, and 
was critical of the CHEs communication style and monocultural approach. As she 
commented one call to Maoridom is not enough as it depends on who calls the 
Hui. 
My knowledge of the consultation process and the changes that were to 
happen to the hospital are by reading the papers. The Te Taiwhenua Board 
which I assist with was not part of the negotiation process with the CHE. It 
appears to me that the negotiations followed after the decision was 
made .... I attended the Hui at Omahu and it is from that Hui which was 
after the decision was made that people were "consulted". 
It seems to me that it was not consultation, that the CHE was reporting on 
its vision. 
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The Board (Hauora) was not approached at any time but the CHE seeking 
the Board's view. They did not come here and there is no records or 
documents. Nor did we participate directly in the negotiations. 
I found out about the Hui at Omahu from (identified kuia) who telephoned 
me informing me that a Hui was to be held. I was informed by her that she 
had met a CHE Board member in the street and who had been told that the 
decision was made fait accompli before the Hui was held. 
I attended the Hui at Omahu which was merely reporting, telling us what 
was going to happen and we were told by Mr. Bowes not to worry. It gave 
us the feeling that things had already been settled, that decisions had 
already been made and we were being spoken to as we have for the last 
150 years (Joe, 1998) 
Te Maari Joe also made a submission to Healthcare Hawke' s Bay on behalf of the 
Taiwhenua and Hauora Board of the Whanganui-a-Orotu, and the Maori 
Women· s Welfare League on 1 June 1994. The submission made several 
suggestions including; 
• The Taiwhenua and Hauora Board stress the value of people as against bricks 
and mortar. 
• The Taiwhenua and Hauora Board agree that there be two hospitals. 
• The Taiwhenua and Hauora Board recommends that Maori people and Maori 
organisations must be consulted on any issues affecting Maori. 
Mrs. Joe was also invited to make a submission before the Healthcare Hawke' s 
Bay Board. She states she was told what she could speak about and was confined 
to commenting on the Maori Health Unit. 
We were told how long we could speak and I spoke after Tom Hemopo 
and talked on the Maori unit stressing the fact that there was no 
consultation with Maori through our areas .... It is my view that the 
Hawke's Bay area needed to be required(consultation) because the 
proposal is for a Hawke's Bay regional hospital and that people from these 
areas needed to be consulted. That would have required a Hui. ... 
Although I was to go and talk about my submission with other Maori it 
was really on behalf of the Maori health unit. I do not feel that I was able 
to speak for Maoridom as a whole as I am not authorised to do so (Joe, 
Interview, 1988). 
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When Bridgeport consultants John Hill and Robyn Goldsmith reported to the 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board at their meeting of 10 June 1994, the Board 
minuted: 
Four or five submissions had been received from Maori organisations, as 
well as the report of the hui held at Omahu. The general feeling from those 
submissions was for the status quo to remain and some references had 
been made to a perceived inadequacy in the consultation process. 
Nothing further is recorded other than that the consultants were thanked for their 
presentation. 
In the 1997 round of public consultation over services to be retained and located 
in Napier there were three public meetings. The documentation from Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay indicates that there was not a specific consultation meeting with 
Iwi. It was suggested in the response from Healthcare Hawke's Bay to the 
Statement of Claim that there had not been a lack of consultation as local Iwi and 
other Maori could have attended general public meetings. 
Network Communications continued to manage Healthcare Hawke's Bay public 
relations work and refined their understanding of public consultation. In a 
memorandum from them to the Chief Executive Officer an opinion has been 
given on the management of the Napier services "consultation" in 1997. 
It is important from the outset that we establish the exact status of any 
discussions that might take place, because our experience suggests groups 
such as the Napier Hospital Retention Group will attempt to manipulate 
anything we do to suit their broader political objectives. 
There is a danger that they will attempt to use activities we may initiate to 
gain community comment, not to debate the configuration (within the 
framework provided by the RHA purchasing policies), but to campaign for 
the retention of Napier Hospital in its current form. It is also possible, for 
example, that they will try and "filibuster" the process by making dozens 
(possibly hundreds) of submissions and wanting them all heard publicly. 
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There is also the danger of inadvertently creating an expectation that we 
are undertaking a full public consultation and all that implies in terms of 
process. 
Any process of discussion or comment that we initiate has to be carefully 
defined and specified. 
I would make the following suggestions: 
• that the terms of the public discussions are clearly spelt out ( eg. 
that Healthcare Hawke' s Bay has no legal requirement to 
consult, but wants comment on its proposals from interested 
groups) 
• that very specific questions are posed on which comment is 
sought 
• that submissions are received, but are not actively pursued, and 
that they are called "commentary" 
• that no hearings are held, although Healthcare Hawke' s Bay 
retains the right to follow-up with any commentators on 
specific issues 
I believe we should avoid public meetings. They are simply an invitation 
for participants to push political agendas and contribute little to 
constructive discussion (Henley, 1997) 
Specific groups were identified to be included in the "consultation" process. The 
groups were identified as, GP's, Napier City Council, Napier Services Retention 
Group and the Hawke's Bay Health Council. There were no references to any lwi 
or specific Maori group who should be consulted or met with. 
The Chief Executive Officer of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay when questioned about 
the document was emphatic that it was not a memorandum but the jottings 
between two colleagues, not intended for public perusal, and that it had been 
stolen from his office. The presentation of the document suggests otherwise. It is 
titled memorandum on Network Communications letterhead, dated, to be sent to 
identified staff other than the CEO, and the subject was on the Napier services 
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consultation. Mr Flowers' discomfort with the circulation of the document was 
clear from his reaction, though the reasons for that discomfort remain open to 
speculation. 
While Mr. Flowers said he did not follow the advice given, it was consistent with 
the management of previous public consultations. There has been no evidence 
supplied or uncovered in this research study of an alternative approach or 
recommendations. 
The lack of consultation and the manner in which it was conducted was an issue 
for the wider community. In 1997 Neil Kirton, the then Associate Minister of 
Health, commissioned a personal review of Napier hospital services and the 
consultative process with the people of Napier. The review was to examine the 
process Healthcare Hawke's Bay used when consulting with the Napier 
community. "There has been enormous public criticism and an explicit lack of 
confidence from many Napier citizens in the processes that led to the regional 
hospital decision" (Kirton, 1997). 
A retired medical practitioner from Napier Dr Brian Woodhouse was to conduct 
the review and submissions were invited from the public. In his report Dr 
Woodhouse concluded that "I think the public consultation process was 
completely adequate" (Kirton, 1997). 
Neil Kirton stated when interviewed that one of the shortcomings of the report is 
that it did not consider the Maori perspective or address their concerns (Kirton, 
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1997). While the 1997 review may have found consultation adequate from the 
reviewer's point of view it was not for the Tangata Whenua of Ahuriri. They 
considered that the CHE had Treaty obligations to honour as a Treaty partner, that 
is the fundamental difference to its obligations to the wider community. 
At the second Stakeholder meeting, 23 May 1994, a question was asked from the 
floor, "Won't the residual services at Napier be moved away eventually and the 
hospital closed?." The response from the presenters was, "That is not the plan." 
(Minutes of the Maori Consultation Hui, Omahu Marae, Napier, 1994). It has to 
be asked what exactly was being consulted about in the consultation process. Was 
this consultation before the decision making process or was the decision already 
made, and the "consultation" a sham? There was not public consultation to debate 
or consider the closure of Napier Hospital. The 1997 public consultation exercise 
was focused on what services would be retained in Napier and where they would 
be located. 
Principle 2: Participation 
Participation in decision making is the second treaty principle recommended by 
the Royal Commission on Social Policy and refers to Maori involvement in a 
particular activity or sector. Maori participation has historically been marginalised 
in the health sector with the increasing reliance on health professionals. 
The Waitangi Tribunal set out its expectations of participation in the following 
form: 
... in a society based on a partnership of two peoples, the achievement of 
social goals requires the active support and participation of both. 
Inevitably, then, the tighter the control that one party exerts over social 
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policy, the less the other is able to contribute, and the less likely the goals 
are to be reached. It appears to us that Crown agencies cannot exclude the 
values and aspirations of communities unless they are totally incompatible 
with Crown goals (Waitangi Tribunal, Te Whanau o Waipereira Report, 
1998,p232) 
When the Taskforce report was completed in early 1994, the process of public 
submission and comment included: 
• An 0800 number whereby people could make oral comment 
• An opportunity to make written submissions 
• The possibility of being invited by the Healthcare Hawke' s Bay board to make 
an oral submission in support of the written submission. 
However, without access to the Taskforce report, the process of making 
submissions was difficult. Healthcare Hawke' s Bay charged 20 dollars per copy 
of the report. However, Network Communications advice to Health care Hawke's 
Bay was: 
Some copies will need to be provided free and others for perusal to avoid 
the accusation that the decision process is inaccessible to community 
members (Network Communications, 1994). 
In the event, 4 copies were reserved for local Iwi and one for the Maori 
Community Health Group. It is evident, that for Maori to make submissions in the 
traditional way, by korero with the decision-makers, the hurdles were substantial. 
In the end, such submissions were only by invitation, with the exception of the 
Omahu hui 
In the review mentioned in the previous section conducted by Dr Woodhouse in 
1997 he stated (Kirton, 1997) that there was a widely held concern within the 
community over the lack of community participation in the activities of 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay. The new structure of Crown Health Enterprises 
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removed democratically elected Board members who were replaced with 
appointed Directors who were not necessarily local or known to the community. 
This contributed to a sense of reduced accountability of the Board and subsequent 
lack of transparency in their activities. 
A recurring theme concerned the structure of the CHE Board. Nearly 
everyone agreed that the company structure makes for easy and effective 
decision-making but there is also a substantial feeling of loss of 
participation in the system. When elected representatives ran the hospitals 
they were "ours" in a sense that no longer applies. The consensus was that 
a mixed governing body, with a small majority of appointed members and 
some elected representatives, would be the best structure (Kirton, 1997) 
It has been difficult for this researcher to establish fully how Maori participated in 
the day to day running of Healthcare Hawke's Bay without interviewing the 
relevant staff. Permission to interview them was refused by the CHE, though 
some staff members gave evidence at the Wai 692 hearing before the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Examination of Healthcare Hawke· s Bay reports on the regionalisation 
proposal ( 1994) and Napier Services Working Party ( 1997) indicates that Maori 
membership of such groups was low to non-existent. 
The membership of the Napier Services Working Party consisted of clinical and 
support staff of Healthcare Hawke· s Bay, consultants such as Network 
Communications and a union representative. The non-Healthcare Hawke's Bay 
members were community based and consisted of a General Practitioner, a Napier 
City Councillor, Hawke's Bay Health Council representatives and the General 
Manager for a medical practice. Members were appointed by the CHE and those 
from the community were invited to participate. 
Page 220 
There appeared to be no specific Iwi representative or the inclusion of any 
representative from a Maori community group. In the deliberations and 
considerations of what services should be retained and located in Napier there was 
not a Maori perspective in the formal decision making group. 
Healthcare Hawke' s Bay has commented that Maori were considered and 
consulted adequately about the Napier services report in 1997. They have outlined 
how this was achieved. 
Prior to the presentation of that report and the public consultation 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay executive Bill Hodges (Manager, Maori Health) 
whose function was to liaise with the Maori Health Committee ensured 
that matters of concern or material to Hawke's Bay Maori including those 
at Napier were considered (Heaney, 1998). 
This statement appears to be saying that Maori matters were effectively 
marginalised and delegated to the Maori Advisory Committee. There does not 
appear to have been a consciousness that any decisions or factors affecting Maori 
should be incorporated into all aspects of decision-making. Not all Maori 
considerations or concerns should have gone solely to the Maori Committee. 
Participation in decision making, partnership in the Treaty of Waitangi sense, 
would have required a greater level of participation by Maori at all levels of 
decision making within Healthcare Hawke's Bay. A single hui and a single 
advisory committee were arguably not adequate participation. 
Principle 3: Representation 
In 1986 the Board of Health issued a statement that acknowledged the need for 
formally recognised Maori representation at board level. 
Affirmed the need for special representation of Maori people on all 
hospital and area health boards. In addition to encouragement for Maori 
people to stand for election as individuals, the Board of Health believes 
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that provision should be made for the appointment of Maori 
representatives selected and determined in accordance with Maori culture 
and tradition (Department of Health, 1987 ,88) 
There has been concern expressed by Maori about the lack of Maori 
representation at the senior levels of decision-making in the health sector 
throughout the period under study (Cunningham & Durie, 1999). The issue of 
representation was recognised by the Department of Health. In its 1986 
memorandum 'Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Health', it recognised the need for 
greater participation and representation of Maori in the development and delivery 
of health services: "That Maori health issues be addressed by the involvement of a 
greater number of Maori people in the delivery of health services and the setting 
of priorities ... challenges health decision makers to involve Maori people in the 
development of plans and priorities" (Department of Health, 1987, p88). 
Effectively a Maori perspective at the most senior levels of management would 
only occur when there was adequate Maori representation at board level. The 
Department of Health recognised this and reminded Area Health Boards that 
adequate levels of representation might only be achieved if Maori selected by 
their communities were appointed by the government to the Board ( 1989 
onwards). There was legislation that supported and protected this option. Maori 
representation could not be guaranteed through elections. The legislation provided 
a mechanism for Boards to ensure they had adequate Maori representation, 
through a system of government appointments. "This approach is supported by the 
Board of Health as the most effective way of ensuring adequate Maori 
representation" (Department of Health, 1987, p88). The Board of Health was the 
national collective body of Hospital Boards and latterly of Area Health Boards. 
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The active support for Maori representation was less visible in the 1990s after the 
1993 reforms. The structure of the new entities known as Crown Health 
Enterprises saw less commitment to such initiatives. The Health and Disability 
Services Act 1993 contained no requirements for representation by Maori on 
Boards of the new health bodies. The Boards of CHEs were wholly government 
appointed. Where Boards did have Maori directors, they were not necessarily 
either local or mandated by lwi to represent their views. The number of Maori 
directors in 1999 of HHS companies was fifteen out of a total number of 133. 
(Oral Interview, McLean, 1999) 
Directors were appointed by the shareholding Ministers, the Minister of Health 
and the Minister of Finance. The Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit 
recommended possible candidates to the shareholding Ministers: 
Recommendations take account of the need to ensure each board has an 
appropriate balance of skills and knowledge and a composition (in 
particular in relation to gender and ethnicity). CCMAU maintains an 
extensive database of actual and potential directors and actively seeks CVs 
from a range of people - including by way of public advertising for those 
interested in acting as directors of Crown companies. 
Recent changes to policy have encouraged local authorities to nominate 
candidates for consideration for appointment by Shareholding Ministers to 
HHS boards. However, those appointed as directors (regardless of the way 
in which they may have been nominated) are not appointed as 
representatives of any particular body, community, profession or other 
group. They are appointed to act as directors of the company - the primary 
legal duty of directors is to act in the best interests of the company, not the 
interests of any group they may belong to or wish to 'represent'. 
While the decision to appoint directors is for the Shareholding Ministers 
alone, Government policy is that as part of the appointment process those 
decisions must be ratified by the Appointments and Honours Cabinet Sub-
committee. 
(CCMAU Record of Meeting of 12 March 1999) 
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CCMAU took a commercial approach to its role and the role of the Directors it 
appointed. CCMAU identified its role in respect of the health sector as advising 
shareholding Ministers on the balance between public policy objectives and 
efficiency objectives (CCMAU, 1999). It had previously been criticised for an 
undue focus on organisational and financial performance of CHEs (Stent, 1998). 
CCMAU's response to the Health and Disability Commissioner was to state that 
"many of the comments and observations made in relation to CCMAU arise from 
misunderstandings of CCMAU' s role" (Stent, 1998). It is hard to see how public 
policy objectives in relation to Maori health could be brought into the balance if 
those public policy objectives could not be brought to bear on the appointment of 
the directors who run the Crown companies. 
Maori make up seventeen percent of the Napier City population. They have the 
worst health status in the central funded region of the HF A as outlined in the 
second half of this report. How then were Iwi represented in the largest health 
provider of the Hawke's Bay separate to their role of consumers? 
The Board of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay from 1993 - 1999 had nine directors who 
met monthly. At these meetings the Company direction, policy and objectives 
were set and their progress reviewed. The Shareholding Ministers had laid down 
the responsibilities of the Board: 
• To manage the Company so that they achieve the targets 
established for the business in the annual business plan and 
Statement of Intent. 
• To act in a manner consistent with their directors' obligations 
under the Companies Act 1993 and the shareholders interest 
(Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Financial and Operating Report, 
1999) 
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Healthcare Hawke's Bay had one Maori Director Mr. Walter Wilson who was on 
the Board for six years. Mr. Wilson was from Ngati Kahungunu kite Wairoa. He 
initially consented to be interviewed for this study but then withdrew. His 
impressions and perspective would have been valuable as he was one of the 
longest-serving Directors. He had participated in decisions that the Board have 
taken and has also been the target of significant criticism from within the 
community who feel he had not represented their interests (Meeting at Maori 
Women's Resource Centre, 27 January 1999) 
In the management structure of Healthcare Hawke' s Bay Maori representation 
had been limited. In 1996 Healthcare Hawke' s Bay appointed a Manager of Maori 
Health Wiremu Hodges. His role in the management structure was elevated to the 
second tier after a recommendation from the Maori Health Committee. Mr. 
Hodges held this role for two years and resigned in 1998. 
His role, as he described it (Wiremu Hodges, interview with author, 20 January 
1999), was to establish a sound Maori health policy. He believed this would be 
the foundation for future Maori health development in the Hawke's Bay. Mr. 
Hodges felt he was effective in gaining some recognition for Maori at the 
executive level within Healthcare Hawke' s Bay as until 1996 Maori were not 
alluded to in the business plan. 
Interviews with the staff of the Healthcare Hawke's Bay Maori Health Unit were 
requested, agreed to and then later refused by Healthcare Hawke's Bay. Those 
staff came under the management of the Maori Health Manager and implemented 
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Healthcare Hawke's Bay policy in their service delivery. They were perfectly 
placed to provide information on the day to day effect of their work within 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, and the effectiveness of their representation of Maori 
health interests and issues. The documentary evidence provides little information 
as to the impact of the Maori Health Unit. The Maori Health Unit staff could have 
provided a first hand account of the integration of Maori issues into Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay's decision making processes, and would have been in a position to 
clarify if that did in fact occur. 
At the Omahu Hui in 1994 attendees requested a Maori Committee or Advisory 
group be established and be involved in the decision-making process of 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay and report back to community. The Advisory Committee 
was created in 1994. 11 In 1996, with the appointment of the Maori Health 
Manager, new terms of reference were developed for the committee. The source 
of these terms of reference is unclear. Once again, an interview with relevant staff 
or Board members who sit on the committee could have clarified this issue. 
The Committee consisted of eight members who were elected by hui of whanau, 
hapu and Iwi in each of the four geographical areas of Hawke's Bay. At each 
monthly meeting Executive staff, Board members, Manager of Maori health and 
relevant service managers of Healthcare Hawke· s Bay would also attend. The 
CHE's statement to the hearing requesting urgency on the Wai 692 claim 
11 There is little documentary evidence of the Committee. It has been hard to establish any details of its history in the 
period 1994-96 without access to relevant staff. It is not visible in the CHE business plan. or in the Board minutes as 
supplied by Crown Law Office where large sections had been excised. 
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mentioned the makeup of the Maori Health committee, but made no mention of 
the details of its monthly deliberations between 1994 and 1996. 
The main purpose of the Committee was defined as receiving information from a 
variety of sources on Maori health, disseminating it to the relevant sources (Terms 
of Reference, Maori Health Committee, undated)and maintaining a monitoring 
role of services delivered to Iwi. 
There was no obligation on Healthcare Hawke's Bay to incorporate or implement 
recommendations from the Committee. As the terms of reference state, the Maori 
Health Advisory Committee was one of several such groups advising Healthcare 
Hawke· s Bay on matters relating to health. 
In July 1996 a Maori Working Party was convened to provide cultural advice on 
the design and layout of the planned Regional Hospital. The membership appears 
to have been drawn initially from Healthcare Hawke' s Bay staff and subsequently 
selected individuals from the community. The minutes indicate that their purpose 
was to awhina and support: 
• Advice on internal design and layout 
• Staff training on why the design is culturally appropriate 
• Staff need for Kaumatua support 
• Work with other staff to get their ideas on sensitivity and 
cultural appropriateness (Te Komiti Maori Awhina, Minutes of 
Meetings - 23 July 1996, 7 August 1996) 
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The minutes of these meetings stop at September 1997. It is unclear whether the 
group continued to meet or that their advice was incorporated into the design and 
overall cultural appropriateness of the facility .12 
Some of the issues they raised and the response from the organisation suggest a 
lack of cultural awareness and appropriateness. For example, at the November 
1996 meeting the Committee discussed the issue of the storage of body tissue. 
The response from staff at the mortuary was that there was no facility for that and 
that they did not see it as their responsibility. This issue was discussed at a further 
two meetings. At the February 1997 meeting it was suggested that the 
responsibility lie with the individual and be further debated. The last set of 
minutes supplied is for the August 1997 meeting and the body tissue and parts 
issue still had not been resolved. 
This researcher argues that Maori working parties or advisory groups provide the 
organisation with the Maori perspective or opinion on specific issues defined as 
pertaining to Maori. They do not adequately address what efforts the CHE makes 
to incorporate a Maori perspective in all aspects of decision-making. There is also 
no obligation on the CHE to implement any decision or recommendation from 
advisory groups or committees. Without the opportunity to discuss these issues 
through interviews of Maori Health Unit staff, it is quite impossible to arrive at 
any conclusions as to the adequacy of Maori participation in decision-making and 
representation on decision-making bodies. 
12 All minutes of the Working Party were requested through the Crown Law Office. No further minutes were supplied. 
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Unilateral Changes and a Failure to Partner with Maori 
The core of the issue in the contemporary context was the inclusion of Maori in 
the decision making process. Who determined what was best for Maori in Napier? 
The Wai 692 report stated that it could not be demonstrated that Maori were 
consulted in a true and meaningful way, and therefore able to participate with 
adequate representation at all levels of decision making. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay and its predecessor organisations have not 
considered the healthcare and health status of Napier Maori as a 
significant issue in their service delivery planning. They have not offered 
Maori an opportunity through consultation, participation or representation 
to effectively join in the decision-making processes affecting their health 
and healthcare (Ferguson, 1999b, p41 ). 
The Wai 692 claim highlighted the fragmented accountabilities within the health 
sector. It raised issues of monitoring and implementation and the responsibility 
for monitoring the Crown entities. 
Government monitoring agencies appear to believe that in the 1990s, 
Crown Companies will not breach the Treaty, therefore monitoring is not 
required. It is evident that if it is not explicit in the monitoring role and 
enforced, self-monitoring is not adequate. This report demonstrates that 
the expectation that HHSs will comply is not sufficient and that rigorous 
monitoring is required (Ferguson, 1999b, p42). 
The Wai 692 claim explored the relationships within the health sector and how 
they worked towards improving health outcomes for Maori. The inconsistencies 
of the sector were apparent. 
Measurement of health status by the provider and the purchaser has been 
piecemeal, and hampered by poor information collection and analysis. 
CCMAU has been slow to change the framework of the quality indicators 
reported to it, and shows no likelihood of considering Maori health 
outcome a significant quality indicator for HHS's. The requirement to 
"involve Maori in the development of quality measures for tertiary 
services, in relation to access, transport, whanau support, and 
accommodation" appears to have passed the Maori community of Napier 
by (Ferguson, 1999b, p42). 
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The Wai 692 claim also raised the issue of what is adequate consultation with 
Tangata Whenua. The claimants challenged the adequacy of one consultative hui 
that took place in Hastings in 1994. Healthcare Hawke's Bay attempted to argue 
that they had no legislative requirement to consult and that the responsibility for 
consultation rested with the RHA/HF A. 
The Auditor General's report ( 1998) would suggest that there was a requirement 
on any Public Sector Organisation to consider the Government's strategic goals, 
involve Maori in the planning process and identify potential Treaty Issues with 
any strategic planning. 
The report to the Waitangi Tribunal concluded that in the context of the claim 
Maori were not consulted as a Treaty partner. There was no documentary 
evidence to show Maori had any meaningful and satisfactory participation in the 
major decisions that would have a fundamental impact on their access to local 
health services. 
The fundamental issue in the claim was identified as, "if Maori are excluded from 
the pivotal decisions that will have significant impact on their health status, who 
will protect the Treaty rights of tangata whenua?" The claim proposed that "The 
Crown and its relevant agencies, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Central Regional 
Health Authority and CCMAU have not protected and upheld the Treaty rights of 
the peoples of Ahuriri". 
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The Tribunal decision in respect of Wai 692 - The Napier Hospital and Health 
Services Report (Waitangi Tribunal, 2001) was released in October 2001.The 
Tribunal found over 100 breaches by the Crown in the decisions it made and the 
processes it used regarding Napier Hospital and health services. The claim and the 
Tribunal's consideration of it illustrate the degree to which the Crown was found 
not to have lived up to its Treaty obligations in respect of Maori health. The 
Tribunal found that the Crown has failed at all levels, in its legislation setting, in 
its instructions to its agencies, in its consultation processes, in its affording Maori 
the opportunity to participate and be represented in decisions that effect them. 
Furthermore, it found that the Crown had at times breached the duty of good faith 
conduct. 
The Wai 692 claim serves as a robust and concrete illustration of the degree to 
which the Crown has attempted to remedy Maori health status in a unilateral way. 
Its failure to use a partnership consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi, to act in line 
with the Treaty principles of consultation, participation and representation, has 
not enhanced the health status of Ahuriri Maori. Neither has it met their 
aspirations, voiced over many years, for participation in health sector decision 
making (Waitangi Tribunal, 2001, p361). 
Changes in governing party or parties, and consequent shifts in ideology over the 
period of this study were considered not to have had a positive effect, either in 
perceived improvement in health service delivery, or in engaging Maori as 
partners in the health sector, or in determining their collective health status 
(Waitangi Tribunal, 2001, pp363-373). To what extent then, can the lessons of 
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Wai 692 be seen as applicable across the whole of the health sector? The next 
chapter highlights the effect of such unilateral change, and the Crown· s attempts 
through policy development and monitoring to address Maori health issues. 
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CHAPTER 7 - CROWN ACCOUNTABILITY TO MAORI -
MONITORING OF THE HEALTH SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT 
ON MAORI 
Government Policy - Maori Health is a Priority 
This chapter investigates the strategies and policy statements of successive 
governments to address Maori health needs within the period of this study. It will 
review policy documents and interview material from health sector participants to 
understand what has been implemented and how it has been monitored. The 
processes the Crown has put in place to monitor the effectiveness of their own 
strategies will also be examined. These will be used to investigate the Crown's 
delivery of health services to Maori consistent with its Treaty obligations as 
outlined in Chapter 2. 
Government policy in respect of the Treaty of Waitangi and of Maori has 
occupied both a generic and overarching space, and more specific sectoral 
contexts, at least since the time that the Third Labour government restored the 
Treaty to a statutory role with the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. That is not to 
imply a level of consistency between successive governments beyond that of an 
acknowledgment of its status as a 'founding document'(Whaia te ora mo te lwi, 
1992). There is an abundance of references to the Treaty of Waitangi in recent 
government Maori health policy. In generic strategic policy documents over the 
time of study the Treaty has often been acknowledged in terms of the "special 
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relationship between Maori and the Crown," or acknowledging the unique needs 
of Maori as tangata whenua (Moving Forward, Ministry of Health, 1997 ). 
More specific Maori health policy documents do make some effort to tum Treaty 
acknowledgment into Treaty based action. There has been no shortage of policy, 
indeed, it exists in abundance. However, there appears no sense of a unified 
approach to the Treaty and its role in health. The following display of key policy 
milestones (Table 6) during the health reforms of the last two decades highlights 
the inconsistencies and the variety of meaning placed on the Treaty in recent 
times. It highlights the inability of the Crown to sustain a clear view of the Treaty 
through the cycles of political change, and the variety of approaches used to try 
and operationalise the Treaty in respect of Maori health status improvement. 
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Table 6: Selected Milestones in the Development of Health Policy to Improve Maori Health 
Sector Policy Milestone Strategies and recommendations Outcome 
Chan2e 
1984- Maori Policy Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere, strongly supported the concept of devolution Disestablishment of the Department of 
Labour of activities from the State to lwi. This reflected perhaps an amalgam between the Maori Affairs, and incorporation of 
Government Labour government's initial intentions to 'honour the Treaty' (Kelsey, 1990, p46) and performance expectations into mainstream 
the shift from universal welfarism to greater individual responsibility. Crown agencies. 
1984-1994 Decade for Maori Development (Hui • 'a greater focus on Maori self-detern1ination utilising Tribal structures' The beginning of lwi social and 
Taumata) (Public Health Commission, • 'integrated cultural, social, and economic development, positive funding (rather development programmes . 
1994,p59) than negative spending), greater Maori autonomy, and Maori self-determination' 
(Durie, 1994, p.54) 
Maori development begins to be seen as a remedy for Maori social ills, and opens the 
way for shifting the Maori burden off the State. 
1988 Te Urupare Rangapu (The Partnership • Improve responsiveness of government agencies Legislation that gave effect to the Te 
Response) Department of Maori • eliminate the gaps which exist between the educational, personal, social, economic Urupare Rangapu policy was repealed 
Affairs, 1988 and cultural well being of Maori people and that of the general population. following a change of government in 1990 
• promote decision making in the machinery of government, in area~ of importance (Labour to National) and subsequent 
to Maori communities redefinition of government Maori Affairs 
• provide opportunities for Maori people to actively participate, on jointly agreed policy in 1991. "The only attempt by any 
terms, in such policy formulation and service delivery. government to work with the resilient 
An Article 3 ba~ed approach, where Maori would finally enjoy the same rights and Maori cultural structures of whanau, hapu. 













Wahanga Hauora Maori Treaty 
Framework Maori Health Team within 
the Department of Health 
Ka Awatea A report of the Ministerial 
Planning Group (I 991, p9) 
Strategies and recommendations 
Area Health Boards could evaluate their performance against Treaty of Waitangi 
obligations by answering eight questions: 
• What Crown Treaty principles are addressed? 
• How are government objectives for Maori taken into account? 
• What impact will there be on and for Maori people? 
• What resources are allocated to Maori strategies and priorities? 
• What gaps or inaccuracies in data have been identified? 
• How are Maori involved in the development, implementation, and review of the 
policy? 
• Have Maori priorities and issues been identified and addressed? 
• Does the proposal reflect Maori values and concepts? 
A short-lived opportunity for Treaty partnership to effect the delivery of health 
services, attempting to meet the intent of Te Urupare Rangapu. 
Given that Maori aspirations are seen by Government as "positive" and therefore 
worthy of support and encouragement, and the state-dependency of Maori as "negative" 
and therefore to be discouraged, it would follow that Government policy should be 
formulated accordingly.) 
The recommendations for health were: 
• That any future policy emphasis in Vote: Maori Affairs include a strengthened 
health policy function. 
• That a Health Promotion Programme be established within Vote: Maori Affairs. 
• That a Health Promotion Unit be established within the operations function of the 
proposed new specialist Maori agency. 
• That the health promotion function have a regional presence in the proposed 
Regional Development Agencies. 
• That community health initiatives continue to be enhanced and promoted as 
legitimate mechanisms for reaching and catering for the needs of Maori people. 
Maori health policy would be driven from within government, rather than by 
partnership. Maori development is promoted to reduce Maori dependency on the State. 
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Outcome 
Area Health Boards were abolished in the 
Health sector reforms of 1991. 
The report and recommended policies were 
never implemented as Winston Peters was 







Your Health and The Public Health 
Minister of Health Green and White 
Paper (Upton, 1991, p70) 
1992 He Kaupapa ... He Hanga 
Tikanga - A Foundation ... Shaping a 
Way Maori caucus of the Ministry of 
Women's Affairs 
Strategies and recommendations 
'Reform of our health system is worth doing only if the outcome is a better system with 
benefits for all New Zealanders. We must be quite clear about the goals we set 
ourselves and realistic about what can in fact be achieved. 
The primary objective of this reform process must be to secure, for everyone, access to 
an acceptable level of health care. Low income should not create a barrier to quality 
care.' 
The document, which became the blueprint for the 1993 reforms pays scant attention to 
Maori or Maori health (one and a half pages of a one hundred and fifty-three page 
document). It makes no reference to the Treaty of Waitangi. It fails to signal to the 
health sector the government's position or perspective on Maori health when significant 
structural change is being proposed. 
The report makes reference to Ka Awatea and the need for Maori to participate "fully 
and in and contribute to the development of New Zealand". The suggested remedy is " 
Positive incentives must be given to Maori as individuals and as members of whanau, 
hapu, iwi and other community groups to take responsibility for their own health". 
The plan provides a useful framework for assessing a Government department's 
capacity to respond to Maori. The plan wa, divided into three main sections, Treaty of 
Waitangi, Relationship with Maori, and Management of the Ministry, each of which 
had their own set of objectives. 
The objectives relating to the Treaty of Waitangi included measurement of Treaty 
obligations and human resource policies. To a,sess the Ministry's effectiveness in their 
relationship with Maori, account needed to be taken of: 
• the incorporation of kaupapa Maori in policy advice 
• Ministerial services 
• information services 
• human resources 
The management objectives were to ensure that all a,pects of organisational 
management were responsive to the needs and aspirations of Maori. 
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Outcome 
It is not clear from reading the report what 
degree of consultation with and 
participation of Maori was intended or 
occurred. Your Health and the Public 
Health contradicted previous policy that 
recommended participation of Maori in the 
development, implementation and review 
of policy. 
It ha, been difficult to ascertain how 
widely accepted and implemented the 
responsiveness plan was across the state 
sector. It appears to currently not be used 






Treaty Framework for North Health 
Regional Authority G Doherty and M 
Durie 
Public Health Commission 
Strategies and recommendations 
This Treaty framework model was described as dual focused as it combined Treaty 
provisions and Treaty principles. The framework provided a comprehensive template to 
assess the development of strategies to achieve gains in Maori health. The three key 
Treaty provisions were each derived from an article of the Treaty. Kawanatang.i is 
from Article one. Tino Rangatiratanga from Article two. The third provision ~s 
oritetanga from article three and guarantees equality and equity between Maori and 
other New Zealand citizens. The three Treaty principles were defined as: 
• partnership, 
• participation 
• active protection. 
The framework endeavoured to bring Maori ways of doing and being within the 
operation of a mainstream organisation. The establishment of joint purchasing 
arran_g_ements with Iwi reflect some success in this approach. 
The Public Health Commission (PHC) was established in June 1993 under the Health 
and Disability Services Act 1993 to improve and protect the public health and to meet 
the Crown's objectives for public health. The Public Health Commission's areas of 
responsibility included: 
• the public health needs of Maori and of special groups. 
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Outcome 
It is not evident whether the wider health 
sector considered or utilised this 
framework. North Health was absorbed 
into the Health Funding Authority 
following the 1996 election. 
Two years later the Public Health 
Commission was disestablished and its 
functions were integrated into the Ministry 






He Matariki: A Strategic Plan for 
Maori Public Health 1994-1995 - The 
Public Health Commission 
The CHI Model - A Culturally 
Appropriate Auditing Model, M Durie 
1994 for the Public Health 
Commission 
Strategies and recommendations 
He Matariki 's six Maori public health goals were developed in consultation and were 
compatible with wider a~pirations of those working in Maori health. They were 
• To promote a social and physical environment which improves and protects 
whanau public health. 
• To improve and protect the health of tamariki. 
• To improve and protect the health of rangatahi. 
• To improve and protect the health of pakeke/matua. 
• To improve and protect the health of kaumatua. 
• To improve Maori health status so in the future Maori will have the opportunity to 
enjoy at lea~t the same level of health a~ non-Maori. 
Each goal had several objectives that assisted the health sector to implement 
appropriate strategies to achieve the best outcome. 
The Public Health Commission acknowledged the place of the Treaty and its 
responsibility to address Maori health inequities, but not the place of Maori in 
determining how and by whom that might happen 
Based on seven themes and for each theme a number of indicators were proposed and 
others could be included. The themes were grouped into three major goal categories: 
• Goal: Maori Development 
Themes: The Treaty of Waitangi. Empowerment 
• Goal: Health Gains For Maori 
Themes: National Standards and Government Obligations, Data and 
Information , Active Involvement 
• Goal: Maori Cultural Values and Beliefs 
Themes: Cultural Safety, Intellectual Property Rights 




He Matariki has been the most specific 
policy document in terms of setting out 
what the health sector needed to do to 
make a difference to Maori health status. It 
assisted the sector by describing the course 
of action required to deliver on the goal. 
By comparison, many other health policies 
have been generic and lacking specific 
detail to aid in translating the policy into 
action. 
In 1995 the Public Health Commission 
was disestablished and its functions were 
integrated into the Ministry of Health and 
Regional Health Authorities. The separate 
Maori public health section of the PHC 
was retained with in the Ministry and had 
six staff in 1997. In the year 2000 the 
number of staff specifically responsible for 
Maori public health is half of a position. It 
appears that the model wa~ not picked up 






Te Raranga Kete - A six question 
framework to assess components of the 
health reform process Te Puni Kokiri 
1994. 
A Maori Policy Analysis Framework 
for the Ministry of Health, Keri 
Lawson Te Aho 1995. 
Strategies and recommendations 
The framework has similarities to the Hauora checklist with the addition of a more 
explicit question on Article Ill responsibilities of the Crown. 
• How does the report assist the Government to improve the health status of Maori 
so that in the future Maori will enjoy at least the same level of health as non-
Maori? 
• What recognition has been made of the factors that affect Maori health status in 
the development of this report? 
• What involvement have Maori had in the development of the report? 
• What ongoing arrangements have been developed for Maori to be involved in the 
further development of this report? 
• How effective is this report in promoting the development and maintenance of 
Maori health initiatives to enable Maori to take responsibility over their own 
health? 
• How effective is the information gathering system used to ensure that Maori 
health status is monitored, and how will this information be used? 
"A way of developing policy that will assist staff in the Ministry of Health to 
incorporate a Maori perspective into their policy work." 
Another example of the use of external Maori consultants to advise on the 




It has been difficult to ascertain whether 
this framework was widely used or 
implemented in the health sector. 
The Te Puni Ko kiri review ( 1997, p6) 
found "only partial ownership ... and 





The National - New Zealand First 
Government Coalition Agreement - a 
softening of the commercial focus of 
CHEs and RHAs 
Strategies and recommendations 
Improvements in Maori health status were identified as priorities. 
In recognition of Government's commitment to improving the status of Maori health, 
increased resources will be made available to provide Maori leadership within the 
health sector and to enable the continuing growth and development of Maori health 
service provision by Maori (National - New Zealand First Coalition Agreement. 1996, 
p. 34, Coalition Agreement) 
The key initiatives of Maori policy relevant to health included: 
• Implement Ka Awatea as amended 
• The development of the four Maori Commissions. including the Maori Health 
Commission, Maori Economic Unit, Maori Education and Maori Employment and 
Training Unit 
• To review the representation (of Maori) on various government bodies (National -
New Zealand First Coalition Agreement, 1996, p35) 
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Outcome 
The National-New Zealand First Coalition 
Agreement health policy encouraged the 
further development of Maori providers. 
The Article Two argument of "by Maori 
for Maori" was supported as it coincided 
with the governments thrust towards 
decreased dependency on the state and the 
encouragement of the development of 





Maori Health Commission 
Strategies and recommendations 
The role of the Maori Health Commission as determined in its Terms of Reference 
required the Commission to: 
• assist the Government in meeting their Strategic Result Area (8) for 1997-2000 by 
making "significant progress towards the development of policies and processes 
that lead towards closing the economic and social gaps between Maori and non-
Maori", 
• operate as "think tanks" by developing initiatives for accelerating Maori 
development in education, health, economic development, and employment and 
training that can be grafted into the mainstream, 
• assess the general progress of Maori in each policy sector, monitor reports of other 
agencies and consider their implications as well as reporting on the progress of our 
own initiatives, 
• coordinate, plan and provide advice to the Minister of Maori Affairs in an 
interconnected and inter generational manner, 
• manage the expectations of Maori communities, relevant sector agencies and the 
public, 
• provide advice and reports to the Minister of Maori Affairs recommending 
changes to policies for Maori development that will contribute to a reduction of 
disparities between Maori and non-Maori. 
The Maori Health Commission identified the priorities in Maori health as: 
• Maori Mental Health 
• Maori participation in the Health Sector 
• Maori integrated care 
• Rationing Systems and their criteria 
• Maori Health Authority 
The Commission explicitly criticised the government for its focus solely on an Article 
3 approach. "Maori health is a priority only insofar as Government is required to act to 




The Maori Health Commission was 
abolished by the incoming Labour -
Alliance government in February 2000 
From the recent policy development outlined in Table 6 above it is clear that the 
Crown and its agencies have been unable to apply a coherent framework to their 
own activities, let alone translate that action into health gain. The Ministry of 
Health has failed to model effective Treaty based relationships, and failed to 
ensure the primacy of the Treaty within its operations. The Health Funding 
Authority was unable to effectively influence mainstream providers in spite of a 
clear Maori health gain policy. Crown health agencies failed to deliver health 
services to Maori in a way that is consistent with the Crown's Treaty 
responsibilities. Relationships that were established with Maori became disrupted 
through sector and agency change. 
At times, Treaty policy has taken a very narrow interpretation. Crown responses 
to the Treaty and Health in the 1990s concentrated to a large extent on historical 
issues, and the process of settling grievances. This is clearest in instructions from 
the National Interim Provider Board and later from CCMAU reminding Crown 
entities of their the obligation to ensure that real estate that they held was 
available to Maori as part of a settlement process, where they looked to dispose of 
such assets ( National Interim Provider Board, 1992 & CCMAU, Statement of 
Owners· Expectations of Crown Health Enterprises, March 1998 ). 
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Who has been responsible for Developing Effective Maori Health 
Policy? 
The health sector reform of 1993 set out clear expectations of the Minister of 
Health in the Health and Disability Services Act 1993. The Minister was obliged 
to give written notice of the Crown's objectives in relation to: 
(a) Health status of the community served by the funder: 
(b) The health outcomes sought to be attained for the community 
served by the funder: 
( c) The health services or disability services, or both, to be funded by 
the funder: 
(d) The terms of access to those services; and the assessment and 
review procedures to be used in determining access to those services or 
such of those services as are specified in the notice: 
( e) The standard of those services: 
(f) The special needs of Maori and other particular communities or 
people for those services (The Health and Disability Services Act 1993, 
Section 8) 
Once the Minister issued the objectives, they were also required to ensure that the 
objectives were met. 
The Minister of Health is responsible to the House of Representatives for -
(a) Monitoring the extent to which -
(i) The purpose of this Act has been achieved; and 
(ii) The objectives of the Crown and the Health Funding 
Authority have been achieved; and 
The performance and exercise of the functions, duties, and powers given 
to him or her by this Act (The Health and Disability Services Act 1993, 
Section 12) 
The Minister of Health's duties were clear. However, the same clarity could not 
be said to prevail in the rest of the sector as is revealed below. 
Reform effects, identities and roles 
Health sector reform of the late 1980s and 1990s had the effect of multiplying and 
reconstructing policy with each change of government. As has previously been 
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noted, health structures were also regularly and periodically substantially 
changed. This changed the identities of various Crown agencies, and their roles, 
sometimes in more than subtle ways as displayed in Table 7and Table 8 below. 
Table 7: Health Entities 1983 -1997 
Entity Description Period of 
operation 
Hospital Board: 28 entities consisting of a wholly locally 1885 to 1989, 
elected Board of community representatives depending on 
responsible for hospital services in its date of 
electoral area. replacement by 
AHB 
Department of The Government's chief policy adviser on Up to 1993 
Health health and provider of public (population) 
health services 
AHB-Area 14 distinct entities charged by the 1986- 1993. 
Health Board Government with both elected and appointed 
representatives with the responsibility for all 
health service delivery and health promotion 
within their defined geographic areas. 
NIPB - National The Central Government agency created to 1991 - 1993. 
Interim Provider oversee the transition from Area Health 
Board: Boards into the split entities of Regional 
Health Authorities and Crown Health 
Enterprises. 
PHC-Public The funder of public health services (that is, 1993 - 1995 
Health population-based health services such as anti-
Commission: smoking initiatives), previously funded by the 
Department of Health. Services rolled into the 
Regional Health Authorities in 1995. 
RHA - Regional Four health funding bodies established by the 1993 - 1997. 
Health Authorities Government, with appointed Boards, to fund 
the health needs of their regions, North, 
Midland, Central, and Southern. 
CHE-Crown 23 distinct State Owned Enterprises (usually 1993 - 1998. 
Health Enterprise based around one or more hospitals) with 
Boards solely appointed by the government, 
charged with providing health services to a 
local population, subsequently known as 
HHSs, Hospital and Health Services. 
CCMAU - Crown The arm of the government that acted as the 1993-2000 
Company owner's agent in respect of Crown Health 
Monitoring and Enterprises. It monitored the CHEs · 
Advisory Unit performance on behalf of the shareholding 
Ministers, and was an arm of Treasury. It was 
funded from the appropriations of those areas 
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of government service provision it was active 
in monitoring, with health making up 
approximately 50% of its revenue stream. 
Predecessors include CHEEU (Crown Health 
Enterprise Establishment Unit) and CHEMU 
(Crown Health Enterprise Monitoring Unit). 
MOH - Ministry The replacement of the Department of Health 1993 - present. 
of Health: as the Government's chief policy adviser on 
health issues. 
Maori Health One of four Maori Commissions established 1996 - 1999 
Commission: as a result of the 1996 National-New Zealand 
First Coalition agreement to address issues of 
Maori inequity. 
MHC- Mental A commission established subsequent to the 1996 - present 
Health second Mason Enquiry into Mental Health 
Commission: Services, to oversee the impact of additional 
government funding of mental health 
services. 
HFA-Health The single national successor to the Regional 1998-2000. 
Funding Authority Health Authorities as Health Funder. It 
replaced the Transitional Health Authority, 
which in tum had replaced the four Regional 
Health Authorities. 
HHS - Hospital The replacement name for CHEs. 23 in 1998-2000. 
and Health number, with 2 CHEs merging, and the 
Services formation of a national Blood Service HHS 
NGO-Non Usually meaning a not for profit health or Significant 
Government disability support service provider. factor from 
Onrnnisation: 1992 to present 
The result of the above ongoing changes has included community confusion over 
which section of the health sector is responsible for what, and confused 
accountability and control structures within the sector (Blank in Miller, 1997). 
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Table 8: Summary of Health Sector Organisations 
Year of Local Regional National authority/ 
Creation authority accountability 
Pre 1986 Hospital Board, No Entity Department of Health 




1993 Crown Health Regional Health Ministry of Health and 
Enterprise Authority (RHA) Public Health 
Commission (PHC) 
1995 Crown Health RHAs assume Ministry of Health 
Enterprise PHC role 
1997 Crown Health Transitional Ministry of Health 
Enterprise Health Authority 
1998 Health and Hospital Health Funding Ministry of Health 
Services Authority Maori Health 
Commission 
Fragmentation 
Who leads and sets the strategies? 
Health and Disability policy development takes place within the framework of 
New Zealand's parliamentary democracy, led by the government of the day. 
Many state agencies, particularly those with coordinating functions across state 
sector boundaries, influence, guide and limit both the development and 
implementation of such policy. The State Services Commission, the Treasury and 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet are the three central agencies in the 
New Zealand Public Service for providing leadership, coordination, and advice on 
the management of the State sector. 
The recent change within the health sector has often concentrated on structural 
reform. These three agencies mentioned above can have a pivotal effect on 
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structural reform, and on the tension between achieving government policy 
outcomes and the cost of doing so. The leaders in Maori health and disability 
policy development must therefore be seen within the constraints that can be 
imposed by these central agencies. While the agencies have not remained 
consistent throughout the reform period under study, many of the functions have 
persisted, though in differing guises. 
Policy Development - The Leaders 
The government of the day is the key determiner of policy, as it operates with the 
electoral mandate to set the country's direction and governance. Three agencies, 
the Ministry of Health, the Health Funding Authority ( 1998 - 2000, now 
disbanded) and Te Puni Kokiri have played key roles in developing health and 
disability policy in respect of Maori during the period of this study. 
The Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health (and its predecessor the Department) has remained the 
principal adviser to the Minister of Health and to the Government on all health 
and disability matters including those pertaining to Maori throughout the period 
1983 - 1997 . The role of the Ministry of Health has remained consistently to: 
• provide the Minister of Health and the Government with advice 
on policy for health and disability support services and on 
health implications of policies in other sectors; 
• act as the Minister of Health's agent for administering public 
funding to the sector, negotiate funding agreements with 
purchasers and manage their performance; 
• protect, promote and improve the public health, and report 
annually on the state of the public health; 
• monitor the overall performance of the sector; 
• administer health sector legislation and regulations; 
• collect and disseminate national health information; and 
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• provide Ministerial and parliamentary information and support 
services (Te Puni Kokiri, 1997, pl4) 
The Ministry of Health's role applies to the wide variety of providers and 
purchasers in the sector, be they Crown health entities, non-government 
organisations and private sector organisations. 
Health Funding Authority (and its predecessors) 
The Health Funding Authority (HF A) was formally established in 1998 as the 
centralised replacement body of the previous four Regional Health Authorities. 
The primary role of the HF A was that of purchasing services and ergo policy 
implementation. There is no doubt that it played an important role in policy 
development as well, as witness for example the Maori Health Policy attached in 
Appendix 2 (HFA, 1998). The HFA's objectives were: 
• To promote the personal health of people 
• To promote the care or support for those in need of personal 
health services or disability services 
• To promote the independence of people with disabilities 
• To meet the Crown's objectives notified to it under section 8 of 
the Act--- in accordance with, and to the extent enabled by, its 
funding agreement (Health and Disability Services Act 1993. Section 10). 
Its functions were: 
• To monitor the need for public health services, personal health 
services and disability services of the people who are described 
for this purpose in its funding agreement 
• To purchase public health services, personal health services and 
disability services for those people, by means of purchase 
agreements or otherwise 
• To monitor the performance of purchase agreements or other 
arrangements by persons with whom it has entered into such 
agreements or arrangements 
• Such other functions as it is for the time being: 
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• Given by or under any enactment; 
• Authorised to perform by the Minister, by written notice to the 
authority after consultation with the authority (Health and 
Disability Services Act 1993, Section 33, as amended in 1995), 
The Health Funding Authority was itself later "morphed" and integrated with the 
Ministry of Health under the reforms of the incoming Labour led coalition 
government in 2000. 
Te Puni Kokiri 
Te Puni Kokiri was established under the Ministry of Maori Development Act 
1991. Its responsibilities under that Act included: 
• Promoting increases in the levels of achievement attained by Maori with 
respect to---
1. Education 
2. Training and employment 
3. Health 
4. Economic resource development 
• Monitoring, and liasing with, each department and agency that provides or has 
a responsibility to provide services to or for Maori for the purpose of ensuring 
the adequacy of those services. 
The Act specifically noted that the responsibilities of Te Puni Kokiri were not 
limited to the provision of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
The role of Te Puni Kokiri was to provide high-quality policy advice on the 
Crown's relationship with iwi, hapii and Maori and on the Government's 
objectives, interests and obligations relating to Maori. 
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Strategic leadership advice includes: 
• strategic policy advice to the Government on Maori 
development issues and on the Crown's ongoing relationships 
with iwi, hapil and Maori; 
• monitoring the performance of mainstream government 
departments to assess the impact on Maori of the policies they 
develop and administer, and give advice to departments on the 
design and development of monitoring systems for this 
purpose; 
• facilitating consultation between the Crown, its agencies, and 
iwi, hapil and Maori, on policies affecting Maori, and the 
development of the relationship between the Crown and Maori; 
• informing Maori that mainstream departments are responsible 
for designing and delivering policies, which meet their 
circumstances (Te Puni Kokiri, Post Election Briefing, 1999, 
pll) 
Te Puni Kokiri must also provide advice on sectoral issues, as follows: 
• alongside the principal mainstream departments, provide advice 
on the design and implementation of policy as it affects Maori. 
This covers the four main areas of education, training and 
employment, health and economic resource development, 
including advising on inter-sectoral issues; 
• comment on and contribute advice on other policies developed 
by mainstream departments that will satisfy government 
objectives in respect of Maori; 
• monitor and analyse outcomes and trends in the areas of 
importance to Maori development, which are indicated in the 
Ministry of Maori Development Act 1991. Te Puni Kokiri is to 
communicate these results to iwi, hapil and Maori, and to work 
with other departments to develop and implement systems for 
improved performance; 
• facilitate consultation between the Crown, its agencies, and iwi, 
hapil and Maori on sector-specific policies and practices (Te 
Puni Kokiri, Post Election Briefing, 1999, pl 1). 
In respect of local intervention and risk management, Te Puni Kokiri should: 
• provide early warnings of local, discrete, issues that are likely 
to have a significant impact on the Crown-Maori relationship 
and, where Ministers consider appropriate, move to resolve the 
issues; 
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• facilitate access, at a local level, by Maori to mainstream 
service delivery agencies (Te Puni Kokiri, Post Election 
Briefing, 1999, pl 1) 
Policy Implementation - The Providers of Health Services 
Health and Hospital Services 
Health and Hospital Services were originally established as Crown Health 
Enterprises under the Health and Disability Act 1993. They assumed the HHS title 
after an amendment to that act in 1998. Their objectives were to: 
• Provide health services or disability services, or both 
• Assist in meeting the Crown's objectives under section 8 of this 
Act by providing such services in accordance with its statement 
of intent and any purchase agreement entered into by it--- while 
operating as a successful and efficient business 
• To exhibit a sense of social responsibility by having regard to 
the interests of the community in which it operates 
• To uphold the ethical standards generally expected of providers 
of health services or disability services, or both, as the case 
maybe 
• To be a good employer 
• To be as successful and efficient as comparable businesses that 
are not owned by the Crown (Health And Disability Services 
Act 1993) 
The latter objective was amended to requiring HHSs to operate in a business like 
manner, said amendment being widely seen as removing the profit motive as a 
driver of HHSs. 
In the latest reforms ( 1999-2000), HHSs have become the base organisations from 
which the new District Health Boards have been created. They have become the 
"provider arm" of the DHBs. 
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NGOs and Maori Providers 
One of the results of the 1993 Health sector reforms was a significant broadening 
of the non-government owned health providers. Many agencies that were 
previously voluntary or charitable entered funding contracts and have since 
become a significant part of the sector in their own right. General practitioners 
have grouped together into, in some instances, quite sizeable Independent 
Practitioner Associations. Maori health providers have significantly increased in 
number, as noted elsewhere. 
Who Drives Policy Consistency? Inter-sectoral Structures and 
Relationships 
Overview 
Many central agencies have had an influence on aspects of health policy within 
the period of this study. Their response to Maori health issues and concerns and to 
the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in health is highly variable. Margaret Wilson, 
Associate Justice Minister, has been reported as describing the relationship 
between the Crown and Maori as "highly shambolic, leaving the government open 
to legal action. She says that government agencies' inconsistent approach to 
Maori, lack of expertise, and focus on past wrongs may give rise to a new batch of 
grievances (Sunday Star Times, May 28, 2000, p2)". The central agencies' 
response to Maori health policy exemplifies this concern. 
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The Ministry of Health 
From 1993 onwards the Ministry of Health believed that its policies became 
effective through the actions of the Health Funding Authority, in contracting for 
services to meet needs and improve health status. The onus to consult the 
community rested with the Health Funding Authority in terms of the health 
legislation. The role of Te Kete Hauora, the Maori advisory unit within the 
Ministry of Health, exemplified the development of policy in a pure environment, 
that is an environment with few linkages to the sector or consumers, largely 
limited to reference groups, specific issues focused hui, and personal networks, 
divorced from the effects of that policy on the health outcomes affecting Maori. 
Te Kete Hauora 
Te Kete Hauora was the Maori Health Group in the Ministry of Health formed in 
1993 as a catalyst to enhance the way the Ministry and the health sector 
responded to Maori health needs. Te Kete Hauora was to be responsible for 
providing Maori health policy advice to the health sector through the development 
of strategic policy analysis and advice. As a result of the Maori Health Review 
( 1993) conducted by Mason Durie and Hekia Parata the previously integrated 
Maori health section was established as a separate group dedicated to Maori 
health policy and led by a Deputy Director-General, Maori Health. 
The role of Te Kete Hauora has been described as maintaining a strategic focus on 
Maori health. This included providing advice to Government, to ensure the 
Ministry of Health meets its Treaty of Waitangi obligations to improve Maori 
health, the development of new policy and analysing key Ministry proposals. 
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Despite the 1999/2000 reforms and restructuring of the health sector Te Kete 
Hauora continues to function. 
Performance Management Branch: MOH 
Within the Ministry of Health, the Performance Management Branch (PMB) had 
the role of ensuring that the funder (HFA) delivered to the Minister and Ministry 
on the undertakings in its funding agreement. Those undertakings were often 
measured in terms of outputs (such as needs assessment, rationing, contracting, 
and contract-monitoring) (HFA Accountability Arrangements, Ministry of 
Health, July 1998). The PMB did not have a responsibility for Maori health 
outcome. At the time of this research interview in mid 2000, only one-quarter of a 
full time position was allocated to the Maori health accountability arrangements 
within the Performance and Monitoring Branch's overall brief. Performance was 
set and determined on the basis of contractual requirements rather than improved 
health outcomes. Audit and monitoring processes carried with them few sanctions 
and even fewer rewards. For example, the Ministry of Health report entitled 
Health Funding Authority Performance Report Quarter Three 1999/2000 (June 
2000) concluded that the HF A did not achieve 7 out of 50 performance measures. 
In the area of Maori Provider Development, which the Ministry considered "still 
considerably behind schedule " the sanction was to "monitor progress in this area 
closely" (MOH,2000, p vii). 
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Sector perception of the Ministry of Health13 
Interviews conducted nationally in 2000 with a wide range of sector participants, 
both Maori and non-Maori, provided a series of common themes, illustrating the 
sector's perceptions of the Ministry of Health. 
• The health reforms of the 1990s provided opportunities for leadership and the 
modelling of a Treaty partnership in action. However, this opportunity appears 
to have been lost. 
• Provider perception is that their Maori health initiatives had little to do with 
MOH policy or leadership. 
• Their experience was that the Ministry of Health worked in isolation, did not 
"close the loop", and that they had or made minimal opportunity to establish 
the effect of their policy at local level. 
• The Ministry of Health has never conducted a national review of Maori health 
status 
• "Policy occurs in a vacuum" 
• "The distance of policy from the coal face, not a lot of bearing on what we do. 
Health policy is not a living document by the time it gets to the ground." 
The Deputy Director General of Maori Health has recently been reported as 
stating that the Government's Maori Health Policy is the document Whaia te Ora 
mote Iwi, (Ria Earp, Brief of Evidence, Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 692 Hearing, 
W 16, 9 July 1999), published in 1992. Quite clearly, sector perception does not 
see this as relevant or current policy, and sees a failure on the part of the Ministry 
of Health to lead effectively in Maori health. Further discussion on these issues 
follows later in this chapter in the section entitled Crown Owned Entities -
Reflections on the Sector starting page 273. 
13 Themes arising from the interviews conducted with sector participants and agencies as detailed in the bibliography 
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Health Funding Authority (and its predecessors) 
The Health Funding Authority on its formation in 1998 had inherited four 
different approaches to Maori health from the four Regional Health Authorities. It 
had supported improved Maori health outcomes through continuing the 
development of Maori health providers and the establishment of Treaty 
relationships. More latterly, it had begun the process of focusing on Maori health 
gain through mainstream health service organisations. The HF A senior staff 
interviewed in the course of this research acknowledged that the HF A's ability to 
use contracting processes to deliver improved services to Maori was significantly 
limited by wider political considerations concerning large mainstream health 
providers. 
The Health Funding Authority developed a Maori health policy specific to their 
role as purchasers in 1998. The purpose of the policy was "to identify and 
implement a proactive HF A response to Maori health gain issues and 
development." The policy separated the ownership (internal) and performance 
(external) issues (see Appendix 2: Health Funding Authority Maori Health 
Policy). The Health Funding Authority had implemented a matrix organisation, 
where the Maori Health Group actively collaborated with the service operating 
groups to inform funding policy. Since 1999, the HFA required the providers with 
which it contracted to develop Maori health plans. As the funder, the HFA had a 
very direct capacity to influence the growth of new Maori health approaches, and 
change in the delivery of existing services. One issue that is critical in improving 
Maori health is the number and adequacy of the Maori health workforce. The 
Page 257 
HFA, through its Clinical Training Agency, was in a position to influence 
workforce development. 
Sector perceptioll of the Health Fullding Authority14 
Interviews conducted nationally in 2000 for this research on the topic of the 
development and effectiveness of Maori Health policy, with a wide range of 
sector participants, both Maori and non-Maori, provided a series of common 
themes, illustrating the sector's perceptions of the Health Funding Authority. 
• No Maori were included in the initial appointments to the Board of the 
Transitional Health Authority. The subsequent appointment of Wayne 
McLean required ministerial intervention. 
• The HFA was perceived as having failed to use the contracting processes to 
effectively drive improved Maori health outcomes 
• No HHS has ever had any of its funding withheld for failure to deliver 
effective health outcomes to Maori, even where the HFA (or predecessor) had 
known that the HHS was in breach of the Treaty. 
• Personal relationships dominated the contracting for Maori providers 
• All HF A and RHA contracts had not consistently held Treaty specific 
requirements until the 1999/00 financial year 
• Continual risk of loss of institutional memory and sector gains through 
restructuring. 
• Loss of consistent information as the health sector undergoes frequent changes 
• Consultation is at times perceived as inadequate or lacking, and has led to 
perceived disadvantage for some Maori providers 
• Staff of provider organisations interviewed viewed Maori staff and the Maori 
health group as having influence across the whole organisation 
• Some providers are clearly out of favour in spite of the responsiveness of their 
organisation to meet the needs of Maori. 
• The dominance of the I wi model has created barriers in some areas for urban 
and pan tribal initiatives 
• Iwi providers have felt that they have not fitted the HFA Maori health group 
model and therefore been disadvantaged 
• Policy (all agencies) can lead to improved opportunities for Maori staff within 
mainstream providers to improve health service delivery to Maori. 
14 Themes arising from the interviews conducted with sector panicipants and agencies as detailed in the bibliography 
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Sector participants interviewed for this research perceived both the Ministry of 
Health and the Health Funding Authority as lacking the level of leadership the 
sector expected of these agencies in respect of Maori Health. 
Te Puni Kokiri 
Given the role of Te Puni Kokiri (TPK) as outlined in legislation, it might be 
expected that the monitoring of Crown entities (including Hospital and Health 
Services), their Treaty compliance and contribution to Maori health gain was 
TPK's responsibility. This was not so. Te Puni Kokiri did not take a monitoring 
role at the local or regional level. Their focus was at the central decision-making 
level. The agency review process did not look at health provider level 
performance but was process focused. They were not involved in the monitoring 
of Hospital and Health Services. 
In the Ministry of Maori Development Act 1991, Te Puni Kokiri is 
required to "monitor, and liaise with, each department and agency that 
provides or has a responsibility to provide services to, or for, Maori for the 
purpose of ensuring the adequacy of those services". This has led the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Branch to focus on reviewing the policy 
advice, purchasing processes and decision-making processes in the public 
sector. 
CCMAU is responsible for monitoring HHS on behalf of the Crown, as 
owner of those companies (Lisa Davies, Letter to author - Clarification of 
Health Services Monitoring Roles, Te Puni Kokiri, Wellington, 1999) 
The Memorandum of Understanding between Te Puni Kokiri and the Ministry of 
Health ( unpublished internal memorandum, 1998) was interesting in respect of 
the limitations that it imposed on Te Puni Kokiri. Te Puni Kokiri was constrained 
by the MOU from developing systems outside the Ministry of Health's existing 
monitoring and public accountability activities that could impose additional, or 
duplicate existing, monitoring systems or costs within either the Ministry of 
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Health or the Health Funding Authority, without prior consultation with the 
Ministry of Health. 
There was no agreed framework underpinning the collective working 
relationships between the three key agencies, MOH, HF A and TPK. While a 
formal framework of relationships and accountabilities existed, particularly with 
reference to appropriations, there was little that provided for day to day 
mechanisms promoting common goals with respect to Maori health outcomes. 
Each of the agencies had an opportunity for leadership within the sector, yet they 
appear to have had no capacity to collaborate effectively on that leadership. The 
Ministry of Health required the Health Funding Authority to use the funding and 
contracting process to drive Maori health gain through access and health outcome 
targets and service expectations in the Funding Agreement. Te Puni Kokiri, which 
had a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Health, evaluated the 
Ministry of Health on the effectiveness of its policy activities. Their 1997 review 
of the Minstry of Health is discussed in detail in the following section. 
What has the Crown's Health Sector Performance Been? 
How well has the Crown done as Leader? 
It is instructive to consider how well the Crown views itself as having done in 
respect of Maori health. The Ministry of Health and its predecessor the 
Department have been consistently criticised over the decade of the 1990s (Te 
Ara Ahu Whakamua, 1994 and Ria Earp cross examination of evidence for the 
Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 
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1999, pl22-132). Two separate examples of this criticism are given, on behalf of 
two Crown entities, and an external standard for performance is also given, that of 
the Controller and Auditor General's office. The criticisms reflect on the lack of 
leadership exercised by the Ministry in improving Maori health and driving Maori 
health policy. The examples demonstrate that the Crown has failed its own 
accountability tests let alone its accountability to Maori as a partner under the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
Maori Health Review - Department of Health, 1993 (Parata & Durie) 
In 1993 the Department of Health was reviewed on how it could meet the 
Government's Maori health objectives. The review, an assessment of the 
Department of Health's ability to be responsive to Maori health, was prompted for 
several reasons. All the staff in the existing Maori Health Unit had resigned and 
decisions about further appointments needed to be made. The future role of the 
unit, its functions and fit in the new Ministry of Health structure needed to be 
considered. The review was seen as timely by the Ministry of Health in order for 
it to meet the new legislative requirements giving effect to the changes in the 
health sector in the early 1990s. 
The Government's principal Maori health objective of that time was that: The 
Crown will seek to improve Maori health status so in the future Maori will have 
the same opportunity to enjoy at least the same level of health as non-Maori 
(Policy Guidelines for Regional Health Authorities, 1995/1996) .. The expectation 
was that the Department of Health as the Government's principal adviser and 
agent in the health sector would be delivering on the objectives. The review found 
that Maori health was not a high priority in its corporate policies or practices. 
Page 261 
The review demonstrated that the Department of Health needed to take immediate 
action and be more proactive. 
"the Department of Health has the principal responsibility for delivering 
on the Government's Maori health objectives, and for monitoring and 
reporting upon the performance of the total health sector in this regard. 
The Department does not, at present, have the capacity to do this." 
"there is no provision within the various resource allocation processes that 
ensures that Maori health gains are given priority, or indeed, are identified 
at all." 
"the Department needs to take urgent, substantial, and comprehensive 
action to resolve this situation. A critical mass of Maori staff, and 
expertise in Maori analysis and advice needs to be developed, along with a 
robust and serious role for Maori participation in the achievement of 
Maori health gains (Para ta & Durie, 1993, p 15 )". 
The review again highlighted issues (see Table 6: Selected Milestones in the 
Development of Health Policy to Improve Maori Health) that had been raised five 
years previously in Te Urupare Rangapu, (Dept. of Maori Affairs, 1988); poor 
recruitment and retention of Maori staff in the state sector, little participation of 
Maori in decision making, unclear accountability of Crown agencies and their 
officials, and the inability of the mainstream to deliver to Maori. Issues of 
leadership were raised in the review as being quite critical for the Department. 
They needed to lead the sector given their national role. 
While the other health agencies have their own statutory obligations, 
national coordination and a national overview will be of critical 
importance. In the absence of that wider context, and without strong 
leadership at a national level, goals for Maori health run the risk of being 
reduced to a series of pragmatic objectives based primarily on the 
perspective of the organisation involved but without any coherence or 
links to the wider aims of Maori development. The elaboration of a 
national picture must be the responsibility of the Department of Health. 
This is consistent with the vision of the Department to, among other 
things, 11 provide leadership within the health sector. We have a national 
role and will be seeking to enhance this 11 (Para ta & Durie, 1993, p 15) 
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Leadership had implications for the organisational structure within the 
Department. The review found that responsibility for Maori health appeared to 
have been relegated consistently to the Maori Health Policy Section and was not 
perceived as a department wide responsibility. 
The review looked at the functions and roles of the organisation and where Maori 
were located. Recommendations were made on the necessity of senior roles of 
leadership for Maori within the organisation as well as increasing the numbers of 
core Maori staff. It also recommended a Maori graduate recruitment programme 
to increase the number of core staff in the Department of Health. 
Te Puni Kokiri, Review of the Ministry of Health Service Delivery to Maori, 
1997. 
In 1997 the Ministry of Maori Development conducted a review of the Ministry of 
Health's internal processes for the provision of services to Maori. The review 
contrasted the Ministry of Health· s internal processes with those the Ministry of 
Maori Development had developed for the wider state sector. 
The 1993 review of Parata and Durie of the Department of Health was revisited. 
Progress identified since the 1993 review included the establishment of the 
strategic Maori Health Group (Te Kete Hauora) and identifying Maori health as a 
health gain priority. Despite improvements fundamental issues still needed to be 
addressed in the Ministry's Article Three responsibilities to Maori and their ability 
to deliver on those. 
"(the Ministry has) not applied the various Maori health frameworks 
throughout its operations" 
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"the Ministry of Health as a whole has yet to accept full responsibility for 
promoting improved Maori health outcomes" (Te Puni Kokiri. 1997). 
The issues raised in the 1993 review of wider ownership of Maori health gains 
throughout the Department were revisited and commented on. Staff in the 
Ministry appeared to be still reliant on the Maori health policy analysts to achieve 
gains. This reliance interfered with the Maori Health Policy analyst's ability to 
focus on their strategic role as they were frequently called on to fulfil an 
operational role. 
The key finding of the Ministry of Maori Development ( 1997) review was; " .... 
The Ministry of Health has yet to fully implement its strategies and frameworks 
for promoting Maori health gains". Nine further points were made as to how the 
Ministry of Health could improve the Ministry's service provision for Maori. 
While some of the issues were new, others had been raised in the 1993 review. 
The Ministry of Health was found to have: 
• not applied the various Maori health frameworks throughout its operations. 
The Ministry of Health was currently refining its policy development process 
to include Maori health frameworks; 
• a need to promote greater involvement by non-Maori staff in considering 
Maori health issues to reduce the reliance on Maori health policy analysts; 
• not clearly communicated internally the role of Te Kete Hauora. Clarification 
of Te Kete Hauora's role may provide an opportunity for the Ministry of 
Health to better support and improve the effectiveness of Te Kete Hauora (Te 
Puni Kokiri, 1997). 
The review clearly found shortcomings in the Ministry's ability to adequately 
prioritise Maori health and raised questions on their commitment to Maori health. 
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In 1994, the Ministry of Health had developed a responsiveness plan, Te Tatai 
Urupare ki te Maori o te Manatu Hauora. The aim of the plan was to make the 
Ministry of Health the role model of a responsive organisation for the health 
sector. The findings of the Te Puni Kokiri review suggested this had not been 
achieved. 
The review demonstrated the contradictions within both the state sector and health 
sector. While Maori health may be a stated priority of the government of the day 
the Ministry demonstrated an inconsistent understanding of its Article Three 
responsibilities. 
Report of The Controller and Auditor General, 1998. 
In 1998 a report was released by the Controller and Auditor General's office, one 
chapter of which examined the Government's policy in relation to Maori and 
reviewed Public Sector Organisation (PSO) performance and progress in 
achieving the policy expectations. The key feature of the policy in relation to 
Maori was: " that improving outcomes for Maori is the collective responsibility of 
the state sector. This emphasises the need for PSOs to be responsive to Maori" 
(Controller and Auditor General, 1998, p76) 
The report included an audit model that had been developed after consultation 
with Te Puni Kokiri, the State Services Commission, the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, and the Treasury. Processes were identified that were 
expected that a PSO would follow when preparing outputs which would be 
effective for Maori. These were; strategy, policy advice and service delivery, 
human resources, structure, and working environment. 
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The audit model provided a PSO with the opportunity for self-evaluation of their 
management processes to improve their service provision for Maori. 
The report outlined the Auditor General's expectations of the public sector and its 
ability to deliver effective outputs for Maori. 
"We expect that a PSO's strategic planning process would: 
• Take account of the Treaty of Waitangi, and in particular the 
Crown· s position on Treaty issues 
• Consider how to contribute to the Government's strategic goals 
with respect to Maori 
• Identify potential Treaty issues 
• Involve Maori as appropriate 
• Require coordination and cooperation with other organisations 
delivering related outputs to for Maori 
• Include objectives in relation to Maori, which translate into 
operational objectives and outputs to fulfil the government's 
strategic goals with respect to Maori 
• Produce performance measures to assess progress towards 
strategic goals, objectives and outputs, and changes in 
outcomes for Maori 
• Review and identify how to improve Maori-related capability 
and outcomes for Maori." (Controller and Auditor general, 
1998,p80) 
For the public sector to be responsive and meet the objectives the report outlined 
several factors that needed to be considered including: 
Government's Strategic Goals -
The strategic planning process requires a PSO to consider a range of 
influences on its work. For example: 
• Cabinet decisions on Te Puni Kokiri's medium to long-term 
role 
• Compliance with legislative requirements such as section 
56(2)(d) of the State Sector Act 1988and sections 6(e) and 8 of 
the Resource Management Act 1991 
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• Case law relating to the Crown's responsibilities under the 
Treaty of Waitangi 
• The reports and findings of the Waitangi Tribunal ... and the 
Government's response 
• Government policy in respect of the Treaty and associated 
issues 
• Advise from Te Puni Kokiri as a monitoring and advisory 
agency 
• Guidelines produced by the State Services Commission such as 
"Towards Responsiveness" and Partnership Dialogue." 
• Expectations of iwi and pan-tribal groups 
• Maori demographics and future trends ... 
• Potential future scenarios for Maori in New Zealand. 
Identifying Potential Treaty Issues: 
A PSO should consider how its role and functions relate to the Crown's 
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi, and how the PSO could 
contribute to meeting those obligations. For example, it needs to consider 
whether its activities might affect rangatiratanga (control) over resources 
and taonga (Article Two) or influence the degree of quality of access by 
Maori to services, which affect equity of outcomes (Article Three). 
A PSO also needs to reflect accurately the collective Crown position on 
these matters. 
Involving Maori in the Planning Process; 
A PSO might need to involve Maori to test the assumptions and priorities 
in the strategic planning process. For example, a PSO might draw on the 
views of a previous consultative hui or it might build long-term 
relationships with people who can represent Maori perspectives. 
The strategic planning process might also allow for input from Te Puni 
Kokiri, which has significant relationships with all departments and 
provides advice in the areas of most concern - such as justice, education, 
health, and employment (Controller and Auditor general, 1998, p80,81) 
The report recognised that the strategy of a PSO needed to be translated into 
action plans and recommended plans should include: 
• Objectives for recruiting Maori. 
• Support for Maori employees. 
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• Skills relevant to understanding Maori society and values. 
• Procedures to take account of Maori perspectives. 
• Assurance about compliance with legislation, case law and best 
practice, in relation to Maori (Controller and Auditor General, 
1998, p82) 
The report provided clarity on what the responsibilities and expectations are on 
the state sector. The Government objectives were outlined together with how 
these could be incorporated into organisational strategic plans. Public Sector 
Organisations had a responsibility to meet Government objectives and Treaty 
principles and this was explicitly stated. 
The report provided a detailed framework so that an organisation could implement 
the strategy to ensure it was as responsive to Maori as possible. If an organisation 
could implement the framework then this would actively contribute to the Crown 
meeting Article Three responsibilities. The report clearly recognised the Treaty 
responsibilities on the Crown and attempted to provide a cohesive approach for 
the entire state sector to ensure consistency. 
The Ministry of Health since 1998, however, has given no indication that it or any 
other Crown Owned Health entity has audited itself against the processes spelt out 
in the Auditor General's report. Clearly, the examples given in other parts of this 
section indicate that such an audit carried out now would be unlikely to produce 
consistently positive results. 
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How well has the Crown done as Owner? 
The Crown as Owner: CCMAU 
Crown Company Monitoring and Advisory Unit (CCMAU) 
CCMAU was established in 1993 to provide the Government with information on 
the performance of a range of Crown companies (HHSs, Crown Research 
Institutes, and State Owned Enterprises), as well as advice on how to maximise 
the benefit of the Crown's ownership of those companies. 
CCMAU described their role as being "to advise shareholding Ministers on the 
balance between public policy objectives and efficiency objectives, and identify 
trade-offs between them" (CCMAU, 1999, p8). Their core objective as stated was 
"to provide advice that protects and enhances the value of Crown companies" 
(CCMAU, 1999, p3). 
The ownership relationship between the Crown and Health and Hospital Services 
sat with two Ministers, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Health, and 
was exercised through CCMAU. The accountabilities and reporting relationships 
were highly complex. CCMAU described itself as an independent unit 
administratively attached to the Treasury. 
CCMAU focused on 
• The formation, structure, investment and continued ownership of individual 
companies 
• Business strategy and the associated risks and opportunities 
• Ensuring the most qualified directors were recommended for appointment 
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• Performance, in absolute terms against objectives and relative performance 
against benchmarked companies 
• The impact of government policy and regulation of individual companies or 
groups of companies 
• Innovation best practice and continuity of services 
CCMAU set out the range of strategies to influence the health sector available to 
the incoming 1996 Government as follows: 
• Setting the total level of health funding 
• Determining how and at what level rationing will occur 
• Introducing competition through allowing multiple purchasing 
• Legislating change or negotiating protocols (CCMAU, 1996, 
p9) 
Direct influence on CHEs could be exerted through: 
• Appointments of Chairs and Boards of CHEs 
• Setting performance targets 
• Removing non-performing Boards, allowing mergers, 
takeovers etc 
• Establishing pressure through targets 
• Reporting requirements 
• Meeting or writing concerning performance 
• Disallowing borrowing 
• Encouraging benchmarking 
• Advocacy, including highlighting successes 
• Publicly explaining poor performance and any remedial action 
taken (CCMAU, 1996, p9, 10) 
CCMAU was the entity that carried out these activities on behalf of the Ministers. 
The Crown established its expectations of its business entities through annual 
statements of owner's expectations. Those formed the matching half of the 
accountability framework to the CHE/HHS annual statement of intent. 
Throughout most of the 1990s, the SOE documents to CHEs and HHSs have 
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contained little or no reference to Maori health gain as a government priority, or 
to the special relationship of Maori with the Crown as based on the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Those few references to Maori, and Maori health that existed, were of a 
relatively marginal nature. For example, the March 1998 Statement required 
Boards of CHEs: 
In disposing of surplus facilities, ... ensure that you comply with the 
surplus asset disposal requirements, including; 
• the relevant protection mechanism which addresses the Crown's 
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi, and good governance 
over Maori sites of significance 
It further noted that CHEs were also required by the Health and Disability 
Services Act ( 1993) to: 
• assist in meeting the Crown's objectives under the Act, which 
include the special needs of Maori for health and disability 
services. 
This change appeared to reflect the government policy changes brought about as a 
result of the 1996 National-New Zealand First Government Coalition agreement, 
and specifically the advice to the government on implementing that policy 
(Steering Group, Ministers of Health, 1997, p54). 
The monitoring role of CCMAU was limited to ensuring that the relevant health 
entities were fit to carry out whatever function they were required to do by 
contract together with the limited monitoring of other numerical or fiscal criteria. 
CCMAU was not required to monitor the actual health output of any Crown 
entity. CCMAU has no formal or indeed statutory role in the health system in any 
event. 
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Q. Does CCMAU have a role in monitoring -I think you call it, the 
key accountability documents, which you've set out in paragraph 17 of 
your evidence. Does CCMAU have a role in monitoring that those key 
accountability documents properly address Maori Health needs? 
A. Not in relation to these particular documents, but I will answer the 
question in relation to the documents that -
Q. So, just -yeah, just in relation to these particular documents? 
A. In relation to these particular ones, no. The Ministry would be 
responsible for 17 .1 through 3. The financial statements, annual reports, 
are subject to Audit Office scrutiny. Naturally, we'd be aware of these 
documents; we don't formally monitor the documents (Chris Clark 
evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, 
Waitangi Tribunal July 29 1999, transcript p32) 
For the period of the study there were no arrangements by CCMAU to include 
Treaty obligations within the ownership expectations imposed on Crown Health 
providers by the Crown. It was not until 1999 that the Maori Health Commission 
developed policy with CCMAU to include Treaty-based obligations in the annual 
set of expectations. The 1999 Statement of Expectations from the Shareholding 
Ministers referred for the first time to principal objectives and performance 
expectations of HHSs for Maori health (see Appendix 1: CCMAU Treaty 
Obligations in SOE). Both of these entities were swept away in the subsequent 
1999 Labour-Alliance coalition government health reforms. CCMAU became 
absorbed into the Ministry of Health as the Sector Funding and Performance 
Directorate in the most recent (1999/00) restructure. 
Until the Crown as primary owner of the health sector providers (not 
funder/policy maker) rated Maori health gain as a priority for those of its agencies 
that could effect it, and thus signalled it as a priority to the rest of the sector, the 
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gap between rhetoric, policy, and practice was highly explicable. In that 
circumstance, policy was truly in a vacuum, talking to itself. 
Crown Owned Entities - Reflections on the Sector 
To gain an understanding of the impact of central policy and how policy was 
translated and implemented at the regional level management staffs of five HHS's 
were interviewed (Crown Health Association, Auckland Healthcare, Canterbury 
Health, Capital Coast Health, Northland Health, Pacific Health, April - June 
2000). They included staff from Chief Executive level to Managers of Maori 
health units. To ensure balance the HHS's ranged from urban and rural service 
provision, included North and South Island services, both high and low density 
Maori populations, and services that provided for large populations and smaller 
providers covering a large geographical area. Despite the variety there were 
consistent themes in the comments made. 
The most constant and universal criticism was the perceived lack of leadership on 
Maori health issues throughout the 1990 reform period by central agencies, 
particularly the Ministry of Health. HHS's had no sense of there being a "big 
picture" for Maori health such as a national strategic plan or direction that every 
entity in the health sector implemented consistently. 
Policy from the Ministry of Health and the Health Funding Authority was 
described as not clearly articulated by most interviewees. One southern HHS 
stated they had never sat down with the Health Funding Authority to specifically 
discuss Maori health. Surprisingly, they also were not aware that the Southern 
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Regional Health Authority's strategy for Maori health was mainstream 
enhancement. 
It is not surprising that there was inconsistency of approach if Crown owned 
service providers were not aware of the key Maori health strategies. How could 
they ensure they were delivering on stated Crown priorities? Consequently good 
initiatives tended to be isolated, individual and, in spite of, rather than because of 
central policy. 
Some interviewees identified the degree of support at HHS governance level for 
Treaty responsiveness as a critical success factor in developing Maori health 
strategy. One HHS interviewee stated that the relationship with Iwi and 
subsequent model they were able to develop was possible due to the Board having 
a strong understanding of their governance role in the Treaty relationship. The 
understanding of Treaty partnership at the governance level provided the CEO 
with the support required to implement change so the organisation could be more 
responsive to Maori. 
One HHS participant stated that unless there were key government documents, 
such as the Crown Statement of Owners Expectations and the Health Funding 
Authority National Strategic Maori Health Plan, Maori management staff would 
not have leverage within the organisation to improve responsiveness to Maori. 
The reality for HHS's was that Maori health developments have occurred to some 
extent in a policy vacuum, where business imperatives rather than policy 
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imperatives had prevailed. The effective initiatives implemented by HHSs 
occurred in spite of Maori health policy, not because of it. Of the 5 HHSs 
involved in this study only one described key Crown policy documents as being 
influential on the initiatives they attempted to implement. 
The Chief Executive of one HHS disclosed that their wide ranging initiatives to 
improve their responsiveness to Maori had not been in response to central policy 
directions, and had not been resourced by the Health Funding Authority as they 
had not rated it as a priority to fund. An HHS that was trying to be innovative and 
responsive felt it was not actively encouraged to deliver on a stated government 
priority. Lack of clarity, lack of leadership and lack of consequences for other 
HHSs that were found to be in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi compounded the 
lack of incentives to innovate. 
One urban HHS Maori unit providing strategic advice to their Board and Chief 
Executive commented on the standard cultural model in HHSs, as having been the 
Kai Awhina who provided active emotional and practical support for the 
individual client and whanau. However, that model provided little challenge or 
influence at the organisational leadership level. 
How well has the Crown done as Funder/Contractor? 
The Crown as funder and hence contractor is predominantly a feature of the 1990s 
health sector reforms under study. The funder/provider split established in 1993 
has been identified by the Crown as a key accountability mechanism to ensure its 
objectives are met (Health and Disability Services Act, 1993 ). 
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The responsibility of the Minister of Health is, obviously, to ensure that 
the funder spends its money wisely, essentially, and gets value for dollar 
in terms of health gain, given that we can't meet all health needs, and 
certainly I think that's been the critical issue about the reforms. 
Prior to separation of purchaser and provider, services were provided from 
hospitals really on what the hospital thought they should do. The 
purchaser has to provide a range of services, not just from hospitals, but 
for primary care and any other initiative, such as Maori Health providers 
that we've heard about, to really put the money where the purchaser, or 
funder, thinks they will get the best health gain. That doesn't necessarily 
mean that traditional - the way medicines have been traditionally provided 
necessarily does that (Colin Feek evidence for the Crown concerning 
Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 29 1999, 
transcript p94) 
The Crown from 1993 placed a high level of expectation on the funder to deliver 
Maori health status improvements through: 
• Consultation with Maori communities 
• Identifying Maori health need 
• Monitoring the provision of service to Maori communities by contracted 
providers 
The second Whaia Te Ora Mo Te lwi (MOH, TPK, 1993, plS-17) document set 
out these expectations of the funders in some detail in the Maori Health 
Purchasing and Contract Strategy - Key Requirements section. Consultation 
included requirements to be involved in all aspects of purchasing plans, 
development, implementation, review, and monitoring. Purchasing plans were 
required to be specific in respect of Maori health needs, prioritisation processes, 
and the development of performance and monitoring standards. 
Health service utilisation data was to be provided, and the methodology and 
timeframes to obtain such data to be spelt out. Lastly, the demographic factors 
impacting on service purchase requirements were to be identified, and the funder 
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was specifically required to "consider the socio-economic and cultural factors 
which deter Maori from using health services in accordance with their health 
needs." (MOH, TPK, 1993, pl7) 
The collection of Maori health information will need to be sufficiently 
comprehensive to ensure that effective monitoring of the government's 
objectives is possible if under purchaser and provider levels. It is 
understood that the development of these health information systems may 
not be completed until after the 1993/94 transition year (MOH, TPK, 
1993, pl7) 
To remove any doubt as to the obligations of the funder to consult with and 
monitor the needs of Maori, these obligations were repeated in sections 33 and 34 
of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 and maintained with minor 
changes following the 1997 reform. Section 33 included requirements that the 
funder monitor the performance of the purchase agreements of those entities with 
which they contracted. 
Crown evidence given in cross-examination during the Wai 692 claim showed 
how far the funder fell short of the requirements placed upon it by the Health and 
Disability Services Act 1993. During this time Mara Andrews was a policy 
analyst and subsequently a Manager of Maori health in the Central Regional 
Health Authority (CRHA) and the Health Funding Authority. 
MR POWELL (Counsel for the Claimants, Wai 692): I'm sorry. It's 
fair to say that the CRHA did not take a proactive leadership role in trying 
to ensure participation through all the levels of the mainstream services? 
MS ANDREWS (Maori Health Manager, Health Funding Authority): 
No, I don't think we didn't take a proactive leadership role; I think, we 
didn't know what Maori expectation was, as to how they wanted that 
policy implemented. And, until we went out and consulted and had, you 
know, got into getting out and about and hearing from people, it was no 
good us trying to put things in place that defined how policy was to be 
implemented until we heard how they expected it to be implemented. 
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MR POWELL: And the net result of that was that, there wasn't any -
you weren't able to make any moves, or any serious moves in increasing 
that participation --
MS ANDREWS: In that early year. 
MR POWELL: -- because you didn't have that information? 
MS ANDREWS: Yeah, in 93/94 we could not come out with any 
definitive implementation policies, or plans on how to implement Whaia te 
Ora mo te Iwi until we went out and talked to everybody about what their 
expectations were. So, the intent was, what we can do in this early year, 
this first year of business, is to go out and consult, put some money aside 
to extend some initiatives; and then, when we know what people's 
expectations are, then we can start putting in place some criterias and 
plans and things like that, which is why the three year strategic plan didn't 
come out until the following year, because that's when we heard it all, and 
that's when we could start firming things up. 
MR POWELL: And, do you think you would have been able to have 
started trying to implement Te Whaia te Ora a bit more quickly, if you'd 
had more funding to be able to go out and send teams out to consult, to 
find out what Maori wanted? 
MS ANDREWS: Umm, if we had more people? I don't know. Well, 
maybe we could have. I think it - well, even if we had more people - I 
mean, there was only two of us in the Maori Health Team at the time, and 
we had our Kaumatua Group, and let's say there was six of us; I think, still 
the same six would have gone to the same places, because we all needed to 
hear what it was people wanted out of the Health System. There was just 
nothing documented about any prior consultation on Maori Health and 
where it should go to give us a lead, or a starting point, or anything. So, I 
don't know if more people would have had time. I couldn't answer (Mara 
Andrews, evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services 
Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript p203). 
The two people identified in the transcript quote were responsible for Maori 
health for all of the lower North Island and Nelson/Marlborough in the South 
Island. Mara Andrews had never been involved in health before the time she 
referred to and learned about the health issues on the job, having come from a 
background in the Maori Land Court, Trust Office and Maori Affairs Department 
(HF A, Sept 1998, p4, & Mara Andrews, evidence for the Crown concerning 
Page 278 
Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript 
p204). 
It was over three years from its inception in 1993 before the Central Regional 
Health Authority undertook a review of Healthcare Hawke's Bay's performance 
in respect of its services to Maori. No follow up action in respect of the review's 
recommendations had occurred by the time of the Wai 692 hearing in 1999. At the 
hearing, Mara Andrews acknowledged that no action appeared to have occurred in 
respect of Healthcare Hawke's Bay's breach of its funding contract. 
MS ANDREWS: No. What I'm saying is, if we get to the point where 
we're writing letters to all our providers "you're in breach and that's it", 
sort of thing; what it's not considering, is the developing nature of both 
organisations. You know, we - these aren't the only things that any CHE 
is required to do; they're required to do hundreds of things to meet their 
contract obligations, and in their relationships with us they develop time 
lines around - the capability of them to meet those and we know, in all 
reality, they're not going to meet every single condition in a year. What 
we're doing is putting the stake in the ground saying, "these are the 
measures that we are expecting providers to meet". 
Now, providers have to develop a plan to meet them and agree a time line 
with us. And, the same happened with Maori providers; they were given 
standards to meet too, none of them would have met them in the first year, 
none of them would have met them in the second probably, because they 
all needed time to develop and put systems and processes and learning 
paths in place. 
So, the environment wasn't as rigid as saying, "we've whacked some 
clauses in a contract, now you just do them or else". The environment was 
one where we had to try and be as clear as we could about expectations, 
and then allow our providers to develop to meet them. But, if we're going 
to insist "you do it now or breach", then I think we would have run into 
some very bad relationship management issues. 
MR POWELL: So, what you're saying is, really, the realities have got in 
the way of this arm's-length funder-provider model? 
MS ANDREWS: No, it's not - it's because it's - the realities of a 
developing sector are that, you cannot, in reality, expect developing 
providers to have everything in place from day one. And that, we knew 
CHEs and Maori providers and others had a learning curve and a 
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development process to go through, to learn what the expectations of a 
purchaser were and how to put quality systems in place; just as they knew 
that we were learning to be a purchaser at the same time. 
So, we just both lived with the reality that this was all new, and we were 
both learning, and to start slapping breach things on each other would have 
just been counterproductive. It was better to say, well - and I think this is 
what happened is, meetings I had with Maori providers, and they would go 
through the contract and say, "Well, we've looked at this thing and how to 
implement it, and we don't quite know how, and are there any models for 
it". And we'd say, "Well, this other Maori provider tried this, why don't 
you try that". And I just keep going back to the fact, there was no 
previous model for it, so everybody was learning, and learning to put in 
place standards like this as well. 
MR POWELL: Just, what was the time line that was given to 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay to implement its Treaty policy? 
MS ANDREWS: From memory, we said we would re-audit in two 
years. 
MR POWELL: That's two years from December? 
MS ANDREWS: From that financial year, which is why - and I think, 
had we stayed as a Central RHA, the cycle would have naturally come 
around; but with the restructuring and merger to HF A, some of the things 
that Central RHA had planned, had to be, sort of, merged into national 
processes. So, there is a national audit, cultural audit, planned of the 
CHEs this year, and we've simply sort of got woven into audits that other 
areas were planning themselves (Mara Andrews, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 
1999, transcript p218) 
So an audit that happened three years after the early 1990s reforms was due to be 
rerun two years later, by which time the Crown entity carrying out the review had 
already been phased out of existence. A clear example of the way that ongoing 
restructurings have hampered the continuity of policy and monitoring processes. 
By 1998/99, after the period of this study, the Health Funding Authority had 
established a clear Maori Health policy that was Treaty based (see Appendix 2: 
Health Funding Authority Maori Health Policy). However, like its 
contemporaneous organisations, the HHSs and CCMAU, by the time such 
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policies were able to drive decision making, the HF A had joined the ranks of 
other restructured Crown health entities. 
The Resource Management Act - A marked contrast 
The radical nature of the 1990s reforms in the health sector was matched by the 
reforms of environmental resource management. However, the incoming National 
Government 1990 could not sweep away local government structures with the 
same degree of ease they could abolish the Area Health Boards. The Resource 
Management Act 1991 created a redefinition of roles and responsibilities for how 
the sustainable management of natural and physical resources would be carried 
out. The Act provides a model of how the Crown has in the context of resource 
management established a process that was more inclusive and consultative than 
any prior legislation. It is in stark contrast to the health sector where radical 
change was imposed with little interaction or dialogue with the community and 
was perceived by many (Blank, 2000) as excluding rather than including. 
The Resource Management Act was enacted in 1991 after a very comprehensive 
consultation process. The lengthy consultation process had been to provide more 
opportunities for public participation in shaping policy for environmental 
management. The environmental reforms began with a national 'Environmental 
Forum', held in 1984, to which a large number of community groups were invited. 
Continuing public deliberation followed up the Environmental Forum. 
Following the forum, a working party was appointed to advise government 
on the restructuring of New Zealand's environmental administration. This 
group toured the country, holding numerous public meetings. As a result, 
two new government agencies were created, to provide policy advice 
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(Ministry for the Environment) and conservation management 
(Department of Conservation). The government then set about reviewing 
all environmental legislation, replacing over fifty statutes with a single 
piece of legislation, the Resource Management Act ( 1991) (RMA) (Miller, 
1997,pl4) 
The three-year lead-in to the RM Act itself involved a wide-ranging consultation 
process involving public meetings, public information campaigns and free phone-
ins. The consultation strategy clearly reached a wide audience as it generated 
3500 submissions. The RMA was viewed favourably as it provided greater 
opportunity for public participation in environmental management. Among the 
significant provisions of the RMA are: new procedures for extending public 
consultation through pre-hearings, hearings, and environment court; a wider 
definition of who may make a submission on resource consent, to include people 
with an interest in a planning issue, as well as those directly affected by it. 
Table 9 sets out some of the provisions in the RMA. The significant contrasts with 
the contemporaneous health legislation include specific reference to the role of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, and consultation requirements of some depth and specificity. 
By comparison, health legislation of the same time period had some consultation 
requirements of the funding entities, and none at all of provider entities. 
Table 9: Resource Management Act Provisions 
Section 8 - Treaty of W aitangi 
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, 
in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources, shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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First Schedule - Preparation and Change of Policy Statements and Plans by Local 
Authorities 
3. Consultation 
( 1) During the preparation of a proposed policy statement or plan, the local authority 
concerned shall consult 
(a) The Minister for the Environment; and 
(b) Those other Ministers of the Crown who may be affected by the policy statement 
or plan; and 
( c) Local authorities who may be so affected; and 
(d) The tangata whenua of the area who may be so affected, through iwi authorities 
and tribal runanga. 
(2) A local authority may consult anyone else during the preparation of a proposed policy 
statement or plan. 
Fourth Schedule - Assessment of Effects on the Environment 
1. Matters that should be included in an assessment of effects on the environment 
Subject to the provisions of any policy statement or plan, an assessment of effects on the 
environment for the purposes of section 88(6)(b) should include 
(a) A description of the proposal: 
(b) Where it is likely that an activity will result in any significant adverse effect on 
the environment, a description of any possible alternative locations or methods for 
undertaking the activity: 
( c) Repealed by s225 RMAA 1993 
(d) An assessment of the actual or potential effect on the environment of the proposed 
activity: 
(h) An identification of those persons interested in or affected by the proposal, the 
consultation undertaken, and any response to the views of those consulted. 
(i) Where the scale or significance of the activity's effect are such that monitoring is 
required, a description of how, once the proposal is approved, effects will be 
monitored and by whom. 
2. Matters that should be considered when preparing an assessment of effects on the 
environment -
Subject to the provisions of any policy statement or plan, any person preparing an 
assessment of the effects on the environment should consider the following matters: 
(a) Any effect on those in the neighbourhood and, where relevant, the wider 
community including any socio-economic and cultural effects: 
(b) Any physical effects on the locality, including any landscape and visual effects: 
( c) Any effect on eco-systems, including effects on plants or animals and any 
physical disturbance of habitats in the vicinity: 
(d) Any effect on natural and physical resources having aesthetic, recreational, 
scientific, historical, spiritual, or cultural, or other special value for present or 
future generations: 
(f) Any risk to the neighbourhood, the wider community, or the environment through 
natural hazards or the use of hazardous substances or hazardous installations 
(Resource Management Act, 1991) 
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The RMA provides a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities and 
processes for decision-making in environmental planning. The purpose of the Act 
was to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. 
'The net effect of the purposes and principles of the Act is to provide a formal 
framework against which standards, policy statements and plans can be 
formulated, and development proposals (consents) evaluated.' (New Zealand 
Institute of Local Government Managers, 1992) The Act provided and defined the 
hierarchy of decision-making as national, regional and district: 
Central Government: overview; policy development; performance and 
quality standards; national policy statements; mineral allocation; aspects 
of coastal management; management of hazardous substances. 
Regional Councils: overview/coordination; regional policy statements; 
regional plans (optional); water and soil management; management of 
geothermal resources; natural hazards mitigation/planning; regional 
aspects of hazardous substances; pollution management and air pollution 
control; aspects of coastal management. 
Territorial Councils: district plans; control of land use and subdivision: 
noise control; control of natural hazards, avoidance and mitigation; local 
control of hazardous substances use (Boston, 1996, p 170) 
This has provided clarity of structure, roles and function in contrast to the lack in 
the health sector over the same period. The RMA defines at the Central agency 
level the government's principal role is oversight and supervision. Functions 
formerly the responsibility of departments are now devolved to local government. 
A key difference between resource management legislation and health sector has 
been the definition and the allocation of monitoring functions. For the last decade 
monitoring has not been the allocated responsibility of any single agency in the 
health sector, but split amongst many. So CCMAU monitored the financial 
matters, and protected the shareholding Minister's interests. It did not consider its 
brief extended to Treaty monitoring, in spite of its name. 
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The effect of Crown fragmentation is evident in the response of the Maori Health 
Manager of the HFA, when questioned in the Wai 692 hearing: 
MR POWELL (Counsel for the Wai 692 Claimants): But, just in 
terms of the consultation itself; at that time, in mid-1994, you would have 
been aware of the consultation that was, say, being undertaken in terms of 
the Resource Management Act. Have you looked at all of that and what 
constituted good consultation under that Act? Is that something that --
MS ANDREWS (Maori Health Manager, Health Funding Authority): 
I personally didn't, no. 
MR POWELL: Do you know if anybody else in the Maori Health 
Group did? 
MS ANDREWS: No, we took a line - we didn't look at any other Acts 
for guidance on consultation; we took the advice of the Maori advisors we 
had, which was to go out and have hui on marae and get around as much 
as you could, and listen to what people said. And so, the planning for this 
one, the May hui, if I remember, was actually to have that hui to see what 
the issues were and how big they were, and what things people might say, 
and then to take it from there (Mara Andrews, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 
1999, transcript p203) 
RMA : Contemporary Criticisms 
While public participation processes were strengthened in the RMA, more public 
participation does not necessarily mean greater public influence. Increased 
participation is valuable yet critics of the RMA have commented that participation 
occurs in a reactive manner usually through public submissions. A major 
limitation on effective participation has been access to resources. 
Preparing submissions or attending planning hearings and appeals is a 
costly, time-consuming, complex process. Those citizens, iwi and 
community groups who lack access to legal advisers, expert witnesses, 
photocopiers or telecommunications are heavily disadvantaged. At present 
there is no form of legal aid which might assist impoverished groups to 
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prepare cases. In contrast, citizens and organisations who stand to make 
tangible financial gains from planning decisions, such as business interests 
and developers, are often highly motivated, comparatively well funded and 
consequently advantaged in the planning process (Miller, 1997, p415) 
While the Resource Management Act has its drawbacks, the consultation model it 
provides warrants consideration as a potential template to be considered across all 
government agencies. A fundamental contrast to other examples of recent reforms 
across the public sector is that the RMA provides a process that allows Maori the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making, and work in partnership with local 
government. Consultation and participation are seen within the Act as valuable in 
and of themselves, almost as though the opportunity to arrive at a public 
consensus might be considered a public good. 
The RMA model recognised Maori cultural and spiritual values and demonstrated 
they could be incorporated in legislation for contemporary issues. Section 8 of the 
RMA commits to upholding the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and binds all 
those exercising functions under the Act to take into account the principles. The 
RMA is more specific in its recognition of the Treaty and the value it placed on 
Maori cultural and spiritual values, in contrast with the health sector legislation of 
1993 and 2000. 
Policy leads to progress? 
The reality of policy implementation and monitoring through the reforms of the 
health sector of the 1990s has been the increased fragmentation of accountability. 
The delineation of roles and responsibilities within the health sector became 
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confusingly complex. Then it is not surprising there was a lack of any 
mechanisms to tell the government how the reforms were working. The Ministry 
of Health was never able to implement an accountability system that would give 
the government that level of information. There was therefore no feedback loop in 
place to advise the Crown of the impact of its policies and decisions on Maori 
health. 
MR POWELL: In terms of the core accountabilities, what you're talking 
about is, as you say, the legal documents that link these different 
organisations, including the contracts? 
MS EARP: It links the different elements, like the Health and Disability 
Sector, yes. 
MR POWELL: Now, I think you'd agree, and I think you perhaps 
touched on it before, that across the Health Sector, across all these entities 
that you've listed in paragraph 13, there's no overall - no single entity that 
is in direct control of all of those entities that you've listed? 
MS EARP: There is not - the Health and Disability Sector is not set up 
in terms of command or control type structures; that would be correct. 
The Ministry of Health does provide an overview, there are these 
mechanisms in place to clearly outline the expectations of different parties 
and different groups within the Health and Disability Sector. 
MR POWELL: But, as you said before, the Ministry then relies on 
everybody else down the food chain in carrying out their tasks? 
MS EARP: That is correct (Ria Earp evidence for the Crown concerning Napier 
Hospital Services Claim. Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript pl46) 
In other words, the Crown has promulgated policy, but has never put in place an 
effective feedback loop to monitor and ensure policy drives health service change. 
Effectively policy was developed and promoted as the government's position and 
each entity under the Ministry of Health was free to interpret and implement as 
they wished. The Deputy Director General of Maori Health acknowledged in the 
above statement that it is not the role of any Crown agency to take overall 
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responsibility for the health sector. This highlights a flaw within the Crown 
strategy, in that, it is not enough to make Maori health a priority and hope the rest 
of the health sector agrees with you and implements accordingly. 
This chapter has outlined the policies and strategies of successive governments 
from 1983 to 1997 to address Maori health. It has attempted to establish what the 
Crown· s position has been and then examined whether the Crown has met its own 
expectations of the health sector. The Crown's own reviews have demonstrated 
the flaws in the health sector and established the shortcomings of its own 
monitoring processes. This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the Crown 
by its own policy and accountability tests has been in breach of its Treaty of 
Waitangi obligations to Maori. 
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CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION 
What Now - How will Maori Health Outcomes be Improved? 
At the outset of this research I set out to investigate how the conflicting ideologies 
driving health reform in the period of study, 1983 - 1997, have served Maori 
interests, in particular their expectations of partnership under the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The research has attempted to investigate the proposition that the 
Crown· s attempts to address Maori health needs in a largely unilateral way, rather 
than using frameworks for partnership consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi, 
have not met Maori aspirations in respect of participation in health sector decision 
making nor significantly affected the problem of Maori health needs during the 
period of study. 
In this concluding chapter I argue that my research suggests the Crown is aware 
of its responsibilities in respect of Maori health, has had little difficulty in 
generating quantities of Maori health policy, and is aware of its own failure to 
translate those policies into effective response to Maori. The preceding chapters 
demonstrate unilateral processes of reform, from either side of the political 
spectrum, have commonly failed to engage Maori in the sort of partnership that 
they expect under the Treaty of Waitangi. Leadership within the health sector that 
ensures Maori of a partnership with the Crown at all levels of the sector has not 
been forthcoming in the period of this study. 
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As is evident from the preceding chapters, the New Zealand health sector has not 
had a lot of stability over the past fourteen years that this study focused on. With 
further structural change embarked on by the 1999 Labour/ Alliance Government, 
there are risks that gains in Maori health service delivery will be lost, that Maori 
participation in the health sector will be compromised, and that Maori health 
status will further deteriorate by comparison with their fellow citizens. The key 
areas of risk are identified within this section. Effective management of these 
risks will contribute to improving Maori health outcomes. 
I conclude the chapter in two parts: suggestions for the Crown as to the means 
whereby it can engage Maori effectively in the challenge to improve Maori health, 
and a final concluding comment on the lack of inclusion of Maori in health reform 
processes to date, effectively constituting an ongoing breach by the Crown of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, in respect of Maori health. 
Failure of leadership 
Maori Health - An Overview 
The Wai 692 claim to the Waitangi Tribunal discussed earlier (Chapter 6) 
subjected the Crown's record in health services to an unprecedented level of 
scrutiny. The Crown defended the claim by presenting a total of nine witnesses. 
These were predominantly senior officials of the Ministry of Health, Health 
Funding Authority, CCMAU, and Healthcare Hawke's Bay. 
Those witnesses painted a grim picture of Maori health, and the inadequacy of the 
government's attempts to improve it. Ria Earp, Deputy Director General of Health 
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(Maori) was cross-examined in some depth in respect of the Ministry of Health 
document "Action for Health and Independence - Bridging the Gap between 
Actions and Outcomes ... the population perspective - Maori Health Issues." 
(Ministry of Health, 1998). She described the document as "certainly supposed to 
represent or give a generic overview" (Ria Earp evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, 
transcript p 122 lines 6-27) of the state of Maori health at its publication. The 
document had the following to say about the state of Maori health 15 years after 
the commencement of the structural reforms: 
Background on Key Issues for Maori Health 
There has been a steady improvement in infant mortality and life 
expectancy, for Maori, over the last four decades. The ill health status for 
Maori, in a number of areas, has also improved over time, for example, 
reduced death rates for sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) and higher 
immunisation rates. 
Despite these improvements, however, the gap between Maori and non 
Maori has still widened across the whole spectrum of ill health, including 
SIDS, immunisation rates, glue ear, asthma, youth and teenage pregnancy, 
youth suicide, self injury and motor vehicle injuries, cancer, diabetes, 
stroke, pneumonia and influenza, and mental ill health (Ministry of Health, 
1998, p5). 
Clearly, in spite of years of well-intentioned policy, the gap between Maori health 
and that of other citizens (Article III rights) continued to widen during the period 
of the study. 
Maori Health strategies during the reforms 
My research is clear that the Crown clearly knew that Maori health status was not 
at acceptable levels for much if not all of the period under study. The Labour 
Government's 1989 national health charter ( 1989, p5) had identified Maori health 
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as a priority. The National government that followed had also identified as the 
Crown's objective to meet special Maori needs that: 
The Crown will seek to improve Maori health status so that in the future 
Maori will have the same opportunity to enjoy at least the same level of 
health as non-Maori (Department of Health, Whaia te ora mote iwi -
Strive for the good health of the people, 1992, p13) 
When challenged by counsel for the claimants at the Wai 692 hearing, Ms Earp 
identified the objective as a medium term one, requiring three to five years to 
achieve. Furthermore, she agreed that the time elapsed since the objective was 
promulgated effectively amounted to nearly two medium terms, and that the 
objective had not as yet been realised. 
MR POWELL (Counsel for the Claimants, Wai 692): What you're 
really saying is, since Whaia te Ora came out, we've had two medium 
terms, or perhaps a medium and a half if you take it as five years, and we 
haven't achieved our medium goals in that time? 
MS EARP (Deputy Director General, Maori Health, MOH): No, and 
I think anyone who would get up on the stand, and perhaps talk about the 
issue of health outcomes, would say that it is a long-term issue, achieving 
those kinds of improvements. They are not improvements that are 
necessarily achieved overnight; there may well be, in some specific areas, 
things that could be done - that can be - where improvements can be made 
more quicker than others (Ria Earp, evidence for the Crown concerning 
Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, 
transcript p140 Linesl-37) 
CCMAU, another Crown agency representing the ownership interests, was quite 
clear on the strategies that it had at its command to influence HHSs. However, it 
had not until very recently (CCMAU, 1999) seen that it had any responsibility to 
do so in respect of Government Maori health policy. 
The Minister of Health, one of the two "owners" represented by CCMAU stated 
the following medium term policy goal in a recent publication: 
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Make marked progress in decreasing the long-standing disparities in health 
and disability status, in particular for the needs of Maori and for the needs 
of pacific peoples so those groups can enjoy the same level of health as 
other New Zealanders (Minister of Health, The Government's Medium 
Term Strategy for Health and Disability Services 1999, p3) 
The six years between the two policy objectives have clearly made little 
difference to the state of Maori health disparity. There is little evidence of a new 
approach on the part of the Ministry of Health, and the Deputy Director General 
could only state she remained "hopeful" of some improvement in the medium 
term, while conceding that the issue was really a long term one (Ria Earp, 
evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi 
Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript p141 L29-36, p140 L22-39) 
Sector Responsiveness to Maori 
Ria Earp's "generic overview" (Ministry of Health, 1998) document, as she 
referred to it in the Wai 692 hearings noted the need to focus on "Improving 
mainstream responsiveness to Maori" (Ministry of Health, 1998) as a key strategy 
for closing health disparities between Maori and non-Maori. Indeed, such a 
strategy was critical to the improvement of Maori health disparity, as the Article 
II Kaupapa Maori strategy could not deliver on its own. 
The health sector needs to ensure mainstream providers take responsibility 
for Maori health. To do this successfully, they must work in partnership 
with Maori to reduce barriers and improve the access Maori have to health 
services. Innovative Maori health services have been successful in 
responding to Maori health needs. However they are too few and too 
small to tum around the poor Maori health status by 
themselves .... Mainstream health services would benefit from developing 
better relationships with Maori providers, and this would contribute to 
Maori health gain by assisting them and identifying and filling the gaps in 
health services to Maori (Ministry of Health, 1998) 
Clearly, the Ministry is acknowledging that: 
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• Mainstream providers, including Crown-owned entities, have failed to take 
responsibility for Maori health. 
• That the development of Maori health providers in isolation cannot and will 
not solve Maori health disparity 
Ms Earp accepted that unless mainstream providers took responsibility for Maori 
health and began working on a full partnership they could not effectively deliver 
health to Maori (Ria Earp evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, 
Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript pl24 lines 1-13) The fact that the Ministry of 
Health was identifying a need to improve the mainstream responsiveness to Maori 
after fifteen years of health reforms is somewhat overdue recognition that there is 
a major problem with such responsiveness. 
Sector Identification of Continuing Maori Health Problems 
The five Ministry of Health Maori health briefing hui which were the focus of the 
"Bridging the Gap" (Ministry of Health, 1998) document were held around New 
Zealand (Palmerston North, Rotorua, Invercargill, Christchurch, and Auckland) in 
August 1998. Ria Earp identified these hui as being important, successful, and 
involving a wide cross section of participants from the Maori health sector (Ria 
Earp evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, 
Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript p121 lines 34-49, p 122 lines 1-4). She 
accepted that the hui identified a large number of significant problems in relation 
to health service design and delivery and Maori health. These included: 
• Data collection problems, including the lack of systematic 
collection of ethnicity data, and the range and quality of other 
data such as income levels 
• The lack of robust or any monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms , between the Crown and its various agencies 
involved in health, most notably the funder, and between the 
agencies themselves. 
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• The lack of universal internal monitoring capabilities amongst 
providers. 
• A lack of safe practice and responsiveness in respect of Maori 
culture and values. 
• A need for increased responsiveness of the funder and service 
providers to the needs, rights and interests of Maori. 
• The need to specify services to and outcomes for Maori 
(Ministry of Health, 1998 p 14-18, & Ria Earp, evidence for the 
Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi 
Tribunal July 30 1999, transcript p 131-136) 
The range and depth of the problems identified indicate the level of abject failure 
on the part of the current health system as it has half heartedly endeavoured to 
respond to Maori health needs. Ria Earp stated as much when she admitted that 
the issue of accountability alone was sufficient to require a wholesale 
improvement of the health sector. 
MR POWELL: But what I'm saying to you is that, that particular 
concern for improvement, I think it is, that they're looking for improved 
accountability, goes right across the whole Health Sector, isn't it? It's not 
just limited to one part of it, it's improved accountability right across, 
between all indeed facets? 
MS EARP: It is saying that the whole Health Sector needs to be 
improved; that is what it's saying (Ria Earp, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 
1999, transcript pl35) 
More recent health policy statements reiterate the commitment of government "to 
reduce the health inequalities that exist between Maori and other New 
Zealanders." (King, 2001, p6 ). The remainder of this chapter demonstrates how 
little the government has known about whether its reform strategies of the 1990s 
are making any difference in respect of these inequalities. 
Page 295 
Monitoring the Treaty and Maori Health 
This dissertation argues that the Crown and its agencies have failed to effectively 
monitor both Treaty compliance and Maori health status. The Ministry of Health 
appears to have never conducted a national assessment of Maori health. Funders 
have struggled to get their contracted providers to deliver adequate ethnicity data, 
a fundamental requirement of any attempt to monitor Maori health gain. The 
Crown as owner of health sector or its agent, CCMAU, has not monitored Crown 
Companies. When the question was put to Crown Law to raise with CCMAU on 
the researcher's behalf, the Assistant Crown Counsel wrote: 
I am advised that no information is held by the Crown Company 
Monitoring Advisory Unit that specifically addresses your request for 
information on "how Crown companies are monitored to ensure the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi are upheld and the interests of the 
Maori Treaty partner are protected." (Linkhom, Letter, 1999) 
CCMAU developed performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of Crown 
Health Enterprises, provide information on service delivery and assist HHSs in 
becoming successful health providers. However, in these performance 
measurements there was no reference to Maori and what was a quality service for 
them. There appears to have been no measurement of effectiveness of the health 
services provided to Maori or how the HHS established whether it would meet the 
Government's identified targets for Maori health. The government continues to 
state that Maori health is one of its health gain priority areas. 
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It is evident that the opportunity to measure the perceived Maori health gain 
through HHS quality reporting measures was not done by either CCMAU or 
HHSs themselves. If neither of those organisations attempted to measure 
improvement in Maori health, will the government actually require any of its 
agencies to do so? If the Crown does not know whether it is making progress in 
this priority area, calling it a priority becomes little more than rhetoric. 
Article II and Ill 
It is clear from interviews for this research that there is a poor understanding 
amongst health services of the health sector responsibilities of the Crown under 
Article III. The implications of Article III for the Crown are described as "the 
health status of Maori should be improved to equal that of non-Maori" (Policy 
Guidelines for Regional Health Authorities, 1995/1996). Although successive 
governments during the period under study have accepted that Maori health 
should be a priority area, it is evident from the interview data that entities in the 
health sector did not understand how to respond to that priority. Providers do not 
understand how to operationalise the policy priority, or even that there is an onus 
on the Crown to reduce disparity and achieve equality of health status for Maori 
(Interview with Canterbury Health Senior Staff, 2000). What is evident is that the 
health status of Maori continues to deteriorate. 
There has been significant regional variation in HHS models for improving their 
responsiveness to Maori. There was no consistency of approach among the HHSs 
as to how to ensure participation of Maori in all levels of decision-making, 
representation of Maori in the organisation, development and implementation of 
policy that recognises Crown Treaty responsibilities to Maori. There has been no 
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leadership from any central agency, be it Ministry of Health, CCMAU, or the 
Health Funding Authority to try to develop such consistency. 
The poor understanding by the health sector of Article III and consequent lack of 
implementation within the sector has been compounded in this researcher's view 
by lack of leadership from the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health is 
charged with the responsibility of providing the Minister of Health with advice 
and development of policy. Many providers interviewed in the course of this 
study believe that policy is developed in isolation from the sector without a clear 
understanding as to the impact policy will have at the local level. Furthermore, the 
policy that is developed appears to be poorly communicated, inadequately 
explained, and is not given either a strategic or a political context. 
Political Response 
The three-year political cycle compounds the problems in delivering effective 
outcomes from Maori health policy. The politicians tend to focus on structures 
and structural solutions. It appears they assume nothing positive comes from 
previous administrations. It is clear from the policy review of health sector policy 
development on Maori health within the study period (in Table 6) that there is a 
repetitive cycle reiterating the proposed policy initiatives to address Maori health 
status. The same issues are repeatedly raised in this cycle - reviews of the 
Ministry, recruitment, policy templates, fatigue for Maori as positions are 
recycled, tied to the lifecycle of an individual politician, prevailing ideology or 
term of government. 
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It is perhaps inevitable that any politician wants visible, immediate results. 
However, the political will required to address Maori health disparity must engage 
with the fact that the required remedies are not short term. Those remedies cut 
across professional and political interest groups, and in an environment of health 
rationing, advantaging Maori service delivery to remedy poor Maori health status 
is not a politically popular action. It is little wonder then that health service 
providers find difficulty delivering on the government priority in this area. They 
need look no further back than the fate of the Public Health Commission in 1995 
under the National government of the time, to see the consequences of voicing 
health messages that are not politically or economically popular. 
Further Reform and its Risks 
Transition / Fragmentation 
Ongoing restructuring of the health sector brings with it the loss of structural 
understanding, and the loss of established sector relationships. Existing 
accountability within the sector has been fragmented as a result of the 1990s 
reforms as illustrated in earlier chapters. While the establishment of District 
Health Boards in 2001 may lead to enhanced local accountability, there is a 
significant risk that that accountability will be interest group rather than need 
driven. If the experience of the 1990 reforms is anything to go by, good intentions 
at the political level may not translate to action in the community: 
MR CLARKE (Member of the Waitangi Tribunal Hearing Wai 692): 
Mr Flowers, the Omahu hui has come up with just about every one of the 
last three speakers - one of the last four speakers in fact. So, obviously, it 
is one of the integral issues of this whole matter; the whole question of 
consultation in regard to the setting up of the Health Centre in Hastings. I 
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just couldn't catch your answer, or the answer of the Chairman of the 
board; were you in attendance at that hui? 
MR FLOWERS (Chief Executive Officer, Healthcare Hawke's Bay): 
Yes, yes, I was. 
MR CLARKE: What about the Chairman? 
MR FLOWERS: No, he - no, he wasn't there, no. I think he was 
represented by Mr Moore, one of the Directors. 
MR CLARKE: So, that particular hui was specifically held for Maori 
throughout the Hawke's Bay District, and we referred here, extending from 
Mahia to Central Hawke's Bay, more specifically Porangahau; that was the 
area that was outlined by Mr Puriri. And, you - your organisation had 
decided that that was the best way of obtaining a Maori point of view. 
Would that be right? Was to have that hui? 
MR FLOWERS: At that level, yes. It was coming in in addition to the 
series of three or four stakeholder meetings, which had Maori people on 
them as well; and that was the perception at the time, that that was the best 
way, yes. 
MR CLARKE: But, of course, it was involving many different 
communities in that area, as I said, extending from Mahia out into - to 
Wairoa, into this area, and into the Central Hawke's Bay area, particularly 
Porangahau. So, there was a number of communities, different 
communities, asked to assemble; and it was the best way, as far as you 
were concerned, of obtaining a Maori point of view. 
This article here, Whaia te Ora Mote lwi, Strive for the Good Health of 
the People, was discussed in conjunction with Mr Keelan's evidence. It's 
the Maori Health Policy objectives of Regional Health Authorities and the 
Public Health Commission. It's an interesting document. It was published 
in 1993; 1993, before the Omahu hui. 
There's a paragraph here that talks about the way in which the policy was 
to be discussed with Maori, and this is coming from central Government; 
from the top. And it says, "Ministers took the statement to marae", not 
Middle Managers, not Advisory Groups; the top dogs. And in your case 
the top dog would have been the Chairman of the board, and here we're 
saying "Ministers took the document to maraes", okay. And this article 
also says "Ministers took the statement to marae around the country". 
They just didn't have one hui in Wellington for all Maori, all right. So, I 
guess there's a parallel between your situation and the situation relating to 
what the Minister did in 1993. 
The document also says, "the matter was taken around, in what I took, to 
present the Government's response". And, like you, they thought that the 
method that you used, of face-to-face on the marae, was the best option. 
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They used the expression "and to present Government's response, kanohi 
ki te kanohi ", okay; kanohi ki te kanohi. And for them that means - it's a 
translation of "face-to-face", it's exactly the same. 
So, obviously you could say that, this comes from the centre, from the 
Ministers involved in Health. Kanohi ki te kanohi seems to be a policy for 
Ministers of Health as early as 1993, when consulting with Maori 
communities, going to each of these communities and talking to them 
kanohi ki te kanohi, okay. Would you like to comment on that? 
MR FLOWERS: Well, the only comment I can make to that is that, I 
think with a perception and the sense that I personally would have now, I 
wouldn't have any argument with, I think, the position that you are 
making. The difficulty was that it didn't, rightly or wrongly, it did not 
appear like that at the time as being the best method to use. 
There were, as you know, stakeholder groups set up by Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay as the best way of trying to work through what is, I'm sure 
everyone would agree, was a very complex process, and that included 
several Maori people. And the expectation was that that would ensure -
and of course there were many interested parties as well as other interested 
parties - that would ensure that a good dialogue went on within the 
community, and that those views and concerns and ideas were fed back 
into the next stakeholder meeting process. That was what was set up 
which, presumably, at the time was regarded as the best way of doing it. 
The Omahu Marae consultation, as I understood it at the time, was coming 
at the end of that sort of process, which was intended to draw out all of the 
issues, and try and get those out into the open for a final sign-off - if you'll 
pardon the expression - for that; some sort of completion of that process. 
And, that was the intent. 
MR CLARKE: It's also interesting to note, Mr Flowers, that Mara 
Andrews talked about the numerous hui that was held by the Central 
Regional Health Authority around the same period; and there were many 
hui held in this area, okay. So, you've got the Ministers of the Crown, 
Central Government, doing this kanohi ki te kanohi in detail, and you've 
also got the Central Regional Health Authority doing the same thing, and 
then you've got Hawke's Bay, your group, giving its best shot; one hui. 
You see, all these other groups are doing it, all your masters, you could 
say, they're doing it. But you decide this was your best shot; one hui, 
Omahu, and all these different communities. 
MR FLOWERS: Well, I'm not aware of the HFA undertaking a number 
of hui at the same time. I thought that series of hui commenced 
afterwards, but maybe I'm incorrect in that, but that was my recollection of 
it. It was a decision made jointly with the Health Funding Authority at the 
time. Their advice came into that decision as part of the process. 
MR CLARKE: That's all I wanted. 
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MR FLOWERS: If I may just add one more point. The clear perception 
at the time, and I think it would still be the case, was that the main 
obligation for consultation, on the matter of Health Services in Hawke's 
Bay, lay with the Health Funding Authorities in both statutory terms and 
in terms of what they're trying to set out to do. There was no obligation at 
all on Healthcare Hawke's Bay to undertake consultation. We chose to for 
all the reasons that you're describing, that it's important to have a 
community view on some critical decisions. 
MR CLARKE: But someone, a member of your team, it may have been 
your Chairman, talked about the importance of the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. 
MR FLOWERS: That's correct, yes. 
MR CLARKE: Yeah, so we need to take that into account. But, it's 
interesting to hear Mr Keelan talking about these policies that are going to 
be infused into your healthcare district, okay; the Maori perspective is 
going to be infused right throughout this whole area. And it seems that the 
fundamental reason for that, it's probably a better way, a more effective 
way, culturally more sensitive, to do it this way, do it the Maori way, 
okay; do it the Maori way. And obviously the kanohi ki te kanohi is a 
Maori way that maybe you didn't take advantage of? 
MR FLOWERS: There are many parts of the process of this whole 
thing, in relation to Maori and in relation to many other things that, when 
I'm doing it next time, will be different. And, I quite agree, there are - and 
I think - I would like to say that the way in which Wi Keelan is advancing 
that type of concept and philosophy, in the way we do things within 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, is extremely productive; it's a very satisfactory 
way of proceeding with that, and I just wish he had been part of 
organisation at the time. 
MR CLARKE: Thank you very much, Mr Flowers (Mark Flowers, 
evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, 
Waitangi Tribunal August 2 1999, transcript, p445) 
Representation 
There has been longstanding concern about the lack of Maori representation at the 
senior levels of decision-making in the health sector. As far back as its 1986 
memorandum 'Treaty of Wai tangi and Maori Health', the Department of Health 
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recognised the need for greater participation and representation of Maori in the 
development and delivery of health services: 
"That Maori health issues be addressed by the involvement of a greater 
number of Maori people in the delivery of health services and the setting 
of priorities ....... challenges health decision makers to involve Maori 
people in the development of plans and priorities" (Steering Group, 
Ministers of Health, 1997, p54) 
The active support for Maori representation was less visible in the successive 
government health policies of the 1990s. The Health and Disability Services Act 
1993 contained no requirements for representation by Maori on Boards of the new 
health bodies. The Boards of CHEs were now appointed by the Minister of Crown 
Health Enterpirses. Where Boards had Maori directors, they were not necessarily 
either local or mandated by lwi to represent their views. The number of Maori 
directors of HHS companies prior to the transition to the DHBs was fifteen out of 
a total number of 133 and of that fifteen only six were Maori women. 
Maori are obviously concerned to ensure they have adequate representation on the 
Boards of the new DHBs. When nominations were invited for the transitional 
Boards in 2000 Maori candidates comprised some 22% of all candidates. 
Naturally, many of those Maori with health sector expertise work for or with 
Maori health providers. There is a considerable risk of under-representation of 
Maori in the new structures if an undue influence is placed on potential conflict of 
interest in selection of the new Board members. The same conflict of interest may 
not be challenged for non- Maori where they are part of providers such as IP As. 
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Consultation 
The 1999 Labour-Alliance government embarked on the latest round of health 
sector restructuring believing it had a mandate, if not from the sector, at least from 
the electorate. Consultation concerning the structure as mandated by the New 
Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 was limited to the select 
committee process. It appears little has been learned about consultation with 
Maori from criticisms to date of the health reform consultation processes during 
the period of this study. 
Successful Maori Health Outcomes 
The Treaty of Waitangi should be the Central Framework for Crown Maori 
Health Policy 
One overall critical conclusion of this research is the lack of a consistent 
framework or "big picture" for the health sector to address health disparity for 
Maori. The consequences are an inconsistent approach that does not impact 
sufficiently on improving the health status of Maori. The obvious framework that 
is recognised as the basis of the constitutional government of New Zealand and 
would provide sector consistency is the Treaty of Waitangi. Health policy has 
recognised the Treaty and discusses the importance of the Treaty. This is not a 
formal Treaty framework. Policy has tended to be equity based not Treaty based 
and the emphasis has been on achieving equitable outcomes for everyone. 
Addressing disparities will address part of the Crown Treaty obligations but, I 
argue, does not recognise Maori rights under the Treaty to preserve and protect 
their own health status. 
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Previous legislation for the health sector reflects this as it has never had a Treaty 
of Waitangi clause. Recognition of 'the special needs of Maori and other 
particular communities or people for those services' as stated in the Health and 
Disability Services Act 1993 is not Treaty based. The combination of lack of 
specificity in the legislation and non-Treaty based policy reinforces the equity 
approach. The Treaty could give consistency and overarching clarity to the health 
policy framework. 
Continue to support "By Maori for Maori" Health Initiatives 
The Ministry of Health has convinced itself the health sector is being Treaty 
responsive and addressing health disparities due to the growth of Maori providers 
(Earp, 2001 ). This highlights the poor understanding of the Treaty in the health 
sector. The growth of Maori health service providers is significant as an Article 
Two response and strategy. The "By Maori for Maori" initiatives are important as 
a combined Article Two and Three strategy that has the potential for the 
maximum impact on improving Maori health status. The Maori health provider 
initiatives and their influence on such factors as smoking cessation and 
immunisation rates suggest that these services at least have higher levels of 
acceptability amongst Maori service users. 
The research indicates from the interviews conducted with health sector 
participants that the health sector has a poor understanding of the Article Three 
responsibilities on the Crown. The implications of Article 3 for the Crown are 
described as "the health status of Maori should be improved to equal that of non-
Maori". It is evident from the research interviews that different entities in the 
health sector do not understand how to respond to that priority. 
Page 305 
Establish Clear Guidelines in Implementing the Crown's Article Ill 
(Mainstream) Maori Health responsibilities 
I argue that the poor understanding by the health sector of Article III and 
consequent lack of implementation within the sector has been compounded by 
lack of leadership from the Ministry of Health. The role of the Ministry of Health 
should be to lead and influence the health and disability sector and to provide 
skilled policy advice about regulation, funding management and monitoring of the 
sector. During this research a consistent criticism voiced by many interviewees 
(see Chapter 7 - Crown Accountability to Maori - Monitoring of the Health Sector 
and its Impact on ) regardless of their geographical location or organisational type 
was that health policy is developed in isolation from the sector. Policy was also 
described as poorly communicated and developed without a clear understanding 
as to the impact it will have at the local level. 
This was evident in the significant regional variation of HHS models (from 1996-
99) in their attempts to improve their responsiveness to Maori or even in the 
recognition of the need to. There was no consistency of approach among the 
HHSs as to how to ensure participation of Maori in all levels of decision making 
or representation of Maori in the organisation, development and implementation 
of policy that recognises Crown Treaty responsibilities to Maori. 
A national framework for the entire sector would allow a consistent approach to 
be taken. Prior to the development and implementation of a framework a national 
review of Maori health status also needs to be conducted. A baseline needs to be 
established so that there is a clear understanding as to what exactly needs 
improving and so that gains made can be measured. If Maori health gain is a 
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priority, then it makes good sense to begin a national review process with them. 
Such a review process should be transparent, separately funded, accountable to 
and enabling participation of Maori, rather than an imposed technical assessment 
done to Maori by 'experts' such as demographers and epidemiologists. 
The opportunity of implementing such a framework in the 2000 DHB based 
reforms has not been taken. While there is a commitment on the part of the 
current government to have a minimum number of Maori on each District Health 
Board, the means of developing a partnership relationship with mana whenua or 
local Iwi have been left to the discretion of the Boards themselves. Given that 
they are based on the previous HHS entities, the variation evident prior to 1999 is 
likely to continue. 
Proposed Key Performance Parameters 
In order to measure Crown performance in respect of Maori health, the following 
performance indicators are proposed. 
The Crown as the Primary Maori Health Service Provider 
should: 
1. Incorporate the Treaty of Waitangi in the new Health sector legislation 
2. Include clear statements of the Crown's view of its health sector responsibility 
under both Article II and Article III 
3. Ensure equitable numbers of Maori members are elected or appointed to 
District Health Boards 
4. Ensure that sector leaders including DHB boards and Chief Executives are 
both competent in and evaluated on 
ability to apply the Treaty in changing Maori health 
s. 
5. Develop a work programme to consult Iwi about Maori health 
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strategy and policy development with specific attention to: 
• A national review of Maori health status 
• lwi control of health data such as consumer level ethnicity information 
• lwi monitoring of Crown performance in Maori health 
• The development of explicit Maori health targets 
• The development of the Maori health workforce 
6. Require all Crown health entities to explicitly identify their spending on Maori 
health activities 
8. Develop information and communication strategies to ensure mainstream 
providers and the New Zealand public understands and supports the Crown's 
intentions in respect of the Treaty and Maori health. 
Other Maori Health Services should: 
1. Demonstrate an increasing equity of outcome between Maori and non-Maori 
service users 
2. Ensure participation of Maori in significant decisions effecting the delivery of 
services 
3. Demonstrate increased acceptability of health services by Maori service users 
4. Demonstrate service contribution to Maori health capacity building 
5. Contribute to increased knowledge of effective Maori health interventions and 
strategies 
The Breach Goes On 
This research shows there has been no shortage of good intentions documented by 
the Crown and its agencies in respect of Maori health over the recent reform 
period within this study. Maori health policy exists in abundance. However, such 
policy is not rooted in a consistent framework. Accordingly, it is reconstituted in a 
regular cycle, and has provided little guidance to a health sector undergoing 
almost continuous change itself in recent years. Consistent policy and action are 
needed for impactful change. 
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Crown entities and political parties over the last seventeen years have acted as 
though they have a right to embark on health sector change in a unilateral fashion. 
They cannot leave the system alone. They are constantly tinkering with the 
structure, and there is a lack of consistent vision and theoretical rigour to their 
approach. 
I argue that the Crown has been unable to create structures or processes through 
its health reforms that deliver effectively for Maori health. Crown agency 
understanding of the Treaty and their obligations has been minimal: 
PROF SORRENSON (Member of the Waitangi Tribunal Hearing 
Wai 692): Yes, I think I want to bring up the issues of consultation, the 
same sort of thing that Mr Clarke's been talking about, but from a slightly 
different perspective. You made a statement just a minute ago that I found 
rather surprising and I think, if I heard you correctly, you said there was 
"no obligation on Healthcare Hawke's Bay to undertake consultation". Do 
you mean by that, there's no obligation under the Treaty to undertake 
consultation? 
MR FLOWERS (Chief Executive Officer, Healthcare Hawke's Bay): 
Sorry, no, I didn't mean that. What I meant was, there is no legal 
obligation, as I understand it, for Crown Health Enterprises, as they then 
were, to consult with the community. 
PROF SORRENSON: There was no obligation to consult? 
MR FLOWERS: That's my view on the position, yes. 
PROF SORRENSON: What's your understanding of Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay's obligations, as a Crown Enterprise, under the Treaty? 
MR FLOWERS: In respect to consultation? 
PROF SORRENSON: Well, that's just one aspect of it; but generally 
speaking, what's your understanding of its obligations to the principles of 
the Treaty? 
MR FLOWERS: I have the sense of being faced with an enormous 
question. I mean, as I perceived it, and it's certainly to take proper account 
of the relationship between the Crown and Maori in significant decisions; 
to ensure that the interests of Maori are protected and considered as part of 
the decisions, and to promulgate things that are of importance to Maori in 
Page 309 
the way we go about our business and provide our services; to protect 
certain rights, such as privacy rights and the like. Those are the ones that 
immediately come to mind. 
PROF SORRENSON: Yes. Have you any, or much knowledge of 
discussions about the principles of the Treaty? For instance, the - I 
suppose one should say innumerable discussions in Tribunal reports in 
court judgments, like the Lands case in the Court of Appeal in 1987? 
MR FLOWERS: A very limited exposure to that. 
PROF SORRENSON: I mean, as a CEO, you don't - of a Crown 
Enterprise, you don't really consider it your, sort of, obligation to become 
Treaty literate? 
MR FLOWERS: I certainly do, yes. I'm sorry, maybe I misunderstood 
your question. I read and I discuss these issues many times, and I haven't 
had any specific questions about Tribunal judgments. 
PROF SORRENSON: You read and discuss them, but do you sort of 
bring them into your decisions, or the decisions that --
MR FLOWERS: Yes, I attempt to do that, and I most recently have 
tried to ensure that the board itself develops a clear policy, a company 
policy, around the matter of Treaty obligations and I've ensured in recent 
years, since I became CEO, that there are proper statements about some of 
these principles in the annual business plan and the like. 
MRFLOWERS: Yes. 
PROF SORRENSON: How do you think partnerships should operate, 
particularly in terms of consultation between the two Treaty partners? 
MR FLOWERS: Well, to me, it must operate as a number of different 
levels. There should be, and starting for no particular reason, at the level 
of the governance of the organisation; there should be clear partnership 
principles stated in terms of the company policy and the role and 
obligations of the Directors, and that's what we have been most recently 
dealing with. 
At the level of management, there should be a clear and proper 
representation of a Maori perspective, and advice and views at the 
management level, and that's what Mr Keelan provides and why his 
position now reports directly to me; and then, at the level of providing 
Health Services. And, to do that effectively, particularly in some areas of 
health, it's vitally important that there not only be Maori staff as part of the 
health provisional team, but also that in some cases it may be better for us 
to provide services jointly with other Maori Health providers, or indeed to 
contract to them, or indeed for us not to attempt to provide those services 
at all. So, I see it as a multilevel obligation. 
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PROF SORRENSON: Yes. Would you agree that the two partners 
should consult, and that Maori views should be taken into account before a 
decision is made? 
MR FLOWERS: Yes, I do, absolutely. 
PROF SORRENSON: You see, my feeling of this whole process that's 
gone on here, particularly - I mean, particularly in relation to the decision 
to concentrate the hospital facilities at Hastings, is that - and I'm not 
accusing you personally of this, because you didn't become Chief 
Executive until 1996, after the decisions were made, but an essential 
predecessor seems to have decided that, for all sorts of good technical 
reasons, clinical reasons, administrative reasons and so on, this was a 
necessary decision. Yet, the decision itself might have been carried out in 
such a way that you were breaching the principles of the Treaty by not, 
effectively, consulting with your Treaty partner. That's what I mean. 
MR FLOWERS: Yes, I understand that. 
PROF SORRENSON: Yes; would you agree that that could have 
happened? 
MR FLOWERS: Yes. 
PROF SORRENSON: You do. Thank you very much (Tribunal 
questioning of Crown Witness Mark Flowers, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal August 2 
1999, transcript p448) 
In my view the health reform process from 1983 to 1997 has clearly not had 
nearly the level of inclusion that Maori have a right to expect as a result of the 
Treaty. Partnership has been evident in the exception rather than the rule. My 
position is that the fact that the Crown has inadequate monitoring and control 
mechanisms in the health sector to ensure Maori are appropriately included, is, in 
itself, a breach of compliance with the Treaty. In my view, the recent process of 
reform, with the implicit assumption by parties in government that the democratic 
process gives them the only mandate they require to change the health system, is 
in itself a breach of the Treaty requirements for partnership, consultation, 
representation, and participation. 
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POSTSCRIPT - AFTER 1997: THE FUTURE AND ITS 
ANTECEDENTS 
There is a strong sense of deja vu in developments in the New Zealand health 
sector in the post 1997 political scene. There is a sense of having been here 
before, of the newly created District Health Boards of 2000 resembling the old 
Area Health Boards of the late 1980s. There is a strong sense that the place of the 
Treaty in health is being litigated yet again, and that the place of Maori interests is 
secondary to the political imperatives for change. 
The 1996 National-New Zealand First Coalition 
Government: Health Agreement: A Softer Gentler Health 
Service? 
The Coalition agreement between the National Party and the New Zealand First 
Party was entered in order to enable them to form a government with a majority 
after the 1996 election. The Agreement covered a wide range of policy related to 
the state sector. The influence of Ka Awatea (1990) is evident in the health 
policies and the way in which health disparities were to be addressed. 
The major structural change to flow from the coalition government efforts was 
that the four Regional Health Authorities created in 1993 were combined into the 
Transitional Health Authority, which was subsequently replaced by the Health 
Funding Authority, formally created October 1 1998. 
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The 1998 change in name of the state health providers from Crown Health 
Enterprises to Hospital and Health Services derived directly from the National-
New Zealand First Coalition agreement. The politicians argued that it was more 
than a name change. The key initiatives of the health policy focused on increased 
resourcing and structural changes such as the centralisation of the functions of the 
Regional Health Authorities. Crown Health Enterprises, soon to become HHSs, 
were required to have less of a commercial focus or profit motive, and were now 
to operate only in a "business like manner". Other changes included the return of 
a level of direct community representation, with local Councils being invited to 
nominate two candidates for inclusion on CHE Boards, with the condition that 
they not be sitting Councillors. 
Maori health remained a high priority for government in its funding and delivery 
of health services under the National-New Zealand First Coalition agreement. 
Policy advice to the incoming National-New Zealand First Coalition government 
following the 1996 election stressed that the three key issues in Maori health 
were: 
• Maori health remaining a health sector priority for improvement 
• The need to consolidate gains in Maori health development 
• The need to continue to acknowledge the special relationship between Maori 
and the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi 
Improvements in Maori health status were identified as priorities. 
In recognition of Government's commitment to improving the status of 
Maori health, increased resources will be made available to provide Maori 
leadership within the health sector, and to enable the continuing growth 
and development of Maori health service provision by Maori (The 
National - New Zealand First Coalition Agreement on Health, 1996, p34) 
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The key initiatives of National-New Zealand First Coalition Maori policy relevant 
to health included: 
• Implement Ka Awatea as amended 
• The development of the four Maori Commissions, including the 
Maori Health Commission, Maori Economic Unit, Maori 
Education and Maori Employment and Training Unit 
• To review the representation ( of Maori) on various government 
bodies (The National - New Zealand First Coalition Agreement 
on Health, 1996, p35) 
The Commissions were expected to act as a "think-tank" to monitor progress and 
design initiatives to work with Crown agencies. They were established in 1997 
and were accountable to the Minister of Maori Affairs, Tau Henare. 
However, while the National-New Zealand First Coalition Agreement health 
policy encouraged the development of Maori health service providers, the Article 
Two argument of "by Maori for Maori" appears to have been supported as it 
coincided with the government's thrust towards decreased dependency on the 
state and the encouragement of the development of private providers to compete 
in the market, in preference to sole or primary state owned health service 
providers (Steering Group, Ministers of Health, 1997) 
The 1999 Labour Government: - Back to the Future 
Prior to the general election of 1999 the Labour Party signalled their intention that 
the health sector would again be restructured should they become the government. 
Two of the strongest and most consistent criticisms Labour had voiced about the 
1990s reforms were the dominance of a commercial focus and the lack of 
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openness and accountability. The Labour health policy stated that profit should 
not be the motivation of the public health sector; 'Labour will introduce the New 
Zealand Public Health Services Bill to ensure that hospitals are no longer under 
the Companies and Commerce Act and that cooperation rather than competition 
drives the health system'. 
Labour Maori Health policy 1999 
The Labour/Alliance Coalition Government was elected in 1999. The health 
policy and strategy that the Labour Party campaigned on revisited some of the 
policy they had promoted in their previous term of government ( 1984-90). 
Economic, social and cultural factors were described as the most important 
determinants of good health by this government (Turla, Lecture, 7 July 2000) 
The Labour Maori health policy stated that a Labour government would: 
• Encourage the integration of culturally appropriate health 
services as part of the wider holistic approach to whanau, hapu, 
iwi and Maori development; 
• Ensure equitable representation on District Health Boards and 
cultural safety is part of on-going quality and safety monitoring 
across the health sector. 
• Ensure the delivery of New Zealand Mental Health Strategy is 
consistent with Treaty principles, and that Maori have access to 
mental health services that are aligned to cultural expectations; 
• Identify and develop specialist services for tamariki, rangatahi, 
kuia and koroheke and increase the availability of kaupapa 
Maori services to all Maori across the health sector; 
• Increase the Maori health workforce, their skill base and 
encourage further professional development (Labour Party, 
1999, Part 1) 
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The policy outline provided little or no detail as to how these gains would be 
achieved. There was no timeframe given as to when these commitments would be 
delivered on. 
In 2000, at the commencement of their term of government Labour indicated that 
it was prepared to commence another era of significant health sector reform with 
scant detail provided. This raised questions as to how developed the policy was let 
alone its potential implications on the sector if Labour achieved a successful 
election to government. 
There was no explicit Treaty of Waitangi reference to Crown and Maori 
relationships in Labour's Maori health policy (Labour Party, 1999, Part I). When 
the Government was undertaking another round of extensive health reforms 
without a clear position on its Treaty relationship with Maori and implications for 
the health sector there was cause for concern. A definite position on this would 
have underpinned structural reform and provided clarity as to the way they 
intended to move forward. 
The policy did not make reference to complex issues of consultation with Maori 
prior to the pending sector changes and the need for lwi mandate for 
implementation at the regional level. Equitable representation on District Health 
Boards does not adequately address the Treaty responsibilities on the Crown and 
the special relationship between the Crown and Maori, as it only addresses 
citizenship rights inherent in Article 3 of the Treaty. Rights of participation and 
partnership inherent in the other articles are ignored. 
Page 316 
Labour Maori Health Policy was consistent with that of preceding governments in 
their recognition of Article Two rights of governance of Maori entities, and a lack 
of explicitness on Article Three accountabilities on the Crown. The addressing of 
inequities occurs in the general health policy; 
• Labour will rebuild a comprehensive public health system for 
all New Zealanders. 
• Labour will ensure that access to the health system is not 
limited by ability to pay. 
• ensuring strong community services and affordable primary 
care are accessible for all; 
• improving the overall health status of New Zealanders. 
(Labour Party, 1999, Part 1) 
This did not explicitly address Article Three responsibilities, particularly the 
responsibility for ensuring Maori citizens have health status no worse than that of 
their fellow citizens. The challenge of poor Maori health status is ignored, with a 
focus on equity of access unlikely to redress past inequities, and thereby create 
equity of outcome. 
Labour-Alliance Coalition Government - District Health Boards and 
the Current Structure of the Health Sector 
The 1999 Labour-Alliance Government further restructured the health sector, 
disestablished the Health Funding Authority and transferred its purchasing 
functions to 22 new District Health Boards. The rationale for this was to 'simplify 
health bureaucracies and cut administration costs' (Labour Party, 1999, Part 1 ). 
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The previous HHSs would expand to form the bases for 22 District Health Boards 
and have both the funding and service provider roles. The proposed structure had 
many similarities to the Area Health Board model of the 1980s though with eight 
more administrative regions than the fourteen AHBs of that time. The new 
structure provided for a return to local representation and accountability on the 
Boards and a community oriented public health service. The Government had 
committed to: 
• establish District Health Boards, which will consult local people on five-year 
regional strategic health plans for the provision of local health services. 
• return to elected representation and public accountability. District Health 
Boards will be made up of a majority of elected representatives 
• empower local people to make decisions about their health services. 
Thus the health sector since the 1999 election has again been in a time of 
structural transition and uncertainty. The new structure was to be in place by 
November 2000. This was the most rapid health reform process embarked on by a 
government in the last two decades. There was a stark contrast between the 1999 
Labour-Alliance government time frame of a matter of months to the sedate and 
considered five-year pilot study of the Area Health Board model trialed in 
Wellington and Northland in the mid to late 1980s. The National government of 
1990 allowed a two-year time of transition for the radical reforms of the health 
sector they introduced. Due to the speed that the 1999 Labour-Alliance 
government attempted to introduce change it was not surprising that the proposed 
timetable they were working to experienced some delays. 
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The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 
The legislation that defined the new structure, the lines of accountability and the 
roles and responsibility was the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 
2000. The Act replaced the Health Funding Authority and the HHSs with District 
Health Boards (DHBs). In the new structure the DHBs were to have a population 
health focus with the overall objective of improving the health of the population 
in their districts. DHBs were to be responsible for analysing the health and 
disability needs of their populations, and then either funding services from non-
government providers to meet the identified needs, or providing hospital-based 
services from their own facilities. Boards would be made up from seven members 
elected by the DHB population, and up to four members appointed by the 
Minister of Health. Each DHB was to have a minimum of two Maori members. 
The Act included several sections aimed at achieving Government's objectives for 
Maori health. The broad thrust of the specific Maori sections was to: 
• recognise and respect the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
• establish mechanisms for Maori participation throughout the 
sector 
• protect gains already made and move forward to strengthen 
Maori provider and workforce development, to improve 
mainstream service responsiveness to Maori, and to close gaps 
between the health of Maori and other populations (Maori 
Health Directorate, Ministry of Health, Information Sheet -
Provisions for Maori Health and the Treaty of Waitangi in the 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 19 
September 2000 update) 
The Ministry of Health identified the key Maori measures in the Act, as set out in 
Table 10 below. 
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Table 10: Key Measures Specific to Maori in the New Zealand 
Public Health and Disability Act 2000. 
• A reference to reducing the well established inequalities which exists between different population groups within 
New Zealand society 
Section 3(1)(b) "to reduce health disparities by improving the health outcomes of Maori and other population 
groups." 
• A reference to the Treaty of Waitangi to give legal support and backing to the Government's commitment to the 
Treaty and Maori health improvement: 
Section 4: "In order to recognise and respect the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and with a view to 
improving health outcomes for Maori. Part 3 provides for mechanisms to enable Maori to contribute to decision-
making on, and to participate in the delivery of, health and disability services." 
• DHBs will have the statutory objective of improving Maori health outcomes and reducing disparities between 
Maori and other New Zealanders. Section 22: Objectives of DHBs 
• To ensure effective Maori participation and contribution to Maori health improvement. 
DHB governing boards will need to establish and maintain relationships with Maori in their regions so Maori can 
participate in, and contribute to, strategic planning for Maori health gain. Section 23(1)(d) 
• DHBs will have the statutory function of continuing to develop Maori capacity to participate in the sector and to 
provide for their own needs. Section 23(1)(e) 
• DHBs must provide information to Maori for the purposes of Maori partnership, participation, capacity 
building. Section 23(1)(f) 
• To ensure an effective voice for Maori at the DHB level: 
Maori will be represented on DHB boards, with Maori membership on boards proportional to the number of 
Maori in the DHB's resident population, and a minimum of two Maori on each Board (section 29(4)). DHB 
committees will also have Maori representation. Section 34-36 and Schedule 3(39)(2) 
DHBs must also consult with Maori in developing their district health plans. Section 38(3)(a) 
• DHB boards must ensure board members are familiar with the obligations and duties of a member of the board. 
Maori health issues or Treaty of W aitangi issues, and ensure any members who need to receive approved training 
Schedule 3 (5)( l) and 5(2)(c) 
The whole board is accountable for the achievement of Maori health improvement, not just Maori members. 
• DHBs must be good employers of Maori - which includes recognising the aims and aspirations of Maori, the 
employment requirements of Maori and the need for greater involvement of Maori as employees. Section 
6:lnterpretation 
• DHB accountability arrangements and operating rules will hold DHBs to account for achieving their Maori 
health objectives and functions. This is achieved by linking DHB strategic district plans, district annual plan and 
reporting requirements under the Public Finance Act to their objectives and functions sections 38(1)(a), 
39(2)(b)(i), 42(3)(b). Opening DHB meetings to the public section 38(4), making all DHB annual plans, agendas 
and reports available to the public (subject to some protections) Schedule 3, sections 16 and 19, and requiring 
disclosure of conflicts of interest for board members Schedule 3 section 34 are other important accountability 
mechanisms. 
These accountability mechanisms are designed to maximise transparency as well as effectiveness and efficiency -
and among other things, to ensure DHBs use Maori providers where that would be more effective and appropriate 
than using DHB sen•ices 
• Other mechanisms in the Act available to the Government to achieve its Maori health objectives include the New 
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Zealand Health and Disability strategies (section 8), Crown Funding Agreements (section 10), the Minister's 
power to make directions ( section 32 ), to require provision of services ( section 33 ). or to request information 
from DHBs (section 44). The rewards and sanctions in the Act can also be used to get traction on Maori health 
issues, for example appointing a Crown monitor to sit on boards (section 31 ), and the ability to replace Boards 
(section 31) or dismiss board members (Schedule 3 section 8). The exercising of these broader powers and 
functions will be subject to the Treaty provision. 
• DHBs boundaries (as set out in Schedule!) are based on existing HHS boundaries and local authority boundaries. 
Traditionally this has meant iwi boundaries do not always align with HHS boundaries so just as has been needed 
in the past, ways will be needed to work around this. 
• DHBs will be required to get the Minister's agreement or in some cases the agreement of the Attorney General to 
dispose of land under the Act (Part 7). The government policy is that DHB land will go through the land-banking 
process. 
The draft New Zealand Health Strategy and New Zealand Disability Strategy "Whakanui Oranga" contain high 
level goals and objectives for Maori health. These will be further developed in the Maori Health Strategy, which 
the Ministry is developing now. 
The Ministry of Health will also develop guidelines/protocols, model agreements and disputes resolution 
procedures etc to assist the DHBs in achieving their responsibilities under the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Selective quotes from Maori Health Directorate, Ministry of Health, Information Sheet - Provisions for Maori 
Health and the Treaty of W aitangi in the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 19 September 2000 
update) 
The Ministry identified a further work programme addressing policy and 
guideline development on the application of the Treaty ofWaitangi and funding 
work to include the needs of Maori communities. It also identified the timetable 
for the development of the Maori Health Strategy, with a public discussion 
document (King, 2001) due by May 2001, and the final Strategy in August 2001. 
Clearly, the stated intention as outlined in Table 10 is a more detailed attempt at 
bringing the Treaty back into focus within health sector structures. As such, it is 
reminiscent of the good intentions of the late 1980s Area Health Board period, it 
remains to be seen whether those intentions are any more effective at delivering 
for Maori than they were the first time around. 
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Debate over the Treaty of Waitangi and the NZ Public 
Health and Disability Act 2000 
Restructuring Risks 
While the new Labour-Alliance government of 1999 believed it had a mandate to 
return the health system to a more localised structure, not everyone agreed with 
this strategy. Te Puni Kokiri advised its Minister in January 2000 that: 
District Health Boards may interfere with the significant advancements 
over the past ten years in terms of Maori representation in the purchasing 
and provision of health services (TPK, 21 January 2000) 
Te Puni Kokiri had concerns regarding the direction of the restructuring, and what 
they saw as the very real threat to the Treaty partnerships established in health. 
Te Puni Kokiri is concerned at the level of genuine commitment the 
proposed structure has to improving health outcomes for Maori. 
Considerable attention must be given to the obligations of the Crown in 
relation to the Treaty of Waitangi partnership requirements with Maori. 
This partnership must be based upon equitable representation in both the 
decision-making processes and in the implementation of policy and 
services at both a national and local level. Te Puni Kokiri advises that 
implementation of the proposed health sector changes without adequate 
consultation with Maori opens the Ministry of Health (as representatives 
of the Crown) to potential legal challenges on the basis of breaching 
Treaty obligations (TPK, 21 January 2000) 
In the event, Te Puni Kokiri's concerns were to be justified. Maori input into the 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Bill was through the select committee 
process, on exactly the same basis as other citizens, rather than specific 
consultation with Maori, in acknowledging their partnership role in respect of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
Others, including Professor Mason Durie, the then chair of the National Health 
Committee, and an eminent Maori Health academic, echoed their concerns: 
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One of the characteristics of the (pre 1999) reforms was that there was 
some partial deregulation of the health sector and in that climate it was 
possible for providers of Maori health services to begin to make a strong 
contribution. Now no-one's I don't think absolutely [sure] what the new 
look will be like in the reformed health service, but there is a concern that 
the balance between the national objectives that might be set and the local 
priorities could lead to some down-playing of Maori health providers as a 
strategy for developing Maori health. And that would be the concern ... 
But what I'm not sure about is whether the District Health Boards will 
want to take a wider view than simply representation. Whether they will 
be concerned about how the Treaty of Waitangi might impact on their 
activities for example (Radio New Zealand "Checkpoint" 5-6 PM Friday 
25 February 2000) 
Maori concerns were mounting. The response of Maori to the call for interim 
District Health Board members was significant. 
"Treaty relationships already established in the health sector must be built 
on and improved by mana whenua and these Hospital and Health Services 
boards until the District Health Boards are established, and must exist at . 
all levels of the decision-making process. 
"Participation in decision-making processes is therefore not optional for 
Maori it is a requirement. 
"Whanau, hapu and iwi involvement in the new health structures through 
representation is an example of that requirement. 
"I am therefore very pleased at the response to the Governments' call for 
nomination for the extra places on the Hospital and Health Services 
boards. 
"There have been 408 Maori people nominated, making up 22 per cent of 
the overall nominations. There is strong interest in every region and I 
thank you all for your willingness to become involved in the new health 
structures of this Government. 
"It is only through your willingness to participate and work with us, that 
the Government can fulfil its commitment to improve the Maori health 
status and Maori development (Turia, Press Release, 10 March 2000) 
The Minister accepted that a level of concern was both evident and justified. She 
reassured Maori that their health concerns remained a distinct priority for the 
government. 
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I accept that is a concern among Maori and others in the community, that 
there could be backsliding in terms of Maori provision and the building of 
Maori capacity. I accept that is a concern and I'm also concerned to make 
sure that Maori know that is not the direction of this government. We 
made it very clear in our policy that we want to develop services for Maori 
by Maori as a priority. That we want to close the gaps that we have in 
health status in New Zealand between Maori and the rest of the population 
and we know that the best way to do that is actually to grow the capacity 
of Maori to provide. So my task as I see it is to convince Maori that they 
will not be left out in the health system reforms, that they wont be ignored 
by District health boards, and that in fact the growth of their provision is a 
priority for us (King, Radio New Zealand "Checkpoint" 5-6 PM Friday 25 
February 2000) 
The Treaty in the Bill 
The Minister set high expectations for Maori in respect of the Public Health and 
Disability legislation to enact the new health structure. 
Reference to Treaty in Bill 
The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Bill will include a Treaty 
of Waitangi clause to affirm and give coherence to the Government 
commitment to the partnership between Maori and the Crown. 
This will have a significant impact in reducing disparities in health 
between Maori and other New Zealanders. Legislative provisions will 
empower DHBs to meet their objectives with regard to Maori health. 
Maori can have greater confidence that the health system will deliver more 
effectively for Maori. 
DHB boards will have an obligatory partnership to enable mana whenua to 
participate in and contribute to the development of strategic planning for 
Maori health improvement in their regions. 
There will also be other arrangements including memoranda of 
understanding or relationship agreements between the DHB and other 
Maori organisations such as Maori development organisations, to ensure 
Maori generally have the opportunity to contribute to and participate in 
strategies to improve Maori health. 
DHBs will be required to continue to build capacity for Maori to provide 
for their own health and disability needs and improve mainstream service 
responsiveness to Maori. 
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Building on Achievements To Date 
The Government is committed to protecting gains in Maori provider 
development and to building on those gains. 
It is envisaged that Maori development organisations will evolve over 
time, taking on more responsibility as their capacity grows. Potentially 
they could evolve into organisations responsible for a wide range of 
services for Maori, not just health. 
Representation on DHB Boards 
Maori membership on DHB boards will reflect the proportion of Maori in 
the DHB population, with at least two Maori on each board. Ministerial 
appointments to boards will be used to supplement the results of the DHB 
elections to ensure this level of Maori representation. 
National Maori Forum 
A national Maori forum will be convened at least once a year to provide 
Maori representatives with an opportunity to discuss existing and future 
Maori health policy directions with the Minister of Health (King, Issue 16, 
August 2000) 
Three key areas formed the focus of public debate on Maori and the Bill. These 
were: 
3 Purpose 
( 1 ) The purpose of this Act is to provide for the public funding and 
provision of personal health services, public health services, and disability 
support services, and to establish new public health organisations, in order 
to----
(d) consistently with the purposes specified in paragraphs (a) to (c), 
recognise and respect the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
4 Treaty of Waitangi 
This Act is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi 
14 Functions of DHBs 
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(4) To Establish and maintain partnership relationships between the board 
of the DHB and mana whenua (New Zealand Public Health and Disability 
Bill 48-1 (2 August 2000)) 
Debate on these was not long in coming. 
Response to Treaty Clauses 
In the debate that surrounded the proposed legislation there were arguments put 
forward that suggested that the increased recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi in 
health over the last two decades had not taken place. For example, the Race 
Relations Conciliator took a strong stand in opposition to the Treaty clauses when 
making his submission to the select committee, as outlined in the following 
paragraphs. Despite the new government's stated (Labour Party, 1999, Part 1, & 
Turla, Lecture, 7 July 2000) pre and post election intentions to have a Treaty 
based approach to health legislation as part of their 'closing the gaps' strategy to 
reduce disparity between Maori and non-Maori they did not deliver. The Public 
Health and Disability Act 2000 was initially proposed to be more Treaty specific 
than the 1993 legislation had been. However, what appears to have occurred was a 
clawing back to maintaining the status quo. 
The Race Relations Conciliator made a submission to the Parliamentary Health 
Select Committee on the Government's proposed health legislation. It argued that 
the proposed legislation should not be biased towards Maori on the basis of the 
Treaty of Waitangi as it would be discriminatory towards non-Maori. 
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The conciliator raised three separate areas of concern. He objected to the inclusion 
of the Treaty on the grounds of its divisiveness, and also on the grounds that it 
would privilege Maori ahead of other New Zealanders. 
The Conciliator recommends the removal of clause 4. Including the 
direction that the legislation is interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi could be unduly divisive and would 
not promote positive race relations in New Zealand. This is particularly 
important in view of the acknowledgment that the implications of the 
Human Rights Act 1993 have not been fully considered. There have been 
concerns with section 44 in the past as it relates to health services. It 
cannot be assumed that section 73 will always apply and, if does, whether 
it is appropriate. 
The Conciliator agrees that it is appropriate to adopt measures which will 
address Maori poor health. However, this should not be at the expense of 
other New Zealanders. There are better ways of addressing this, for 
example, targeting high-risk groups. If there are a disproportionate number 
of Maori within those groups, then they stand to benefit from the measure 
in greater numbers (Race Relations Conciliator, 2000, pl2) 
He also objected to the appointment of Maori to District Health Boards on any 
other grounds but that of their skill and knowledge. 
The Conciliator is not opposed to requiring specific Maori representation 
on District Health Boards, but those appointed should be appointed for 
their particular skills and knowledge of the health area rather than because 
they are Maori (Race Relations Conciliator, 2000, pl2) 
All three objections miss much of the debate around the role of the Treaty in 
health, and the Treaty's legal status as I have argued in chapter 2. The fact that the 
Treaty is a point of division is only a reflection of the fact that New Zealand is not 
a monocultural society, though at times its institutions behave as though it is. 
Maori simply do not have the same health status as that of other New Zealanders, 
and are arguably a high-risk group. Health rationing on any group's behalf (say 
people suffering from diabetes) is always going to be at the expense of other New 
Zealanders. 
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The third objection completely misses the possibility of Maori participating with 
the Crown in a partnership on District Health Boards. Needless to say, that 
possibility has not come to fruition. 
Maori similarly challenged the notion of mana whenua, seeing this as a coinage to 
avoid the difficult issue of the relationship between tangata whenua and urban 
Maori and their varying aspirations. 
The Treaty in the Act 
The challenges to the Bill led to a substantial watering down of its provisions in 
the finally enacted Health and Disability Services Act 2000. The purpose no 
longer made reference to the Treaty of Waitangi, clause 4 focused on a much 
narrower application of the Treaty, and the notion of partnership with mana 
whenua was reduced to ensuring Maori could continue to participate and build 
capacity. 
3 Purpose 
( 1) The purpose of this Act is to provide for the public funding and 
provision of personal health services, public health services, and disability 
support services, and to establish new publicly-owned health and disability 
organisations, in order to pursue the following objectives: 
(a) ... 
(b) to reduce health disparities by improving the health outcomes of Maori 
and other population groups: 
4 Treaty of Waitangi 
In order to recognise and respect the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, and with a view to improving health outcomes for Maori, Part 3 
provides for mechanisms to enable Maori to contribute to decision-making 
on, and to participate in the delivery of, health and disability services. 
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23 Functions of DHBs 
( 1) For the purpose of pursuing its objectives, each DHB has the following 
functions: 
(a) ... 
(d) to establish and maintain processes to enable Maori to participate in, 
and contribute to, strategies for Maori health improvement: 
( e) to continue to foster the development of Maori capacity for 
participating in the health and disability sector and for providing for the 
needs of Maori: 
(f) to provide relevant information to Maori for the purposes of paragraphs 
(d) and (e): (New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000) 
Fit with Closing The Gaps 
The 1999 Labour/ Alliance coalition government was being challenged on a 
number of fronts in respect of Maori issues. The cornerstone policy of "Closing 
the Gaps" (Turia, Lecture, 7 July 2000) had come under increasing fire as the 
Minister of Maori Affairs proved unable to withstand pressure to resign over 
allegations of improper behaviour. The Associate Minister of Health also came 
under public criticism, when she likened the effects of colonisation on Maori to 
the Holocaust in Nazi Germany (Hill, 30 August 2000) 
By April 2001 the "Closing the Gaps" brand was firmly consigned to history. 
Mark Prebble, Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, wrote to chief executives of the state sector advising: 
At the Cabinet Policy Committee on 10 April 2001, ministers agreed to the 
rewording of two of the government's key goals. 
Ministers have asked me to emphasise that the revisions, which relate to 
references to "closing the gaps", do not represent any change to the 
substance of government policy. All chief executives remain accountable 
for the range of goals, plans and intentions that the government has laid 
out over its term in office (Prebble, 2001) 
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Key government goals had been restated in greatly watered down terms. The 
government would endeavour to uphold the Treaty of Waitangi, and reduce social 
inequality. 
KEY GOVERNMENT GOALS TO GUIDE PUBLIC SECTOR POLICY 
AND PERFORMANCE 
• Strengthen National Identity and Uphold the Principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi 
Celebrate our identity in the world as people who support and defend 
freedom and fairness, who enjoy arts, music, movement and sport, and 
who value our cultural heritage; and resolve at all times to endeavour to 
uphold the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
• Reduce Inequalities in Health, Education, Employment and 
Housing 
Reduce the inequalities that currently divide our society and offer a good 
future for all by better co-ordination of strategies across sectors and by 
supporting and strengthening the capacity of Maori and Pacific Island 
communities (Prebble, 2001) 
A government under increasing public pressure had abandoned any special focus 




Appendix 1 : CCMAU Treaty Obligations in SOE 
In 1999 the Maori Health Commission developed policy with CCMAU to include 
Treaty-based obligations in the annual set of expectations. The 1999 Statement of 
Expectations from the Shareholding Ministers refers for the first time to principal 




The Crown's overall objective for Maori health is to improve Maori health 
status so that Maori have the opportunity to enjoy the same level of health 
as non-Maori. 
It is the responsibility of the HFA in making purchase decisions to ensure 
that Maori people are able to access health services relative to their needs. 
In contracting with them, we expect you to work with the HFA and with 
other providers to develop and improve health services that can effectively 
address Maori health priorities. 
Performance expectations 
Inclusion of Miiori advice at board and management levels 
When making decisions that will impact on the delivery of health services to 
Maori as customers we encourage you to seek appropriate advice. 
In accordance with good practice such decisions will normally take into 
account: 
• your HHS purchase contract requirements; 
• the cultural perspectives of Maori as consumers of your health care 
services, 
• your organisational capacity to respond appropriately and effectively 
to those customer needs, and 
• any constraints encountered in integrating and responding to advice 
on the needs of Maori people, as consumers of your health care 
services. 
Maori customer satisfaction 
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We e).pect you to continue to ensure that customer satisfaction among 
Maori is recognised as an integral part of good business practice. 
Communications with Maori providers and with Maori customers 
As part of the effective conduct of your business, it is necessary that you 
maintain appropriate links with Maori customers and Maori providers 
within your sen,ice areas. We expect you to work with the HFA to ensure 
that Maori patients and communities receiving the services of your HHS are 
kept informed of those services and initiatives. Where applicable you should 
engage in appropriate consultation processes with Maori, particularly 
where your contracts with the HFA require you to: 
i. develop new services that will impact on Maori customers; 
ii modify (where necessary) existing services in a way that will impact 
on Maori customers; or 
iii seek joint ventures or other collaborative arrangements with Maori 
organisations or providers for the provision of health services to 
Maori. 
Reporting Requirements 
Your business plan should specify your existing health services and new 
initiatives that are relevant to your Maori customers. 
In recognition of HHS responsibilities to Maori as customers and the HFA 's 
responsibilities to Maori communities, we expect HHSs to report on 
activities relevant to advancing the Government's goal for Maori health in 
your SOI. 
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Appendix 2: Health Funding Authority Maori Health Policy 
(Health Funding Authority, National Strategic Plan for Maori Health 1998-2001, 
p59,60) 
The Health Funding Authority developed a Maori health policy for the 
organisation specific to their role as purchasers. The purpose of the policy was 
defined as "to identify and implement a proactive HF A response to Maori health 
gain issues and development." (Health Funding Authority, HFA Maori Health 
Policy 1998/99, pl). The policy separated the ownership (internal) and 
performance (external) issues. 
The key internal issues identified in the policy are: 
Strategic Business Planning 
Ensure that all HF A strategic and business plans explicitly provide for the ways 
and means by which Maori health gain objectives shall be achieved. 
Financial Accountability (Funding Allocations) 
Ensure that the HF A identifies the amount of funding allocated to both 
mainstream and other services for the benefit of Maori and applies additional 
resources based upon issues of equity and need. 
Personal Accountability (Employment Contracts) 
Ensure all HF A employment contracts (including those with independent 
consultants) incorporate a standard Maori Health/Treaty clause in addition to a 
series of measurable performance goals and objectives. A recommended clause 
follows: 
Given that the Crown regards the Treaty of Waitangi as New Zealand's 
'founding document' and that Maori Health is a Crown Health Gain 
Objective, the Employee/Consultant shall ensure that in every aspect of 
employment with the HFA, all Maori health strategies, principles, policies, and 
practices approved by the HF A Board, shall be implemented in a pro-active and 
duly diligent manner. 
Collective Accountability 
Ensure that all HF A Executive Management Team decisions impacting upon 
Maori health give full regard to, and implement the Maori health strategies, 
principles, policies and practices approved by the HF A Board in a proactive and 
duly diligent manner. 
Maori Workforce Development 
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Ensure that the HF A Human Resource policies and employment practices 
encourage the active recruitment, retention and continuous quality training of 
Maori staff at all levels of the organisational structure. 
Indigenous Matrix Management System 
Ensure the implementation of an Indigenous Matrix Management System which 
provides for the strategic placement of Maori personnel within the HF A 
operational structure. 
Key external issues: 
Relationships with Maori 
Ensure that the HF A gives full regard to building relationships with Maori which 
provide the opportunity for Maori to contribute, in association with the HF A, to 
the development of principles and practices which improve Maori health status. 
Maori Provider Development 
Maori Provider Development and its contribution to improved access and choice 
of services for Maori, is supported by the HF A Board as a necessary element of 
the health sector. Therefore, approved Maori providers' shall receive the 
developmental support of the HF A which may include managed access to the 
human, technological and financial resources of the HF A. Therefore the CEO 
shall: 
Ensure Maori providers receive access to the developmental support of the 
HFA. 
Mainstream Enhancement - Contract Clauses (particularly relevant to HHS 
contracts) 
Ensure that the HFA contracts include a statement concerning the HFA's position 
on the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Health. 
Ensure that HF A contracts include a Maori Health clause requiring the provider to 
specify how it intends to implement "The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Health" 
statement. 
Strategic Dialogue 
Ensure that the HF A initiates dialogue with the HHS shareholder regarding Maori 
health policies and appointments of Maori personnel to HHS Boards. 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
Ensure that the HF A defines and implements performance accountabilities within 
provider contracts which allows for monitoring, evaluation and contract re-
definition in order to achieve Maori health gains. 
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Appendix 3: Maori Health Cabinet Papers 
Overview and Treaty of Waitangi (2000, 
http://www.executive.govt.nz/minister/king/cabinetOO-
OS/index.html) 
HON ANNETTE KING, MINISTER OF HEAL TH 
MEMORANDUM TO CABINET SOCIAL POLICY AND HEAL TH 
COMMITTEE 
THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES FOR MAORI 
PARTNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION 
Four Cabinet papers being released today set out the 
Government's policy with regard to partnership with Maori 
and Maori participation in the District Health Boards. The 
Government's overall aim is to: 
• acknowledge the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
• protect gains already made in Maori provider 
development 
• move forward, to strengthen Maori provider and 
workforce development, to improve mainstream 
service responsiveness to Maori, and to close gaps 
between the health of Maori and other populations. 
The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Zealand Health and 
Disability Bill 
• The Government has decided there will be a reference 
to the Treaty of Waitangi in the New Zealand Health 
and Disability Bill to give legal effect to the 
Government's commitment to the principles of the 
Treaty 
• There will be a general reference of a high level 
nature in the Bill when it is introduced, while further 
work is done to specify how the Government will give 
effect to its commitment in more detail 
• The more detailed work will not be completed in time 
for the introduction of the Bill, so will incorporated 
into policies, guidelines, protocols or other 
mechanisms. 
Partnership between Maori and the Crown 
• There will be partnership arrangements between 
Maori and the Crown at all levels of the health and 
disability sector. While there is an expectation that 
Page 335 
relationship arrangements be established at each 
level, there will be flexibility about how this is done, 
since the characteristics and needs will be different 
from area to area. 
• At the DHB governing board level, there will be 
Treaty-based partnership agreements between the 
board and the mana whenua of the region. The 
purpose of these agreements will be to ensure iwi are 
able to participate strategic planning to improve the 
health of, Maori in the area 
• Existing relationship agreements between the HFA 
and local iwi will be rolled over to the DHBs until they 
can be replaced with more appropriate arrangements, 
and DHBs will be required to develop relationship 
agreements in areas where there are none 
• DHBs will be able to establish Maori health advisory 
committees or other advisory mechanisms where 
appropriate 
• At the DHB operational level there will be memoranda 
of understanding and other agreements between the 
DHB and Maori. The aim is to continue to build Maori 
capacity to provide for their own health and disability 
needs, and to continue to improve mainstream servic 
responsiveness to Maori 
• Maori service providers will continue to work with the 
DHBs, Maori Development Organisations and 
mainstream providers to improve service delivery to 
Maori. 
• It is envisaged that these Maori health and disability 
organisations will evolve over time, increasingly 
taking on responsibilities as their capacity grows, and 
potentially evolving into holistic organisations 
responsible for a range of services for Maori, not just 
health 
• At the national level, there will be a new national 
Maori health forum, intended to provide a route for 
Maori to discuss with Ministers and the Ministry of 
Health issues of strategic importance to Maori health, 
and to have a say in national policy that impacts on 
Maori health. The forum will not replace other means 
for Maori to provide advice on national health policy 
issues by will provide a regular forum to supplement 
other ad hoc consultation and advisory arrangements. 
Maori representation on DHB Boards 
• There will be at least two Maori members on each 
DHB governing board, with additional Maori members 
where necessary to reflect the proportion of Maori in 
the DHB population. This will be achieved through a 
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fairer DHB voting system, the Single Transferable 
Voting system (STV) - a proportional voting system 
which is likely to achieve better representation of 
minority groups, including Maori - with the results of 
the elections supplemented with Ministerial 
appointments to achieve the required levels of Maori 
representation. Each DHB governing board will have 
seven elected members and up to four appointed 
members. 
HON ANNETTE KING, MINISTER OF HEAL TH 
MEMORANDUM TO CABINET SOCIAL POLICY AND HEAL TH 
COMMITTEE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI IN HEALTH LEGISLATION 
PROPOSAL 
This paper compares three options in relation to the 
inclusion of a reference to the Treaty of Waitangi in 
the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Bill: 
no clause 
a generic clause 
a clause with greater specificity. 
I recommend that a generic clause be agreed to, with 
the precise wording to be drafted by the 
Parliamentary Counsel's Office in consultation with th 
Crown Law office. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Ministers have indicated their support for the inclusion of 
a Treaty clause in the NZ Public Health and Disability 
Bill to affirm and give coherence to the Government's 
commitment to the partnership between Maori and 
the Crown, to maintaining Maori confidence in the 
health sector, and to accelerating progress towards 
parity between Maori and non-Maori health. 
Given the precedent that such a clause might set for 
other social service legislation, the paper compares 
the risks and benefits of the inclusion of such a clause 
with the risks and benefits of having no Treaty clause. 
The most powerful argument for having no Treaty clause 
is the reduced risk to the Crown of litigation. The 
introduction of a specific reference to the Treaty in 
legislation carries with it a statutory responsibility to 
meet Treaty responsibilities. A moral responsibility 
becomes a legal responsibility. 
The paper concludes that the risk of litigation is not a 
sufficient reason to omit a Treaty clause from the 
Page 337 
legislation. 
The inclusion of a Treaty clause is a principled policy 
response - both to the Government's Treaty 
obligations and to its explicit commitment to 
significantly improving Maori health. 
The merits of a simple generic clause are compared with 
those of a clause with greater specificity. 
I recommend the inclusion of a simple generic clause. 
While a Treaty clause with greater specificity has an 
intuitive appeal, there is [a] some difficulty in coming 
to an agreement as to what should be specified, [b] a 
risk of becoming over prescriptive and thus limiting 
the development of genuine partnership, and [c] 
locking agencies into actions that may be 
inappropriate in some settings, or over time. 
BACKGROUND 
At their meeting on 19 April 2000, the Ad Hoc Ministerial 
Committee on Health Sector Change considered a 
paper canvassing the issues arising from the inclusion 
of a reference to the Treaty in health legislation. Whil 
Ministers supported such an inclusion, it was agreed 
that, given the precedent that the health legislation 
might set for future social service legislation, further 
work on the Government's position on the inclusion of 
a reference to the Treaty clause in social service 
legislation should be undertaken. This paper reflects 
that work. 
This paper complements several other areas of work that 
are relevant to the application of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in the health sector, particularly relating to 
the principles of participation, partnership and 
protection. These include: 
equitable representation of Maori on DHB Boards 
[CAB (00) M 2/4] An accompanying paper 
provides advice on how this could be achieved. 
Treaty-based partnership arrangements between 
Maori and the Crown and between iwi and DHBs 
[CAB (00) m 11/1A(4)]. An accompanying 
paper sets out more implementation details. 
the objectives, goals and targets for Maori health 
included in the draft New Zealand Health 
Strategy. 
WHY CONSIDER A TREATY CLAUSE? 
As Crown Law advisers have pointed out1, arguments 
about special treatment for Maori can be made 
whether or not there is a specific Treaty clause in 
legislation. Governments in recent years have 
implicitly and explicitly recognised the need for policy 
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responses to mitigate the disparities that exist 
between Maori and non-Maori and for Maori provider 
development in a range of sectors. For some time 
now, even where there is no legislative reference to 
the Treaty of Waitangi, Courts have tended to refer to 
the principles of the Treaty as an aid to statutory 
interpretation in matters of particular concern to 
Maori. Crown Law cites the High Court's decision in 
Barton-Prescott2 as a case of interest 'because it 
moves further toward making the Treaty a mandatory 
relevant consideration for decision makers in areas 
where the court considers relevant Maori interests are 
affected." 
The Government may, however, include a Treaty clause 
where it wishes to: 
affirm the Treaty, and/or 
give legal effect to particular Treaty- based 
entitlements. 
Ministers have already indicated that they wish to include 
a Treaty clause in the New Zealand Public Health and 
Disability Act - in effect affirming and bringing 
coherence to the Government's policy commitment to 
ensuring an effective partnership between Maori 
and the Crown in the health and disability secto 
maintaining Maori confidence in the restructured 
health sector 
accelerating progress towards parity between 
Maori and non-Maori health. 
Since there are no precedents thus far in social service 
legislation, and since a decision in this particular 
instance may set a trend for future legislation, this 
paper compares the risks and benefits of the inclusion 
of a Treaty clause ( of two different levels of 
specificity) with the risks and benefits of the exclusion 
of such a clause. 
OPTION ONE: NO CLAUSE 
Under this option, there would be no specific reference t 
the Treaty of Waitangi in the Act. Instead, the 
Government's intentions with respect to Maori health 
would be conveyed through other means: i.e. specific 
clauses in the New Zealand Public Health and 
Disability Act which set out the Government's 
intentions for Maori without reference to the Treaty; 
the goals, targets and service priorities for Maori in 
the NZ Health Strategy and the NZ Disability 




The Government's commitment to Maori [issues} will 
be perceived as being lacking. 
Maori expectations have been raised by Government 
manifesto and policy statements in relation to Maori. 
Omission of any reference to the Treaty in legislation 
will be deeply disappointing to Maori, particularly 
those in the health sector who have argued for such 
inclusion for some time. The omission may of itself be 
perceived as a breach of the partnership and 
protection principles of the Treaty. 
The lynch pin of the "model for partnership" will be 
missing 
The model for partnership at each level of the health 
system [described in CAB(OO) 11/1A (4) and 
accompanying paper] will lack its key element. The 
Treaty of Waitangi underpins that model, and Maori 
expect that the Treaty will underpin their relationship 
with this Government. 
Maori may increasingly seek to address health status 
issues through the Waitangi Tribunal 
The Waitangi Tribunal may more frequently be called 
upon to fill what might be perceived to be a policy 
vacuum, directing the Government in respect of its 
obligations to Maori health. 
BENEFITS 
The Crown will have less exposure to the risk of 
litigation 
With the introduction of a specific reference to the Treaty 
into legislation, a statutory responsibility to meet 
Treaty obligations ensues. As Crown Law notes 
"maintaining the status quo does not alter the legal 
risk from the present situation. The issue becomes a 
policy one as to whether this [position] is adequate 
from the Treaty perspective. "3 
Comment 
The omission of a specific reference to the Treaty in the 
health legislation would not diminish the 
Government's responsibility in relation to Maori health 
development. Nor would it limit the Government's 
ability to require health sector agencies to take 
account of those responsibilities. However, omission 
of any reference to the Treaty would be interpreted b 
Maori as indicative of a less than whole-hearted 
commitment to the principle of partnership and as 
such could be seen to be making a negative 
contribution to Maori health and well being. 
Footnote(s): 
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Advice to Ministry of Justice (1996); Draft Advice to Treasury (1997); Advice to 
Ministry of Health (April 2000) 
2 
a child custody case ,where the well-being of a whanau was at stake 
3 
Crown Law Advice to Ministry of Health, May 2000 
HON ANNETTE KING, MINISTER OF HEAL TH 
MEMORANDUM TO CABINET SOCIAL POLICY AND HEAL TH 
COMMITTEE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI IN HEAL TH LEGISLATION 
CONTD 
OPTION TWO: A GENERIC TREATY CLAUSE 
A 'generic' clause is a general reference to the Treaty of 
Waitangi without further specification of processes or 
actions that will occur in the context of 
acknowledgement of the Treaty. 
Two examples of 'generic 'clauses are Section 4 of the 
Conservation Act ( 1987) and Section 9 of the State 
Owned Enterprises Act (1986): 
This Act shall be so interpreted and administered to 
give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. ' 
[Conservation Act] 
"Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. "[SOE Act] 
The Treaty clause in the draft Te Puni Kokiri legislation is 
a current variation: 
"This Act must be interpreted in a manner that is 
consistent with the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi." 
Crown Law advises that important legal consequences 
flow from the different wording used in the various 
generic clauses. If Ministers agree to a generic clause, 
it is proposed that, with the assistance of the Crown 
Law Office, the Parliamentary Counsel Office draft the 
form of words that most appropriately gives effect to 
the Government's policy intention (summarised in 
para 3 above). 
RISKS 
Inclusion of any Treaty clause lowers the threshold 
for litigation 
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Inclusion of a Treaty clause in legislation gives legal 
weight to Maori aspirations in relation to health: 
"Conversion of previously unenforceable Treaty 
obligations into those of an enforceable kind by way 
of a statutory reference will increase rather than 
reduce litigation if for no other reason than the fact 
that there is thereby made available an independent 
accountability mechanism. If it is a general clause 
that requires compliance with Treaty principles, 
litigation is even more likely as the nature of the 
Treaty obligation (as well as whether the standard is 
met on the facts) is left open to the courts to decide 
in particular circumstances." [Crown Law, April 2000] 
Maori will no longer be limited to the Waitangi Tribunal in 
seeking redress for perceived inadequacies in health 
care. It is difficult to predict the extent to which 
litigation may occur, although there may be some 
initial 'testing of the waters' for the purpose of 
establishing the bounds of the law. This would direct 
resources from other areas of health and disability 
funding but could be considered a desirable 
constitutional process. 
Following the pattern of claims to the Waitangi Tribunal, 
it is likely that challenges will be seen in two main 
areas: Maori control over their own health resources 
under Article 2, and claims that the Crown has failed 
to actively protect Maori health status compared to 
other New Zealanders under Article 34• 
A generic clause may mean that Treaty principles are 
applied in unexpected ways 
It might be argued that without greater specificity as to 
the Crown's intention in relation to Maori health, 
courts may interpret Treaty principles in ways that the 
Government did not intend: 
"There is of course a risk that the Courts acting under 
such a clause could interpret or apply Treaty 
principles in unexpected ways or in ways that have 
results that are difficult to foresee. However, given 
the relatively limited nature of the Courts functions on 
judicial review and their reluctance to intervene in 
matters of resource allocation, clinical judgement or 
decisions with a high policy content, I consider the 
risk relatively low." [Crown Law, May 2000] 
Maori will be seen to have claims upon the health 
system over and above those they share as citizens. 
The insertion of a Treaty clause is acknowledgement that 
Government accepts that Maori do have claims upon 
the health system in addition to those that they have 
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as citizens, which relate to their status as indigenous 
people and Treaty partners, and their desire to have a 
say over the delivery of their own health and disabilit 
services. 
A generic Treaty reference may be seen as a token 
gesture. 
Lacking greater specificity about the Crown's intentions 
in regard to Maori health, a generic clause may be 
viewed by some Maori as merely a mantra, without 
much significance. But any Treaty clause-generic or 
specified - will be just one element of a 
comprehensive policy approach to Maori health. The 
Government's goals, targets and priorities for Maori 
health are detailed in the NZ Health Strategy; the 
proposal that a Treaty-based partnership model form 
the basis of relationships between Crown and Maori at 
all levels of the health system is detailed in an 
accompanying paper; the Government's commitment 
to equitable representation of Maori on the DHB 
Boards is the subject of the third paper in this suite. 
All of these commitments will be given direction and 
weight in both the legislation and the funding 
agreements that the Minister of Health will enter with 
DHBs. 
BENEFITS 
A reference to the Treaty acknowledges the 
Government's commitment to Maori as its Treaty 
partner. 
By taking this step of opening the door to enforcement in 
law of the Crown's responsibility to Maori the 
Government is making its commitment to Maori 
aspirations in health clear. It moves forward from the 
status quo (a reference in current legislation to the 
'special needs of Maori') with "a relatively low risk 
that the Courts would imply a substantive shift in 
jurisdiction in the absence of clear statutory terms". 
[Crown Law] 
A generic clause enables an evolutionary approach to 
partnership and participation in the health sector 
While it may be argued that a generic clause leaves 
questions unanswered as to what the Treaty of 
Waitangi means for the health sector in the 21st 
century, it might more persuasively be argued that it 
is better not to prescribe the answers in legislation, 
but rather leave them to be developed by Maori and 
non-Maori working in partnership in the health sector. 
Comment 
The inclusion of a generic Treaty clause in the health 
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legislation will lower the threshold for litigation, 
although much will depend on the actual words used 
in the clause. However it is unlikely to give rise to any 
substantive shift in jurisdiction or responsibility for 
policy, resource allocation or clinical decision-making. 
Inclusion of a Treaty clause will signal the 
Government's clear commitment to Maori as its Treat 
partner and to the importance it attaches to 
addressing the fundamental causes of Maori ill-health. 
OPTION THREE: A TREATY CLAUSE WITH GREATER 
SPECIFICITY 
This option would see a general reference to the Treaty 
of Waitangi, with a more detailed specification of how 
the principles of the Treaty would apply at various 
levels of the health sector. 
RISKS 
There is difficulty in deciding what to specify 
In moving from an elaboration of principles into 
specifying how they will operate in practice, there is a 
fine balance between being under prescriptive and 
over prescriptive. Articulating the principles of the 
Treaty is relatively easy, but operationalising them 
across all areas of the health sector may be viewed as 
an attempt to create an instruction book. At that 
point, the limiting aspect of specification becomes 
clear. It may be difficult to arrive at a consensus as to 
what should be specified (process or outcomes?), 
there are too many processes to specify, and 
Governments have too few levers to control (and 
thereby guarantee) outcomes. 
Specificity creates its own risks 
Specifying a particular process may lock agencies into 
actions that may be (a) inappropriate in some settings 
or locations and (b) difficult to adapt over time and to 
changing priorities. More appropriate practices might 
be open to legal challenge simply because they were 
outside specification. Once law, processes are not 
readily changed. 
BENEFITS 
A more detailed clause would clarify how the 
Government interprets its undertakings with respect 
to the Treaty 
It is argued that there is a need for greater clarity as to 
how the principles of the Treaty should be applied in 
the health sector. It is envisaged that this clause 
would spell out for the benefit of the sector just how 
the principles of participation, partnership and 
protection would be applied in practice throughout the 
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sector. 
A more substantial signal of Government's 
commitment is given to Maori 
Many Maori are seeking evidence of a more practical 
commitment to improving Maori health than a generic 
Treaty clause is perceived to deliver. The more that is 
specified in legislation, it is argued, the faster the 
results. However this is not a universal view. Different 
expectations and interpretations of the Treaty of 
Waitangi exist from community to community. Some 
Maori may prefer an open interpretation of the Treaty 
as opposed to one negotiated by the Government. 
There is a greater incentive to comply with principles 
that are spelled out in legislation 
DHBs and other health agencies might move more 
quickly to meet specific legal responsibilities to their 
Maori constituency once legal redress is possible. 
Greater specificity would give courts more guidance 
in any litigation involving Maori health issues 
At present, courts refer to other legal interpretations of 
Treaty principles for guidance in matters where Maori 
interests are at stake. Spelling out the Government's 
intentions in relation to Maori health issues might give 
greater assistance to the judiciary in making 
determinations in the area of health. 
Comment 
A Treaty clause with a more explicit set of accompanying 
obligations has an intuitive appeal, in that the 
Government is seen to be giving a clearer exposition 
of what it interprets its Treaty obligations in the area 
of health to be. However, in going beyond a 
statement of the principles that will underpin the 
operation of the public health service, the risk of 
limiting the development of genuine partnership by 
over-prescription becomes clearer. The legislation 
should aim to enable, rather than to control, Maori 
health development. There are other accountability 
mechanisms that can be brought to bear to achieve 
the Government's Maori health objectives. 
Footnote(s): 
4 
A review of some of the legal issues and risks that might arise based on recent 
claims to the Tribunal was canvassed in the Crown Law advice of 4 April 2000 
paragraphs 26-39. 
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1. PRIMARY SOURCES. 
Interviews were conducted with the following participants: 
Anderson, Steve; Principal Adviser, Health, CCMAU, Wellington, 12 March 
1999. 
Bednarek, Dr. Simon; President, Hawke's Bay Branch, New Zealand Medical 
Association, Napier, 13 January 1999. 
Braybrooke, Geoff; MP, Napier, 25 January 1999. 
B unkle, Phillida; MP, Alliance Spokesperson on Health, Wellington, 16 and 19 
February 1999. 
Committee of the Maori Women's Resource Centre; Napier, 19 January 1999. 
Cullen, Michael; Deputy Leader, Labour Party, List MP for Napier, Wellington, 
16 February 1999. 
Davies, Lisa; Branch Manager, Monitoring and Evaluation, Te Puni Kokiri, 
Wellington, 12 March 1999. 
Dick, Alan; Mayor of Napier, Napier, 19 February 1999. 
Douglass, Hera; Policy Analyst, Ministry of Health, Wellington, 19 February 
1999. 
Fine, Brenda and Bernard Thompson; disbanded Hawke's Bay Health Council, 
Havelock North, January 25 1999. 
Flowers, Mark; Chief Executive Officer, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 5 
February 1999. 
Hay, James; Legal Adviser, CCMAU, Wellington, 12 March 1999. 
Hodges, Wiremu; ex Maori Health Manager, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 20 
January 1999. 
Joe, Te Maari; Business Director, Te Kupenga Hauora, Napier, 26 August 1998. 
Joe, Te Maari; Business Director, Te Kupenga Hauora, Napier, 26 January 1999. 
Kirton, Neil; MP, ex Associate Minister of Health, Napier, 20 January 1999. 
Kirton, Neil; MP, ex Associate Minister of Health, Wellington, 17 February 1999. 
Macintosh, Alan; General Manager, City Medical, Napier, 19 January 1999. 
Manaia, Wiremu, Ministry of Health, Wellington, June 1997. 
Matatahi, Tutata, Primary Health Care Worker, Raukura Hauora O Tainui, 
Huntly, 11 July 1996 (for MA Thesis) 
Orsborne, John and Barry Howell; General Manager and Operations Manager, 
Hawke's Bay Ambulance Service, Napier, 29 January 1999. 
Taylor, Bevan; Chair of the Taiwhenua Office, Napier, 19 January 1999. 
Taylor, Neil; Chief Executive Officer, Napier City Council, Napier, 5 February 
1999. 
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Te Hemara-Maipi, Ramiri, Primary Health Care Worker, Raukura Hauora 0 
Tainui, Huntly, 25th June 1996 (for MA Thesis) 
Wilson, Walter; Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board Member, Maori, Wairoa, 14 
January 1999. 
Interviews were conducted with officials of the following central agencies: 
Treasury: Health Directorate, CCMAU 
Ministry of Health, including Te Kete Hauora, Safety and Regulation Branch, and 
the Performance Monitoring Branch 
Health Funding Authority: Maori Health Group, Personal Health Group, Public 
Health Group, Clinical Training Agency, Te Tai Tokerau MAPO 
Te Puni Kokiri 
Accident Compensation Corporation 
Commissioner for Children 
Maori Health Commission 
Mental Health Commission 
Ministry of Women's Affairs 
Ministry of Youth Affairs 
Work and Income New Zealand 
Interviews or meetings were conducted with officials of the following provider 
agencies: 
HHSs: 
Crown Health Association 
Auckland Healthcare 
Canterbury Health 
Capital Coast Health 
Northland Health 
Pacific Health 
Non Government Organisations 
Healthcare Aotearoa HCA 
Platform 
Pegasus IPA 
The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society 
I wi/Maori Providers 
Ngai Tahu Development Corporation 
Raukura Hauora O Tainui 
Te Hauora O Te Tai Tokerau 
Te Runanga O Nga Mata Waka 
Eru Pomare Research Institute 
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Focus groups 
First focus group, 9 participants, Taiwhenua office, Napier, 26 January, 1999 
Second focus group, 15 participants, Maori Women's Resource Centre, Napier, 
27 January, 1999 
Third focus group, cancelled by participants, Maori Wardens, Napier, 4 February 
1999 
Telephone interviews were conducted with the following participants: 
McLean, Wayne; Maori Health Commissioner, Telephone interview, 9 March 
1999 
Evidence presented at the Waitangi Tribunal Hearings into the Napier Hospital and 
Health Services (Wai 692) Claim. 
(the transcript used in this and subsequent references is an electronic copy of the 
evidence presented at the 12th hearing of the Mohaka Ki Ahuriri Inquiry, The 
Napier Hospital and Health Services Report, Waitangi Tribunal, p416) 
Chris Clark, Team Leader, Targeted Assistance Group, CCMAU, evidence for the 
Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 29 
1999 
Colin Feek, Chief Adviser, Medical, Ministry of Health, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 29 1999 
Mara Andrews, Senior Maori Planning Manager, Health Funding Authority, 
evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, W aitangi 
Tribunal July 30 1999 
Ria Earp, Deputy Director general, Maori Health, Ministry of Health, Brief of 
Evidence, Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 692 Hearing, W16, 9 July 1999 
Ria Earp evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, 
Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999 
Ria Earp cross examination of evidence for the Crown concerning Napier 
Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal July 30 1999 
Mark Flowers, Chief Executive, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal August 2 1999 
Tribunal questioning of Crown Witness Mark Flowers, evidence for the Crown 
concerning Napier Hospital Services Claim, Waitangi Tribunal August 2 1999 
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Tribunal questioning of Crown Witness Peter Wilson,, Chairman, Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay, evidence for the Crown concerning Napier Hospital Services 
Claim, Waitangi Tribunal August 2 1999 
Co"espondence with author: 
Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit; Letter - Agreed Record of Meeting 
of 12 March 1999, Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Wellington, 
1999 
Davies, Lisa; Letter to Lisa Ferguson - Clarification of Health Services 
Monitoring Roles, Te Puni Kokiri, Wellington, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Fax to Richard Moorsom - 15 April 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Craig Linkhom - 10 March 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to James Hay (CCMAU) - 18 March 1999, Harrison 
Ferguson Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Mark Flowers - 24 January 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Richard Moorsom - 14 March 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Richard Moorsom - 16 March 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Richard Moorsom - 19 March 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Richard Moorsom - 5 March 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Ferguson, Lisa; Letter to Richard Moorsom - 8 March 1999, Harrison Ferguson 
Associates, Hamilton, 1999 
Linkhom, Craig; Fax - Care of Richard Moorsom - Request Dated 10 March 
1999, For Information Requested by Napier City Council, Crown Law Office, 
Wellington, 1999 
Flowers, Mark; CEO Healthcare Hawke's Bay E-mail, 1999 
Gwynn, Robin; Letter to Lisa Ferguson - 6 April 1999, Napier, 1999. 
Linkhom, Craig; Faxed Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Interview with 
CCMAU, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999 
Linkhom, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Access to Information 
held by CCMAU 20 February 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhom, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Outstanding Matters -
8 March 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhom, Craig; Letter to author - Na pier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information - 15 February 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999 
Linkhom, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information Held by Healthcare Hawke's Bay., Crown Law Office, 
Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhom, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information dated 26 February 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhom, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information dated 10 February 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
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Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information Dated 24 January 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information Dated February 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information of 24 January 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for 
Information of 24 January 1999, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Napier Hospital Claim - Request for Official 
Information, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Request for Information (26 February, 10 and 
12 Marchl999), Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; Letter to author - Request for Information Held by CCMAU and 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Linkhorn, Craig; A Faxed Report from Richard Moorsom that Originally Came 
from Crown Counsel RE: Lisa Ferguson and Napier Hospital Services Claim, 
Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1999. 
Love, Morris T. W.; Letter oflntroduction, Ms Lisa Ferguson from Waitangi 
Tribunal - 18 December 1998, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1998. 
Moorsom, Richard; Faxed Memorandum to author in Reply to Her Memo to 
Waitangi Tribunal - Fax Sent 22 April 1999, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 
1999. 
Moorsom, Richard; Letter to Craig Linkhorn (Copied to author) - Researcher 
Access to Government Agencies - 18 February 1999, Waitangi Tribunal, 
Wellington, 1999. 
Quinliven, Michael, Fax to Lisa Ferguson from Health Funding Authority - Wai 
692 Claim (Y692 sic), Health Funding Authority, Wellington, 1999. 
Waitangi Tribunal; Terms of Reference for Lisa Ferguson - Contemporary Issues 
Report, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1998. 
Official Correspondence 
Bishop, Emily; Letter to Fred Reti - Next Five Years in General Practice - 26 June 
1998, Health Funding Authority, Wellington, 1998 
Bolger, Jim; Letter to Estelle Ward from Rt. Hon. J B Bolger - Prime Minister, 
New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995 
Bolger, Jim; Letter to H Lindsey from Rt. Hon J B Bolger - Prime Minister, New 
Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995 
Bolger, Jim; Letter to Mrs. M V Blair from Rt. Hon Jim Bolger - Prime Minister, 
New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995 
Bowes, Alistair; Acute Hospital Task Force Faxed from Healthcare Hawke's Bay, 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1993. 
Central Regional Health Authority; Letter to Alan Dick - Napier Mayor 
Regarding the Process of Consultation, Central Regional Health Authority, 
Wellington, 1995 
Collection of "Assurance" Letters from Government to "Concerned Citizens", 
New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995,96 
Coopers and Lybrand, Letter to CCMAU - Regional Hospital Proposal - Coopers 
and Lybrand Report, Coopers and Lybrand,, 1995 
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Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Briefing Note for Prime Minister's 
visit with Mayor of Napier, Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, 
Wellington, 1996 
Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Fax Letter to Ministers of Health 
and CHE - Healthcare Hawke's Bay 1995/96 Business plan review - Update, 
Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Wellington, 1995 
Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Letter to Ministers - Review of the 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay Ltd. Business Plan 1998/99 - 2000/01, Crown 
Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Wellington, 1998 
Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit; Letter to Ministers - Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay Statement of Intent Targets for 1997/98, Crown Company 
Monitoring Advisory Unit, Wellington, 1998 
Dick, Alan; Letter from Napier Mayor to Hon. Simon Upton-Hawke's Bay CHE 
Advisory Committee, Napier City Council, Napier, 1992 
Dick, Alan; Letter to Minister of Finance and CHE from Napier Mayor, Napier 
City Council, Napier, 1995 
East, Paul; Letter to Alan Dick - Mayor of Napier from Minister of CHEs, New 
Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995 
East, Paul; Letter to Alan Dick - Napier Mayor from - Minister of CHE, New 
Zealand Government, Wellington, 1992 
Edwards, B; Memo to Phillida Bunkle Including a four page resignation, New 
Zealand Resident Doctors' Association, Napier, 1998 
English, Bill; Letter from Minister of Health to Healthcare Hawke's Bay and HFA 
- Napier Health Centre and Healthcare Hawke's Bay 1998/99 - 2000/01 
Business Plan, New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1998 
English, Bill; Letter to Wilson Wright from - Minister of CHE, New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, 1996 
Flowers, Mark; Correspondence to and from Mark Flowers and Napier Mayor, 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997,98 
Flowers, Mark; Fax letter to CCMAU - Healthcare Hawke's Bay Regional 
Hospital Project - Implementation Framework, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, 
Napier, 1995 
Flowers, Mark; Letter to the Ministers of Finance and CHE, Healthcare Hawke' s 
Bay, Napier, 1995. 
Flowers, Mark; Memorandum to Directors and Executive from Neil Kirton 
Review Submission - 15 August 1997, Also Including the Submission to the 
Hawke's Bay Regional Hospital - Review of Consultation Process, 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Letter from Healthcare Hawke's Bay to Justine 
Tringham (CCMAU)- Site for proposed Napier Health Centre Napier South 
Railway Land, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1998. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Letter to Bill English - Statement of Intent Targets 
1997/98, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1998. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Letter to CEO of CCMAU - Results of Coopers and 
Lybrand's efficiency analysis, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1996. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Letter to Chris Jagger (CCMAU) - Summary of Issues, 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Letter to Minister of Health - Healthcare Hawke's Bay -
Business Plan - 13 March 1997, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997. 
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Healthcare Hawke' s Bay; Collection of Information on the Boards Decision - 2 
Letters (29 March 1995) and ( 4 April 1995) and a Written Report of the 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board Meeting, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 
1995. 
Healthcare Hawke· s Bay; Covering letter and Copy of the Decision of the Board 
of Healthcare Hawke's Bay on the Establishment of a Regional Hospital for 
Hawke's Bay, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1995. 
Henley, Geoff; Correspondence between Network Communications (New 
Zealand) Ltd and Healthcare Hawke's Bay - A Collection of Faxes. Memos 
Letters and Reports, Network Communications (New Zealand) Ltd, 
Wellington, 1994. 
Henley, Geoff; Memorandum to Mark Flowers from Network Communications -
Napier Services "Consultation", Network Communications (New Zealand) 
Ltd, Wellington, 1997 
Hodges, Wiremu; Memo to Maori Health Committee, Maori Health Services - Bi-
Monthly Report., Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997 
Hodges, Wiremu; Memo to Maori Health Committee, Maori Health Services 
- Report for December 1997, Maori Health Committee Meeting, Healthcare 
Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997. 
Joe, Te Maari; Letter to Taskforce - Submission on Regional Hospital Taskforce 
Report, Whanau Atawhai Maori Women's Welfare League, Napier, 1994. 
Laws, Michael; Letter to Paul East - Minister of CHEs from Michael Laws MP -
RE: Audit Office Powers and Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1995. 
Laws, Michael; Memorandum to Minister of Health Simon Upton from Michael 
Laws Hawke's Bay MP - RE: Napier Hospital and Hawke's Bay Health 
Commission, Napier, 1992. 
Moore, David; Letter to Alan Dick (Napier Mayor) from Regional Director 
(HFA) - Change to Future HFA Arrangements with Community Health 
Groups and Heath Councils in the Central Region, Health Funding Authority, 
Wellington, 1998. 
Moore, Kevin; Fax to Healthcare Hawke's Bay Ltd. from Delnagairn - RE: Claim 
Wai 692 - Report Not Written, Delnagairn Investments Ltd., Napier, 1999. 
Napier Hospital Retention Group; Fax to Hon. Jim Anderton, including 
Newspaper Clippings, Napier Hospital Retention Group, Napier, 1996. 
Opus International Consultants; Letter - Appendix 8 - File Reference 25041509 -
To CEO of Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Opus International Consultants, 1997. 
Pohe, Rapai; Letter to Maori Health Committee from Manager Corporate Health 
Services Healthcare Hawke's Bay - 25 February 1998, Healthcare Hawke' s 
Bay, Napier, 1998 
Pohe, Rapai; Memorandum to Maori Health Committee - Bi-Monthly Report to 
Maori Health Committee, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997. 
Sales, Lindsay, Internal Memo to Mike Ashby and Andrew Kiblewhite - CHE 
business plans - Canterbury and Hawke's Bay, CCMAU, 1995. 
Shipley, Jenny, Letter from Minister of Health - Unknown recipient, New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, 1994. 
Shipley, Jenny, Letter to Charles Carrel from Minister of Health, New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, 1994. 
Shipley, Jenny, Letter to H Lindsey from Minister of Health, New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, 1995. 
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Shipley, Jenny, Letter to Margaret Curphey from Minister of Health, New 
Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995. 
Shipley, Jenny, Letter to R Dean (Blacked out) from Minister of Health, New 
Zealand Government, Wellington, 1995. 
Smith, Adrian, Memorandum to Andrew Weeks - Healthcare Hawke's Bay Visit 
Letter to Associate Minister of Health, 1997 
Taylor, Neil; Letter to Sir Brian Elwood-Ombudsman's Office from Napier City 
Council CEO: Consultation - Napier City Council I Healthcare Hawke's Bay, 
Napier City Council, Napier, 1994 
Upton, Simon; Letter to Alan Dick from Minister of Health, New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, 1992 
Upton, Simon; Letter to Healthcare Hawke's Bay Board Chairman from the 
Minister of Health - Review of Services and Report on a Meeting with the 
Minister, New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1991. 
Wilson, Peter; Collection of correspondence to Minister of Health - 12 September 
1997, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1997 
Wilson, Peter; Fax letter to Adrian Wimmers (CCMAU) - Copies of letters to the 
Ministers - Birch and English, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1994 
Wilson, Peter; Letter to the Directors of Healthcare Hawke's Bay CCMAU - The 
Decision for Healthcare Hawke's Bay Ltd, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 
1994 
Wilson, Peter (Chair, Healthcare Hawke's Bay Ltd.) Letter to Michael Laws, MP, 
14 April 1994 ( draft prepared by Network Communications) 
Letter to Healthcare Hawke's Bay CEO from Manager of Maori Health - Maori 
Consultation Hui - Regarding Taskforce Report on Hawke' s Bay Regional 
Hospital Issue, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Napier, 1994. 
Reference material collected by the claimants: 
Bloomer, P. H .E; Letter from PH E Bloomer to Keith Sellars, Napier, 1994 
Callinicos and Gallagher; Letter to Tom Hemopo from Lawyers - RE: Treaty of 
Waitangi Judicial Review - Healthcare Hawke's Bay LTD, Callinicos and 
Gallagher, Napier, 1994 
Emery, Takuta Hohepa Mei, Brief of Evidence for the First Napier Hospital 
claim, Napier, 1998 
Hemopo, Tom; Letter to Healthcare Hawke's Bay - re: Hospital Submissions, 
Napier, 1994. 
Hemopo, Tom; Letter to the Napier Mayor re: Healthcare Hawke's Bay - Napier 
City Council Consultation, Napier, 1995. 
Hemopo, Tom; Submission to Healthcare Hawke's Bay, Ltd., 1 June 1994. 
Joe, Te Maari; Brief of evidence, 1994 
Waaka, T; Correspondence from Te Taiwhenua o Whanganui A Orotu to 
Lawyers, Te Taiwhenua o Whanganui A Orotu, Napier, 1994 
Waaka, Tom Edward; Brief of Evidence of Toru Edward Waka, Chairman, Te 




Hawke's Bay Area Health Board in Committee Minutes, 26 November 1990 
Hawke' s Bay Area Health Board Minutes Appendix E, Letter to A. Train from 
Minister of Health, Simon Upton, 13 December 1990. 
Healthcare Hawke's Bay; Crown Health Hawke's Bay Limited - Minutes of 
Meeting of Board of Directors - 13 December 1993, Healthcare Hawke's Bay, 
Napier, 1993. 
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